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REGULATING RISK
BY “STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”
Paul Rose∗
***
This essay, prepared for the “Regulating Risk” symposium of the
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, reviews the connection between risk
and corporate governance, then examines the “Strengthening Corporate
Governance” provisions of Subtitle G of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). The
corporate governance provisions, covering proxy access and the
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to
have one of two possible effects. On the one hand, the provisions may be
pernicious, in that they further enhance shareholder power without a clear
justification for increased shareholder power, and more particularly
without a justification for shareholder power as a risk management device.
Indeed, Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance provisions may work at crosspurposes to the risk management intent of the remainder of Dodd-Frank:
the corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers)
would not prefer.
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank may have very little effect on investor
behavior or risk management. Increases in shareholder power over the
past years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have
made management more responsive to - and in some cases probably overly
responsive to - shareholder concerns over agency costs. Indeed, some of
the proposed reforms already have been or were likely to have been put in
place at most public companies. If private ordering is already working,
what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across the

∗

Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University – Moritz College of Law.
This essay benefited from comments at the Conference on “Regulating Risk” at the
University of Connecticut School of Law, April 16, 2010. Any errors are
attributable solely to the author.
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market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are victims
of, rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis‘
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Of the many explanations of the Financial Crisis of 2008, perhaps
the most pervasive is the linkage of the crisis to managerial greed: the crisis
as the result of managerial expropriation and excessive risk-taking
permitted by lax corporate governance and risk management. To assess the
characterization of the Financial Crisis as a governance crisis, we must test
the strength of the links between managerial behavior, corporate
governance and risk management. Certainly, in the run-up to the Financial
Crisis existing systems of governance and risk management failed to detect
and mitigate firm-level risks before they became systemic risks. Are these
failures of risk management ultimately corporate governance failures? If
they are, how do we address them?
Regulators and firms can (and do) attack governance problems
from multiple angles. Firms incentivize managers better by constructing
executive compensation schemes that closely link operating and/or stock
performance to compensation. Firms create monitoring systems that allow
managers and directors to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate risks to the
enterprise, and regulators create monitoring systems within regulatory
structures that allow them to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate systemic
risks created by a myriad of firm decisions. Regulators provide regulatory
support for a vigorous market for corporate control and impose, either
through new regulations or through existing corporate governance
mechanisms (such as proxy voting), governance structures that limit
managerial authority and/or increase managers’ accountability to
shareholders.
This essay will focus on a specific effort of this last means of
managing agency costs—regulated governance arrangements—as a means
of managing both systemic and firm-specific risk. The essay will first
briefly consider the connection between risk management and corporate
governance, showing how the two are often linked. This link is implicitly
assumed by the recently passed Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). The second part of this
essay will consider the Dodd-Frank Act’s assumptions concerning risk
management and shareholder power, and will argue that in the worst case
the Dodd-Frank Act exacerbates rather than mitigates risk, and in the best
case is merely a pointless exercise in political crisis management that will
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have no significant positive or negative effect on corporate governance or
risk management.
II.

LINKING RISK
GOVERNANCE

MANAGEMENT

AND

CORPORATE

Risk management, broadly conceived, is an essential aspect of
good corporate governance, and vice versa. However we define corporate
governance (as a description of the relationship between corporate
stakeholders, as a set of rules or processes governing the corporate entity,
etc.), risk management works hand in hand with corporate governance as a
means of constraining agency costs and promoting efficient and prudent
management. Indeed, risk management so overlaps with corporate
governance that the terms may sometimes be used synonymously. Because
risk management practices in many financial firms failed during the
Financial Crisis, it has been said that corporate governance failed during
the Financial Crisis1—if this is true, the Financial Crisis is not a risk
management problem but a larger crisis in corporate governance. In this
essay I do not seek to dispute that corporate governance failures at some
firms contributed to the Financial Crisis. However, even if we assume that
this is the case, determining which aspects of corporate governance failed
is crucial: as Brian Cheffins has noted, important normative implications
flow from this determination.2 If the failure is in part due to incentive
compensation systems, should these systems be subject to additional
regulation, and if so, how should they be regulated? If the failure is also
due to failures of internal controls systems, should we rethink or enhance
the regulatory framework under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley?
At the level of each specific firm, the precise nature of the failure
of governance and risk management is likely to be somewhat different.
Perhaps like Tolstoy’s unhappy families,3 each is unhappy in its own way
and failed for reasons that elude a simple narrative of greed or hubris. As
we continue to unravel the causes of the crisis, we do find some common
factors in the stories of financial firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,

1

See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008
Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2009).
2
See Id. at 3.
3
See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., Penguin Books Deluxe ed. 2002) (1877).
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AIG, and others. William Sahlman has aptly summed several common
factors:
In studying the financial crisis as it unfolded over the past
couple of years, it seems clear that many organizations
suffered from a lethal combination of powerful, sometimes
misguided incentives; inadequate control and risk
management systems; misleading accounting; and, low
quality human capital in terms of integrity and/or
competence, all wrapped in a culture that failed to provide
a sensible guide for managerial behavior. This assessment
refers to financial services firms like Countrywide, AIG
and Bear Stearns: it also applies to other actors like
regulatory agencies, politicians, ratings agencies and
probably to individual consumers.4
One of the financial firms that suffered from this “lethal combination,”
UBS, provided its shareholders with a frank assessment of its risk
management and governance failures. The 50-page report5 provides a
helpful catalog of the numerous specific failures at UBS, the majority of
which almost certainly affected most other financial firms, including:
•
•
•
•

4

Incomplete risk control methodologies.6
Insufficient challenge of the business case and governance
approach.7
Inappropriate risk metrics used in strategic planning and
assessment.8
Failure to own the business.9

William A. Sahlman, Management and the Financial Crisis (We have met
the enemy and he is us . . .) 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-033, 2009),
available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-033.pdf.
5
UBS AG, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS (Apr. 18, 2008),
available
at
http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/share_information/
shareholderreport?contentId=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf.
6
Id. at 29.
7
Id. at 33.
8
Id. at 34.
9
Id. at 36.
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Ex-post review versus pre-agreed limits [asking for forgiveness
rather than permission].10
Failure to respond to wider industry concerns.11
Over-reliance on VaR.12
Over-reliance on [debt] ratings.13
Lack of recognition of idiosyncratic risk.14
Asymmetric risk / reward compensation.15
Insufficient incentives to protect the UBS franchise longterm.16

With UBS, we indeed recognize powerful, sometimes misguided
incentives (in the form of trader and management compensation);17
inadequate control and risk management systems that could not adequately
evaluate and respond to risks; misleading accounting (UBS restated its
financials for 2008);18 and, low quality human capital in terms of integrity
and/or competence (lack of a willingness to challenge the bankers at UBS,
and a decline in the number of skilled risk managers).19
If UBS’s risk management and governance problems were typical,
we might ask how better corporate governance at UBS could have
prevented the crisis. Arguably, management (including the board) should
10

Id. at 37.
UBS AG, supra note 5, at 37.
12
Id. at 38. A 2009 article by Joe Nocera contains two pithy quotes from two
famous VaR Skeptics:
David Einhorn, who founded Greenlight Capital, a prominent
hedge fund, wrote not long ago that VaR was ‘relatively useless
as a risk-management tool and potentially catastrophic when its
use creates a false sense of security among senior managers and
watchdogs. This is like an air bag that works all the time, except
when you have a car accident.’ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the bestselling author of ‘The Black Swan,’ has crusaded against VaR
for more than a decade. He calls it, flatly, ‘a fraud.’
Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 26-27.
13
UBS AG, supra note 5, at 39.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 42.
16
Id.
17
Sahlman, supra note 4, at 4.
18
Id.
19
Id.
11
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have recognized the dangers in the subprime market and begun to de-lever
(debt to equity ratios were 30:1 at Lehman and Morgan Stanley).20 With the
benefit of hindsight, it seems that UBS’s internal controls systems were not
adequate, that risk managers were using incomplete information and
incomplete models, and that UBS had a culture that was focused on shortterm profits and, in the words of the report, had “[i]nsufficient incentives to
protect the UBS franchise long-term.”21 But even with the risk management
systems then in place, one may ask why risk managers could not anticipate
the crisis. I suspect that many risk managers did, in fact, recognize the
problems in the housing and credit markets before the crisis, but obviously
did not anticipate the magnitude of the problem, nor appreciate the
interconnectedness of financial institutions. Some probably did express
their concerns to management, and perhaps their concerns were discounted.
A better question might be to ask why managers believed that they
could time the market so that they would be able to stop dancing just as the
music stopped playing, sure in the knowledge that risks would have been
passed along to someone else or adequately hedged, and that we would
make the fabled “soft landing” that Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke predicted
in February 2007.22 A partial answer to this question may be found in
behavioral explanations of the Financial Crisis, but a simple explanation
may also be found in the incentives of the managers. Citigroup, for
example, had to “keep dancing,” as Chuck Prince put it, in order to stay
competitive with other banks. The low rates brought about by Fed policy
helped drive the leveraged buyout business; banks like Citi had “no
credibility to stop participating in this lending business . . . My belief then
and my belief now is that one firm in this business cannot unilaterally
withdraw from the business and maintain its ability to conduct business in
the future.”23 He believed that “if you are not engaged in business, people
leave the institution, so it is impossible to say in my view to your bankers
we are just not going to participate in the business in the next year or so
20

Michael J. de la Merced, Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Goldman
and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008,
9:35 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-tobecome-bank-holding-companies/.
21
UBS AG, supra note 5, at 42.
22
Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Says Outlook Is Positive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2007, at C10.
23
Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains His Dancing Comment, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 8, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/
08/prince-finally-explains-his-dancing-comment/.
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until things become a little more rational. . . You can’t do that and expect
to have any people left to conduct business in the future.”24
How, then, should we characterize the governance failures at UBS
and other financial firms, and how do they relate to risk management?
Certainly the control systems—and particularly the risk management
systems—failed, though perhaps not in every case due to a reckless
indifference to risk. As with the failure of Long Term Capital Management
over a decade ago, the state of the art in hedging and risk management
simply was not good enough, and a failure to respond to warning signs and
challenge existing models and business practices clearly contributed to the
collapse. Moreover, I believe that the incentive structures were also flawed
in that traders and originators had incentives to take on excessive risk
without internalizing the costs of that risk. Where appropriate limits are
placed on trading activities—a real back office check on the risk assumed
by the front office—a high-reward incentive structure is less problematic.
The problem comes when lax controls are combined with incentives to take
heavy risk.
Over both of these areas—risk management systems and incentive
schemes—management and the board must provide oversight. Generally,
they are obligated to ensure that systems are created and function
effectively in controlling (but not hobbling) the animal spirits that drive the
business forward. With this understanding, the governance structures at
most major financial institutions (excepting perhaps Goldman Sachs) can
be said to have failed from a risk management perspective.
Although my description of how risk management failures can be
described as failures of corporate governance may not offer the strongest
argument in support of the position, I believe that it is at least a reasonable
assessment of how the two failures may be linked. But importantly, even if
we recognize that the Financial Crisis was a risk management crisis, and
that as a risk management crisis it is in effect a corporate governance crisis,
we have still only introduced a problem, and have not justified any solution
to that problem. If we accept that poor corporate governance at least
contributed to the Financial Crisis, we must now turn to the question of
how corporate governance can be improved in order to better manage risk.
This question was recently addressed in the sweeping Dodd-Frank
legislation, in part through Subtitle G: “Strengthening Corporate
Governance.” In the next section, I will focus on the assumptions

24

Id.
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underlying Subtitle G’s corporate governance prescriptions, and on the
implications of the prescriptions for risk management.
III.

REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO MANAGE
RISK

In this section, I will first begin by describing the governance
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, then turn to an analysis of the
assumptions underlying the governance provisions. I will then discuss the
implications of the provision, focusing on how they are likely to affect risk
management.
A.

“STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”: SUBTITLE G
OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT

The first point of interest in the Dodd-Frank Act is its scope: DoddFrank’s corporate governance provisions are not limited to “too big to fail”
firms or financial services firms. They generally apply to any company
traded on a national stock exchange. The Dodd-Frank Act does not
explicitly preempt state law, but instead applies the SEC’s power to
approve listing standards of the national stock exchanges.25 The DoddFrank Act contains provisions that affect shareholder rights and that focus
on executive compensation.26 Although appropriate incentive compensation
is an important component of an overall corporate governance structure,
other papers in this symposium provide a detailed analysis of the
advisability of the compensation rules set out in the proposed regulations.
This essay will focus on the corporate governance aspects of the DoddFrank Act that relate to shareholder rights.
The final version of Subtitle G of the Dodd-Frank Act contains two
major corporate governance provisions:27 1) explicit approval of an SEC

25

Richard J. Sandler, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in
the New Dodd Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar.
17, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/03/17/corporategovernance-and-executive-compensation-in-the-new-dodd-bill/.
26
See id.
27
Other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act not discussed in this paper also cover
important governance-related issues such as say-on-pay. This essay is limited to an
analysis of Subtitle G.
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proxy access rule;28 2) and a comply-or-explain provision on the separation
of the CEO and board chairman position.29 The Senate version of the bill
contained a majority-voting requirement, but this was eliminated in a
compromise with the House version of the bill.30 A provision in the 2009
Dodd Bill, absent in all versions of the 2010 bill, would have prohibited
classified boards unless approved or ratified by shareholders.31
1. Proxy Access
In a shift from the 2009 Dodd Bill,32 the SEC “may” require proxy
access for shareholders, rather than requiring the SEC to issue proxy access
rules within 180 days of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment.33 In response to
this authority, on August 25th, 2010, the SEC approved rules that provided
shareholders with the right to place director candidates on the corporate
ballot. To be able to nominate a director under this rule, a shareholder or
group of shareholders must hold 3% of the company’s shares for more than
3 years.34

28

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 971 (2010) (enacted).
29
Id. § 972.
30
David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation
Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jul. 7, 2010,
9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-doddfrank-financial-regulation-legislation/. In the Senate version of The Dodd-Frank
Act, stock exchange listing requirements would have been required to include a
majority vote standard in uncontested director elections for all listed companies.
Plurality voting was permitted only in contested elections. A director receiving less
than a majority of votes cast would have been required to submit his or her
resignation. The board could have then refused the resignation, but the bill
required that it then publicly explain why it did not accept the director’s
resignation. The majority voting requirement would not have been met by the
plurality-plus voting rules in place at many companies. Sandler, supra note 26.
31
Sandler, supra note 25.
32
Id.
33
H.R. 4173, § 972.
34
Lucian Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, Proxy Access Is In, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:20 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/25/proxy-access-is-in/.
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2. CEO and Chairman Positions
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to promulgate rules
mandating proxy statement disclosure concerning the separation of the
CEO and chairman roles—companies must explain why the same or why
different persons serve in these roles.35 Similar disclosure is already
required under the “Corporate Governance” disclosures mandated under
Item 407 of Regulation S-K. In particular, Item 407(h) requires companies
to “[b]riefly describe the leadership structure of the registrant's board, such
as whether the same person serves as both principal executive officer and
chairman of the board, or whether two individuals serve in those
positions….”36 If one person serves as both CEO and chairman of the
board, the company must “disclose whether the registrant has a lead
independent director and what specific role the lead independent director
plays in the leadership of the board.”37 The disclosure should also explain
“why the registrant has determined that its leadership structure is
appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the
registrant,”38 and “disclose the extent of the board's role in the risk
oversight of the registrant, such as how the board administers its oversight
function, and the effect that this has on the board's leadership structure.”39
B.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT

The corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
suggest several tenuous assumptions about the role of corporate governance
in preventing financial crises. First, the inclusion of the provisions in the
Bill arguably assumes that the governance structures required by the
provisions could have helped prevent the Financial Crisis of 2008, or at
least limited its effects on compliant firms. More specifically, the DoddFrank Act makes assumptions about the desirability of shareholder power
and the risk preferences of shareholders. Each of these assumptions has
tenuous support.

35

Huntington, supra note 30.
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(h) (2010).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
36
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1. Could the Provisions have Helped Prevent the
Financial Crisis?
There is plenty of blame to go around when one looks for causes of
and contributions to the Financial Crisis. The question as posed—could the
Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions have helped to prevent the Financial
Crisis?—may be interpreted so broadly that it becomes unreasonable. I
doubt that anyone would argue that the whole of the blame for the
Financial Crisis rests on a few corporate governance practices that the
Dodd-Frank Act intends to cure. But even if we think of the question more
narrowly—that the “right” corporate governance practices could have
provided more warning, could have added accountability to corporate
governance, could have ensured more independent thinking by the board
that may have resulted in decisions that would have at least helped mitigate
some of the effects of the crisis—Dodd-Frank implicitly holds expectations
of the value of corporate governance. More precisely, the Dodd-Frank Act
assumes a need for mandatory, one-size-fits-all corporate governance
reform and shareholder empowerment.
As a preliminary matter, the evidence that corporate governance
matters for firm performance is uneven.40 Intuitively, this is primarily due
to the fact that “good” corporate governance is firm-specific and often
based on qualities, such as corporate culture, that are not readily
quantifiable and so are difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.
Determining causation in governance and performance is challenging, and
corporate governance research is replete with studies attempting to isolate a
particular metric (say, the separation of the CEO and chairman roles) to
determine whether the separation improves some measure of firm
performance. Much effort has recently gone into determining the accuracy
of the good governance metrics offered by governance ratings firms and
proxy advisors like RiskMetrics’ ISS unit. We have some evidence that
some of the metrics used by ratings firms can meaningfully predict
40

Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang reason that the failure to find an association
between corporate governance and abnormal returns in the last decade is due to the
fact that investors have learned to appreciate the differences between goodgovernance and poor-governance firms, and these differences have been factored
into market prices. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C. Y. Wang,
Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns
(unpublished discussion paper, no. 667), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1589731.

12

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

performance, but at least some of these studies were commissioned by or
produced by the subject ratings firms.41 Other independent work suggests
that the ratings used by various firms do not accurately predict firm
performance.42 To underline an obvious but often disregarded point, proxy
advisory and corporate governance ratings firms are, after all, businesses.
They must have something of value to offer their clients, and they must
differentiate their products by price or by methodology. It would be
problematic for these firms if something basic—for example, share
ownership by independent directors, as Professors Bhagat, Bolton and
Romano’s work suggests43—is a more reliable predictor of firm
performance than their multitude of metrics. A simple, single metric could
be produced by the clients—institutional investors—relatively cheaply.
Instead, we have a profusion of proprietary rating systems, each constantly
tweaked and recalibrated—a process I call “methodology churn.” No two
are alike, although the ratings are offered (at least by those firms that do not
engage in detailed analysis of the companies they rate by particular
governance issue) as though there were a single grand unified theory of
corporate governance, perfectly expressed by their proprietary
methodology. On this point, I note that Bebchuk, who is generally allied
with the governance ratings firms in the general goal of promoting
shareholder empowerment, has argued that governance ratings that try to
impose a great number of “good governance” metrics on firms are less
useful in predicting good governance than simply keying on a few

41

See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance
and
Firm
Performance
(Dec.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423 (creating a measure of
corporate governance based on data from Institutional Shareholder Services).
42
See e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 89, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1019921; Robert Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the
Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (Arthur and Toni
Rembe Rock Ctr. For Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 360, 2009),
available at http://law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/publications_pdf/
dg16-26-2008_1.pdf (finding that there is no consistent relation between
government indices and measures of corporate performance).
43
Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices.
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problematic entrenchment devices such as poison pills44—in other words, it
seems easier to spot “bad governance” structures than it is to effectively
prescribe “good governance” structures.
The problems with the corporate governance industry metrics are
instructive with respect to the particular provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
As we inch closer towards a federally-mandated, one-size-fits-all corporate
governance framework, companies, investors and regulators may begin to
treat corporate governance and particular governance structures as an end
rather than as means. Should we be surprised then, as ISS must have been,
when a technically, superficially well-governed company like Enron turns
out to be a whited sepulcher? Little faith should be placed in the risk
management utility of mandatory “good governance” structures, and the
Dodd-Frank Act provisions require practices and structures which, as will
be discussed below, have uncertain governance value and potentially
serious governance disadvantages.
2. Shareholder Power and the Risk Preferences of
Shareholders
Cheffins has noted that “given the zeitgeist, it is doubtful whether
any set of corporate governance arrangements could have forestalled the
financial bandwagon on the loose in the mid-2000s. Amidst an implicit
consensus among investors, politicians, regulators, journalists and even
homebuyers that an overheating financial system was fundamentally sound,
those preaching caution were marginalized.”45 The irony of the DoddFrank Act is that things may have been worse if the Act were in place prior
to the Financial Crisis. Indeed, it is when we analyze the Act’s
assumptions about shareholder power and shareholder risk preferences that
we recognize that investors were among those encouraging the banks to
keep dancing.
Because shareholders, the residual claimants of the corporation, are
diversified across markets and often across asset classes, they will often
push management to swing for the fences. The Dodd-Frank Act assumes
that shareholders are primarily interested in long-term value creation, but
this assumption does not square with the behavior of many investors.
Shareholders may have different risk preferences and attempt to influence
44

See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD, 783, 787 (2009).
45
Cheffins, supra note 1, at 38.
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managers to make decisions in line with those preferences. As outlined by
the Aspen Institute’s statement on “Overcoming Short-Termism,”46 signed
by John Bogle, Warren Buffett and others, the influence of money
managers, mutual funds and hedge funds “who focus on short-term stock
price performance, and/or favor high-leverage and high-risk corporate
strategies designed to produce high short-term returns”47 present several
problems. First, many such investors’ preferences work not only against
other long-term-focused shareholders but against their ultimate investors’
interests because high rates of portfolio turnover through frequent trading
can significantly erode gains.48 Second, fund managers focused on shortterm trading gains “have little reason to care about long-term corporate
performance or externalities, and so are unlikely to exercise a positive role
in promoting corporate policies, including appropriate proxy voting and
corporate governance policies, that are beneficial and sustainable in the
long-term.”49 Also, managers and board members may harm the interests of
shareholders seeking long-term growth and sustainable earnings by
pursuing strategies designed to satisfy short-term investors; “This, in turn,
may put a corporation’s future at risk.”50
Deeper shareholder involvement in corporate governance, as
encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate governance provisions, is
designed to encourage more vigilant monitoring of managers and more
prudent risk management. However, the UK experience suggests that this is
unlikely to be the case. As Cheffins notes:
U.K. company law is, in various respects, more
“shareholder-friendly” than the equivalent regime in the
U.S., as U.K. shareholders have greater scope to call
shareholder meetings, initiate changes to the corporate
constitution and dismiss directors. . . . Regardless, it does
not appear that banks were better managed in the U.K. than
in the U.S. Moreover, bank shareholders apparently made
46

THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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little use of the powers available to them. The chief
executive of the U.K.’s financial markets regulator
admonished major shareholders for being “too reliant and
unchallenging” in the run up to Financial Crisis. Lord
Myners, Financial Services Secretary in the U.K. Treasury,
similarly chastised institutional shareholders as being
“absentee landlords”. The experience in Britain implies
that even if shareholder rights are increased in the U.S. in
the aftermath of the stock meltdown of 2008, there is no
guarantee shareholders will use the powers made available
to them to forestall a similar future assault on shareholder
value.51
David Walker, commissioned by the Prime Minister to review UK banks’
corporate governance in the wake of the Financial Crisis, makes a similar
observation, and suggests that in some cases shareholder were complicit in
excessive risk-taking:
Before the current crisis broke there appears to have been a
widespread acquiescence by institutional investors and the
market in the gearing up of banks’ balance sheets as a
means of boosting returns on equity. This was not
necessarily irrational from the standpoint of the immediate
interests of shareholders who, in the leveraged limited
liability business of a bank, receive all of the potential
upside whereas their downside is limited to their equity
stake, however much the bank loses overall in a
catastrophe. The atmosphere of at least acquiescence in
high leverage on the part of shareholders will have
exacerbated critical problems encountered in some
instances. And, while institutional investors could not have
prevented the crisis, even major fund managers appear to
have been slow to act where issues of concern were
identified in banks in which they were investors, and of
limited effectiveness in seeking to address them either
individually or collaboratively. The limited institutional
efforts at engagement with several UK banks appear to
have had little impact in restraining management before the
51

Cheffins, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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recent crisis phase, and it is noteworthy that levels of
voting against bank resolutions rarely exceeded 10 per
cent.52
Viewed in this light, shareholder power may not only fail to
remedy risk management problems but also exacerbate them. If we view
the Financial Crisis as a governance problem, it is not clear that the crisis is
attributable to expropriation of principals’ interests by management
shareholders. Nestor Advisors, a corporate governance consultancy, argues
that management does not seem to have short-changed shareholders in the
Financial Crisis. Executives’ financial interests were aligned with
shareholders’ interests. But in the case of banks, especially, this can be
problematic: “Regulators, like everyone else, seem to have forgotten that,
when it comes to firms that are by definition highly geared due to their
maturity transformation function, full alignment with shareholder interest
might be the riskiest of all alignments.”53
At least from the point of view of banks, the shareholder
empowerment envisioned by the corporate governance section of the DoddFrank Act thus may work at cross-purposes to the risk management
purposes of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act. But even with nonfinancial companies, there is little evidence to support the notion that
enhanced shareholder power as encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act will
improve the risk management function of corporate governance. Indeed, to
the extent that influential shareholders encourage risk-taking by managers,
the long-term interests of the corporation may suffer.
As a final note, consider the performance of Goldman Sachs in the
Financial Crisis.54 Because of a strong firm culture, Goldman’s
management was arguably the best-insulated from influential shareholder
pressure; arguably, their relative success in navigating the crisis lies in the
fact that Goldman treated risk management as though it were still a
52

DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES § 5.9 (2009), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_consultation_160709.pdf;
see
generally id. § 5 (discussing engagement, stewardship, collective action and
governance).
53
NESTOR ADVISORS, GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
US
INVESTMENT
BANKS
17
(2009),
available
at
OF
SIX
http://www.nestoradvisors.co.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/articles/USBank09.pdf.
54
For a discussion of Goldman in the Financial Crisis, see Nocera, supra note
12; Sahlman, supra note 4.
AND

2010]

“STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”

17

partnership—with partners internalizing losses as well as gains—rather
than a corporation influenced by the short-term interests of certain
investors.
3. The Act’s Provisions: Pernicious or Merely Pointless?
Given the potential higher appetite for risk associated with
increased shareholder power, the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate governance
provisions seem to provide little enhancement to risk management. The
corporate governance provisions are better understood as not directed
towards the causes of the Financial Crisis, but rather as simply not letting a
crisis go to waste55—packaging corporate governance reforms that have
been long-sought by powerful Democratic constituencies with a bill that
should be directed solely towards systemic risk management. More to the
point, the corporate governance provisions would not be good legislation
even if they stood alone, unconnected to the questions of risk management
raised by the Financial Crisis. In the aggregate, the Dodd-Frank Act’s
corporate governance provisions are likely to have pernicious56 effects.
Hopefully they will be merely pointless.

55

See Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama, Assembling Team, Turns to the
Economy, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008 at A1.
56
In my symposium remarks, I noted the possibility that the Dodd-Frank Act
could have pernicious effects on corporate governance, but I was not the only one
to characterize the provisions in this way. See also Steven M. Bainbridge, The
Fruits of Shareholder Activism, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 3, 2010, 11:25
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/wall-streetAM),
reform/ (Steven Bainbridge provides an excellent analysis of the pernicious
corporate governance provisions of Dodd-Frank).
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a) The Potentially Pernicious Effects of the
Dodd-Frank Act57
Proxy access has generated the most controversy of the two
adopted provisions, having been the subject of several proposed SEC rules
that generated thousands of comments. Like majority voting, proxy access
is touted by its proponents as a step towards more democratic governance
of the public corporation (notwithstanding the questionable value of
democracy as applied to the corporate form58). However, empirical work on
proxy access suggests that it is more likely to harm than help corporate
governance. Grundfest, reviewing recent studies on stock price response to
the SEC’s earlier proxy access proposals, states that:
The best currently available empirical data thus indicate
that, given a choice between the current regime and the
Commission’s proposed proxy access rules, shareholders
seeking to maximize returns would prefer the status quo
because the proposed rules appear to destroy shareholder
wealth. Moreover, if there is to be a proxy access rule, the
cross-sectional variation in the data suggest that an opt-in
regime, in which shareholders define for themselves the
rules governing proxy access on a corporation-by57

As indicated above, the majority voting standard was eliminated from the
final version of the Act. This is just as well, because majority voting has been
enacted at many public companies already, largely as a result of consistent pressure
from institutional investors and the corporate governance industry in the past
decade. See William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the
Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2007). A recent study of the
governance practices of the largest U.S. companies, conducted by Shearman and
Sterling LLP, showed that 82 out of the top 100 companies had implemented some
form of majority voting in director elections. SHEARMAN & STERLING,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (2010). As
most of the larger public companies have enacted majority voting provisions, the
mandatory imposition of majority voting provisions would have affected smaller
public companies most directly. For a summary of the arguments against a
majority voting standard, see Sjostrom & Kim, supra, at 469.
58
For an extended argument on the merits of democracy in business entities,
see DINO FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
BUSINESS (2009).
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corporation basis, is likely preferable to an opt-out regime,
in which the Commission has to guess at an optimal
default rule, and where the data indicate that the
Commission’s current best guess destroys a statistically
significant amount of shareholder wealth.59
Why would at least some shareholders be concerned with greater
shareholder power? Because larger shareholders with proxy access may
use the threat of a proxy fight to extract private benefits from a
corporation—perhaps merely by using the proxy as a megaphone for the
shareholder’s causes (imposing what Grundfest calls “megaphone
externalities”)60—or simply to pursue idiosyncratic corporate governance
changes that the shareholder (but not management or the majority of the
other shareholders) believes are necessary.
Buckberg and Macey provide several arguments against proxy
access in a report accompanying the Business Roundtable’s comments on
the SEC’s 2009 proxy access proposal.61 They find that proxy access is
unnecessary given numerous effective mechanisms to discipline
management, that proxy contests under the pre-Dodd-Frank rules were not
prohibitively expensive, and that the SEC’s proposed rules would
inefficiently allocate benefits and costs of proxy contests and would not
distinguish between the issues associated with expressing disapproval of an
incumbent director and the issues associated with identifying, nominating,
legitimating, and electing an outside insurgent director, among other
reasons. They also argue that an increase in proxy-related costs is a
predictable and inevitable result of proxy access:
59

Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate 3-4
(Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 71, Stan. Univ. L.
Sch. L. and Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 392, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538630.
60
Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics,
Economics, and the Law 4 (Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper
Series No. 64, Stan. Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 386,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491670.
61
See ELAINE BUCKBERG & JONATHAN MACEY, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL
FORMATION IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (2009) (stating
that risks of the SEC’s proposal include less qualified boards of directors, board
members whose interests diverge from maximizing shareholder value, a
disincentive to go public, and increasing the cost of capital for U.S. companies).
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It is a well-known result in economic theory that when the
marginal social cost of an activity exceeds its marginal
private cost, as is the case with any subsidy, more of that
activity will take place. In the case of the proposed SEC
rule, the marginal social cost of a shareholder nominating a
director is higher than the marginal private cost because
the costs of the contested election are borne in part by the
issuer, rather than the nominating shareholder. This
subsidy will inevitably increase the number of director
nominations by shareholders.62
Lowering the cost of proxy access leads to a pernicious result,
particularly when the right of access is conditioned upon a relatively low
level of shareholder ownership: proxy rules give influence to investors with
less to lose from the poor performance of the company and more to gain
through private benefits. Even if the dissident shareholders are interested
in wealth maximization for all shareholders, Buckberg and Macey present
evidence that companies with dissident board members significantly
underperform peer companies without dissident directors.
Dodd-Frank’s other Subtitle G corporate governance provision, a
comply-or-explain provision that would require disclosure on the CEO and
chairman of the board of directors (COB) positions, may also have
pernicious effects. The policy justification for splitting the two roles is
thin. Oded, Palmon and Wald argue that while a management structure in
which two executives hold the CEO and COB may facilitate checks and
balances and thus may mitigate management agency costs, a management
structure in which one person holds both positions provides a clearer set of
directives for the companies and facilitates better communication between
boards and management.63 Results from the UK also show that splitting the
roles does not appear to produce positive effects. In a recent study, Dahya,
Garcia and van Bommel reviewed the performance of publicly listed U.K.
companies over a period covering the issuance of the Cadbury Committee's
Code of Best Practice, which advocated splitting the CEO/COB positions.64
62

Id. at 8.
Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, Are Two Heads Better than One: The Impact
of Changes in Management Structure on Performance by Firm Size, 8 J. CORP.
FIN. 213, 214 (2002).
64
Jay Dahya, Laura Galguera Garcia & Jos van Bommel, One Man Two Hats:
What's All the Commotion!, 44 FIN. REV. 179 (2009).
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They found that companies splitting the combined CEO/COB position did
not exhibit any absolute or relative improvement in performance when
compared to various peer-group benchmarks.65 These findings are
supported by a study by Dey, Engel and Liu.66 They examined the effects
of US firms that had split the CEO/COB position and ones that had not, and
noted that there was no significant difference in either the accounting or
market return performance. In fact, when firms had a powerful CEO,
strong information flows and strong governance, in addition to a combined
CEO/COB position, returns were significantly higher than both combined
CEO/COB firms without these traits and firms with separate roles for their
CEO and COB. They conclude that regulators should be wary about
implementing a one-size-fits-all requirement for this position, as some
firms appear to benefit from the combined arrangement.
This section has addressed the potentially pernicious effects of the
Dodd-Frank Act as stand-alone provisions, but there is also a general
concern over what Bainbridge calls the “creeping federalization” of
corporate law. Bainbridge argues that:
[T]he uniformity imposed by [the Dodd-Frank Act] will
preclude experimentation with differing modes of
regulation. As such, there will be no opportunity for new
and better regulatory ideas to be developed—no
“laboratory” of federalism. Instead, we will be stuck with
rules that may well be wrong from the outset and, in any
case, may quickly become obsolete.67
With respect to corporate governance, the Dodd-Frank Act’s onesize-fits-all governance structures will not reduce either company or
systemic risks, and instead will incrementally reduce the flexibility and
value of state regulation of public corporation governance. Ribstein notes
the irony of establishing a rule that supposedly empowers shareholders, yet
65

Id.
Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, Xiaohui Gloria Liu, Determinants and
Implications of Board Leadership Structure, UNI. CHI BOOTH SCH. BUS RES. PAP.,
(Jun. 2009).
67
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Pernicious Corporate Governance
Provisions of the Dodd Bill, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 22, 2010, 2:07
PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/04/thepernicious-corporate-governance-provisions-of-the-dodd-bill.html.
66
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at the same time eliminates their ability to choose something other than a
federally-mandated proxy structure:
The real problem is that the SEC has barred any possibility
for the shareholders or state law to provide for less proxy
access than under the new rule. How can a rule that bars
shareholders from making certain types of governance
rules, either directly or by choosing the state of
incorporation, increase shareholder participation in
governance?
Perhaps the answer is that shareholders shouldn’t
participate in governance because they are too easily
manipulated and misled and simply don’t know what’s
good for them. Rather, the SEC knows best. . . . Consider
the most obvious anomalies: If the shareholders can’t be
trusted to decrease proxy access, why should they be
trusted to increase it? If we fear that managers, even with
the new proxy rule, can still manipulate shareholders, then
why trust the shareholders to do anything? And if the
shareholders can’t be trusted, why should the securities
laws force firms, at great cost, to inform shareholders so
they can participate in the proxy process? In other words,
the rule is fundamentally inconsistent with the whole point
of the securities laws to provide the disclosure necessary to
enable the shareholder to be effective governors of their
firms.68
b) The Pointlessness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
Corporate Governance Provisions
Even if one assumes that the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate
governance provisions are good policy, given recent trends in state law and
the private ordering of corporate governance, the provisions appear to be
pointless, rather than pernicious; reminiscent of Cunningham’s memorable

68

Larry Ribstein, The SEC vs. shareholders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET
(Aug. 30, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/30/the-sec-vsshareholders/.
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characterization of the Sarbanes-Oxley ”yawn,”69 the Dodd-Frank Act
might also represent more rhetoric than reform. While the corporate
governance provisions are unlikely to produce any significant benefits (and
many would argue that Sarbanes-Oxley did not either), the direct costs will
certainly be less significant than Sarbanes-Oxley’s.
Dodd-Frank’s
provisions may simply not have much of an effect on corporate
governance.
In the case of proxy access, shareholders in the most important
corporate jurisdiction, Delaware, had the ability prior to the enactment of
Dodd-Frank to select shareholder proxy for their firms. Delaware General
Corporation Law section 112 provides that “[t]he bylaws may provide that
if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it
may be required, to the extent and subject to such procedures or conditions
as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation
materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition to
individuals nominated by the board of directors, 1 or more individuals
nominated by a stockholder. At least in Delaware, private ordering was
already possible, making the Dodd-Frank proxy provisions pointless unless
it is the case that shareholders are impeded from exercising their right to
nominate shareholders under the DGCL. In the adopting release for the
proxy access rules, however, the SEC argued that:
corporate governance is not merely a matter of private
ordering. Rights, including shareholder rights, are artifacts
of law, and in the realm of corporate governance some
rights cannot be bargained away but rather are imposed by
statute. There is nothing novel about mandated limitations
on private ordering in corporate governance.
The SEC then argued that private ordering is less desirable
because a “company-by-company shareholder vote on the applicability of
Rule 14a-11 would involve substantial direct and indirect, market-wide
costs.” A compromise solution—the ability for companies to opt out of
the proxy access rules—was rejected because “management can draw on
the full resources of the corporation to promote the adoption of an optout, while disaggregated shareholders have no similarly effective
platform from which to advocate against an opt-out.” Finally, even where
69

Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
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proxy rights are granted pursuant to a provision like DGCL sec. 112, the
SEC noted that “the board of directors is ordinarily free, subject to its
fiduciary duties, to amend or repeal any shareholder-adopted bylaw.”
Although I do not believe these arguments carry the burden of
proof that would justify such important mandatory governance changes,
especially given the pernicious effects outlined by Buckberg and Macey,
the importance of this change may prove to be less significant than the
arguments against proxy access have suggested. Some hope that this may
be the case comes from the Canadian experience with proxy access.
Although proxy access is available to investors in Canadian firms, that
access is rarely used.70 The reason, a Canadian lawyer suggests, is that
using the corporation’s proxy would put the shareholder activist at “a
tactical disadvantage.”71 If activists use the corporate proxy, they would
be limited to the restrictions of the corporate proxy (presumably
including word limitations). Effectively, activists tend to view the ability
to control the message as worth the costs of a proxy solicitation. The
hope that investors will only use proxy access as a means of reducing
managerial agency costs is dampened by the likelihood that even if
shareholders rarely use proxy access in the U.S, activists may credibly
use the threat of proxy access as a lever with corporations to extract
private benefits. One means of neutralizing this threat is to make clearer
to other shareholders the effects of this leverage. Exposing this leverage,
by requiring enhanced disclosures of shareholder involvement in
corporate governance matters, may help prevent some of the harmful
aspects of proxy access predicted by its detractors.72
The provision on the separation of the CEO and chairman roles
seems much less likely than proxy access to have an impact on governance
since it has already been enacted in principle.73 Perhaps like the proxy
access provision, the CEO-Chairman disclosure provision was included
simply to provide legislative protection for the SEC’s rulemaking efforts.
Even if this were a new rule, however, it would likely not have a significant
70

Lisa Fairfax, Some Canadian Perspective on Proxy Access, THE
CONGLOMERATE (Mar. 9, 2010, 1:03 PM), http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2010/03/some-canadian-perspective-on-proxy-access.html.
71
Id.
72
For a discussion of the effects of shareholder influence and a proposal of
possible disclosure rules that would address the enhanced shareholder influence
created by the Dodd-Frank Act, see Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355.
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Dahya, Galguera, Garcia & van Bommel, supra note 64, at 180.
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effect. In some cases, comply-or-explain sorts of provisions tend to have
the effect of mandatory governance rules because of the costs of noncompliance (either through burdensome disclosures or because of the
shaming aspect intended by the disclosure). This may be the case, for
example, with the disclosure of a code of ethics required under Section 406
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the case of the separation of the CEO and
chairman roles, however, combining the two roles is not intuitively
inappropriate; on the other hand, shareholders might reasonably wonder
why a company would not have a code of ethics.

III.

CONCLUSION

This essay has briefly reviewed the connection between risk and
corporate governance and the specific corporate governance provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act. The corporate governance provisions, covering
majority voting for director elections, proxy access, and the separation of
the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to have one of two
possible effects. On the one hand, the provisions may be pernicious—and
the proxy access rules seem very likely to fall into this category—in that
they further enhance shareholder power without a clear justification for
enhanced shareholder power, but more particularly without a justification
for shareholder power as a risk management device. Indeed, the DoddFrank Act’s corporate governance provisions may work at cross-purposes
to the risk management intent of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act: the
corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers)
would not prefer. Empowering shareholders further will not change the
nature of the shareholders’ interest in risk-taking since they are limited in
their downside risk; if influential shareholders focus on long-term rather
than short-term gains, it will be because of market forces, not because they
have been empowered by the Dodd-Frank Act.
On the other hand, the Dodd-Frank Act may have very little effect
on investor behavior or risk management. This is probably the case for the
CEO/COB split provision. Increases in shareholder power over the past
years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have made
management responsive—and in some cases probably overly responsive
to—shareholder concerns over agency costs. If private ordering is already
working, what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across
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the market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are
victims of, rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis?

JUSTIFICATION NORMS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
Claire A. Hill∗
People making decisions under uncertainty may need to justify those
decisions to their reputational community. This Essay considers when and
how the potential need to justify might lead a decision-maker to employ a
methodology better suited to yielding a justifiable choice that may not be
the best choice. When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible
outcomes and probabilities are not known. A broad consensus about a
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.
But
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is,
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.
The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant
others “do it.” This Essay identifies a particular pathology associated
with the practice of favoring a justifiable decision over a “good” one, and
argues that this pathology can have significant negative consequences.
The main example discussed is the volume of subprime securities
purchased. Other examples include the process by which CEOs are
selected, and decisions regarding contract terms in complex business
contracts.
“The acceptability heuristic is, perhaps, the least inspiring strategy for
coping with accountability. This strategy does, however, have obvious
adaptive value for the individual decision-maker.”1
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Investors bought enormous quantities of subprime mortgage
securities when they were the hot new thing; the financial crisis began
when the securities plummeted in value. Investors’ reasons for buying the
securities were not based on a careful appraisal of the securities.2 Rather,
the investors relied on what others said and did, even when their reliance
was not warranted.3 If more investors had done their own appraisals, the
crisis might not be as severe. Indeed, if enough investors had done their
own appraisals, the crisis might not have occurred. This Essay argues that
the strategy investors followed – reliance on others – was adopted more to
help them justify to others whatever results their investments yielded than
to genuinely arrive at the best substantive decision. This Essay also argues
that when enough individuals follow such a strategy, society may suffer.
One might think that the potential need to justify ex post should
naturally lead to better ex ante decisions. After all, the better a decision is
ex ante, the less likely an ex post justification will be needed. But in a
class of cases involving decision-making under uncertainty, the potential
need to justify may not lead to better decisions. Instead, it may lead to
decisions that yield negative externalities and other social costs. It may
also prevent the accretion of useful information, as well-worn strategies
that provide justification are used in lieu of strategies aimed directly at
making the best decision. The enormous volume of subprime securities
purchased, and the consequent crisis, provides an important example.
The phenomenon of focusing as much or more on potentially
justifying a decision as on making the best decision is exceedingly
common. This Essay considers when and how the potential need to justify
might lead a decision-maker to employ a methodology better suited to
yielding a justifiable choice that may not be the best choice. The intuition
is simple to articulate. When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible
outcomes and probabilities are not known. A broad consensus about a
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.
But
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is,
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.4
2

See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010).
See id.
4
The contrast between decisions supported by “good” justifications and those
supported by “acceptable” justifications that are not also “good” justifications
unrealistically assumes that there are clear ways to determine what counts as a
3
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The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant
others “do it.”
Justifications may need to be directed to any or all of the
following: courts, regulators, self-regulatory bodies, colleagues, clients, or
the “court of public opinion.” What makes a justification acceptable differs
for different groups. This Essay addresses justifications to one’s colleagues
or clients, or, more broadly, to one’s reputational community, and leaves
other focuses of justification to later work. In that regard, the examples
used in this Essay relate to business decisions. The phenomenon is not
confined to business, but business is a convenient port of entry. Business
actors are continually judged by their reputational community, including
people in a position to offer rewards such as promotions or bonuses, or
punishments such as firing or demotion. The reputational community of
such actors has a rich set of norms for acceptable justifications—norms that
business actors abide by.
That business actors may “herd” or abide by social norms or
established practices is a commonplace observation. This Essay identifies
a particular pathology associated with that practice, in disparate but
common contexts, decision-makers’ potential need to justify decisions
made under uncertainty, and argues that this pathology can have significant
negative consequences. The goal of this Essay is to provoke inquiry as to
the breadth of the problem identified, as well as possible solutions.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Section 2 articulates the problem.
It distinguishes uncertainty from risk, comparing the need for and
availability of justifications in both cases. Section 3 discusses the
motivating example, the purchase of highly-rated subprime securities by
institutional investors. Section 4 discusses several additional examples;
one is the process by which CEOs are selected. The other examples
involve decisions regarding contract terms, choice of state of incorporation,
and the purchase of insurance. Section 5 considers ways in which law
contributes to the problem. Section 6 makes preliminary suggestions for
solutions. Section 7 concludes.

“good” decision and methodology. While the assumption is ultimately unrealistic,
it is sufficient for purposes of this Essay.
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UNCERTAINTY DISTINGUISHED FROM RISK

In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Frank Knight famously
distinguished uncertainty from risk:
…Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct
from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never
been properly separated. The term "risk," as loosely used
in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really
covers two things which, functionally at least, in their
causal relations to the phenomena of economic
organization, are categorically different. . . . The essential
fact is that "risk" means in some cases a quantity
susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is
something distinctly not of this character; and there are farreaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the
phenomenon depending on which of the two is really
present and operating. . . . It will appear that a measurable
uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in
effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict
the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitative
type.5
Knight notes that in conditions of uncertainty, “no valid basis of
any kind for classifying instances” exists.6 This statement is, in some
meaningful sense, an exaggeration: there is always some valid basis for
classification.7
Indeed, a valid basis for classifying instances of
5

FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921).
Id at 225.
7
“Classification” as used here is synonymous with “categorization;”the latter
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a definition of “categories”)”); Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts,
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uncertainty exists. Thus, the difference between risk and uncertainty is, in
an important respect, quantitative rather than qualitative. There is a
continuum of more-or-less valid bases for “classifying instances.”
At the uncertainty end of the continuum, there are, in Donald
Rumsfeld’s famous words, “unknown unknowns.”8 At the risk end of the
continuum, there are (wholly) valid bases for classifying instances: the
classification yields an identifiable and determinate set of instances as to
which we know the possible outcomes and associated probabilities. Thus,
a risk, in the true sense of the word, can easily be assessed using a
straightforward arithmetic computation typically known as “expected
value.” Few things are at the extreme end of the continuum- an exception
is the stylized gambles used in experiments. But many things are close
enough. A pool of prime mortgages is (or at least before the financial
crisis, was) a notable example. The performance of prime mortgages has
been tracked extensively for at least the last 40 years.9 Of course,
notwithstanding its colloquial use to the contrary, “risk” is not synonymous
with “high risk.” Treasury securities are technically “risky” although they
are commonly referred to (and thought of) as being risk-free or nearly so.
Natural disasters are at the uncertainty end of the continuum.
Which is the better classification to enable us to make predictions, the
broader set of natural disasters or a subset of specific such disasters? (And:
what counts as a natural disaster?) Moreover, even for a classification that
is straightforward, considerable uncertainty can exist: how well can we
predict the damage hurricanes will cause in 2012? Uncertainty makes it
difficult to assess how much to spend insuring against the possibility of all
or particular natural disasters, or how much to pay for investments that
constitute bets on the occurrence of such disasters.10
In an idealized (and of course highly unrealistic) paradigm of
decision-making, these difficulties do not arise. A decision maker can
Behavioral Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 563, 573–76 (2004) (discussing
the relevance of categorization for law and economics and behavioral law and
economics).
8
Michael R. Gordon, Rumsfeld, A Force for Change, Did Not Change With
the Times Amid Iraq Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006,
9
See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1119 (1996).
10
Investments that constitute bets on the occurrence of natural disasters are
called “catastrophe bonds” or colloquially, “cat bonds.” See Glossary of Economic
and Finance Terms, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/smm/a_f.htm#C.
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
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perform an accurate expected value computation – she chooses among
some determinate set of identified options, and knows the possible
outcomes and associated probabilities for each option. The strategy is a
good one from a substantive perspective. For the same reason, it is readily
justifiable.11 Consider a choice between option A, offering a 10% chance
of a $200,000 payoff and a 90% chance of a $4,000 payoff, and option B,
offering a 99.5% chance of a $12,000 payoff and a .5% chance of a $1000
payoff.
A choice of option A would be easy to justify: (.10x
$200,000+.90x $4000) > (.995x $12,000 +.005x $1000). 12 Even a choice
of B is justifiable, especially for a one-time gamble – the decision-maker
could claim risk-aversion. 13
Using this strategy requires that the outcomes and probabilities of
each option are known (and even more heroically, that the options
11

See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 62 (2006). This Essay uses “cost benefit analysis” and
“expected value” as though they were synonymous; while they clearly are not, for
purposes of the argument here, they can be treated as such.
12
Of course such a simple computation won’t often be possible. Even if a
computation of this sort is possible, the numbers will almost certainly be open to
argument.
13
Of course, proceeding in this manner is not infrequently controversial. One
common objection is that this approach is cold or unfeeling, or constitutes trying to
value something that inherently cannot be valued. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE
VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004). For a discussion of the issue in the context of
environmental law, see Richard L. Revesz, The green community should mend, not
work in vain to end, cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May 8, 2008, 09:12 AM),
http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalism/ (promoting the use of
cost-benefit analyses in the context of environmental regulation); Lisa Heinzerling,
Lisa Heinzerling responds to Richard Revesz on cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May
14, 2008, 4:49 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalisman-oxymoron/ (arguing against the use of cost-benefit analysis in the area of
environmentalism); Richard L. Revesz, Richard Revesz responds to Lisa
Heinzerling, defending cost-benefit anaylsis, GRIST, http://www.grist.org/article/atool-in-the-toolbox (June 5, 2008, 06:21 AM) (responding to Lisa Heinzerling’s
posting on Grist). A related objection is that quantification makes a decision seem
more well-supported than it is – to overstate, the inputs into the quantification may
be “garbage,” such that “garbage in, garbage out.” See Claire A. Hill, Law and
Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 219, 224 (2004).
But, in principle it is a respectable method, and may come closest to commanding
the most general conceptual acceptance. Certainly, there is no obvious competitor.
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themselves are known), or at least known well enough. What if they are
not? How do we know what our choice set consists of? Even if we know
what the set consists of, how do we assess possible outcomes and the
associated probabilities for each member of the set? In fact, we almost
never “know” the appropriate elements of the canonical expected value
computation. 14 But not infrequently enough of a consensus exists as to
those elements, so that the computation can be done and defensibly used.
Any decision may need justification. Many factors bear on the
possibility that justification is required, including the likelihood and nature
of the possible bad outcomes (or foregone good outcomes). But closer to
the risk end of the spectrum, there is, in principle, a good and acceptable
justification in the form of expected value. Of course, many decisions raise
issues about what can and should be quantified, and what kinds of tradeoffs are acceptable.15 Consider decisions about whether to proceed with a
mass immunization program when the best evidence indicates that some
small number of people will suffer serious side effects from the
immunization.16
A particular decision may make a controversial
assumption about how to quantify the “cost” of the side effects. But the
assumption will be used to make the decision and to justify it: the good
justification and the acceptable justification are one and the same.
Closer to the uncertainty end of the continuum, we may not have a
decision methodology that is as accepted or good as expected value. By
definition, in cases of uncertainty, we cannot compute probabilities and
outcomes. The methodology thus is not available to help make the decision
or to provide a justification. How might a decision-maker react? There is
voluminous literature demonstrating the existence of “uncertainty
aversion,” or, as it is sometimes called, “ambiguity aversion.”17 People do
14

A computation of risk can be quite complex: we may only know secondorder probabilities, and even those only within certain ranges. But we may know
enough to make a computation in which we have significant confidence. If the
decision is one of a series of like decisions, we may have considerable confidence
in the aggregate results.
15
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 13.
16
See, e.g., CTRS. See, e.g., UPDATE: VACCINE SIDE EFFECTS, ADVERSE
REACTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND PRECAUTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (ACIP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/00046738.htm.
17
See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal
Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2006); Craig R. Fox & Amos
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not like uncertainty; they will pay money to avoid choosing in conditions
of uncertainty.18 Business actors do not have this option. They must make
a choice.
A decision-maker who faces uncertainty knows she may have to
justify her decision. Without a sound decision-making methodology to get
the best decision, without a way to assess how likely it is that the
justification will be needed, and especially when the downside of a bad
decision is potentially high, she will focus significantly on seeking a
justification that would be accepted by the relevant reference group.
In the stylized case of risk, there is by hypothesis a known and
accepted way to make the best substantive decision – expected value.19
The decision-maker may have to be ready to justify her decision, especially
if it potentially carries a significant downside risk. The need to justify does
not, however, change the decision she makes. Her decision-making
methodology should yield the best decision as well as the most justifiable
decision. By contrast, in the stylized case of uncertainty, there is no
known and accepted way to make the best substantive decision. The
decision-maker cannot accurately assess the probability that she will have
to justify the decision, but she cannot rule out that it might be high. She
therefore makes a decision that she is able to justify. What kinds of
Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585,
585 (1995). A search on ssrn.com for “ambiguity aversion” in the title, abstract or
keywords yields 110 papers.
18
See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON.
643 (1961), (the seminal article addressing choices under conditions of
uncertainty.). See also Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 138 (Steven N. Durlauf &
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
19
Of course, there are few cases of pure risk or uncertainty. Moreover, the
situations in which an expected value computation is feasible, meaningful and
sufficiently uncontroversial are few and far between. Still, expected value is, as a
matter of rhetoric, a paradigmatic decision-making process in the realm of business
and has significant force in other realms, as well. That being said, in the political
realm—the realm which provides Tetlock’s framework of accountability in
Tetlock, supra note 1, - expected value might almost never be accepted in the
broader community to which a politician is accountable because the community is
intractably heterogeneous, the methodology might be too technical, there exists
insufficient consensus on the components of the computation, and, probably most
significantly, there may be many people who are either disingenuous in their nonacceptance or simply regard the outcome as the only thing of importance, such that
a bad outcome cannot be justified.
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decisions would a decision-maker be best able to justify? Decisions that
invoke history or authority seem well-suited to become the norm20 for the
relevant community. 21
Indeed, taking a step back, it should not be
surprising that such norms develop and persist: Decision-makers in a
reputational community are similarly situated vís-a-vís one another: they all
benefit from the existence of norms by which they can minimize their
expected costs. The result can be path dependence,22 stickiness,23 herd
behavior,24 and even groupthink.
B.

JUSTIFICATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCEPTABILITY
HEURISTIC
The foregoing discusses how people may justify less-than-good
outcomes of their decisions. This Section elaborates on the functions and
form of a justification.
20

On social norms generally, see H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 647.
21
What determines community boundaries, and how norms are adopted and
maintained in communities, are clearly relevant to the issues this Essay addresses,
but are beyond its scope. See generally Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language
and Norms in Complex Business Contracts 77, CHI. KENT. L. REV. 29 (2002)
(discussing the boundaries of the complex business transacting community).
22
See e.g., Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 318.
23
The paradigmatic use of the term “stickyness” is in the context of wages and
prices. See THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/
alphabetic.cfm?TERM=STICKY%20PRICES#stickyprices (last visited Sept. 28,
2010). The term has, however, become broadly used in economics to refer to
behavior that changes more slowly than the standard forces in economics, such as
supply and demand, might predict.
24
See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads,
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 992 (1992) (the seminal paper on herding and the related subject of
information cascades in finance). There is a rich literature on the subject. See, e.g,
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Sushil Bikhchandani, Information
Cascades, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18;
Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40
EUR. ECON. REV. 603 (1996); Torben Lütje, To Be Good Or To Be Better: Asset
Managers’ Attitudes Towards Herding, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 825 (2009); David
Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital
Markets: A Review and Synthesis, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT 25 (2003); Ivo Welch,
Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 369 (2000).
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Justifications are needed when people are, in Philip’s Tetlock term,
“accountable.”25
Expectations of accountability are an implicit or explicit
constraint on virtually everything people do . . . . Failure
to act in ways for which one can construct acceptable
accounts leads to varying degrees of censure, depending on
the gravity of the offense and the norms of the society.
Although one can make a powerful case for the
universality of accountability, the specific norms and
values to which people are held accountable vary
dramatically from one culture or time to another.26
Tetlock sets forth a taxonomy of strategies for coping with
accountability, including use of the “acceptability heuristic.”27 According
to Tetlock, people “adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to
whom they feel accountable (a coping strategy labeled here as the
acceptability heuristic).”28 The acceptability heuristic is clearly a norm in
the relevant community. The heuristic has some benefits for both the
individual and groups to which the individual belongs.29 Moreover,
individuals are less likely to make certain mistakes if doing so would not
pass muster with the person to whom they are accountable.30 But it also
can have some “highly dysfunctional effects, from both an individual and
an organizational perspective. The acceptability heuristic implies that
decision-makers can be no better as well as no worse than the
constituencies to whom they are accountable.”31
This Essay articulates a particular pathology within the broader
phenomenon Tetlock describes. Uncertainty yields a need for justification,
but precludes “good” justifications. The community facing decisions made
under uncertainty develops norms of acceptable justifications (which are

25

Tetlock, supra note 1.
Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
27
See id. at 348–51.
28
Id. at 340 (explaining why people might adopt the acceptability heuristic,
Tetlock characterizes it as a “least effort solution” and notes that “[a]ll other things
being equal, people prefer [such] solutions.”)
29
Id. at 349.
30
Id.
31
Tetlock, supra note 1, at 349.
26
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“acceptability heuristics”).32 These justifications rely too much on history,
authority, and present practices, which yield bad decisions that perpetuate
themselves.33 The decisions at issue may be all made in the same time
period, as was the case with the purchase of subprime securities. Or they
may be made at different times, as in the CEO selection example and the
other examples of “sticky” corporate practices.
There may be many
individuals involved, or comparatively few. The individuals may be acting
in ways that favor their own interests at the expense of that of their
principal, typically their employer. Or they may be acting in ways
congruent with their employer’s interest.
In all of these cases, the
decisions yield real social costs – sometimes very large ones.
III.

THE MOTIVATING EXAMPLE

The example motivating this Essay arises from the financial crisis.
Money managers bought huge volumes of subprime securities, apparently
without doing sufficient investigation.
The decision as to whether an investment is worthwhile necessarily
involves making assumptions about the future. There will always be an
enormous amount we do not know, but we can sometimes have enough
information to provide a good basis for a decision. An investor purchasing
US Treasury securities can be well assured that she will be timely and fully
repaid. (Given the state of the economy, maybe she shouldn’t be!). If an
investor lends money to Bernie Madoff today, while he is in jail and there
are presumably many superior claims on his assets,34 the investor is
unlikely to be repaid. Even though nobody can fully predict the future, it
can sometimes be predicted well enough to enable a person making an
investment decision to do so with great confidence.
An investor making an investment decision assesses how she
expects the investment to perform. Canonically, she considers the possible
outcomes and associated probabilities.35 How much will the investment
pay off in good and bad states of the world? How likely are these
respective states? It is immediately obvious that the more of a basis one
has for these determinations, the better one’s valuation will be. It is also
32

See id. at 340.
See id. at 349–50.
34
See Diana B. Henriques, Claims Total Over 15,400 in Fraud by Madoff,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at B3.
35
See id.
33
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obvious that, all else being equal, the newer and more complex the
instrument, the less of a basis one is likely to have.
Subprime mortgage securities and credit default swaps became
very popular investments in a short period of time, notwithstanding that
they were new and highly complex instruments.36 This is puzzling. It is
one thing for consumers to stand in line all night to buy iPhone4,37 but
sophisticated institutional investors are not supposed to respond to trends
simply by chasing them. They also are not supposed to chase trends they
do not understand. These investors are now saying, with some plausibility,
that they never understood the investments.38 A companion paper
discusses this puzzle and provides an explanation:
Investors bought complex securities they could not
properly value. Why did they pay such high prices? One
might think that they would instead discount for
uncertainty and demand a premium to compensate them in
case they were buying a lemon. Perhaps investors thought
the lemon securities had been sweetened because of the
sellers’ stake in their reputation—sellers, not wanting to
risk the loss of reputation and future business, would do
their best not to sell lemon securities. But an explanation
relying on the reputational stake of the sellers – the
investment banks – is insufficient. The time horizons of
many individuals selling on behalf of investment banks are
far shorter than those of their employers. Investment banks
have failed to sufficiently constrain the behavior of these
individuals. Moreover, it is generally known that the
investment banks themselves sometimes put their own
interests ahead of customers’.
Perhaps the investors were simply unfaithful agents
making investments for others. They could have made
36

See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 3-4, 9, 20-30 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.
37
Dawn Kawamoto, iPhone 4 Draws Long Lines, Entrepreneurs and
June
23,
2010,
Expectations
of
‘Wow!’,
DAILYFINANCE,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/iphone-4-draws-early-lines-entrepreneurs-andexpectations-of-w/19527671/.
38
See generally LEWIS, supra note 2.
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self-interested decisions to get a quick payoff in the form
of fees or short-term results, calculating that the payoff
would exceed any long-term financial or reputational cost.
This explanation does not work either: it leaves
unanswered the question of why the ultimate investors
would not have chosen better agents or monitored them
more carefully…
Perhaps the investors simply relied on the rating agencies’
AAA ratings for the securities? This also seems unlikely,
given that Enron was scarcely in the distant past, and that
the securities offered higher yields than other AAA-rated
securities, indicating that they were of lower quality.
Moreover, during the latter part of the period in which
subprime securities were popular investments, the
securities’ low quality became sufficiently evident that
reliance on rating-agency ratings became progressively less
tenable. …
The most satisfactory explanation for why investors did
not demand a much larger lemons premium lies in the
incentives for “herding” among agents who made
investment decisions for others. Investors (and markets)
compare investment managers to other investment
managers. A manager’s best strategy, therefore, may be to
do what her peers do regardless of whether the manager
believes her peers are a reliable source of information
about the quality of the investment decision.39
These investors could have invested in ultra-conservative
instruments, but such a choice would lack an “accepted” justification – that
is not what their peer money managers “do.” For that matter, it would also
lack a “good” justification: a justification based on the merits of the
decision and the methodology used. Investors were hired for their
supposed expertise in investment selection – an expertise which was to

39

Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand A (Much Larger)
Lemons Premium?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 102-4 ( 2011) ations
omitted).
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yield expected returns above those of an insured bank deposit or Treasury
instrument.
Doing what their immediate peers (other money managers) did –
buying an investment crafted by other peers (the big investment banks with
involvement from their lawyers and vetted by still other peers, the rating
agencies) – was “accepted.” The money managers may also have believed
their peers knew what they were doing, that subprime mortgage securities
were sufficiently similar to the historically successful prime mortgage
securities, that housing prices would go up forever, and that brilliant
financial structuring could vastly minimize risk while keeping reward high.
Whatever the money managers believed about how the instruments would
perform, they knew the instruments’ performance (and their own
performance as money managers) was subject to considerable uncertainty.
Thus, they cared a great deal about the potential need for justification. For
money managers, justifying their decisions on the bases that their peers
performed no worse would be easier than justifying doing far worse
because they missed out on the hot new thing.40 We know the outcome of
these “safe” decisions (for the money managers): the financial crisis.
IV.

OTHER EXAMPLES

This section presents several additional examples. In these
examples, decision-makers use methodologies that the relevant community
uses, where there is significant reason to suppose that they do not
necessarily yield the best substantive decision. One example is selection of
the CEO. The other examples are of choice of state of incorporation,
providing for remote contingencies in a complex business contract, and
public company purchases of insurance. I discuss each example below. In
a recent article, I discussed another example related to my motivating
example here: the choice of two (or, in more recent years, two of three)
particular rating agencies for a debt issuance. I argued that a “CEO may
be second guessed if he does not get two ratings [one from Moody’s and
one from Standard & Poor’s] and the offering is disappointing; a downside

40

This ignores the contrarians who made bets against such securities and
others who simply didn’t get involved on either side. Such investors existed, but
there were comparatively few, such that subprime securities came to be
dangerously overvalued. See generally LEWIS, supra note 2.
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for not abiding by the norm is far more likely than any upside from flouting
it.”41
A.

CEO SELECTION

Another example where accepted justifications are sought as much
or more than good decisions (with “good” justifications) is the selection of
CEOs for larger companies – companies watched by the markets because
market participants have a significant stake in the companies’ performance.
How such companies will perform is uncertain for many reasons. The
economy’s performance is hard to predict, as are other potentially
significant factors, such as natural and man-made disasters. Industryspecific factors and the behavior of a company’s competitors are often
unpredictable. If the company does badly, those who selected the CEO
may be criticized.42 Thus, decision-makers may be highly influenced by
the potential need to justify when making their decisions as to who will be
CEO.43 According to Rakesh Khurana, a leading scholar in the field:
[B]oards employ extremely limiting criteria to define the
pool of eligible candidates. These criteria, which are
loosely (if at all) coupled to the specific strategic
challenges facing the firm, are adopted largely with the
intention of producing a candidate who will be seen as
legitimate by external constituents, namely, financial
analysts and the business media. . . . Because the directors
and candidates involved in external CEO search are
embedded in a community of overlapping business and
social relationships, they are particularly sensitive to

41

Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 61
(2004). Fitch also became an acceptable source of one of the two ratings. See
Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such A Bad Job Rating Subprime
Securities?, 71 PITT. L. REV. 585, 600-602 (2010).
42
See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, At G.M.’s Helm or Going Under?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006 (describing the pressure placed on the board of General
Motors when their choice for CEO underperformed in the position).
43
See, e.g., RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 29–36 (2002) (discussing the role of
justification in corporate searches for new CEOs).
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maintaining the appearance of propriety in the conduct of
the search among their peers.44
Each time a prominent company needs a CEO, it chooses from the
same small pool of candidates. This seems to be the accepted modus
operandi, if the company does badly under the new CEO, it permits those
involved to point to the process they followed, and be therefore absolved
from responsibility for the results of their decision. Khurana seems to
intimate that good quality is at least a necessary condition to be in the pool
of candidates.45 But perhaps good quality is not necessary – it may be that
previously being a CEO is sufficient.46
One might think that some past performances are so bad that they
should disqualify a possible candidate. If that is so, how can we explain
Robert Nardelli’s selection as the head of Chrysler after his performance at
Home Depot?47 In 2006, Joe Nocera of the New York Times wrote:
Mr. Nardelli . . . has become this year's version of Mr.
Overpaid C.E.O. He's earned this status, in part, by the
sheer sum of money his board has awarded him in the five
years since he was recruited from General Electric to take
over Home Depot: $245 million, including $37.1 million
just this last year. At the same time, Home Depot's stock
has fallen 12 percent, while shares of its chief competitor,
Lowe's, have risen 173 percent. You've heard of pay for
performance? This is the classic definition of pay for
pulse.48

44

Id. at 29, 36.
See id. at 27–30.
46
This, of course, is an overstatement – a CEO who is discovered committing
a massive fraud probably is no longer in the pool of acceptable CEOs. If he is in
jail, he is probably unavailable. “Chainsaw Al” Dunlap did not see a great demand
for his services after his disastrous and criminal stewardship of Sunbeam. See
JOHN A. BYRNE, CHAINSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL DUNLAP IN THE ERA
OF PROFIT-AT-ANY-PRICE 350 (1999).
47
See Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006.
48
Id.
45
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Home Depot ousted Mr. Nardelli in January of 2007.49 He became
head of Chrysler in August of 2007, hired by Chrysler’s owner, the private
equity fund Cerberus, and resigned in April of 2009 as Chrysler entered
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, returning to Cerberus .50 Of course, Nardelli
headed Chrysler while the economy was in crisis. We cannot know whether
he did a good job; perhaps someone else would have done worse. What is
important is that previously being the CEO at Home Depot seems to have
been sufficient for Nardelli to obtain another CEO job notwithstanding that
he had engendered considerable hostility for his lackluster performance and
high pay package.
The strategy of choosing a new CEO from a small pool of present
or former CEOs is problematic for many reasons. First, the strategy may
not yield the best CEO: another person might have been better.51 Second,
the strategy probably contributes to the high level of CEO compensation
overall.52 It helps perpetuate the illusion that CEO candidates are scarce,53
and amplifies the resonance of a new CEO’s argument that he must be
above the median of his comparison group and therefore should be paid
49

See Michael Barbaro, Embattled Chief Executive Resigns at Home Depot,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007.
50
See Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Chief Says He Believes He Has Saved the
Automaker, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B5. It is interesting, too, that Mr.
Nardelli’s new employer was a private equity fund whose own financial interests
were at stake. Mark Clothier, Chrysler’s Nardelli To Rejoin Cerberus Without
Golden Parachute, BLOOMBERG, May 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQ.PiZK2OzH0. Who did they need to justify their
hiring decision to? In the community that includes private equity funds, there may
be far more incentive to try to make the best judgment and far less reason to use a
methodology importantly motivated by its justifiability. But the fund does have
some agents too. They have their own often-large financial stakes, but they may
face the same constraints as other agents in needing to justify what they do. The
fund itself may also need justification to its investors if it does not perform as well
as its peers.
51
See KHURANA, supra note 43, at 25. How the market perceives the new
CEO and what it says about the company to choose and gain her services, may
influence how well the company does and hence, how successful the CEO “is” or
seems to be. This might seem to complicate the story that the company is losing
out when it hires the CEO chosen using the accepted strategy rather than the CEO
who would have been chosen because of his skill set. Khurana suggests, however,
that the market perception and its effects will fade over time.
52
Id. at 30.
53
See id. at 30 n.18.
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accordingly.54 Third, the strategy perpetuates the reigning narrative that a
particular person – a “charismatic” CEO, in Khurana’s words – can save
the company.55 CEOs may have a far smaller effect on the performance of
their companies than the narrative suggests – the reigning narrative is
probably a myth.56 Finally, this strategy “restricts access to the CEO
position to those who fit certain socially defined criteria.”57
In sum, if this depiction is correct, firms expend considerable
energy and money chasing a myth. Firms do this in significant part to play
to an outside audience.58 Chasing the myth may also serve to perpetuate it.
Going down this mistaken path also prevents accretion of useful knowledge
regarding CEO search methodologies and desirable CEO characteristics, as
the same approach continues to yield what are arguably less than
satisfactory results.59
B.

PROVIDING FOR REMOTE CONTINGENCIES IN COMPLEX
BUSINESS CONTRACTS

Complex business contracts are notoriously long and filled with
legalese. One significant contributor to their length is provisions relating to
remote contingencies.
An illustration is found in a memorable
“melodrama in three acts” in Anatomy of a Merger,60 a book by James
Freund, a leading mergers and acquisitions lawyer. In one scene in the
melodrama, the senior lawyer chastises the junior lawyer’s first draft of an
acquisition agreement:
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See id. at 30.
See id. at 20.
56
Id. at 21 (“The widespread, firmly held belief in the overriding importance
of the CEO is all the more noteworthy considering that there is no conclusive
evidence linking leadership to organizational performance.”). See also Noam
Wasserman et al., When Does Leadership Matter? The Contingent Opportunities
View of CEO Leadership 6–7 (Harvard Univ. Strategy Unit, Working Paper No.
02-04, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=278652 (arguing that the
potential influence of a CEO fluctuates over time and is situation-specific).
57
KHURANA, supra note 43, at 49..
58
See id. at 20–21.
59
See id. at 21 (“[B]oards find themselves trapped in an infinite loop of
dashed expectations and CEO churn.”).
60
JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES
FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 479-540 (1975).
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And then, in the one place you did a little thinking, Pete, it
seems to me you went too far. I know it’s possible that
they’ll repeal the Copyright Act some day, but it doesn’t
really rise to a level of probability sufficient to warrant
three pages of provisions conditional upon that event.61
In this situation, Pete removes the provision. The senior lawyer,
Freund’s alter ego, is in my experience quite idealized. In my years as a
lawyer, nobody questioned such provisions, and they were therefore never
removed.
This is one important reason why contracts have gotten
appreciably larger over time. The process by which complex business
contracts are written involves starting with a “form” – a document used in a
previous transaction. Contract drafters change only what is inapt; they do
not remove what is unlikely to be needed. In Why Contracts Are Written
in Legalese, I explained that:
[in the course of the transaction or its aftermath,] [t]hings
may go wrong for many reasons. If they do, clients may
blame their lawyers, and senior lawyers may blame their
juniors, regardless of where fault lies. And lawyers may
worry more than is warranted that things will go wrong
and that they will be blamed. Finally, because the form is
one’s point of departure, its provisions necessarily have a
mantle of correctness; deviations have to be, in a sense,
“justified.” Things already written down come prelegitimized – not just in the political sense that there’s no
payoff in challenging them, but also in the psychological
sense that they “look like they belong.” As a result,
deviations from the form, especially more structural or
innovative deviations, are disfavored. Necessary changes
to use the form in the new transaction are more apt to be as
limited as possible to “do the job.” Deletions generally
must meet a high threshold of justification: omitting a
provision because it doesn’t do much, but does clutter up
61

Id. at 500-01, also quoted in Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in
Legalese, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001).
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the form, rarely suffices. But inclusion of new boilerplate
that doesn’t seem to help but couldn’t hurt requires much
less justification. Contracts get progressively longer and
more cumbersome, and usually not to any positive end.62
The social costs of overly long and technical complex business
contracts are of course much smaller than the social cost of the excess
purchases of subprime securities. And they mostly fall on parties who have
in a sense agreed to bear them. But the costs are not insignificant. The
extra resources spent in drafting, reading, negotiating, printing, and
reviewing contracts over and above what would be needed if the contracts
were leaner are fairly large, especially given the billing rates of the lawyers
at issue and the value of the time of top-level company officials who may
review them; companies pass these costs onto their customers. And of
course the longer and more complicated the contract, the more
opportunities and costs arise for litigation. Moreover, litigation costs also
are borne by taxpayers, who pay for courts.
C.

OTHER EXAMPLES: “STICKY” BUSINESS PRACTICES

Consider the choice to incorporate in Delaware and the choice of a
public company to buy insurance. A good argument can be made that the
decision-makers are influenced more by justification than by trying to
make the best possible decision from a substantive perspective.
1. Delaware Incorporation
Why do so many companies incorporate in Delaware? Very few
companies conduct business in Delaware, yet more than half of all public
companies are incorporated there.63 A great deal of literature exists on this
subject.64 Other states would like to attract incorporation business; there
62

Hill, supra note 61, at 76.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J.
OF
DELAWARE,
553,
554
(2002);
About
Agency,
STATE
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last updated May 27, 2010).
64
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen
Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF.
63
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have been efforts along those lines, but none that have made an appreciable
dent in Delaware’s market share.65 One explanation, complementary to
many of the explanations in the literature, focuses on justification. At elite
law firms, incorporating new corporations in Delaware is the default norm.
A lawyer attempting to deviate from the norm would have to explain and
justify her decision. Incorporation is typically done by lower-level
attorneys. Thus, the explanation would likely need to be made to the senior
attorney. Such firms’ clients tend to include many people who study the
law firm’s work product carefully; thus, the unusual choice would have to
be explained and justified to a client as well. A typical reason given for
incorporating in Delaware is that the Delaware judiciary is better suited to
resolving corporate disputes: it is more sophisticated and has a quicker
timeline. But very few cases go to court, and many courts follow Delaware
corporate law. 66 What seems likely is overall “stickiness” based on the
comfort of everyone involved with Delaware law and procedure. Decisionmakers do not really investigate alternatives; other states may thus not try

L. REV. 1775 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Federalism and
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1168 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435
(1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve
Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the
Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD.
251 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Comment].
65
How much other states try to get incorporation business is a matter of
considerable debate. It is conventionally argued that other states do compete to
get incorporation business. See, e.g., Winter, Comment, supra note 63; ROMANO,
supra note 64; Fischel, supra note 64. Some scholars argue that they do not try
much to get incorporation business because they know they will not succeed
against Delaware. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63. One state
recently attempting to get incorporation business is North Dakota. See Larry
Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Apr.
23,
2007,
11:48
PM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/23/the-north-dakota-experiment.
66
See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (D.
Nev. 1997).
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as hard to provide them,67 potentially setting up a self-reinforcing dynamic.
In the typical corporate context involving complex business transactions,
there is virtually no chance of being second-guessed and punished for a
choice to incorporate in Delaware unless there is a specific, known reason
to make a different choice. By contrast, the chance of being secondguessed and punished for a choice to incorporate in another jurisdiction
without some affirmative reason for doing so may very well be punished.68
2. Public Company Purchase of Insurance
Why would public companies buy insurance? A great deal of
literature exists on the subject.69 The starting point is that such companies
should be risk-neutral, and therefore should not spend money on insurance
premiums. It must cost more to buy insurance than the expected amount of
any payout the insurance company would make.70 The purchase of
insurance is therefore a puzzle requiring an explanation. Many scholars
have provided explanations, invoking, among other things, risk aversion of
67

See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63, at 553-57.
My authority for this paragraph is my extensive practice experience and
interviews with many other practitioners. See also John C. Coates IV, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame The Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 130405 (2001) (arguing that adoption of particular takeover defenses is importantly
determined by a particular firm’s practices rather than the client’s needs).
Coates’s article is in a different context than the one discussed in the text, and
hypothesizes an “agency cost” in which the law firm’s interests are being pursued
at the expense of the client’s, but Coates’ argument and the one in this Essay are
related. Law firms settle on a particular practice and do not revisit it; the
mechanism by which this occurs is presumably that individual lawyers are
discouraged from deviating. In the context of takeover defenses, there is a clear
better alternative for the client. For incorporation, there is not. Perhaps there is a
better alternative that could be found through research. Or perhaps one would
arise if the norm to incorporate in Delaware became less sticky.
69
See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982) (an early influential article posing the puzzle); LiMing Han, Managerial Compensation and Corporate Demand for Insurance, 63 J.
RISK & INS. 381 (1996) (explaining corporate insurance purchases by reference to
managerial risk aversion); see also Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It:
The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 541 (2009),
available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art22 (giving alternative
explanations for corporate purchases of insurance).
70
See Mayers & Smith, supra note 69 at 282.
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corporate managers,71 expertise by insurance companies,72 or requirements
of the company’s transacting partners.73 Another explanation may be the
one offered here for the purchase of subprime securities and CEO selection
process: that those in charge of making the decisions are looking more to
justification than to the substance of the decision. This may involve an
agency cost, or it may not. The manager may think that if an event occurs
that would have triggered a payout and she has not obtained insurance for
the company, that she will be fired or reprimanded. But the company’s
shareholders might also punish the company in such a case; the manager
might then be serving her company well by obtaining the insurance.
V.

LAW AS PART OF THE PROBLEM

The foregoing has discussed a problem: when a decision-maker
makes a decision intended more to shield her from negative consequences
than to yield the best possible decision. Might law provide a solution?
Law is, unfortunately, often part of the problem.
Law, especially corporate law, encourages process-based
justification, even where the process at issue can be followed fairly
mechanically.74 Consider fiduciary duty law, especially the duty of care
and the duty of good faith under the duty of loyalty. Directors and officers
show that they met their duties by demonstrating that they hired the
appropriate advisors, and had meetings which lasted a sufficient period of
time and conducted enough debate and inquiry.75 There may be a formula
– a true safe harbor, or something close enough – to avoid liability. Using
the court-approved process may not yield a worse decision, but it probably
incurs unnecessary costs in arriving at the decision that probably would
have been arrived at in any event.
71

See Han, supra note 69, at 281-82.
See Goldberg, supra note 68, at 542-43.
73
Id. at 541.
74
See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the
Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 336
(2009) [hereinafter Hill & McDonnell, Executive Compensation] (characterizing
the post-Van Gorkom process of approving mergers in Delaware as resulting in
“full employment” for investment bankers and lawyers); Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1769, 1772 n.14 (2007).
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See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 73, at 1769-72; Hill & McDonnell,
Executive Compensation, supra note 73, at 336.
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The emphasis on process reflects that courts do not want to
micromanage business. It also reflects a desire to give business people
certainty – to specify ways of proceeding that insulate a decision and the
This ethos echoes, and
decision-maker from further scrutiny. 76
encourages, a mindset favoring justification by formula.77
The next Section argues that one important solution to the problem
is to develop and promote norms against the use of justifications that are
merely acceptable, but not “good.” These norms should encourage
business actors to use their own judgment, even if they can not consult a
formula or an established past or present practice. As discussed above, law
has difficulty in preventing people from using safe harbors as refuges from
doing their own inquiry. But perhaps law can do something to help the
problem. It can allow for more personal liability for business decisionmakers in some cases. It can marshal dicta to encourage better practices,
and can outlaw common practices it finds unsatisfactory. I turn to these
issues in the next Section.
VI.

SOLUTIONS

The foregoing described contexts in which decision-makers made
decisions that the decision-makers had more reason to think were
76

See Hickman & Hill, supra note 7, at 1188.
A recent paper pointing out the extent to which justification can distort
behavior is Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of
Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568884. The authors
discuss how actors’ behavior can be distorted by their need to make the best
evidentiary case to a court. Inefficiency may result since a person may, for
instance, allow behavior that harms her to continue so she can demonstrate that it
occurred. Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper shares with this Essay the idea that the
need to get some desired treatment – avoiding professional censure or getting a
recovery in a lawsuit – can distort behavior and potentially be costly to society.
Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper has some important differences, though. First, in
their scenario, the behavior that does not represent a distortion is known, at least as
a matter of theory. This Essay’s analogue– the best decision from a substantive
point of view – is not known. This is precisely why the problem arises. Second,
demonstrations made to a court are governed by different forces than
demonstrations or justifications to one’s peers. In both instances, law and norms
are relevant. But, to overstate for expository ease, norms inform law to a court,
whereas law informs norms to one’s peers.
77
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justifiable than were substantively good. The decisions have varying
social costs, some quite large and some smaller.
What kind of solutions might be possible? If we characterize the
greater society as having an interest in more critically-minded and less
formulaic decision-making, one approach might be to align the interests of
decision-makers with those of the greater society. One way this might be
achieved is to make decision-makers personally responsible for their
decisions. This might be achieved in several different ways.
One is to make decision-makers personally liable for their
decisions. The liability could arise from the decision’s outcome or from
the process used to reach the outcome. Richard Painter and I have argued
for the former solution in a particular context: highly compensated bankers.
These bankers made risky decisions that allowed their banks to fail or
suffer significant losses. We argued that such bankers should be personally
liable if their banks fail; we would allow them to retain a million dollars of
their own wealth, but no more. Investment banking is a business that can
impose, and has recently imposed, enormous social costs. We argue that
investment banking is presently structured in a manner that rewards
excessive risk-taking. Investment bankers had significant equity stakes in
their banks, and were willing to risk those. We argue that they might not
be willing to risk losing amounts they hold outside the firm that enable
them to maintain their accustomed standard of living.78
Obvious objections exist to our proposal, mostly notably that it
may not be politically feasible.79 But this may change given public disgust
at continuing high banker compensation.80 Even if it does become feasible,
though, it is only a partial solution for highly compensated people in a field
that imposes social costs. Limited liability is a bedrock principle in
business, and it is simply not realistic to advocate abandoning it wholesale.
Thus, many decision-makers making decisions more because the decisions

78

Claire A. Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1173-74 (2010).
79
Substantive objections include the following: a regulation imposed by the
U.S. or a state would tempt bankers to work where the regulation did not apply;
fewer people would want to be investment bankers; bankers would find ways to
hide their assets; innovation would be stifled as bankers flocked to safety. Id. at
1196-99.
80
See, e.g., Eric Dash, Federal Report Faults Banks on Huge Bonuses, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A1.
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are justifiable than because they are substantively good could not feasibly
be made guarantors for their decisions.
What about trying to increase oversight of process? If the
oversight is to be done by courts, this does not seem like a promising
solution. As argued in the previous Section, courts, especially those
deciding matters of corporate law, are notoriously reluctant to
micromanage process. Courts are sometimes willing to say directors did
not think long enough; they are not generally willing to say they did not
think hard enough.81 But one related avenue might be promising: trying to
encourage norms and best practices in favor of critical thinking and against
mechanical and formula based decision-making methodologies. Corporate
“law” nowadays very much includes extra-legal forces such as pressure
imposed by major shareholders, through the proxy process as well as the
media.82 Such pressure could make it less “safe” for decision-makers to
follow certain types of established practices. Law could also have a role:
decisions could include dicta encouraging more critical-mindedness. Of
course, critical-minded decision-making is no panacea.
Formulaic
decision-making methodologies may at least impose a lower bound on the
quality of decision-making.83 But it may be realistic to hope that the
decisions at issue, mostly those made by individuals working in an
institutional setting, would be constrained by those institutions, thus
providing a lower bound.
Law can also play another role. It may not be good at dictating the
specifics of good process, but it can be quite good at dictating the specifics
of bad process. In that regard, it can have a more direct role in limiting
“safe harbors.”
It can, for instance, label a particular practice
“unreasonable” as a matter of law. By itself, this may not be sufficient.
Consider that in 1999, the Seventh Circuit characterized reliance on
Standard and Poor’s rating as unreasonable.84 Eleven years later, reliance
continues unabated, notwithstanding Enron and the subprime crisis. But
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See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241-44 (Del. 2009).
See generally Hill & McDonnell, Executive Compensation, supra note 73, at
357-64.
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See text accompanying note 31.
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See Quinn v. McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999), quoted and
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court attempts to specify bad process, making “safe harbors” less safe, is an
approach with some potential.
A final approach to consider is that interested parties – perhaps,
industry groups – might be willing to subsidize research on better decisionmaking methodologies. They might be motivated by their collective
interest or perhaps by an interest in avoiding regulation. In cases where
there is a public interest, government, too, can subsidize such research.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Decisions made under uncertainty may be made more with a view
towards justification than with a view towards making the best substantive
decision. Norms may arise as to justifications the decision-maker’s
community will accept; the decision-maker will often be guided by these
norms. The result may be inferior decisions that impose social costs,
sometimes significant ones. This phenomenon matters for law and policy.
Massive overinvestment in subprime securities is an important example.
The problem will not be easy to address. At first blush, law would
not seem a good place to look. The problem involves people taking refuge
in an accepted methodology or practice rather than fully using their critical
faculties. Law notoriously judges actions by reference to accepted norms
in the community; it also notoriously focuses on process rather than
substance.
This Essay aims to draw attention to the breadth of the problem,
showing its roots and manifestations in standard human motivations. The
breadth of the problem has not been appreciated. Might better solutions be
possible if the problem is viewed at a higher level of abstraction? This
Essay aims to raise this possibility, and otherwise inspire new ways of
looking at what may have seemed like diverse phenomena.
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CATALYSTS FOR CLARIFICATION:
MODERN TWISTS ON THE INSURABLE INTEREST
REQUIREMENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE
Robert S. Bloink*

***
The long dormant insurable interest doctrine is being revisited as banks
and other funds purchase life insurance policies in increasing numbers.
Some industry commentators have raised objections, accusing Wall Street
of perpetrating schemes that amount to impermissible gambling on the
lives, and deaths, of others. In response, Wall Street financiers have
insisted that they are committed to complying with state insurable interest
statutes and that their efforts at building a secondary market for life
insurance policies is expanding consumer options and eliminating the longstanding monopsony of the insurance companies. A workable compromise
between the insurance industry and Wall Street positions that will
modernize the insurable interest doctrine must simultaneously protect the
free-assignability of life insurance policies and avoid a rekindling of the
long-despised practice of gambling on lives. Development of such a
proposal requires comprehensive examinations of the history of the
insurable interest doctrine, the modern context within which it is being
applied, and the primary proposals to modernize the doctrine that have
been offered to date.
***
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT INSURABLE
INTEREST DEBATE

The long dormant insurable interest doctrine is now being revisited
as an outgrowth of the last decade’s halcyon financial markets.1 As banks
*

Professor of Tax Law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
See generally Bryan D. Bolton & Michael P. Cunningham, An Ancient
Doctrine Confronts Modern Problems, FOR THE DEFENSE (Sep. 2008); Robert B.
Barnett, Jr. et al., Amended Substitute House Bill 404: Ohio's Definition of
“Insurable Interest” Unfortunately Remains Largely Uncodified, 19 OHIO PROB.
L.J. 4 (2008); James C. Magner, Whose Life (Insurance) is it, anyway?, STEVE
LEIMBERG’S EST. PLAN. EMAIL NEWSL. (Oct. 30, 2007); Jacob Loshin, Insurance
Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117
YALE L.J. 474 (2007); Robert B. Barnett, Jr. & Jessica B. Kling, The Insurable
Interest Rule: Who Kicked the Slumbering Bear-and Did it Wake Him Up?, 16
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and other funds purchase life insurance policies in increasing numbers,
insurance industry commentators have raised objections, accusing Wall
Street of perpetrating schemes that amount to impermissible gambling on
the lives, and deaths, of others. Describing Wall Street’s foray into the
mortality markets as “death pools” designed to profit on the arrival of the
Grim Reaper, commentators have characterized this practice as violating
the spirit, if not the letter, of state insurable interest laws.2
In objection to such characterizations, Wall Street financiers assure
the industry that they are committed to complying with state insurable
interest statutes. They further suggest that their efforts at building a
secondary market for life insurance policies is expanding consumer options
and eliminating the insurance companies’ long-standing monopsony.3 Just
as the viatical markets were created in an effort to help AIDS patients deal
with end-of-life expenses, they argue, a robust secondary market will
increase the liquidity and value of consumers’ unwanted insurance
policies.4
The enormous demand created by Wall Street's desire to make the
life insurance market yet another sub-asset class in the greater asset-backed
securities paradigm has served as the germ seed of some expansive
interpretations of the insurable interest requirements, thus prompting many
of the industry commentators’ complaints.5
As regulators and legislators attempt to refine the insurable interest
doctrine, this article examines the pitfalls and possibilities presented by
their efforts to improve upon the policy objectives underlying the insurable
interest requirement. Specifically, this article examines the insurable
OHIO PROB. L.J. 171 (2006); Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest
Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477
(2005).
2
See Jenny Anderson, Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/business/
06insurance.html?emc=eta1; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/business/06insurance
.html?emc=eta1; M. Corey Goldman, ‘Til Death Do us Part, HFM WEEK, Jan. 18-24,
2007, at 23; Magner, supra note 1.
3
See, e.g., Natalie Rosenfelt, The Verdict on Monopsony, 20 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 402, 404 (2008).
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interest doctrine and its place in the mixture of separate but interrelated
issues implicated by STOLI transactions, including: (1) material
misrepresentations made on the policy application; (2) placement of the
burden of establishing an insurable interest; and (3) the doctrine’s wider
interrelationship with the bundle of intangible property rights inherent in a
modern life insurance contract. By means of a thorough examination of the
insurable interest doctrine in the context of these related and intertwined
issues, this discussion serves as a call for measured restraint as policy
makers attempt to address market abuses with changes to the long-standing
insurable interest doctrine.
Recent commentary decrying STOLI and similar practices has, in
many cases, focused on violations of the insurable interest doctrine.
Largely unaltered in British and American law over 230 years, the
insurable interest doctrine is a natural candidate for upgrade in the morass
of insurance regulations and common law doctrines implicated by STOLI.
Destabilization of the doctrine will introduce uncertainty as to the value of
many life insurance policies. If potential purchasers can no longer be
certain of whether a policy will be valid or void for lack of an insurable
interest, the resulting questions about the enforceability of the contract
creates a potential shadow looming large over the foundation of consumer
confidence in life insurance generally. Rather than impinging on the
insured’s property interest in a life insurance policy by introducing
uncertainty into the insurable interest requirement, the tangle of socially
undesirable activities inherent in most STOLI transactions must be
unwound and individually scrutinized. Violations of the insurable interest
requirement are an essential element of STOLI, but other elements of the
transaction are equally offensive. For instance, if the insurer does adequate
due diligence, asking questions sufficient to ferret out offending policies,
parties conspiring to purchase a policy as part of a STOLI scheme must, by
necessity, make misrepresentations on the policy application. These
misrepresentations are ripe for STOLI enforcement, as they often void the
contract and also may violate criminal law. Focusing solely on revising
the insurable interest doctrine is too narrow an approach to deal with
modern problems like STOLI. Wholesale revision of the insurable interest
doctrine is unnecessary, when other less drastic tools for combating STOLI
and other undesirable practices are available.
Viewed in its historical context, the insurable interest requirement
emerges as a relevant, powerful tool to combat unsavory life-insurance
practices. The continuing relevance of the insurable interest doctrine, and
the importance of policing misrepresentations on life insurance policies,
will be explored as follows: Section II maps the development of the
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insurable interest doctrine, placing it, and the contemporary discussion
surrounding it, into historical context. Section III examines the effect that
lack of an insurable interest has on the validity of policy, drawing out one
of the disincentives the doctrine presents to STOLI participants. Further
exploring the bar the insurable interest requirement presents to those who
would purchase a life insurance policy for an improper purpose, section IV
probes the allocation of the economic and legal burdens of the insurable
interest requirement between parties to the insurance contract. Section V
examines the history of life insurance as personal property, encouraging
circumspect deliberation for those who would restrict the transferability of
life insurance contracts. Concluding the examination of the transferability
of life insurance contracts, Section VI surveys the history of the secondary
market for life insurance. Section VII moves the discussion to recent cases
illustrating the modern problems taxing the flexibility of the insurable
interest doctrine. In addition to enunciating the courts’ use of the insurable
interest requirement, that section also draws out the second facet of the
courts’ analysis of STOLI, the misrepresentations necessarily made on
most applications for STOLI policies. Finally, section VIII discusses NAIC
and NCOIL and their affect on the insurable interest requirement.
II.

HISTORY OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT
A.

DEFINITION OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT FOR
LIFE INSURANCE

In general, anyone purchasing a life insurance policy must have an
insurable interest in the life of the insured. The definition of “insurable
interest” has changed very little from its inception in English life insurance
law in 17746 to its present manifestation in US statutory and case law.7
6

See LIFE ASSURANCE ACT, 1774, 14 GEO. 3, c. 48, §§ 1-3 (Eng.). The Act,
which is still in force, provides as follows:
1. From and after the passing of this Act no insurance shall
be made by any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate,
on the life or lives of any person, or persons, or on any other
event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for
whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies
shall be made, shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or
wagering; and every assurance made contrary to the true intent
and meaning hereof shall be null and void to all intents and
purposes whatsoever.
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In most versions of the insurable interest requirement, a person has
an insurable interest in the life of an individual based on either (1) “love
and affection” or (2) a substantial economic interest in the continued life of
that individual.8 Additionally, an insured generally has an unlimited
insurable interest in his or her life.9
2. And it shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies
on the life or lives of any person or persons, or other event or
events, without inserting in such policy or policies the person or
persons name or names interested therein, or for whose use,
benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or
underwrote.
3. And in all cases where the insured hath interest in such
life or lives, event or events, no greater sum shall be recovered or
received from the insurer or insurers than the amount of value of
the interest of the insured in such life or lives, or other event or
events.
7
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(c)(1)-(2) (2010)(defining
“insurable interest” as “a substantial interest engendered by love and affection… or
a lawful and substantial economic interest in having the life, health or bodily safety
of the individual insured continue, as distinguished from an interest which would
arise only by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or injury
of the individual insured).”) with Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881)
(stating that an insurable interest arises “from the relations of the party obtaining
the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of
blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or
benefit from the continuance of his life.”).
8
See, e.g.., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(c) (20092010); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-29-09.1 (2010); ALA. CODE 1975 § 27-14-3(a) (SUPP. I 2009); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(a) (SUPP. I 2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (2005);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (c)(1) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(3)
(20091972); But see Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724 (1830) (holding that a
father does not have an insurable interest in the life of his son because, under the
Life Assurance Act of 1774, a pecuniary interest is essential to find an insurable
interest.) contra Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396 (Mass. 1856)
(stating that, under Massachusetts law, a father has an insurable interest in the life
of his son); seeSee also Barnes v. London, Edinburgh & Glasgow L. Ins. Co., 1
Q.B. 864 (1892).); Erskine Hazard Dickson, Insurable Interest in Life, III, 44 AM.
L. REG. 161 (1896).
9
See, e.g.., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(b) (SUPP. I 2009); CAL. INS. CODE §
10110.1(b);) (2005); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 4 F.2d 794 (3d Cir.
1925); Davis v. Gulf States Ins. Co., 151 So. 167, 168 (Miss. 1933); Hill v. United
Life Ins. Ass'n, 25 A. 771 (Pa. 1893); Gray v. Nash, 259 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.
2008);).
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The “love and affection” brand of insurable interest is typically
manifest as a close familial relationship.10 An economic interest in the
continued life of the insured often exists as a creditor-debtor relationship11,
but has also been found to exit between partners in a company with respect
to its employees.12
The relationships encapsulated by both the “love and affection”
and “economic interest” types of insurable interest are viewed as giving a
policy-owner an interest in the insured’s life that exceeds the pecuniary
benefit the beneficiary will reap from the policy on the insured’s death.13
Though the foregoing definition of “insurable interest” has
remained relatively static since its inception, its effectiveness in the face of
modern variations on life insurance is still the subject of substantial
disagreement.14 Of particular importance to understanding its application to
novel, contemporary life insurance arrangements are the policy
considerations motivating the insurable interest requirement.
B.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS MOTIVATING THE INSURABLE
INTEREST REQUIREMENT

The insurable interest requirement is motivated by two primary
policy considerations: (1) the immorality inherent in gambling on the life of
another human being and (2) the moral hazard created when a beneficiary

10

See, e.g.., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79103(c)(1)(A);) (2004).
11
See, e.g., Crotty v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Maine, 144 U.S. 621 (1892);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U.S. 498 (1883); Warnock v. Davis,
104 U.S. at 775.
12
See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 108 U.S. at 505-06; Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901 A.2d 106 (Del. 2006); Prime Mortg. USA,
Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628, 669-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a
statute giving an employer an insurable interest in its employees applies whether
the employer provides the policy to the employee or purchases a policy on its
employee’s life.).).
13
See, e.g., Waldman v. Maini, 195 P.3d 850 (Nev. 2008).
14
Compare Loshin, supra note 1 (arguing that elimination of the insurable
interest requirement will free economic forces to police the insurance industry and
the secondary markets and protect against the abuses the insurable interest
requirement is intended to assuage) with BOLTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1
(analyzing the traditional insurable interested requirement as applied to the modern
phenomenon of stranger-originated life insurance).
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has a motivation to bring about the death of an insured to accelerate a
policy’s payout. 15
Gambling on lives was a relatively common practice in 18th century
England, where the institution resembled modern day sports betting. While
this wagering sometimes took place in social settings, the preferred method
for wagering was the purchase of life insurance contracts, most often on the
lives of public figures. The value of these speculative contracts floated
depending on factors affecting the perceived life expectancy of an insured,
like the turning of tide in war and the progress of capital trials. Though
public condemnation of the practice in England lagged far behind the rest
of Europe, by the late-18th century, public sentiment had turned. Gambling
on lives came to be viewed as blunting human empathy and encouraging
acts by beneficiaries that would hasten collection of a policy’s death
benefit.16
A notorious example often cited as illustrating the moral hazard
inherent in a life insurance policy issued to one without an insurable
interest in the insured’s life17 is the case of Thomas Griffiths Wainewright
(1774-1847).18 Wainewright was an author and dandy with extravagant
tastes that led him to commit increasingly risky and horrific crimes to
satisfy his appetites and the debts they accumulated. When forgery and the
acceleration of an inheritance by his uncle’s suspicious death were
insufficient to sustain Wainewright’s lavish lifestyle, he turned to life
insurance as an “investment.” Wainwright insured the life of his sister-inlaw, though he did not have an insurable interest in her life, and soon
increased the coverage on her life six-fold. She died of poisoning shortly
thereafter. Wainewright never successfully collected the life insurance
proceeds, and he as he spent the remainder of his years in jail on a charge
of forgery.19 Though not as romanticized as the Wainewright case, another
often cited example of moral hazard is the Weldon case, where a woman
15

See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. at
778-79; Trinity College v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 18 S.E. 175 (N.C. 1893); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561 (1876); Connecticut MutualMut. Life Insurance
CompanyIns. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France,
94 U.S. 561 (1876); William Reynolds Vance, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF LIFE
INSURANCE 125-26 (1904); Robert W. Buechner, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 7 (2008).
16
GEOFFREY WILSON CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 49-60 (1999).
17
See, e.g., Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154-155.
18
Wainewright wrote under the pseudonym Janus Weathercock.
19
ALEXANDER COLIN CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRIME 223-38 (1902).
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purchased a life insurance policy on the life of her two-and-one-half-yearold niece and then poisoned the child in an effort to accelerate payment of
the policy’s death benefit.20
It is worthwhile to note that in both the Wainewright and Weldon
cases, at the time each crime occurred, both jurisdictions had an insurable
interest requirement that voided the policies.21 While these example are
proof that in at least some cases the insurable interest requirement is
insufficient to eliminate the motivation of an individual with a criminal
disposition to use life insurance as part of a nefarious scheme, the
requirement is likely to have at least some deterrent effect by exponentially
increasing the difficulty of securing a death benefit payout in the absence
of an insurable interest.22
C.

SNAPSHOT OR CONTINUUM
1. In general

Generally, an insurable interest is required only at the time a life
insurance policy is issued, unless the policy specifies otherwise.23 This
stands in contrast to most other types of insurance polices, which require
beneficial owners of a policy to have an insurable interest in the subject
matter of the policy both when the policy is issued and when the policy
pays on a loss.24
20

Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696 (Ala.
1957).); See also MutualMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886)
(considering whether the assignee of a life insurance policy is permitted to recover
the policy’s death benefit. Unsurprisingly, the Court decided against the
murderer.)..); Ben Kingree & Louise Tanner, Life Insurance as Motive for Murder,
29 TORT & INS. L.J. 761 (1994).
21
See LIFE ASSURANCE ACT, 1774, 14 Geo., 3, c. 48 (Eng.); Liberty
NationalNatt’l Life InsuranceIns. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696at 704; Campbell,
supra note 19, at 225;.
22
See Kingree & Tanner, supra note 20, at 772.
23
See, e.g.., MO. REV. STAT. § 5862; Connecticut MutualMut. Life Insurance
CompanyIns. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876); MutualWellhouse v.
United Paper Co., 29 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1929); Mut. Life InsuranceIns. Co. v.
Allen, 138 Mass. 24 (1884); Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N.Y. 593 (1881); Bowers v.
Missouri Mut. Ass'n, 62 S.W.2d 1058 (Mo.,1933);); First-Columbus Nat. Bank v.
D. S. Pate Lumber Co., 141 So. 767 (Miss. 1932); Appeal of Corson, 6 A. 213 (Pa.
1886).Hilliard v. Jacobs, 874 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Rawls v.
American Life Ins. Co., 36 Barb. 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862);
24
See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 322 (20092010).
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From the advent of the insurable interest requirement, most
jurisdictions have followed the modern rule, only requiring an insurable
interest in the insured’s life at the time the policy is issued and not at any
time thereafter.25 For example, when a life insurance policy purchased on a
spouse’s life during marriage names the other spouse as a beneficiary, in
most jurisdictions, divorce will not terminate an ex-spouse’s right to collect
policy proceeds even though the ex-spouse’s insurable interest likely died
with the divorce.26
2. Application of the Insurable Interest Requirement to
Policy Assignments
While the insurable interest requirement has generally only applied
at a policy’s issuance, courts have struggled with the issue of whether an
insurable interest is also required of an assignee on assignment of the
policy. While the present rule permitting assignment to a person without an
insurable interest is fairly uniform across jurisdictions, prior to the 20th
century, there was a split of authority. In some jurisdictions, an assignment
of a life insurance policy to a person without an insurable interest in the
insured’s life was void as a matter of law.27 In other jurisdictions, such an
assignment was permissible, though not so to the extent it violated the
prohibition on wager policies.28
Courts requiring an assignee to have an insurable interest in the life
of the insured typically reasoned that the public policy rationale for
25

See, e.g., Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. at 30 (1899); Appeal of
Corson, 6 A. at 213.
26
Connecticut MutualMut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 457; Land v. West Coast
Life Ins. Co, 270 P.2d 154, 156 (Or. 1954); Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278
(1907).
27
See, e.g.., Warnock v. Davis, 104 USU.S. 775, 781 (1881); Stevens v.
Warren, 101 Mass. 564 (1869); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 121
(1872) (refusing to permit assignment of a policy to one without an insurable
interest on the grounds that “[a]ll the objections that exist against the issuing of a
policy to one upon the life of another in whose life the former has no insurable
interest, seem to us to exist against his holding such policy by mere purchase and
assignment from another. In either case, the holder of such policy is interested in
the death, rather than the life, of the party assured.)..”).
28
See e.g. Steinback v. Diepenbrock,28 See, e.g., Midland Nat’l Bank of
Minneapolis v. Dakota Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 346 (1928); Grigsby, 222 U.S. 149
(1911); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886);. Aetna Life Ins Co
v. France, 94 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1876); Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 52 N.E. at 662.
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requiring an insurable interest at a policy’s inception apply equally on
assignment of the policy. They reasoned that the assignee gambles that the
insured will die sooner rather than later, thus benefitting from the insured’s
early passing. They also viewed the assignee as motivated to hasten the
insured’s death to the same extent as a person without an insurable interest
who purchases a policy on the insured’s life from an insurance company.29
In jurisdictions requiring assignees to have an insurable interest in
the insured’s life, an assignee who purchased a policy from the insured was
treated as the insured’s creditor to the extent of amounts expended by the
assignee. The assignee was only permitted to recover an amount of the
death benefit equal to the sum of consideration paid for the assignment and
any premiums and fees paid by the assignee.30
By the early 20th century, a majority of jurisdictions generally
upheld assignment of a life insurance policy to an assignee without
insurable interest in the insured’s life.31 However, some assignments are
still impermissible.
3. Prohibited Assignments
Schemes designed to circumvent the insurable interest requirement
by effectuating an initial purchase of a life insurance policy by a person
with an insurable interest in the insured’s life and subsequently transferring
the policy to a party without an insurable interest are not a new
phenomenon.32 In the late 19th century, jurisdictions requiring an insurable
interest only at a policy’s inception were aware that permitting assignment
of life insurance policies made circumventing the insurable interest
requirement possible but believed that other policy considerations
outweighed the danger of permitting free-assignment (see infra section
V).33

29

Id.
See, e.g., Culver v. Guyer, 29 So. 779 (Ala. 1901); Missouri Valley Life Ins.
Co. v. Sturgis, 18 Kan. 93 (1877);).
31
Steinback, 52 N.E. at 663 (considering whether assignment of a policy to an
assignee without an insurable interest in the insured’s life was permissible, and
concluding that: “The result of our further examination persuades us that what has
been understood to be the rule in this state is not only in line with the authorities in
most jurisdictions upon that subject, but is sound as a matter of public policy.”)
(emphasis added).
32
Warnock, 104 US 775 (1881).
33
Steinback, 158 N. Y. 24 at 31.
30
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Even where an insurable interest appears to have existed at a
policy’s issuance, courts often dig deeper to determine whether the party
with an insurable interest in the insured’s life purchased the policy with the
intent to circumvent the prohibition on wager policies.34 The intent of the
parties to a transaction involving the purchase and assignment of a policy
controls treatment of the transactions. Regardless of the form of the
transaction, if the intent of the parties is to effectuate a wager policy, courts
ignored the intermediate step of the insured purchasing the policy and read
the transaction as a direct purchase of the policy by the assignee. If the
assignee did not have an insurable interest in the insured’s life, the policy
was void for lack of an insurable interest.35
The modern approach to assignments developed through two U.S.
Supreme Court cases, Warnock and Grigsby.
4. Warnock
Warnock was an early U.S. Supreme Court case holding that the
assignment of a life insurance policy to someone without an insurable
interest was impermissible. In Warnock, the insured purchased a life
insurance policy and assigned the policy to investors who would pay all
premiums on the policy, retaining nine-tenths of the policy’s death benefit
and remitting the remaining ten-percent to the insured’s family.36
The Supreme Court held that an assignment of a policy to a person
without an insurable interest in the insured’s life was impermissible
because it was just as objectionable as purchase of the policy outright by
that same party. The assignee has, after all, a pecuniary interest in the
insured’s death.37
Rather than void the assignment, the Court permitted the assignee
to recover an amount equal to the assignee’s outlay in the transaction. The
assignment, and the subsequent payout of the death benefit, was partitioned
into two components. The first part was an amount equal to sums actually
advanced by the assignee, with interest.38 This amount was essentially
34

Conn. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460-63 (1876); Loomis
v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396, 398-99 (Mass. 1856). Steinback, 158
N. Y. at 31; See generally Application of the insurable interest requirement to
assignments is discussed infra.
35
Steinback, 158 N. Y. 31-32.
36
Warnock, 104 U.S. at 775-76; See also Franklin Life Insurance Company v.
Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 117-18 (1872).
37
See Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779-80.
38
Id. at 781.

66

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

deemed to be a loan from the assignee to the insured. As such, the assignee
has an insurable interest in the insured’s life to the extent of this amount,
and the assignment is valid to that extent. The second part of the
assignment, which includes any amount of the payout in addition to the
first amount, was a payout on an illegal wager policy.39
Cases decided subsequent to Warnock often focused on the fact
that the policy at issue in Warnock was taken out under an agreement to
immediately assign the policy; the policy was purchased to benefit parties
without an insurable interest in the insured’s life and was clearly a wager
policy.40
5. Grigsby
The second case, Grigsby, took a more nuanced approach than
Warnock, holding that assignments factually akin to those in Warnock were
invalid, but that a blanket prohibition on assignment to a person without an
insurable interest was too restrictive. While cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court prior to Warnock had hinted at the free assignability of life
insurance policies without an insurable interest requirement,41 it was not
until the Court’s decision in Grigbsy that the doctrine took its final, modern
form.42
In Grigsby, the insured assigned a policy to someone without an
insurable interest after the policy was purchased and after the insured made
two premium payments. When the insured was unable to make the third
39

See id. at 782-83; Cammack, 82 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1872); See also
Steinback, 158 N.Y. at 32-33.
40
See Steinback. 158 N. Y. at 32. Without addressing Warnock’s arguments
against assignability, the court in Steinback v. Diepenbrock (1899) held that
assignment of a validly issued life insurance policy to a person without an
insurable interest in the insured’s life is permissible. In discussing Warnock, the
court emphasized that the transaction at issue in Warnock would be illegal because
it involved the purchase of a policy with the intent to sell it. They believed it unfair
to restrict policy holders from selling their policies to attend to their financial
needs, especially when the insured suffers from an illness that has dramatically
reduced his or her lifespan.
41
See e.g. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fr., 94 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1876) (holding that
an assignment by the insured to a family member is presumed not to be made as
“cover for a wager policy,” regardless of the arrangement between the parties for
payment of premiums.); See also N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S.
591, 597 (1886) (holding that a validly issued policy is freely assignable.).
42
Grigsby v Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
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payment, he sold the policy to a Dr. Grigsby to pay for needed surgery.
There was no allegation that the insured purchased the policy with the
intent to assign it to a third party.
Agreeing with Warnock, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that
Grigsby was only permitted to take the policy’s death benefit to the extent
of his advances, including the amount he paid for the policy and premium
payments he made prior to the insured’s death.43
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, overruled the appellate court
and extended the permissibility of assignments of life insurance policies to
assignees without an insurable interest in the insured’s life, “where an
honest contract is sold in good faith.”44
The Court recognized that in early English cases, the primary
purpose of the insurable interest requirement was to prohibit wager
policies. Citing the permissibility of remainders after life estates, the Court
made the case that the law does not inherently disfavor “pecuniary benefit
accruing upon a death.”45 The Court recognized that after a policy is validly
issued, the insured will have the best frame of reference for deciding
whether to trust a potential assignee.46
III.

IMPACT OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT
ON A POLICY’S ENFORCEABILITY

The insurable interest requirement is fundamental to the existence
of a life insurance contract. Because of the important public policy
considerations motivating the requirement, an insurance contract issued
without an insurable interest is in most cases void and cannot be
resurrected by agreement of the parties or because the of inaction on the
part of the insurer.47 The taint infecting a policy issued without an insurable
interest thus follows a policy from its issuance to the insured’s death.

43

Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir. 1909).
Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. at 156.
45
Id. at 155-56.
46
Id. at 155.
47
See Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 686-88 (Md. 1988);
Woods v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 113 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
But see Van Zandt v. Morris, 17 So. 2d 435, 436 (Miss. 1944); Rogers v. Atlantic
Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89 133 S.E. 215, 218 (S.C. 1926). See generally 44 C.J.S.
Ins. § 378 (2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt. a (2009)
(stating that a “’void contract’ is not a contract at all; it is the ‘promise’ or
‘agreement’ that is void of legal effect”).
44
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VOID AND VOIDABLE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS

A life insurance policy purchased by a person without an insurable
interest in insured’s life is void ab initio.48 An agreement that is void ab
initio is unenforceable by either party to the agreement, because either the
law does not provide a remedy for breach of the agreement or does not
“recognize a duty of performance.”49 Generally, contracts that are void ab
initio are missing an element essential for contract formation or are so
violative of the law or public policy that it would be improper to enforce
them in the courts.50
Though often referred to as a “void contract,” an agreement that is
void ab initio is not a contract and is unenforceable from its inception.51 As
a result, in most jurisdictions an insurer cannot be required to pay the death
benefit on a life insurance policy that is void ab initio.52
In contrast to a void contract, a voidable contract is enforceable,
but the legal obligations created by the contract may be rescinded at the
option of one (or, alternatively, all) of the parties to the contract.53 For
instance, a life insurance contract is voidable by the company who issued
the policy based on material misrepresentations made by the applicant that
the insurer relied on when issuing the policy; for instance, when the insured
fails to disclose serious health problems material to the company’s decision
whether to issue the policy.54

48

See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104 (2002); CAL INS. CODE §
10110(e) (1997); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881); Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460, 24 L.Ed. 251 (1876); First Penn-Pacific
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 313 Fed.Appx. 633, 636 (4th Cir. 2009); Wuliger v. Mfrs.
Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2009); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v.
Fima, 105 F.3d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1997); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity
Financial Group, LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Fla. 2009); Ky. Cen. Life Ins.
Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269, 272 (D. Kan. 1993); Gristy v. Hudgens, 203 P.
569, 572 (Ariz. 1922); Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 688
(Md. 1988).
49
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt. a.
50
See e.g., Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir.
2008).
51
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt a.
52
See generally 44 C.J.S. Ins. § 352 (2009).
53
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY void contract (8th Ed. 2004).
54
3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 367. See e.g. Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 96 So.2d 497, 489-99 (La. 1957).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE NONENFORCEABILITY OF A POLICY
ISSUED WITHOUT AN INSURABLE INTEREST

In a small minority of jurisdictions, including Texas, an insurer
who issues a policy to a party without an insurable interest in the insured’s
life may nevertheless be required by the court to pay out policy proceeds.
In such a case, the policy may be void or voidable with respect to the party
purchasing the policy but can still be given effect by the court. When
required to pay out on such a policy, the proceeds will generally be
distributed under equitable principles. In most cases, this rule results in
payment of policy proceeds to the decedent insured’s estate.55
The justification for requiring a company to pay on an otherwise
illegal policy is that the insurer should not be permitted to take shelter in
failure of the insurable interest requirement when the insurer was in the
best position to determine whether the requirement was satisfied. The
insurer is not harmed by being required to pay the set amount it contracted
to pay under the policy, even though the estate was not a named
beneficiary. 56
C.

THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT AND CONTESTABILITY
PERIOD

In a small minority of jurisdictions there are limited circumstances
under which an insurance company will not be permitted to rescind a
policy issued without an insurable interest. Most jurisdictions provide for a
contestability period, after which a life insurance company is not permitted
to challenge the policy’s enforceability based on the applicant’s fraud or
misrepresentation. Most states have a two-year contestability period.57
Generally, an incontestability clause is based on the presumption
that a valid contract exists. In the case of voidable contracts—such as those
entered into based on misrepresentations by the applicant—a valid contract
exists, and the contestability period applies to permit the insurance
company to challenge payout on the policy.58
55

See e.g., Steinback v. Diepenbroc, 52 N.E. 662 (N.Y. 1899).
Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Int’l Accident Facilities
Inc., 999 S.W.2d 12, 14-16 (Tex.Ct. App. 1998).
57
See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5(a) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7102(b) (2010); D.C. CODE § 31-4703 (3)(A)(i) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 627.455
(2005).
58
Bryan D. Bolton & Michael P. Cunningham, An Ancient Doctrine Confronts
Modern Problems, FOR THE DEFENSE 57, 61 (Sept. 2008).
56
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Because a contract purchased by a party without an insurable
interest in the insured’s life is void, and not simply voidable, most states
permit a life insurance company to challenge the enforceability of a life
insurance contract on insurable interest grounds even after the close of the
contestability period,59 on the basis that to disallow a challenge to the
legality of a contract purchased without an insurable interest would allow
private parties to subvert public policy by agreement.60
Only two jurisdictions—Michigan and New York—have barred an
insurance company from rescinding a policy issued without an insurable
interest after the contestability period has passed.61
IV.

BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING INSURABLE INTEREST

Though the duty to determine whether an insurable interest exists
when a policy is issued rests at least nominally on the insurer’s shoulders,62
59

See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Fima, 105 F.3d 490 (9th. Cir. 1997);
Carter v. Cont'l Life Ins. Co., 115 F. 2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Hooker, 62 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1933) First Penn Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Evans,No.
05-444, 2007 WL 1810707 (D.Md. 2007); Ky. Cent. v. McNabb, 825 F. Supp. 269
(D.C. Kan. 1969); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 28 So.2d 910 (Ala.
1947); Home Life v. Masterson, 21 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. 1929); Foreman v. Great
United Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 23 N.E. 2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939); Bromley's Adm'r
v. Wash. Life Ins. Co, 92 S.W. 17 (Ky. 1906); Stevens v. Woodmen of the World,
71 P.2d 898 (Mont. 1937); Wharton v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co, 173 S.E. 338 (N.C.
1934); Brady v Prudential Life Ins. Co, 5 Kulp 505 (1890); Henderson v. Life Ins.
Co. of Va., 179 S.E. 680 (S.C. 1935). See generally Franklin L. Best Jr.,
Securitization of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 911
(2009).
60
Additionally, most jurisdictions will not allow the use of waiver and
estoppel to force a life insurance company to pay out on a policy issued without an
insurable interest or bar an insurer from raising lack of an insurable interest as a
defense to payment of policy proceeds. See Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269 (D.Kan. 1993); Beard v. American Agency Life Ins.
Co., 550 A.2d 677 (Md. 1988); Woods v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 113
S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). See generally C.J.S. Ins. § 378 (2007).
61
See e.g. Bogacki v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 253 Mich. 253 (Mi. 1931);
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 523 N.Y.S.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988), order aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 74 (1989). Note that in Michigan, the decision to bar
rescission of a contract issued without an insurable interest was based on the fact
that the state did not have an insurable interest statute. The public policy
considerations driving the contestability statute were held to prevail over the
common law insurable interest requirement. Bogacki, 234 N.W. at 866.
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in effect, the financial burden resulting from failure of the insurable interest
requirement falls decisively on the policy’s owner and beneficiaries.63 As
established above, a policy issued in violation of the insurable interest
requirement is generally void and unenforceable and, regardless of any
inequity, the insurer will not be required to pay out on the policy to the
policy’s beneficiaries, the decedent’s family members, or any other party.64
The purchaser of the policy issued without an insurable interest will, in
most cases, hold a valueless policy, and beneficiaries will not receive the
policy’s death benefit if the policy is found to have been issued without an
insurable interest. Thus, for practical purposes, it is a policy’s owner and
beneficiaries who bear the economic burden of the insurable interest
requirement.
In addition to bearing the financial burden associated with a failure
of the insurable interest requirement, beneficiaries also have the burden of
proving the existence of an insurable interest in a lawsuit on a life
insurance policy.65 The burden is the beneficiary’s regardless of whether
the beneficiary brings suit to compel the insurance company to pay the
death benefit to the beneficiary, or if the insurer seeks a declaratory
judgment stating that the beneficiary has no right to the policy proceeds.66
62

An insurer who does not conduct due diligence when issuing or paying out
on a policy may inadvertently pay on a void policy or face the expense of
challenging a beneficiary’s right to a policy payout. In general, only the insurer has
the power to raise lack of an insurable interest as a defense to payment on a policy.
See e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Tower, 251 F.Supp. 215 (D. Md. 1966); In re
Marriage of Day, 74 P.3d 46 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003); Ryan v. Tickle, 316 N.W.2d
580 (Neb.1982); Moran v. Moran, 346 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
63
Beneficiaries have the burden of proving the existence of an insurable
interest. See Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269 (D. Kan.
1993); Rubenstein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 584 F.Supp. 272 (D.C.
La. 1984); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 70 So. 190 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915;
Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Houseworth, 25 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943). The
burden is the beneficiary’s regardless of whether the beneficiary brings suit to
compel the insurance company to pay the death benefit to the beneficiary, or if the
insurer seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the beneficiary has no right to the
policy proceeds. See e.g., Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. 825 F.Supp. at 273.
64
See supra Part III.
65
Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. 825 F.Supp. at 269; Rubenstein v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York, 584 F.Supp. 272 (D. La.,1984); American Nat. Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 70 So. 190 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915); Interstate Life & Acc. Co., 25 S.E.2d at
233.
66
See e.g. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. at 269.
Insurers have also been held liable for failing to inform the insured that a policy
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Up to this point, the discussion has been limited to claims sounding
in contract. Though an insurer who carelessly or even intentionally issues a
policy to a party without an insurable interest in the insured’s life cannot
usually be compelled to pay the policy’s death benefit, an insurer may be
held liable in tort for the failure. Insurers have a duty to use reasonable care
in determining whether the purchaser of a policy has an insurable interest
in the insured’s life, and can be held liable in a wrongful death suit for
failing to investigate whether the party purchasing the policy has an
insurable interest, where the insured is murdered so the policy owner can
collect on the policy.67
Regardless of who bears the burden—financial or otherwise—of
determining whether an insurable interest exists at policy issuance
ultimately falls upon, in practice, such determination is best made at policy
issuance based on responses to the policy application. The questions and
representations requested within a policy application are not static, and the
insurance carrier has wide latitude to alter these questions to ascertain
issues pertaining to the existence of a valid insurable interest. As a result,
the carrier’s application can serve as a first line of defense against
undesirable life insurance practices like STOLI. The insurance carriers bear
some portion of the burden to fortify their policy applications to discover
whether an insurable interest exists, and ferret out potential abuses, prior to
policy issuance. The applicant’s contemporaneous burden to be truthful,
and not make material misrepresentations on an well crafted insurance
application will serve to ensure the presence of a bona fide insurable
interest as a life insurance policy is issued.
V.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AS PERSONAL
PROPERTY
A.

INTRODUCTION

Life insurance contracts developed from a simple, nontransferable
contract providing security for the insured’s family into its modern form,

has been taken out on his life. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 362
(S.C. 1964).
67
Overstreet v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1991); Liberty
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696 (Ala. 1958); Life Ins. Co. of Georgia
v. Lopez, 443 So.2d 947 (Fla. 1983); Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 804
N.E.2d 519, 533-35 (Ill., 2004).
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which includes an investment or savings component.68 Life insurance
contracts are a type of personal property called a “chose in action.”69 A
chose in action gives the person holding the chose “the liberty of
proceeding in the courts of law.” The holder has a right to pursue an action
in damages or to compel the payment of money due.
Historically, English law did not recognize the existence of
intangible personal property. As such, the chose n action was a
nontransferable right that could be exercised only by its original holder.70
An attempted assignment of a chose in action gave no rights to the
assignor.71 But the commercial desirability of permitting the assignability
of contract rights and the right to sue on those rights eventually prompted
innovation allowing transferability of the chose in action.
Initially, an assignment could only be made indirectly, with the
assignee pursuing a cause of action in the assignor’s name.72 Modern law
dispenses with this requirement, allowing the assignor to bring suit in his
own name.73
B.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS
AS TRANSFERABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY

Life insurance is a particular form of property subject to a set of
rules crafted in response to its unique nature. Until the early 1900s, these

68

See Comment, The Assignment of Life Insurance as Collateral Security for
Bank Loans, 58 YALE L.J. 743, 743-44 (1949).
69
See Central Nat. Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 207-208 (1888); Warnock v.
Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1881); Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir.
1909). The phrase “chose in action” is a Norman French meaning, essentially,
“right in action.” The chose in action stands in contrast to the “chose in
possession,” which refers to a right of possession in movable personal property.
Joseph James Darlington & Joshua Williams, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY 6-11 (T. J.W. Johnson 1891).
70
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 405 (Baker, Voorhis &
Co. 1924). The advent of the transferability of the chose in action was stalled by
the fear that transferability would encourage the offense of maintenance, the
encouragement of a lawsuit by an uninterested party, here the transferee. See
Darlington, supra note 69 at 7-9.
71
See Darlington & Williams, supra note 69 at 6-7.
72
Id. at 8-10.
73
Id. at 10-11.
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peculiarities stalled the development of life insurance as an investment and
savings vehicle.74
One of the primary factors that limited or eliminated the
investment value of pre-20th century life insurance contracts was their
limited transferability. Although technically transferrable or assignable as
security for a debt, under American law it was the beneficiary and not the
insured or purchaser of the policy who had the power to assign the policy.75
Generally, 19th century life insurance policies were strictly a
contract providing for a payout to beneficiaries on insured’s death. Life
insurance afforded protection to the insured’s family should he meet an
untimely end.76 These policies did not generally allow the insured to
change the policy’s beneficiary.77
Policy beneficiaries were deemed to have an irrevocable vested
interest in the policy, which protected the beneficiary’s interest in the
policy from the insured’s creditors.78 While the insured was under no
obligation to continue making premium payment, the beneficiary was
permitted to keep his or her vested interest in policy proceeds alive by
making the premium payments.79
Nineteenth-century insurance contracts, as indicated, did not
usually provide the insured with an option to change policy beneficiaries;80
this was true even where the insured kept the policy in his physical
possession and paid all premiums on the policy.81 And because policies did
not typically provide for any payout other than a death benefit, an insured
did not have any power over the policy.82 The insured’s only role was to
purchase the policy and pay the premiums. After the policy was issued, the
74

See generally Comment, supra note 68 at 743-44.
See id. at 746.
76
Charles Kelley Knight, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
TO 1870, 132-160 (1920) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania) available at http://books.google.com (describing the development of
life insurance from 1861-1870, a time of innovation that would permanently alter
the purpose of life insurance).
77
See Comment, supra note 68, at 746; Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc., 90 So. 834, 835-36 (1922). See also Vance, supra note 15, at 407.
78
Yore v. Booth, 42 P. 808, 808 (Cal. 1895).
79
See Vance, supra note 15 at 201 (noting that payment of premiums by one
who does not have an interest in the life insurance policy does not confer an
ownership interest in payor.)
80
See Comment, supra note 68, at 46-48.
81
See Yore, 42 P. at 808. See generally Comment, supra note 68, 743-44, n.9.
82
See Comment, supra note 68, at 745.
75
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insured had no further say in the disposition of the policy, other than to cut
off premium payments. As a result, an assignment of the policy was only
valid if the beneficiary was a party to the assignment.83 Because the insured
had no control over a policy once it was issued, the insured did not have an
interest in the policy that was capable of assignment. Beneficiaries, on the
other hand, had a vested interest in policy proceeds that was capable of
transfer or assignment to a third party.
When a life insurance policy did not reserve the insured’s right to
change the beneficiary, under the vested interest rule, the policy’s
beneficiaries had a vested interest in the life insurance policy. A
beneficiary’s vested interest could not be defeated by action of the insured,
except to the extent permitted by the policy.84 In contrast, when a policy
reserved the insured’s right to change the policy’s beneficiary, the insured
had only an expectancy in policy proceeds.85
In the late 19th century, insurers began to include provisions in their
policies granting the insured the right to change the policy beneficiary.86
This change was made, in part, as a response to the fact that, in most cases,
the vested interest rule defeated the intent of the insured who purchased life
insurance. Most insureds purchased policies to protect family members in
the event of the insured’s death. But the identity of dependent family
members and their favor with the insured was likely to change during the
insured’s lifetime. An insured’s ex-spouse, for instance, was a permanent
beneficiary of the policy regardless of the insured’s wishes or whether the
ex-spouse continued to rely on the insured for support.87
In addition to permitting insureds to change policy beneficiaries
during the life of the policy, life insurance companies also conceived of
innovations like legal reserve life insurance, which introduced the concept
of policy surrender value and produced new forms of insurance like whole
life and universal life insurance.88 These changes transformed life insurance
83

Id. at 747.
Filley v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193 (Kan. 1914); Van Bibber's Adm'r, &
Co. v. Van Bibber, 82 Ky. 347, 350 (Ky. 1884).
85
See Comment, supra note 68, at 48-50.
86
See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Daley, 143 P. 1033 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914);
Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y., 90 So. 834, 835-36 (La. 1922).
87
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 459-63 (1876); Begley v.
Miller, 137 Ill.App. 278 (1907) Land v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 270 P.2d 154,
156-57 (Or. 1954).
88
See Vance, supra note 68 at 344. Whole life insurance has a level premium
for the life of the insured and accumulates value, permitting the insured to borrow
against the policy during his or her lifetime. Like whole life insurance, universal
84
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from a contract only providing for payment of a death benefit to a fullfeatured savings vehicle. With the steady development of rules and industry
norms that transformed life insurance from simple insurance to an
investment and savings product, life insurance was soon touted as an
alternative to other investment products and bank savings accounts.89
Once these new contracts that permitted the insured to change
beneficiaries made their way to the courts, the issue arose as to whether the
insured must replace the beneficiary with the assignee in order to transfer
the beneficiary’s rights in the contract to the assignee. Most courts quickly
realized that to withhold the assignee’s rights in the contract where the
beneficiary of the contract was not changed to reflect the assignment was to
ignore the reality of the situation. The insured’s right to change
beneficiaries of a policy came to be viewed as an election by the insured to
keep beneficial ownership for himself during his lifetime.90 An insured
with the power to change the policy beneficiary has the power to assign the
policy, thus effectively cutting off any interest the original beneficiary had
in the policy. Many courts viewed assignment of a policy as, in effect, an
exercise of the insured’s power to change the policy’s beneficiary.91
C.

MODERN APPROACH TO ASSIGNMENT

Today, most states permit the assignment of a life insurance policy
as long as the assignment is not entered into as cover for a wager policy.92
A validly issued life insurance policy, purchased by the insured, is
absolutely assignable, whether as collateral for a loan or in an absolute sale,
without restriction. As such, a validly issued policy may be assigned to a
person without an insurable interest in the insured’s life.93
In spite of the assignability of life insurance policies, a minority of
jurisdictions limit the amount of a policy’s death benefit that is payable to a
life insurance also accumulate internal value. In contrast to a whole life policy, a
portion of each universal life policy premium is allocated to cost of insurance, with
the remainder being allocated to policy buildup . BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 805
(6th ed. 1990).
89
See Comment, supra note 68, at 344.
90
See id. at 749.
91
Rawls v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 36 Barb. 357 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1862); See
Comment, supra note 68, at 49 n. 46.
92
See supra Part II.
93
See e.g., Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir. 1909); Corning Bank &
Trust. Co. v. Foster, 74 S.W.2d 797 (Ark. 1934); Lanier v. Shuman, 24 S.E.2d 55
(Ga. 1943). See generally 30 A.L.R. 2d 1310 § 16 (2009).
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creditor of the insured. Because a life insurance policy is often
irreplaceable, such as when the insured is elderly or in poor health,94 many
jurisdictions restrict the extent to which a creditor is permitted to collect the
policy’s death benefit. When a policy is assigned to a creditor as security
for a debt, the creditor’s interest in the policy’s proceeds cannot exceed the
debt owed by the insured to the creditor. But full-assignment or sale of a
policy does not result in a mere creditor’s interest in policy proceeds. The
assignee is entitled to full payment of the policy’s death benefit.95
VI.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECONDARY LIFE INSURANCE
MARKET
A.

GENESIS OF VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS

Life insurance developed from an unassignable right to payment of
a death benefit into its present form as a full-featured savings vehicle. For
most of its history, life insurance was intended primarily to provide
security for the insured’s family after the insured’s death. Recent
developments, however, are “turning life insurance on its head.”96 With
$26 trillion in life insurance policies in force in the US, it was only a matter
of time before investors sought out ways to tap into this uncorrelated asset
class.97
Prior to the 1980s, the business of buying and selling life insurance
policies was not a robust industry. While life insurance policies were
regularly bought and sold, the transactions did not take place in a
developed market but occurred in relative isolation. The AIDS crisis of the
1980s and 90s, however, generated substantial interest in the purchase and
sale of life insurance policies. With limited treatment options, individuals
diagnosed with AIDS had radically reduced life spans, dramatically
increasing the value of their life insurance policies. Viatical settlement
companies sprang up, willing to purchase policies from the terminally ill
insured for prices far in excess of the policy’s surrender values, but at a
price low enough to net the company a profit when the insured died. When
94

See Comment, supra note 68, at 745.
See St. John v. Am. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 13 N.Y. 31 (N.Y. 1855).
96
See Robert S. Bloink, Premium Financed Surprises: Cancellation of
Indebtedness Income and Financed Life Insurance, 63 THE TAX LAWYER 283, 286
(2010).
97
See Anderson, supra note 2. The value of a life insurance policy is
uncorrelated to the performance of other markets, so life insurance offers a
measure of perceived stability in the current tumultuous financial environment.
95
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antiretroviral drugs began to extend the life expectancy of people infected
with HIV, viatical settlements quickly expanded to include terminal
illnesses other than AIDS.98
B.

THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE

Sensing the nearly endless supply of life insurance policies sitting
idle in the hands of insureds and their families, the viatical settlement
industry rapidly expanded into the life settlement market, offering elderly
insureds who are not terminally ill the option of selling their life insurance
policies for cash in excess of the surrender value of the policy.
The life settlement industry provides a steady stream of new
policies for the secondary market, but demand for investor-owned life
insurance policies far exceeds supply. This mismatch generated a demand
for policies not purchased through life settlement channels. Banks, hedge
funds and private equity groups saw the viatical markets and its
permutations as a door into the profitable longevity of risk markets that had
largely been the exclusive domain of insurance carriers for centuries.99
Wall Street imposed an asset backed securities100 paradigm upon
secondary life settlements and viatical markets with the hope the market
would grow and develop as the mortgage market had developed 20 years
98

See generally Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007);
Bloink, supra note 96; Alexander D. Eremia, Viatical Settlement and Accelerated
Death Benefit Law: Helping Terminal, but not Chronically Ill Patients, 1 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 773 (1997).
99
See Anderson, supra note 2. Life settlement and viatical settlement involve
the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party for less than the face value of the
policy and prior to its maturity. The settlement amount is generally greater than the
total amount of premiums and fees paid by the insured. In both types of settlement
the purchaser will receive payment of death benefits on the policy. Life settlement
is the sale of a life insurance policy on the life of a party who is not “terminally or
chronically ill.” In viatical settlement, the insured is usually “terminally or
chronically ill,” resulting in a shorter life expectancy than predicted by mortality
tables. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (9th ed. 2009). See generally Patrick D.
Dolan, Securitization of Life Settlements, Structured Settlements, and Lottery
Awards, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZAITON 2008 (Practicing Law Institute,
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 14108,
2008).
100
Asset backed securities are securities that are secured by pooled, generally
illiquid, assets such as mortgages, life insurance policies, or student loans.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (9th ed. 2009).
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earlier.101 The investment calculus turned on mitigating the actuarial risk by
aggregating large pools of insurance policies and an endless supply of
cheap money to fund the ongoing premium obligations. Obtaining these
large portfolios of insurance policies containing the right mix of premium
costs and insureds’ predicted mortality became an increasing problem.102
To generate a pool of policies significant enough to satisfy demand
and to smooth the actuarial risk inherent in smaller pools, the market
developed strategies designed to cut the insured out of the process. For
investors, the ideal would be to directly purchase life insurance policies
without the insured’s involvement; however, the insurable interest
requirement necessitated the crafting of complex strategies designed to
utilize an insured’s unlimited insurable interest in his own life to purchase
policies that could not be issued directly to the investor. Stranger-owned
life insurance is one of those strategies.
VII.

STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (STOLI)
A.

INTRODUCTION

Stranger-owned life insurance (STOLI) refers to the practice of
purchasing a life insurance policy with the intent to transfer the policy to a
third party.103 STOLI takes many forms, but in general, it is an arrangement
designed to acquire and transfer a life insurance policy to investors.104
Typically, a STOLI arrangement is initiated by someone other than
the insured, such as an insurance broker, attorney, or other third party who
approaches the insured and initiates the insured’s involvement in the
program. Though stranger or investor initiation of the purchase of the
policy is typical it is not universal.105
Investors and third parties secure the participation of insureds with
incentives and promises of profits when the policy is sold. Incentives may
include a lump-sum payment at the policy’s purchase, partial payment of
101

See Anderson, supra note 2; Rachel Emma Silverman, Letting an Investor
Bet on When You’ll Die: New Insurance Deals Aimed At Wealthy Raise Concerns;
Surviving a Two-Year Window, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, at D1.
102
See Bloink, supra note 96.
103
See Best, supra note 59, at 912-13.
104
See Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger Originated Life Insurance (STOLI):
What Counsel (and What Every Advisor) Must Absolutely Positively Know!,
SP037 ALI-ABA 573 (2009).
105
See id.
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policy proceeds to the insured’s family, or “free” insurance for the duration
of the contestability period.106
STOLI arrangements often delay transfer of ownership of the life
insurance policy or ILIT from the insured to investors until after the
policy’s incontestability period has passed, believing that the
incontestability clause will shield the STOLI policy from challenge by the
insurer.107
Insureds will generally be unwilling or unable to pay the premiums
and other fees necessary to keep a high-value policy in force until the
policy’s incontestability period has passed. While investors may directly
pay fees and premiums, premium financing—the use of borrowed funds to
finance life insurance premiums—is the preferred method for making
premium payments on a STOLI policy. In a premium financing
arrangement, the premium finance lender—which may be a company
specializing in such lending, a traditional lending institution like a bank, or
even an insurance company—pays policy premiums on behalf of the
borrower-insured. The cost of the loan, including interest and fees, may be
billed to the insured or rolled into the loan.108
At the close of the premium finance loan period—which may range
from a year to policy maturity—the insured must either: (1) repay the loan,
including interest and fees, (2) roll the premium finance loan into a new
loan, or (3) surrender the policy (and any additional collateral supplied by
the borrower) to the premium finance lender.109
Premium finance makes it unnecessary for investors to directly pay
premiums and fees to the insurance company, which may alert the
company that the policy is part of a STOLI arrangement and trigger an
investigation that could end in rescission of the policy. Premium finance
also facilitates separation between investors and the insured by providing
putative cover for the true nature of the arrangement.110
In traditional premium finance, the insured debtor generally intends
on holding the insurance policy until its maturity. Traditional premium
finance facilitates estate liquidity for wealthy insureds. Typically the
106

See id. An incontestability clause specifies a time limit on the insurer’s
right to revoke a policy based on the insured’s misrepresentations. All jurisdictions
require life insurance contracts to include an incontestability clause, most requiring
an incontestability period no longer than two years from the date the policy is
issued. Id.
107
See id.
108
See Bloink, supra note 96, at 284.
109
See id. at 284-85.
110
See Id, at 287.
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premium finance loan is secured by the insurance policy and is fully
recourse as to the insured. In contrast, when used in a STOLI arrangement,
a premium finance loan will often be nonrecourse to the insured. STOLIbased nonrecourse premium finance was sold as essentially riskless for the
insured, but insurance company pushback and insurable interest concerns
have drastically reduced the availability of nonrecourse premium
financing.111 Partial-recourse premium financing (e.g. a premium finance
loan that is 25% recourse to the insured) has generally replaced
nonrecourse premium finance; but partial-recourse premium finance is not
always used to facilitate STOLI arrangements. Regardless of the type of
premium finance used, in a STOLI arrangement the insured does not intend
on purchasing long term life insurance coverage but only intends to hold
the policy for the duration of the contestability period. After the
contestability period, the insured expects to sell the policy at a profit.112
When premium financing is used to fund a STOLI policy, the
insured is given three options at the close of the contestability period:
(1) The insured can take ownership of the policy by
paying off the loan, including principal, interest and
fees. The loan can be refinanced with another lender or
paid off in cash.
(2) The policy can be sold on the secondary market. The
insured will retain any profit on the sale after the
premium finance loan and fees are paid off.
(3) The insured can surrender the policy to the lender in
satisfaction of the loan. The lender will then sell the
policy on the secondary market.
The insured is very unlikely to take the first option since the
insured was probably not in the market for a life insurance policy when
entering into the arrangement. Because the first option is effectively offlimits to the insured, the real purpose of the arrangement—moving the life
insurance policy into the secondary market—is essentially guaranteed by
the STOLI plan.

111

See id. See also Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882,
884-86 (D. N.J. 2009); Eryn Mathews, Notes and Commentaries, STOLI on the
Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life
Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 525-37 (2008).
112
See Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 885.
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USE OF IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS IN STOLI
ARRANGEMENTS

STOLI policies are often purchased through an irrevocable life
insurance trust (ILIT). A premium finance loan will be made to the ILIT,
which owns the policy from issuance to maturity. Rather than directly
transferring ownership of the policy to investors, the trustee of the ILIT is
changed to a trustee chosen by the premium finance company. The
beneficiary is also changed so that beneficial ownership and control of the
policy passes to the investors without signaling the change to the company
that issued the policy.
C.

IMPACT OF STOLI
REQUIREMENT

ON

THE

INSURABLE

INTEREST

A central concern with STOLI arrangements is their relationship
with the insurable interest requirement. As discussed in sections II and III,
the insurable interest requirement exists to limit the issuance of wager
policies and prevent the moral hazard due to the beneficial owner’s
financial interest in the insured’s premature death. In STOLI transactions,
the party who is ultimately intended as the beneficial owner of the policy
will not have an insurable interest in the insured’s life at the time the policy
is issued.113
In tension with the insurable interest requirement is the well-settled
principle that a life insurance policy is freely transferrable once the policy
is validly issued. This principle permits an insured to purchase a policy of
life insurance and transfer the policy to any person, including someone
without an insurable interest, subject to very few restrictions. At first
glance, the free transferability of life insurance would seem to vindicate
STOLI as a legitimate practice. After all, the insured, who has an unlimited
insurable interest in his own life, purchases the policy and exercises his
legal right to transfer the policy to whomever he chooses.114 But the foray
113

Although STOLI has received significant bad press in recent years, it is
worth noting that the better-received life settlements implicate the same policy
concerns motivating the backlash against STOLI arrangements. After all, an
investor purchasing a policy in a life settlement has the same incentive to see the
insured meet an early death as the investor purchasing a policy issued directly into
a STOLI arrangement.
114
In a small minority of jurisdiction (e.g. New York), lack of an insurable
interest does not void a policy, but triggers a procedure for equitable distribution of
policy proceeds, the lawsuit will be between investors and the insured decedent’s
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of the capital markets into life insurance has exploited the tension between
the competing policy considerations affecting the insurable interest
requirement and has stretched the requirement to the point of breaking.
D.

RECENT STOLI CASES
1. Phoenix Life v. Lasalle Bank

In the typical modern insurable interest case, an insurance carrier is
asking the court to issue a declaration that a life insurance policy held by an
investment group is void ab initio for lack of an insurable interest. For
instance, in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle Bank, a decision handed down in 2009
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, a life
insurance policy was assigned to a lender as security for a nonrecourse
premium finance loan. Phoenix, who issued the policy, sought a declaratory
judgment that the policy was void ab initio for lack of an insurable interest.
Coventry, the investment group, argued that Phoenix’s motion should be
dismissed because, in their view, Phoenix’s insurable interest argument was
based entirely on the fact that the policy premiums were paid by a premium
finance loan. Coventry argued that this fact was insufficient as a matter of
law to establish that the policies were issued without an insurable interest.
The court disagreed, holding that Phoenix’s allegation that the insured
purchased the policy with the intent to absolutely assign the policy to
Coventry was sufficient to “state a claim for rescission based on the lack of
an insurable interest.” Under Michigan law, assignment of a validly issued
life insurance policy to someone without an insurable interest is permitted.
But a complete assignment of an insurance policy made simultaneous with
issuance of the policy violates the insurable interest requirement. Such an
assignment is void because the assignment is made in bad faith for the
purpose of circumventing the insurable interest requirement.115

estate. See e.g. Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F.Supp.2d 646. See supra
text accompanying notes 55-56.
115
Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., Nos. 2:07-cv-15324, 2009 WL
877684, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2009). See also AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.
v. Infinity Financial Group, LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1352-53, 1356-57 (S.D.Fla.
2009) (holding that an assignment of a life insurance policy may not be made
where an agreement to assign the policy existed prior to the issuance of the policy
or contemporaneously therewith.)
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2. Sun Life v. Paulson
Sun Life v. Paulson, a 2008 Federal District Court of Minnesota
case, involved facts similar to those in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle. Sun Life
brought suit for a declaratory judgment that the policy issued on Paulson’s
life and subsequently purchased by Coventry was void for lack of an
insurable interest. Sun Life’s claim was based on their assertion that at the
time the insured purchased the policy, he intended to sell the policy to a
third party without an insurable interest in Paulson’s life. As in Phoenix
Life, the court considered a motion to dismiss by Coventry.116
Assuming the facts of the plaintiff’s complaint to be true, including
the plaintiff’s assertion that the insured purchased the policy with the intent
to transfer it to a person without an insurable interest, the court found that
the policy was not void for lack of insurable interest.117 Of primary
importance to the court was the fact that there was no evidence that Paulson
colluded with anyone else when purchasing the policy. In the court’s view,
in order for a life insurance policy to be void ab initio for lack of an
insurable interest, not only must the insured purchase the policy with the
intent to transfer the policy to a party without an insurable interest in
violation of the good faith requirement, but the policy must be “procured
under a scheme, purpose, or agreement to transfer or assign the policy to a
person without an insurable interest in order to evade the law against
wagering contracts.” As a result, if an insured purchases an insurance
policy with the intent to transfer the policy to a person without an insurable
interest in the insured’s life, but the insured has not identified a particular
purchaser for the policy, the policy is not void and the transfer is valid. In
the district court’s view:
Paulson’s intent is… irrelevant without facts or allegations
suggesting that a third party lacking an insurable interest
intended, at the time Paulson procured the [policy], to
acquire the policy upon expiration of the contestability
period. Likewise, Coventry’s later acquisition of the
[policy] is irrelevant without similar facts or allegations
regarding its intent at the time Paulson procured the
insurance.118
116

Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Paulson, No. 07-3877, 2008 WL 451054,
at *1 (D. Minn. 2008).
117
Id. at *2.
118
Id.

2010]

CATALYSTS FOR CLARIFICATION

85

3. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Calhoun
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Calhoun, arose under facts
similar to those in Paulson and Lasalle. As in Paulson, the insured
purchased a high-value policy with the intent to sell the policy on the
secondary market. The court did not arrive at a holding with respect to
whether a scheme is necessary for a policy to be found void ab initio for
lack of an insurable interest. But, in contrast to Paulson, the court denied
the defendant’s motion for dismissal. The court viewed New Jersey law as
unsettled on the question of whether mutual intent—of the insured and a
third party without an insurable interest in the insured’s life—is necessary
for a policy to be found void for lack of an insurable interest or whether
unilateral intent of the insured is sufficient. Recognizing that “compelling
policy considerations are raised by either position,” the court viewed
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as premature because, the court said, the
issues of intent implicated by the case were better decided after the plaintiff
had further opportunity to discover whether Calhoun had an arrangement
with a particular purchaser when he bought the policy. If Calhoun had an
arrangement with a third-party purchaser at the time he purchased the
policy, it would be unnecessary for the court to decide the question of
whether unilateral intent is sufficient to void the policy since, in that case,
mutual intent would be present.119
4. Summary of the Typical Contemporary Case
Though each of the preceding three cases were decided on motions
to dismiss rather than at trial, the decisions are important because they
examine the insurable interest requirement in the face of uniquely modern
factual allegations while simultaneously reaffirming the importance of the
traditional doctrine. Lasalle takes the tradition tack, looking for facts
indicating that the arrangement was entered into, and the policy purchased,
for the purpose of subverting the prohibition on wager policies.120 Paulson,
like Lasalle, looks for facts indicating that the policy was a wager policy,
but narrows the traditional rule by including an additional constraint on its
application—the requirement that the policy be issued as part of scheme
involving the insured and another person.121 In light of the policy
119

Lincoln Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882, 890 (D. N.J.

2009).
120
121

LaSalle Bank N.A., 2009 WL 877684, at *7.
See Paulson, 2008 WL 451054, at *2.
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considerations driving the insurable interest requirement, the court in
Paulson may narrow the insurable interest requirement too far. A policy
issued to an insured who, from the beginning, intends on selling the policy
to someone without an insurable interest implicates the insurable interest
requirement and runs afoul of the prohibition on wager policies to the same
extent as policies purchased as part of a “scheme.”
In most of these recent cases, courts have not had to expand the
scope of the insurable interest requirement or otherwise alter its
applicability to successfully target and strike down STOLI transactions.
The courts have, for the most part, stuck to the narrow historical definition
of insurable interest, though Paulson did put a new spin on the insurable
interest requirement by substantially narrowing it when applied to a STOLI
policy. With the exception of the Parduhn case, discussed below, courts
have consistently required the existence of an insurable interest at a single
point in time, issuance of the policy, rather than requiring the existence of
an insurable interest on a continuum running from issuance of the policy to
its maturity.
5. An Anomalous Case —Insurable Interest Required
from Policy Issuance to Maturity
a. Parduhn v. Bennett
Parduhn v. Bennett and the Utah insurable interest statute under
which the case was decided are an anomaly in modern insurable interest
law.122 Rather than requiring an insurable interest only at a policy’s
issuance, the Supreme Court of Utah interpreted Utah’s insurable interest
statute to require a policy’s beneficial owners to have an insurable interest
at all times during a policy’s existence, from issuance to maturity.
The case involved partners in a partnership with a buy-sell
agreement in place. Under the agreement, if one partner died, the other
partner was required to purchase the decedent partner’s partnership interest.
The buy-sell agreement was to be funded by proceeds of a life insurance
contract. The partners sold their business to a third party without the buysell agreement ever being activated and ceased doing business as a
partnership. When one partner died, the other partner filed suit to establish
his right to the insurance proceeds. In opposition to the surviving partner,
the decedent partner’s wife argued that she had a right to the insurance
proceeds.
122

Parduhn v. Bennett, 61 P.3d 982 (Utah 2002).
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In many jurisdictions, each partner would likely have had an
insurable interest in the other partner’s life at the time the insurance
contract was purchased, based on their economic relationship. The Utah
insurable interest law in force at the time Parduhn was decided not only
required an insurable interest at the time the policy was issued, but also at
the time a policy is transferred to a third party and when the policy
matured. The Utah Code stated that “[a] person may not knowingly
procure, directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of
an insurance policy unless that person has or expects to have an insurable
interest in the subject of the insurance.”123 This provision was interpreted to
mean that a person is not permitted to have an interest in insurance policy
proceeds unless that person has an insurable interest in the insured’s life.124
In addition to requiring an insurable interest at the time at transfer
and at maturity, the statute specifically limited a partner’s insurable interest
in another partner’s life to situations involving a legitimate buy-sell
agreement. Without a buy-sell agreement, there was no insurable interest,
regardless of any other economic relationship between the partners.125
Based on the Utah insurable interest statute in force at the time the
case was decided, the Utah Supreme Court held that the surviving partner
was not entitled to the life insurance policy’s death benefit because the
buy-sell agreement was no longer in place when the policy reached
maturity, and the partner was not permitted to receive the death benefit
without an insurable interest in the deceased partner’s life. By so holding,
the Utah court broke with the common law and statutes in force in every
other jurisdiction by effectively requiring the existence of an insurable
interest on a continuum from issuance of the policy to its maturity.
The impact of Parduhn’s anomalous holding was limited fairly
quickly by the Utah state legislature, which brought the state’s insurable
interest law into conformity with the rest of the country.
123

UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(1)(b) (2005) (current version at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (Supp. 2010)).
124
See Parduhn v. Bennett, 61 P.3d 982, 986-87 (Utah 2002); See also Harbor
Funds, LLC, Utah Div. Sec., No-Action or Interpretive Letter, 2002 WL
31746494, at *2 (Nov. 6, 2002) (opinion rescinded Oct. 4, 2010 to reflect
subsequent amendments to the Utah Uniform Securities Act that classify life
settlements as securities even before they are sold in the secondary market).
125
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(1)(b), (2)(a) (2005) (current version at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (Supp. 2010)). Note that in Utah, a policy issued
without an insurable interest is not void or even voidable, but the death benefit will
not be paid to the named beneficiary. Rather, policy proceeds will be equitably
distributed by the court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(6)(b) (Supp. 2010).
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b. Utah’s Amended Insurable Interest Statute
The situation in Parduhn would not likely have the same result if
the case were decided under the current Utah insurable interest statute. A
2007 amendment to Utah’s insurable interest law126 specifies that, in the
case of a life insurance policy, an insurable interest need only exist on the
date the policy is issued and at any later time when an interest in the policy
is transferred or assigned. The insurable interest requirement need not be
met at the time the policy proceeds are payable. Because Parduhn had an
insurable interest in his partner’s life and the policy was never transferred
or assigned, Parduhn would not be required to have an insurable interest in
his partner’s life at the time the death benefit was paid and the payment
could properly be made to Parduhn.
The statute probably also eliminates the absolute restriction on a
partner’s insurable interest to situations where a legitimate buy-sell
agreement exists. While that restriction was formerly included in the
definition of “insurable interest,” the amended statute indicates that the
former restriction is now part of a nonexclusive list of situations where an
insurable interest exists. In other words, a partner’s insurable interest based
on a legitimate buy-sell agreement is only one example of a situation where
a partner would have an insurable interest in another partner’s life. Other
circumstances presenting an insurable interest in a partners life certainly
exist.
VIII.

MISREPRESENTATIONS ON THE POLICY APPLICATION

Though a significant portion of the dialog surrounding STOLI has
centered on the insurable interest requirement, other issues are often
litigated together, creating a mélange of related but distinct concepts and
prohibitions affecting the validity of a life insurance contract. In addition to
an insurer’s claims for rescission due to lack of an insurable interest,
carriers also typically seek rescission of the policy based on intentional
misrepresentations made on the policy application. Many recent STOLI
cases raise the issue of misrepresentation on the policy application in
addition to lack of an insurable interest. Other than the insurable interest
requirement, an insurer’s right to rescind a life insurance contract based on
misrepresentations made on the policy application remains the strongest
enforcement mechanism available to combat STOLI.
126

Utah’s insurable interest statute explicitly permits viatical and life
settlements. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(7) (Supp. 2010).
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An insurer who becomes aware of a misrepresentation made on a
policy application may generally rescind the policy by notifying the insured
of the rescission and refunding any premiums paid.127 An insurer may also
sue for rescission of the policy or assert the rescission as a defense to an
action on the policy. In the alternative, an insurer may also assert
misrepresentation as a defense against a beneficiary’s suit seeking payment
of the policy death benefit after the insured death.128
Generally, a life insurance policy is voidable by the carrier if the
insured made material misrepresentations on the application for insurance.
An innocent misrepresentation is sufficient grounds for rescission of a
policy; it is not necessary that the misrepresentation be made intentionally
or in bad faith.129 A misrepresentation or omission is “material” if the
misrepresentation or omission “can be understood to reasonably affect an
insurer’s decision to enter into the insurance contract.”130 In other words,
the test for materiality is subjective; a misrepresentation is material if it
affects the insurer’s risk in entering into the contract or the amount of
premiums to be charged on the policy is material.131 Materiality is not
determined under an objective, reasonable insurer standard.132
The policy application and the questions included therein by the
insurer may be probative of materiality, since the insurer presumably chose
the questions for the purpose of gauging risk and setting policy premiums.
Because “[m]ateriality is determined solely by the probable and reasonable
effect which truthful answers would have had upon the insurer[, t]he fact
that the insurer has demanded answers to specific questions in an
application for insurance is in itself usually sufficient to establish
materiality as a matter of law.”133
127

N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 23 F.2d 225, 225 (5th Cir. 1928).
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lake, 671 A.2d 681, 686-87 (Pa. 1996); Feierman v.
Eureka Life Ins. Co.,124 A. 171, 171-72, (Pa. 1924).
129
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 504 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying New Mexico law).
130
Id. at 506; Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882, 887
(D.N.J. 2009).
131
Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d at 887-88.
132
Matilla v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 960 F. Supp. 223, 226 (N.D. Cal.
1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1997). See also ALLEN D. WINDT, INSURANCE
CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 2:26, at 110-19 (5th ed. 2007).
133
Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973). See
also LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 4th
1259, 1266-69, Cal. Rptr.3d 917, 920-24 (2007). See generally WINDT, supra note
132, at 110-117.
128
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Issues of misrepresentation are often intertwined with the insurable
interest issue because carriers frequently include questions on policy
applications that are intended to ferret out STOLI transactions that are
formulated to do an end-run around the insurable interest requirement.134
For instance, the application on which the policy in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle
(discussed supra) was issued included four such questions:135
(1) Is “non-recourse premium financing or any other
method being utilized to pay premiums in order to
facilitate a current or future transfer, assignment or
other action with respect to the benefits provided under
the policy being applied for”?
(2) Is there “an intent to finance any of the premiums”?
(3) Is “the current intent… to sell the policy in the future”?
(4) Has there “been any inducement to enter into this
transaction”?
Each of the preceding four questions seeks to determine whether
the insured is purchasing the policy as part of a STOLI arrangement by
looking for signals that the policy is being purchased with an intent to
obfuscate a violation of the insurable interest requirement. An insured who
purchases a policy as part of a STOLI transaction will be forced to make a
misrepresentation when answering these questions or face rejection of his
or her application by the insurer. The insurer can avoid the policy at
issuance by declining to issue the policy if the insured answers the
questions truthfully, and may avoid the policy after issuance by rescinding
the policy if the insured makes misrepresentations on the application.
The insurer is in the best position to determine whether a policy is
being issued in violation of the insurable interest requirement. As discussed
above, in most cases, an insurer has the opportunity to rescind a policy or
seek a determination that the policy is void throughout the entire life of the
policy—from the date the policy is issued to after the insured’s death. And
134

Though the insurable interest requirement is often intertwined with claims
of misrepresentation, the two issues are distinct. Of particular importance is the
fact that an insurer is time barred from suing for rescission based on
misrepresentation when the contestability period has passed, but is not time barred
from seeking a declaration that the policy is void for lack of an insurable interest.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
135
Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 2009 WL 877864, at *1
(E.D.Mich. Mar. 30, 2009).
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the insurer has tremendous power to craft policy applications to discover
whether an insured is purchasing a policy for an improper purpose.
Determination that a policy was issued without an insurable
interest has a devastating effect on the property rights of the insured,
transferees and beneficiaries: such failure voids the policy, extinguishing it
as if it never existed.136 Tampering with the insurable interest requirement
thus impacts all policy owners, introducing a level of uncertainty into a
policy purchase. In contrast, aiming anti-STOLI enforcement efforts at the
misrepresentations necessarily made on a well-crafted policy application
when a policy is being purchased as part of a STOLI transaction targets
only those parties making misrepresentations. As such, policymakers
should be reticent about strengthening or otherwise altering the insurable
interest requirement when other enforcement mechanisms—a welldesigned policy application and misrepresentation detection—offer a
targeted, flexible approach to combating STOLI.
IX.

NAIC AND NCOIL MODEL CODES AND THEIR AFFECT ON
THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT

States have been increasingly interested in supplementing
established insurable interest law with statutes designed to identify and
prohibit nascent types of transactions that violate the spirit, if not the letter,
of the insurable interest requirement.137 Two model statutes, both regulating
life and viatical settlements, have been recently amended to supplement
and strengthen this requirement. Prompted by increased attention on
STOLI, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)138 amended their
respective model codes in 2007. Each model act has been adopted by a
number of states, with some states choosing to adopt a hybrid approach
incorporating elements from both acts.139

136

See supra Part III.
See Leimberg, supra note 104, at 3.
138
The NAIC has published hundreds of model laws covering every aspect of
life insurance regulation, many of which have been enacted by state legislatures.
139
Ariella Gasner, Note, Your Death: The Royal Flush of Wall Street’s
Gamble, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599, 626-628 (2008-2009).
137
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NCOIL’S VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT

NCOIL adopted the Life Settlements Model Act in 2000 as an
alternative to the NAIC model and amended the act in 2007 to address
concerns with STOLI.140 The NCOIL model includes three primary
components: (1) a recommendation that states amend their insurable
interest laws to cover modern permutations on the wager policy, (2) a
definition and prohibition of STOLI, and (3) a moratorium on life
settlements running two years after issuance of a policy.
1. Amend State Insurable Interest Statutes
NCOIL’s approach to STOLI strengthens and uses traditional tools
to combat wager policies, including the insurable interest requirement.
Some commentators have expressed concern that the traditional insurable
interest requirement is ill-suited to the modern environment in which
STOLI has sprung up. Recognizing this potential weakness , a drafting note
to the NCOIL 2007 Life Settlements Model Act recommends that states
“amend their insurable interest laws, if necessary, to provide additional
protection against trust-initiated STOLI and other schemes involving a
cloak.” The model act goes on to suggest a proposed statutory amendment
that would specifically strike at premium financing arrangements intended
to effectuate investor ownership of a life insurance policy:141
In accordance with Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, it
shall be a violation of insurable interest for any person
or entity without insurable interest to provide or
arrange for the funding ultimately used to pay
premiums, or the majority of premiums, on a life
insurance policy, and, at policy inception have an
arrangement for such person or entity to have an
ownership interest in the majority of the death benefit
of that life insurance policy.

140

Press Release, Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators, NCOIL Closes In On
Illegal STOLI, Unanimously Adopts Amended Model Act (Nov. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2007/LifeSettlementsPR.pdf.
141
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators,
Drafting Note 2007).
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2. STOLI Definition
Like the NAIC model act and the traditional prohibition on wager
policies, the NCOIL model act prohibits anyone from entering into a life
settlement142 prior to issuance of the policy and provides for a period
during which most life settlements are prohibited.143
In contrast to the NAIC model, which does not mention STOLI by
name and does not define it, the nucleus of the NCOIL model is its
definition of STOLI. The model act defines “STOLI” as follows: “STOLI
is a practice or plan to initiate a life insurance policy for the benefit of a
third party investor who, at the time of policy origination, has no insurable
interest in the insured.”144
This definition essentially restates the black-letter law (see supra)
prohibiting arrangements intended to subvert the insurable interest
requirement. Going further, NCOIL’s definition also ropes in some
transactions that are not explicitly covered by traditional insurable interest
cases and statutes:145

142

The NCOIL model act defines “life settlement contract” in essentially the
same way as the NAIC model act defines “viatical settlement contract” with some
minor differences. Compare LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(L) (Nat’l Council
of Ins. Legislators 2007) (defining “life settlement contract” as “a written
agreement entered into between a Provider and an Owner, establishing the terms
under which compensation or any thing of value will be paid, which compensation
or thing of value is less than the expected death benefit of the insurance policy or
certificate, in return for the owner’s assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of
the death benefit or any portion of an insurance policy or certificate of insurance
for compensation, provided, however, that the minimum value for a Life
Settlement Contract shall be greater than a cash surrender value or accelerated
death benefit available at the time of an application for a Life Settlement
Contract.”), with VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(N)(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of
Ins. Comm’rs 2010) (defining “viatical settlement contract“ as “a written
agreement establishing the terms under which compensation or anything of value is
or will be paid, which compensation or value is less than the expected death
benefits of the policy , in return for the viator’s present or future assignment,
transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the death benefit or ownership of any portion of
the insurance policy or certificate of insurance.”).
143
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N) (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators
2007).
144
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(Y) (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators
2007).
145
Id.
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STOLI practices include but are not limited to cases in
which life insurance is purchased with resources or
guarantees from or through a person, or entity, who, at the
time of policy inception, could not lawfully initiate the
policy themselves, and where, at the time of inception,
there is an arrangement or agreement, whether verbal or
written, to directly or indirectly transfer the ownership of
the policy and/or the policy benefits to a third party.
This definition sharpens the insurable interest requirement by
covering indirect arrangements intended to shift a policy from an
insured to investors, like nonrecourse premium financing.
3. Two-Year Moratorium on Life Settlements
The NCOIL model’s two-year moratorium prohibits life settlement
transactions for a two year period following issuance of the policy. This
two-year ban on transfers is significantly shorter than the NAIC’s five-year
ban. Like the NAIC model, the NCOIL model provides exceptions to the
two-year moratorium.146
B.

THE NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT

The NAIC issued the Viatical Settlements Model Act147 in 1993 in
response to perceived abuses in the viatical settlement industry.
Subsequently, in 2007 the NAIC adopted a revised model act to take into
account significant changes in the industry, including the increasing
prevalence of STOLI. In contrast NCOIL’s targeted approach, which
defines and prohibits STOLI, NAIC’s model act attempts to strike at the
economic foundations of STOLI transactions.
Rather than define “STOLI,” the NAIC model act defines “viatical
settlement” and proscribes a set of “prohibited practices” with respect to
those viatical settlements. The model act defines “viatical settlement
contract” as:148

146

Id. § 11(N).
Originally the model was entitled "Living Benefits Model Act." The
working group decided to change the title to "Viatical Settlements Model Act."
148
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(N)(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2010).
147
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[A] written agreement establishing the terms under which
compensation or anything of value is or will be paid, which
compensation or value is less than the expected death
benefits of the policy, in return for the viator’s present or
future assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the
death benefit or ownership of any portion of the insurance
policy or certificate of insurance.
By definition, “viatical settlement contract” thus includes
not only what are traditionally known as viatical settlements, but
also life settlements and STOLI arrangements. Many premium
finance transactions are also explicitly categorized as viatical
settlements under the act.149
The first layer of defense against STOLI in the NAIC model act is
its prohibition of any person from entering “into a viatical settlement at any
time prior to the application or issuance of a policy which is the subject of
viatical settlement contract.”150 This provision is essentially a statutory
enactment of the long-standing law in most jurisdictions: Entering into an
agreement to purchase and assign a policy is an attempt to subvert the
insurable interest requirement and amounts to a prohibited wager policy.151
The second, and most controversial, component of the model act’s
anti-STOLI provisions is its moratorium on life settlements in the five
years after a policy’s issuance. This component essentially supplements the
insurable interest requirement by attacking the economic incentives driving
investment in STOLI policies. Requiring a five-year wait before
assignment of a policy increases the mortality risk inherent in the policy,
thus reducing investors’ rates of return and diminishing their incentive to
use STOLI to enter the mortality markets.152
149

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §1(N)(2) . (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2010). Covered premium finance loans includes loans made where (1)
proceeds of the loan are not used solely to cover the policy’s premiums and fees,
(2) the loan includes a guaranteed future viatical settlement value for the policy, or
(3) the viator or insured agrees at the time the policy is issued to sell the policy at
some future date.
150
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §11(A) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
2010).
151
See e.g. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, at 779 (1881); Cammack v.
Lewis, 82 U.S. 643, at 648 (1872).
152
Life
Ins.
Settlement
Ass’n,
NAIC
Model
Act,
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/NAIC.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2010).
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Recognizing that a blanket five-year prohibition on life settlements
could harm consumers who develop a need to sell a policy during that fiveyear period, the Viatical Settlements Model Act includes a number of
exceptions to the five-year moratorium on life-settlements. The first
category of exceptions permits a life settlement in a number of situations
involving major life changes, such as when the insured is “terminally or
chronically ill,” when the insured’s marriage ends due to death or divorce,
or when the insured retires from full-time employment.153 The model act
also permits a settlement two years after a policy is issued as long as the
insured has not been evaluated for settlement during the two-year period
and, if applicable, only traditional premium finance was used to fund
premium payments and fees associated with the policy.154
C.

RESPONSE TO THE MODEL ACTS

Some commentators and industry groups, like the Life Insurance
Settlement Association (LISA) and NCOIL, worry that the NAIC approach
amounts to an interference with the well-established property rights
associated with life insurance policies. They worry that the exceptions to
the five-year moratorium on life settlements do not go far enough to
exempt legitimate settlement transactions from being categorized as
impermissible life settlements.155 This, they argue, undercuts the insured’s
property right in the policy and harms an insured who experiences
unexpected financial difficulty in the two-year period following issuance of
the policy. An insured who does not satisfy one of the exceptions to the
five-year moratorium will be unable to sell the policy in the first two years
after the policy is issued and will be forced to let the policy lapse or accept
153

VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §11(A)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2010)..
154
Id. §11(A)(3). A third exception to the five-year moratorium on settlements
is for policies issued as a result of the insured’s exercise of conversion rights in a
policy. Id. §11 (A)(1).
155
Life
Ins.
Settlement
Ass’n,
NAIC
Model
Act,
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/NAIC.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2010). A legitimate life settlement transaction is a transaction entered into by an
insured who, sometime after purchasing a life insurance policy to satisfy the his or
her need for life insurance, transfers the policy to a third-party because the policy
is no longer needed or because other financial needs outweigh the insured’s need
for a life insurance policy. Transfer of a policy to a third party when the policy was
purchased with the intent to transfer it to a third party is, under the Model Act, not
a legitimate life settlement transaction.
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the surrender value of the policy.156 This, they argue, severely undercuts the
utility of a policy in the initial years of its existence.157
The NAIC model act has also been characterized as an attack on
the entire secondary market rather than a focused approach to eliminating
STOLI. NCOIL has characterized the NAIC model act as creating “harsh
barriers for consumers seeking to sell their policies and burdens for life
settlement companies seeking to act in the life settlement market.”158
Critics view the model act as condemning all premium financed policies
and life settlements but then exempting some transactions from the group
of prohibited transactions. This exceptions-based approach is also criticized
as providing “opportunities” to circumvent the law by crafting STOLI
transactions that satisfy the exceptions.159
Other commentators have dismissed criticisms of the NAIC model
act as exaggerations of a few isolated instances where an insured will not
be permitted to engage in what would otherwise be a life settlement. In
156

One suggested amendments to the NAIC model act includes a provision
explicitly exempting insureds from the five-year moratorium if the insured has
experienced a sudden decrease in net worth. This amendment has not been
incorporated into the act.
157
In a letter to NCOIL, Doug Head, LISA Executive Director, stated that the
solution to the STOLI problem lies in state insurable interest statutes rather than in
upturning established law. He also expressed concerns with the five-year
moratorium, believing that it “harms legitimate life settlements” while failing to
address STOLI. In his view, the NAIC model paints with too broad a brush, not
only catching legitimate life settlement transactions, but also missing a significant
number of STOLI transactions. Also commenting on the NCOIL approach,
Representative George J. Keiser, of the North Dakota State Legislature, stated that
“STOLI occurs at the front-end of a life insurance sale. By defining STOLI, and
strengthening reporting requirements and penalties for participating in STOLI, the
NCOIL model gets at the heart of what needs to change. We hope that states
considering amendments to existing laws, or new life settlements statutes, will be
well-served by the NCOIL proposal.” Press Release, Nat’l Conference of Ins.
Legislators, NCOIL Closes in on Illegal STOLI, Unanimously Adopts Amended
Model Act (Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2007/
LifeSettlementsPR.pdf.
158
Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators, Effective Methods to Stop STOLI,
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/ban_STOLI.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010).
159
Laura Graesser, What's Going On in the Life Insurance Business:
Regulating Life Settlements, LIFE INS. SELLING, apr. 2008, at 8, available at
http://www.lifeinsuranceselling.com/Issues/2008/4/Pages/What-s-Going-OnRegulating-Life-Settlements.aspx .
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their view, the five-year moratorium is an absolute bar that will instantly
eliminate most STOLI transactions. They argue that the right to sell or
assign a life insurance policy has never been absolute, and that the right to
transfer a life insurance policy has always been weighed against the
potential harm created by permitting such an assignment. Any restriction
on an insured’s rights to assign a policy must be weighed against the harm
caused by STOLI, they argue, and any harm created by the NAIC approach
is far outweighed by its benefits.160
The recent enactment of NCOIL-influenced statutes by New
York161 and California162 may signal a momentum shift from the NAIC
model to the NCOIL model, but the dust is still settling. Regardless of how
the battle between the two predominant model codes plays out, the coming
decade is likely to see a further honing of insurable interest statutes as state
legislatures wrestle with STOLI and its progeny. Like the mid 19th century,
the early 21st century is likely to be viewed as a seminal, innovative period
for life insurance and the laws shaping and defining its boundaries.
X.

CONCLUSION

The current debate over the insurable interest requirement has too
often transmuted the moral hazard of the eighteenth century scoundrel,
Wainewright, into the latest object of Wall Street’s insatiable greed. The
historic context within which the insurable interest doctrine formed cannot
so simply be analogized to the current policy discussions. Though the
Grisby Court’s forward-thinking enunciation of the insurable interest
doctrine has been black-letter law for nearly a century, Justice Holmes
certainly could not have foreseen the radical changes in the life insurance
industry or imagined the emergence of the asset-backed securities markets.
At the beginning of the 20th century, life insurance products
consisted of little more than straight forward life insurance and the basic
annuities. The vast expansion of property rights unleashed by Grisby’s
clarification of assignment principles applied to insurance products has
inured to the benefit of both insurers and insureds in the form of much
more marketable products that have savings components and free
alienability.
160

Adam S. Flood, Stranger-Originated Life Insurance: How the NAIC Tamed
an Old Dog with a New Trick (2008), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162492.
161
N.Y. LEGIS. Law § 78 (2010).
162
CAL.INS.CODE §§ 10113.1(g)(1)(B), (w) (West Supp. 2010).
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Recent initiatives addressing the abuses of the historic insurable
interest concept as life insurance has been morphed into a capital markets
product must be viewed in the context of the vastly different bundle of
rights modern insurance policies commonly contain. Any proposal to
modify insurable interest statutes that too greatly abrogates consumers’
property rights in their insurance policies must be viewed as circumspect, if
those same initiatives can also be construed as protecting insurance
companies’ monopsonistic pricing power.
While the Grisby court understood financial institutions such as
insurance companies would profit from insured’s living long, and also from
earlier death in the case of annuities, any legislative proposals should not
weaken insurable interest concepts so as to leave insured’s exposed to the
moral failings of modern-day Wainewright. Nor can the new profit motive
injected into the insurance markets by Wall Street’s securitization markets
be allowed to create new incentives to push and parse the boundaries of
insurable interest statutes. New insurable interest legislation must
incorporate a restrained and balanced effort to reign in abuses of the
insurable interest doctrine, and the fraudulent practices effectuating those
abuses, without unduly curtailing the advantages of modern insurance
products.
Some efforts to curb STOLI abuses, such as NCOIL’s Viatical
Settlements Model Act, and many recent court cases have taken a
restrained approach to the insurable interest requirement, recognizing that a
radical expansion of the insurable interest requirement is unnecessary, even
in the face of modern insurance products and transactions (e.g. STOLI)
without analogue at the doctrine’s inception. This conservative approach to
the insurable interest requirement is wise considering the drastic effect a
failure of the insurable interest has on a policy, voiding it and entirely
eliminating its value. Moreover, the careful crafting policy applications in
an effort to expose abusive transactions or force the policy owners to make
a material misrepresentation and risk holding a void or voidable policy
needs to be used as an equal tool in combating such abuses. This restrained
and multi-faceted approach has the further benefit of targeting offending
transactions without affecting the property rights of other policy owners.
The insurable interest requirement has existed for over two centuries, but is
still well-equipped to serve the purpose for which it was intended:
eliminating wager policies and curbing the moral hazard inherent when
speculators insure the lives of unrelated third parties.
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RATING DEPENDENT REGULATION OF INSURANCE
John Patrick Hunt*

Solvency regulation lies at the heart of insurance regulation and, at
least for now, credit ratings lie at the heart of solvency regulation.
Insurance regulators in the United States have used credit ratings
extensively to determine what types of investments insurance companies
can make and to determine how risky insurers’ investments are. Because
the insurance regulation system has been so dependent on ratings, high
ratings allowed insurers in several different contexts to invest in novel
financial products. When these products suffered rating downgrades and
losses, the insurers suffered results ranging from stressful (the life
insurance industry’s need to raise billions of dollars in additional capital)
to disastrous (the collapse of AIG and the entire bond insurance industry).
Indeed, the latter set of events presented a serious challenge to the
conventional wisdom that insurers do not pose systemic risk.
Complete removal of credit ratings or analogous private credit
assessments from insurance regulation is difficult for both political and
substantive reasons. This Article suggests an alternative approach: a
“seasoning requirement” for credit ratings on novel products, under which
credit ratings on novel products would not be given regulatory effect for
some period of time, perhaps one economic cycle. Given that many novel
financial products failed immediately in the recent downturn, a seasoning
requirement would have avoided the most serious drawbacks of ratingdependent regulation while presenting much less significant political,
theoretical, and practical challenges than approaches that rely on
completely eliminating dependence on credit ratings or analogous
measures.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The apparent failure of credit ratings on novel products and
insurance regulators’ response to that failure highlights the limits of
regulators’ will and desire to wean themselves from credit ratings, as well
as the limits of capital regulation itself. After an overview of the
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law;
jphunt@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to Katherine Florey and David Zaring for helpful
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background, this Article surveys the regulatory response as of early April
2011 to the perceived failure of ratings in the recent financial crisis,
identifying a persistent conflict between insurance regulators – who want to
rely heavily on credit ratings – and rating-agency reformers, who want to
eliminate rating-dependent regulation. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners apparently intends to retain rating-dependent
regulation, at least in some form, while the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, enacted in July 2010, directs federal
regulators to eliminate their reliance on ratings. . Absent a Congressional
takeover of this historically state-dominated area, the conflict is likely to
persist, and so is a high level of rating-dependent in the insurance industry.
This is important, not least because insurers are arguably the most
important single segment of investors in credit-rated instruments: As of
mid-2010, insurers owned about half the dollar value of corporate bonds
outstanding in the United States.1
The Article then turns to some specific areas in which ratings are
perceived to have failed – ratings on exposures taken by AIG and bond
insurers, and ratings on residential mortgage-backed securities held by life
insurance corporations. In the former case, rating failure led to systemic
risk. In the latter, it led to a “rule bailout” – a change in the rules in the
midst of a financial crisis undertaken in response to industry requests to aid
its position. Both have implications for the broader debate beyond ratingdependent regulation – the broad-ranging consequences of the AIG and
bond insurer failures challenge the premise that insurers do not pose
systemic risks. The rule bailout illustrates important fundamental limits on
capital regulation that should be taken into account in designing capital
requirements. Apart from these broader lessons, these situations have
implications for rating-dependent regulation of insurance. In both cases,
regulators’ practice of giving immediate effect to ratings on novel products
contributed to the problems.
A seasoning period—a period in which ratings on a new product
are not given regulatory effect – is a measured approach to addressing the
problems with rating-dependent regulation. It recognizes regulators’ and
regulated parties’ interests in rating reliance and the adequacy of most
ratings for regulatory tasks, while avoiding the most serious problems that
rating-dependent regulation apparently has produced.

1

Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, “Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States,” June 10, 2010.
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WHAT IS SOLVENCY REGULATION AND WHY DOES THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEED IT?

Insurance works because people believe insurers’ promises to pay.
When insurers become insolvent, those promises are likely to be broken,
undermining the purpose and function of the industry. Solvency regulation
can in principle reduce the harm from insurer insolvencies, both by
reducing the number of insolvencies and mitigating the effects of
insolvencies that do occur.
A.

OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE SOLVENCY REGULATION

Solvency regulation lies at the heart of insurance regulation.2 The
1794 statute establishing the first U.S. insurer organized as a stock
corporation limited the new company to investment in specified
government bonds. Massachusetts adopted a general financial reporting
requirement for insurers, aimed at helping customers avoid companies at
risk of insolvency, in 1818,3 and NAIC’s first mission after its creation in
1871 was to work on nationally uniform standards for financial reporting to
state commissioners.4 Rules for reserves to cover policy losses followed by
the 1870s,5 and solvency-related limits on investments began to appear as
early as 1906.6 Increases in the stringency of solvency regulation typically
2

See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN
AND INSURANCE 106 (10th ed.

& THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK
2008) (“Clearly, a primary focus of insurance
regulation is on insurer solvency. Indeed, it has been argued that this should be the
primary function of regulation.”); ALBERT H. MOWBRAY ET AL., INSURANCE: ITS
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 519 (6th ed. 1969) (“The prime
purpose of governmental supervision [of insurance] is solvency, the continuing
financial ability of insurers to meet their contractual obligations.”) (emphasis in
original).
3
See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE
CASE OF INSURANCE 51 (1988).
4
Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation: in
THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1., 32 (Martin F.
Grace and Robert W. Klein eds., 2009).
5
See MEIER, supra note 23, at 56.
6
Id. at 58 (describing New York’s adoption of investment limits in response to
1906 Armstrong Report). The first investment limits for insurance companies
appeared even earlier: The 1794 Pennsylvania statute establishing the first
insurance stock corporation in the United States required the insurer to invest only
in government bonds, but this requirement may have had to do with shoring up
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followed high-profile insolvency episodes, such as the mass failure of
insurers after the 1871 Chicago Fire and 1872 Boston Fire.7
Solvency regulation as currently constituted includes several
interlocking areas.8 Insurers are required to file quarterly and annual
reports on their financial condition to regulators, using specially prescribed
statutory accounting standards to do so. Insurance regulators scrutinize
these financial statements using special tools9 and confidential financial
tests, and additionally conduct periodic on-site inspections of insurers’
operations. Insurers are required to maintain reserves to pay claims and, in
addition, are required to meet capital requirements intended to make sure
that the insurer has a financial cushion against various misfortunes, such as
greater-than-expected insurance losses and adverse interest rates moves.
Solvency regulation attempts to limit the negative effects of insolvency by
requiring prompt regulatory action to close insolvent insurers before their
problems deepen and by providing for state-level guarantee funds to
compensate disappointed policyholders for at least a portion of their
insolvency-related losses.
Insurers invest the premiums they receive in order to be able to pay
claims and make profits, and insurer investment activities are central to
solvency regulation. The likelihood of investment losses figures into the
size of the required capital cushion and state investment laws outright
forbid investments that are judged too risky. 10 Currently, credit ratings are
used extensively in both contexts, as described below.
B.

JUSTIFICATION FOR SOLVENCY REGULATION

Manufacturing firms, restaurants, and law firms are not subject to
solvency regulation. One might assume that insurers generally wish to
remain in business and thus have strong incentives to remain solvent on
their own. Why should insurers be regulated for solvency?
When phrased in economic terms, the answer usually is put in
shaky post-Revolution public finances than protecting the company’s solvency.
7
Id. at 52.
8
See generally VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 21, at 106-09; Grace &
Klein, supra note 43, at 38-40.
9
The “Financial Analysis Solvency Tools” developed by NAIC are one
example. See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An Overview and Comparison of
Risk-Based Capital Standards, 26 J INS. REG. 31, 34 (2008).
10
See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1707, 1736 (2010), Id. at 1736 & n.131.
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terms of “information asymmetries” (the insurer knows better than the
policyholder whether it is solvent, particularly if policyholders are on the
whole unsophisticated)11 exacerbated by an “inverted production cycle”
(the insurer can collect premiums for a long time before enough claims
materialize to reveal that the firm is insolvent).12 These characteristics
combine with a “collective action problem” (a large group of policyholders
is in a poor position to negotiate with the insurer the level of risk of
insolvency the policyholders will tolerate for any given premium level).13
Solvency regulation can, in principle, address this issue by requiring
management to hold enough capital to reduce the risk of insolvency to the
point to which the policyholders would reduce it if they were capable of
effectively representing their interests.14
The point might also be phrased in historical terms: Unregulated
insurers apparently have shown a tendency to go bust and disappoint
policyholders, suggesting that unregulated markets don’t function
optimally. No matter how the justification is phrased, solvency regulation
historically has been based on consumer protection, broadly construed.15
11

See Grace & Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation, supra note 34, at

26
12

See id. at 27; GUILLAME PLANTIN & JEAN CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN
INSURERS GO BUST, 42, That in turn means that the managers of firms that are
getting into trouble have a window of opportunity to employ risky strategies to try
to return to survival, even though these strategies have a high probability of
imposing large losses on policyholders by increasing the consequences of
insolvency. Id. at 44-45. Shareholders would not be expected to police such
behavior because they have no incentive to care about how much the policyholders
receive if the shareholders are wiped out. Id. at 56.
13
See Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 26; PLANTIN & ROCHET, supra note
121, at 57.
14
Economists (and regulators) stress that the goal of solvency regulation is not
to reduce defaults to zero. See, e.g., Grace & Klein, The Future of Insurance
Regulation, supra note 34, at 28 (goal is to “minimize the social cost of defaults”).
15
See, e.g., Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, Solvency Regulation in
the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Empirical Evidence, 11 BELL. J. ECON.
261, 261 (1980) (“The rationale for solvency regulation is to protect the interests of
policyholders, third-party liability claimants and other firms (to whom the
obligations of an insolvent firm are shifted by guaranty fund arrangements).”).
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act can be seen as affirming this. The Act does recognize the possibility that an
insurer, together with its affiliates, could become systemically significant and thus
suitable for regulation as a “nonbank financial company supervised by the Board
of Governors,” see 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(C) (added by § 502 of Dodd-Frank), but
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Indeed, an industry representative recently testified to Congress that
solvency is “the most important consumer protection of all.”16
Historically, the justification for insurance solvency regulation has
not been that insurers’ activities create “systemic risk,” a term that has no
universally accepted meaning but that will be defined broadly here as the
imposition of significant costs on actors that are not owners or creditors of
the firm via effects of insolvency on the financial system as a whole.
Insurance companies have not been seen as posing systemic risk the way
that banks (or investment banks in the “shadow banking” system) have
done.17 The financial crisis has changed this perception to some extent, as
discussed in Part III, below.
Despite its venerable age, solvency regulation has been criticized.
Some authors conclude that if consumers are fully informed of the risk of
insolvency, then insurers will retain sufficient capital. This suggests that
disclosure rather than a prescriptive capital requirement is the appropriate
policy.18 It is also argued that regulatory costs fall heavily on smaller,
it shows great solicitude for the importance of consumer protection. One of the
main purposes of the Act’s insurance-related provisions is to authorize the
negotiation of international agreements regarding prudential measures with respect
to the business of insurance, id. § 314(a), and it limits the agreements it covers to
those that achieve “a level of protection for insurance or reinsurance consumers
that is substantially equivalent to the level of protection achieved under State
insurance or reinsurance regulation.” Id. § 313(r)(2)(B).
16
Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products
Regulation: Hearing Before the H.. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong.
55-57 (2009) (statement of Gary E. Hughes, Executive Vice President. & General
Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers).
17
See, e.g., MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 26 (2009) (classifying insurance companies as “nonsystemic large” entities that “need full micro-prudential regulation, but no
additional macro-prudential regulation.”); Schwarcz, supra note 109, at 1736;
Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND
BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 23 (Hal S. Scott ed. 2005)
(“[T]here has been no evidence of the failure of an insurance company being a
significant source of systemic risk.”); Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in
Insurance and Reinsurance, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL, supra, 87, 92
(Hal S. Scott ed. 2005) (“It generally is agreed that systemic risk is relatively low
in insurance markets compared with banking, especially for nonlife insurance.”);
JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 112-14 (3d ed.
2001).
18
See Ray Rees et al., Regulation of Insurance Markets, 24 GENEVA PAPERS
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specialized insurers19 and that any reduction in insolvencies due to
regulation arises from the fact that these costs reduce the number of small
firms in the market. Still other authors criticize the specific measures of
insolvency risk that U.S. regulators have adopted.20 While these criticisms
are interesting and provocative, evaluating them is beyond the scope of this
Article. The Article proceeds on the assumption that it is unlikely that the
immediately foreseeable future will bring a revision of the consensus view
among policymakers that solvency regulation of insurance is appropriate.
C.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF SOLVENCY REGULATION:
STATES AND THE NAIC

Insurance in the United States historically has been and currently is
regulated at the state level.21 Generally, state insurance regulators are
ON RISK AND INS. THEORY 55, 56, 67 (1999); see also Eling & Holzmüller, supra
note 98, at 32. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance are published by The
Geneva Association, which describes itself as the “ leading international ’think
tank’ of the insurance industry.”
The Geneva Association,
http://www.genevaassociation.org/About_Us/Introduction.aspx, (last visited Oct.
14. 2010).
19
Anton van Rossum, Regulation and Insurance Economics, 30(1) GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 43 (2005). One older study of capital requirements,
which apparently examined the effect only of fixed, absolute capital levels,
generated results that the authors interpreted as supporting the proposition that
“[m]inimum capital requirements appear to reduce insolvencies by reducing the
number of small, domestic firms.” Munch & Smallwood, supra note 154, at 261.
20
See, e.g., Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, The Effectiveness of
Public and Private Sector Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer
Insolvencies, 21 J. FIN. SERV.. RES. 101, 114 (2002) (finding the NAIC’s riskbased capital ratios and financial analysis solvency tools (FAST) to be worse at
predicting insolvency than capital adequacy ratios and ratings produced by the
private credit rating agency A.M. Best, which specializes in insurance).
21
In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183, (1868), decided shortly after the birth
of state-level insurance regulation, the Supreme Court decided that the federal
government lacked authority to regulate insurance. The Court reversed its position
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
In 1945, Congress adopted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which affirmed the
primacy of state regulation by declaring “the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory
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given authority over insurers’ ability to incorporate or conduct business in
the state in question, and are charged with enforcing requirements created
by state statutes, which typically include minimum capital levels.22
Primary responsibility for insurer capital regulation is delegated to the state
in which the insurer is domiciled, with nondomiciliary states typically
staying their hands unless the domiciliary state is falling down on the job.23
It is said that state insurance regulators in the United States typically
discharge their responsibilities via a rules-based, rather than a principlesbased, approach.24
The Dodd-Frank Act does not expressly change the federal-state
balance of power. Although the Act creates a new Federal Insurance
Office within the Department of the Treasury, 25 it expressly provides that
nothing in the provisions establishing and granting authority to the Office
“shall be construed to establish or provide the Office or the Department of
the Treasury with general supervisory or regulatory authority over the
business of insurance.”26
The Act does contemplate international
harmonization of prudential standards via bilateral or multilateral
agreements,27 but specifically saves state capital and solvency standards
from being preempted by such agreements (or otherwise) unless the state
standards discriminate against non-U.S. insurers.28 In other words, it
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 625, 629-34 (1999), for an account of these events.
22
Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 38.
23
Id. at 39.
24
Id. at 38.
25
The Dodd-Frank Act adds new sections 313 and 314 to Title 31 of the U.S.
Code. See H.R. 4173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 1, 31 U.S.C. § 313-14. Section 313(a) establishes the Federal Insurance
Office within the Department of the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 313(a), authorizes the
Office to monitor the insurance industry and advise the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, id. § 313(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C), (c)(3), and directs the Office to
report annually to Congress on the industry, id. § 313(n).
26
Id. § 313(k).
27
See id. § 314(a) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S.
Trade Representative to negotiate “covered agreements”); id. § 313(r)(2) (defining
a “covered agreement” as “a written bilateral or multilateral agreement regarding
prudential measures with respect to the business of insurance or reinsurance that”
is international and “relates to the recognition of prudential measures with respect
to the business of insurance or reinsurance that achieves a level of protection for
insurance or reinsurance consumers that is substantially equivalent to the level of
protection achieved under State insurance or reinsurance regulation.”).
28
See id. § 313(j)(1)(D) (as added by Dodd-Frank) (no preemption of “any
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appears that a state may maintain whatever capital and solvency regime is
in place as long as the state treats non-U.S. insurers subject to international
solvency agreements the same as it treats insurers domiciled in the state.
Although the state legislatures and insurance regulators have the
final say in most areas of insurance regulation, that does not mean that
there are 50 different, independent versions of each regulatory requirement.
States coordinate their regulatory efforts – at least to some extent – through
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary
association of the insurance commissioners of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and the U.S. territories.29 The NAIC has had an important role in
proposing uniform rules and standards ever since its formation in 1871.30
In general, the history of the NAIC reflects the tension between state
regulators’ desire to preserve a state-centric regulatory system and the
desire to minimize unnecessary contradiction and duplication in regulating
an increasingly national and international industry.31
One result of this ongoing tension is a regulatory system that is
more uniform in some areas than in others. Solvency regulation is an area
where substantive standards are “relatively uniform,”32 largely because
state insurance regulators use the risk-based capital framework that the
NAIC has developed.33 Although the state of domicile has primary
regulatory responsibility for the financial condition of any given insurer,
the use of a common capital regulation framework reduces state-by-state
variation in how that responsibility is carried out. One important solvencyrelated area in which the NAIC’s efforts have not brought about uniformity
is in state investment laws, as discussed in Part II.B, below.
State insurance measure covering the capital or solvency of an insurer, except to
the extent that such State insurance measure results in less favorable treatment of a
non-U.S. insurer than a U.S. insurer.”); see also id. § 313(f)(1) (state insurance
measures preempted only if Director determines that measure results in less
favorable treatment of a non-U.S. insurer “domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction that
is subject to a covered agreement” than a U.S. insurer admitted in the state and “is
inconsistent with a covered agreement.”).
29
Randall, supra note 210, at 629.
30
Randall, supra note20Id., at 631-32; see also Paul Walker-Bright, Reed
Smith LLP on the Potential for Future Regulation of Insurance in Light of AIG,
Inc.’s Financial Collapse, 2008 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 3091..
31
See generally Randall, supra note 2021, at 634-40.
32
Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 2.
33
Therese M. Vaughan, The Economic Crisis and Lessons from (and for) U.S
Insurance Regulation, 9 (unpublished working paper) (on-file with NAIC Journal
of Insurance Regulation).
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The NAIC is involved not just in setting standards for insurance
companies, but also in oversight of the insurers’ operations. The NAIC’s
Financial Analysis Division carries out ongoing oversight of all “nationally
significant insurers” and reports unusual findings to a college of regulators,
the Financial Analysis Working Group.34 The Working Group, which has
16 members who have been described as among “the most experienced
financial regulators in the system of U.S. insurance regulation,” reviews
companies that have been identified by the Financial Analysis Division and
discusses such companies’ status with the primary regulator.35 It is said
that the NAIC uses this process to address problems created by some states
which tend to be lax in regulating their home insurers. NAIC’s
coordination of solvency oversight can help nudge the domiciliary state to
move if it is not being stringent enough.36
Since 1990, the NAIC has attempted to promote a minimum level
of regulatory effectiveness in all states by running an accreditation
program.
A NAIC accreditation team reviews each state’s laws,
regulations, and operations every five years, and makes suggestions along
with recommendations to the other states, who decide whether the state’s
accreditation should be continued.37 It appears that all 50 states and the
District of Columbia are now accredited under this program.38
III.

CREDIT RATINGS IN U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION

As an NAIC working group recently concluded, “[r]atings are used
extensively in insurance regulation,” and such reliance is “often required by
statute.”39 This Part surveys the current role of credit ratings in U.S.
34

Id. at 10.
Id.
36
Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 39.
37
Vaughan, supra note 33,2, at 11; Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 39 (in
addition to state-level financial monitoring, NAIC reviews insurer financial reports
for larger companies that write business in a significant number of states).
38
See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 109 (as of 2007, all states but
New York were accredited); Press Release, New York State Ins. Dep’t, Sept. 22,
2009
(announcing
accreditation
of
New
York),
available
at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2009/p0909221.htm. The fact that New York,
which historically has been viewed as one of the most sophisticated state
regulators, was unaccredited for so long has been interpreted by some as evidence
of deficiencies in the accreditation program itself. See Randall, supra note 2021, at
663-64.
39
NAIC RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP, EVALUATING THE RISKS
35
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insurance regulation.
A.

CREDIT RISK, CREDIT RATINGS, AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

Insurers face both fixed and risk-based capital requirements. Each
state has a fixed capital requirement for insurers; the requirements range
from $500,000 to $6 million.40 These numbers suggest that the fixedcapital requirements are significant only for the smallest insurance
companies.
The more important capital requirements are the risk-based capital
requirements that follow the NAIC framework introduced in the 1990s.41
The system, which is designed to force insurers that take greater risks to
hold more capital, is composed of two elements: 42 The first is a risk-based
capital formula, which establishes the minimum capital level, and the
second is a model law that authorizes the state insurance regulator to take
specific action when an insurer’s capital falls below prescribed levels.43
Under current NAIC rules, credit ratings determine the amount of capital
insurers must hold.
1. Overview of the Risk-Based Capital Framework
In general outline, an insurer’s risk-based capital (RBC)
requirement is computed by (1) attempting to quantify “risk charges” and
various risks the company faces; and (2) combining the resulting risk
charges for the individual risks into a total capital requirement in a way that
very roughly takes into account whether the risks are correlated or
independent.
Different RBC formulas are used for different types of insurers –
life, property and casualty, and health -- reflecting differences in the risks
the insurers face. A life insurance company’s risk-based capital is used as
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – FINAL REPORT
OF THE RAWG TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS COMMITTEE, 2 (2010) [hereinafter
RAWG FINAL REPORT].
40

Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 89, at 34.
See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 107 (RBC standards for life
insurers introduced in 1992, for property and liability insurers in 1993, and for
health insurers in1997).
42
National Association of Insurance Commissioners,, Risk-Based Capital
General
Overview
(July
15,
2009).
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_RBCoverview.pdf.
43
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 312-1, (2007)
41
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an example.44
Consider four risks that a life insurance company faces:45 the risk
of subsidiaries’ loss due to defaults on their investments (affiliate risk),
credit risk on the insurer’s investments, interest rate risk, and insurance risk
(the risk of greater-than-expected losses because of a need to pay out on
policies). The losses are combined as follows:46

As the example shows, some risks are added directly and some are
added in squares. This reflects an implicit decision to model the risks that
are directly added as perfectly correlated, and those that are added in
squares as independent.47 The example therefore illustrates a determination
that credit risk and rate risk are perfectly correlated with one another and
independent of insurance risk. The risk arising from the combination of
credit risk, rate risk, and insurance risk is considered perfectly correlated
with affiliate risk. Insurance regulators have been taken to task over the
years for this crude treatment of the correlation of risk.48
Most risk charges are quantified by applying factors to items on the
balance sheet.49 For example, according to a document on the Society of
Actuaries website, insurance risk in the example above is equal to total life
insurance in force, less reserves (which cover the expected loss from policy
payouts), multiplied by a factor determined by regulators.50 Computation
44

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 2.
The risk-based capital formula takes account of other risks, see id. at 4, but
they are omitted for ease of exposition.
46
Id .at 4; Craig F. Likkel & Lloyd M. Spencer, Jr., 2004 Valuation Actuary
Symposium Boston, Session 14 PD:
Risk-Based Capital (2004),
http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/14_combo-valact04.pdf.
47
See PLANTIN & ROCHET, supra note 121, at 34-37.
48
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Model Investment Law: A Missed
Opportunity, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 41, 41 (Edward I. Altman & Irwin T.
Vanderhoof, eds. 1996) .
49
Nancy Bennett, Panel Discussion, Use of Rating Agency Ratings in State
Insurance Regulation, RATING AGENCY (E) WORKING GROUP HEARING, Sept. 24,
2009,
http:www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency_090924_hearing_panel1.htm.
50
Fred Tavan, Society of Actuaries, Risk-Based Capital, (Feb 28, 2007),
http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/03-RMTF-RiskBasedCap.pdf. According to the cited
document, the factor is 0.1495% for the first $500 million in risk and 0.0975% for
45
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of the risk charge for the credit risk of insurer investments is described in
detail in Part III, below.
2. Regulatory Action Under the Risk-Based Capital
Framework
The second major component of the risk-based capital framework
is a risk-based capital model law that authorizes the state insurance
authorities to take action when the insurer’s capital falls short of prescribed
levels.51
Whether capital is impaired depends on a comparison of the
company’s actual capital52 to the minimum required risk-based capital
derived from the formula discussed above. Conceptually, the insurer’s
capital is equal to assets minus liabilities; the rules elaborate on this
concept in more detail.53
The minimum risk based capital is also called the “authorized
control level,” and regulatory actions are keyed to actual capital as a
percentage of authorized control level.

Table 1: Regulatory Actions Under NAIC Model Act 31254
Percentage

of Regulatory Action

amounts above $500 million.
51
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 1.,
There are two NAIC model laws; one that covers property-casualty insurers and
life insurers, and one that applies to health insurance companies. Id.
52
Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 39; Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 89, at
35 (insurer’s “total available capital” is its “statutory capital and surplus”).
53
For life insurance companies, total adjusted capital is equal to unassigned
surplus plus asset valuation reserve plus half of dividend liability. Bennett, supra
note 498. The “asset valuation reserve” is an amount deducted from the total
assets to reflect risks, including default risk. Id. “Surplus” is assets minus
liabilities, and the “asset valuation reserve” is “assigned surplus.” Id.
54
See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 45.
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Authorized
Level
>200%
150-200%

100-150%

70-100%
<70%
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Control
No action.
Company Action Level: Insurer must report to
regulator on what contributed to the company’s
condition. Insurer’s plan must contain proposals
to correct the problems and provide projections
of financial condition, both with and without the
corrections, identifying assumptions underlying
the projections and problems with the insurer’s
business.
Regulatory Action Level: Insurer must file an
action plan, and state insurance commissioner
must perform any examinations or analyses of
the insurer’s business and operations that he or
she deems necessary, and must issue appropriate
corrective orders.
Authorized Control Level:
Regulatory is
authorized to take control of the insurer.
Mandatory Control Level: Regulator is required
to take steps to place the insurer under control
3. Use of Credit Ratings in Assessing Credit Risk

Insurers of every type are subject to capital charges for credit
risk.55 The capital charge for a given fixed-income investment, such as a
bond, note, or mortgage-backed security, is determined by multiplying the
book value of the investment56 by a “quality coefficient” designed to
measure the investment’s riskiness.57 Quality coefficients are based on the
investment’s classification into one of six categories, NAIC-1 to NAIC-6,
with NAIC-1 corresponding to the lowest credit risk and NAIC-6 the
highest.
The default rule has been that insurers must file fixed-income
55
See id. at 2.(“asset risk – other” is a capital charge for all insurer types);
Bennett, supra note 498, at 7 (“asset risk – other” include the risk of investment
defaults).
56
Investments are carried at acquisition price unless “impaired” (meaning that
the company does not anticipate that the instrument will perform as agreed).
Impaired instruments are carried at market value. Bennett, supra note 498, at 8.
57
Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 98, at 34.
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securities they own with the Securities Valuation Office (“SVO”) of the
NAIC, which assigns each security to one of the six categories and charges
the insurer for this service. In 2004, however, the NAIC exempted from
this requirement securities with ratings from recognized rating agencies, as
discussed in more detail in Part IV.A.1 below.58
The NAIC rating of a rated security is determined by its agency
rating, according to fixed mapping between the two schemes, set out
below. If the security is rated by just one agency, that agency’s rating is
used.59 If the security is rated by two agencies, the lower of the two ratings
is used,60 If the security is rated by more than two agencies, the security’s
second-lowest rating is used.61
The upshot is that if a recognized rating agency chooses to issue a
rating on a debt instrument, the capital charge is based on the agency’s
rating.
Table 2: NAIC Classifications and Agency Ratings62

58
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the NAIC
Filing
Exemption
(FE)
Rule
1,
(Feb.
25,
2004),
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_FE_FAQ.pdf. The NAIC maintains a list of
“approved rating organizations” (AROs) whose ratings count for regulatory
purposes. The SEC also maintains a list of “nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations” (NRSROs), which is probably more widely known. The NAIC’s
AROs appear to be a subset of the SEC’s NRSROs. rating agencies that the SEC
has designated “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSROs).
Compare NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, PURPOSES
AND PROCEDURES MANUAL OF THE NAIC SECURITIES VALUATION OFFICE 36
(Dec. 31, 2009) (NAIC list of six approved rating organizations) with SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 3-4 (Jan. 2011) (SEC list of ten NRSROs).
59
See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Request for
Proposal Pertaining to Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Owned by U.S.Domiciled
Companies,
12
(Oct.
23,
2009)
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_rmbs_rfp_102309.pdf.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
Sholom Feldblum, NAIC Property/Casualty Insurance Company Risk-Based
Capital Requirements,83 PROCS. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC’Y, 297, 304-05 (1996);
Chris Evangel, Panel Discussion, Use of Rating Agency Ratings in State Insurance
Regulation RATING AGENCY (E) WORKING GROUP HEARING, (Sept. 24, 2009)
http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_090924_hearing_panel1.htm.

116

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

NAIC Class

Bond
Factor

Federal
Government
Bonds
1: Highest Quality
2: High Quality

0.0%

0.3%
1.0%

3:
Medium 2.0%
Quality
4: Low Quality
4.5%
5: Lower Quality
10.0%
6:
In or Near 30.0%
Default
B.
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RBC Preferred Stock Agency
RBC Factor
Rating
Equivalent
NA

2.3%
3.0%
4.0%
6.5%
12.0%
30.0%

AAA to ABBB+
to
BBBBB+ to BBB+ to BCCC+
CCCCC+ to D

to

RATING DEPENDENCE AND INVESTMENT LAWS

All states have laws that directly govern the types of investments
insurers can make. Unlike capital requirements, which require only that
insurers maintain a larger financial cushion for riskier investments, state
investment laws directly govern investment – for example by authorizing
only certain types of investments and forbidding all others, or by requiring
that only a certain percentage of investments fall below a credit-rating
threshold. State investment laws are also unlike capital requirements in
that they are quite heterogeneous. As described below, different states
impose very different requirements, despite an effort at NAIC to
standardize these rules.
State requirements of the form “X investment is prohibited absent a
rating higher than Y” are relatively uncommon, although they do exist, as
described below. Ratings also come into play in some states in determining
whether insurers have excessive exposure to risky assets or excessively
concentrated portfolios. In aggregate, state investment laws give
significance to a rating agency’s decision to issue a rating – particularly a
high one.
1. NAIC’s Model Investment Laws
In 1991, the NAIC created a working group to devise a model law
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governing all insurer investments.63 Over the course of several years, the
working group developed a proposal that was based on enumerating the
specific types of assets an insurer could hold. This proposal ultimately
became the Investments of Insurers Model Act (Defined Limits Version),64
adopted by NAIC in 1996.65 According to NAIC staff annotations, this
version of the Model Act has been adopted in seven states and the District
of Columbia.66 According to contemporary accounts, insurers strongly
resisted the Defined Limits Version, preferring a more open-ended
investment law that did not enumerate permissible investments in detail,
but instead permitted any investment that met a general standard of
prudence.67 This idea became the basis of the Investments of Insurers
Model Act (Defined Standards Version),68 adopted by NAIC in 1997.69
The NAIC staff annotations indicate that Georgia, Missouri, and South
Dakota acted in some respect on the Defined Standards Version of the
63
See HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 446 (1999).
64
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 280-1, §§ 1-32
(1996) [hereinafter Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version).]
65
Id. § 32.
66
Id. § State Adoption. According to the NAIC staff, the Defined Limits
Version of the Model Investment Act has been adopted in Alaska, the District of
Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, South Carolina, and West
Virginia.
67
See Robert M. Ferm & Jon M. Moellenberg, Recent Developments in the
Public Regulation of Insurance Law, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 447, 460 (1996); Noreen
J. Parrett & Steven M. Schindhelm, Recent Developments in the Public Regulation
of Insurance Law, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 553, 564-65 (1997); Mark R. Goodman,
Recent Developments in the Public Regulation of Insurance Law, 33 TORT & INS.
L.J. 681, 691(1998).
68
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 283-1, §§ 1-19
[hereinafter Model Investment Act (Defined Standards Version)]. Section 4.B sets
out the prudency standard in familiar language, providing that the board of
directors “shall exercise the judgment and care, under the circumstances then
prevailing, that persons of reasonable prudence, discretion, and intelligence
exercise in the management of a like enterprise, not in regard to speculating but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income
as well as the probable safety of their capital.” Id. at § 4.B. In keeping with the
general push to take diversification into account in financial regulation, the
Defined Standards Version expressly directs insurer boards of directors in Section
5.E to “consider … [t]he extent of the diversification of the insurer’s investments.”
Id. at § 5.E.
69
Id. at § 19.
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Model Investment Act.70
The Defined Limits Version of the Act relies heavily on the
NAIC’s six-tier classification system to define permitted investments. It
provides that insurers generally may hold only “rated” credit instruments,71
and restricts an insurer’s holdings of “medium and lower grade
investments” to specified fractions of the insurer’s total admitted assets.72
“Medium and lower grade investments” are defined in terms of credit
ratings.73
The Defined Limits Version provides that property and casualty
insurers may invest in investment pools that in turn invest only in
obligations with NAIC-1 or NAIC-2 ratings, money market funds, or
securities lending or repurchase transactions.74
70

Id. at § State Adoption.
See Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) § 3.A (“Investments
not conforming to this Act shall not be admitted investments”); id. Id. at § 11
(subject to certain limitations, life and health insurers “may acquire rated credit
instruments”); id §§ 21, 24 (subject to certain limitations, property and casualty,
financial guaranty, and mortgage guaranty insurers “may acquire rated credit
instruments”)/). In turn, a “rated credit instrument”is defined as a credit instrument
that meets one of the following tests: (1) “rated or required to be rated by the
SVO”; (2) has a maturity of 397 days or less, and issued by an entity that is rated
by the SVO or an NRSRO recognized by the SVO; (3) has a maturity of 90 days or
less and is issued by an adequately capitalized bank; (4) is a share of a money
market mutual fund; or (5) is a share of a class one bond mutual fund. See id. §§
RRR. Notably, the last two categories are implicitly rating-dependent. Moneymarket funds are required to invest in instruments that have high NRSRO ratings
or the equivalent. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(i), (a)(10).
SEC Investment
Company Act Rule 2a-7. Class one bond mutual funds are required to “maintain
the highest credit quality rating given by an NAIC ARO.” NAIC PRACS. & PROCS.
MAN., Part 6, § 2(b)(iii), at 201 (2009).
72
Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) §§ 10 (life and health
insurers), 23 (property, casualty, and financial and mortgage guaranty insurers).
NAIC-6 securities may make up only 1% of admitted assets; NAIC-5 and -6
securities together may make up only 3% of assets; “lower grade investments” may
make up only 10% of assets, and “medium and lower grade investments” may
make up only 20% of assets. Id.
73
Id. § 1.BBB ( stating that “Medium grade investments” are those rated
NAIC-3); id. § 1.Z (stating that “Lower grade investments” are those rated NAIC4, -5, and -6).
74
Id § 25.A. Recall that money-market funds themselves are required to
invest only in instruments carrying certain ratings. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(12)(i),
(c)(3)
71
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Although the Model Investment Act itself has not been widely
adopted (in either version), it appears that every state has a law governing
insurance-company investments.75
2. Rating Dependence in State Insurance Investment
Laws
Apart from the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model
Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) – Alaska, the District of
Columbia, Illinois,76 Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey,77 and West Virginia
– a number of other states’ investment laws rely expressly on ratings.
This section presents the results of a survey of investment laws of
several states that are particularly important to insurance regulation,
specifically California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and New York.78 The purpose of the survey was to determine the
extent of rating-dependent regulation in each state. Most state investment
laws enumerate specified permitted types of investments and forbid all
others, although some allow any “prudent” investments. Laws of the
former type frequently include rating-based criteria for permitted
investments. In addition, credit ratings are used to specify permitted
investment-pool investments, aggregate exposure limits, and derivative
counterparty exposures.
a. Direct Authorization
i. Corporate Debt
Most states do not impose direct rating requirements for
75
Id. § State Adoption (indicating that every state has “related state activity”
for the Model Investment Act).
76
Illinois is the domicile of major insurance subsidiaries of Allstate, and is the
site of the corporate headquarters of State Farm.
77
It appears that New Jersey has adopted the Model Investment Act only in
part. Its provisions are discussed in more detail in the text. Prudential Insurance is
domiciled in New Jersey and its principal regulatory authority is the New Jersey
Department of Banking and Insurance.
78
The list of states was developed by reviewing the reports of the ten largest
insurance groups in the United States and determining the principal regulator of
each group’s major insurance subsidiaries. This list was supplemented by
consulting with other academics to identify states that generally are considered
important insurance regulators.
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investments in corporate bonds, although there are some exceptions. One
important exception is New York, whose investment laws for most non-life
insurers79 (including financial guaranty insurers) define permitted U.S.
investments by credit rating, although the rules for life insurers generally
do not.80
Minnesota’s general law for life insurers81 provides that
investments in preferred stock82 and corporate bonds,83 must meet
minimum rating requirements. Certain large, well-capitalized life insurers
are subject to a different requirement.

ii. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Mortgage-backed securities are an important exception to the
general rules that states regulate the instruments in which insurers are
permitted to invest. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act
(“SMMEA”),84 enacted in 1984, has required state regulators to treat
mortgage-backed securities that receive high credit ratings85 as the
79
The provision discussed applies to insurers other than life insurers, nonprofit
medical/dental insurers, title insurers, and domestic charitable annuity societies.
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1403(a), (c) (McKinney 2006).
80
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2) (McKinney 2006) (permitting investment in
obligations of U.S. institutions that are secured or that are “rated A or higher by a
securities rating agency recognized by the superintendent” or insured by an insurer
“with a Aaa rating from a securities rating agency recognized by the
superintendent” or that “have been given the highest quality designation by the
Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners.”). The rules for acquiring interests in loans secured by real estate,
apparently including mortgage-backed securities, are not rating-dependent. Id. §
1404(a)(4). The statute does not clearly authorize purchases of ABS.
81
Minnesota is the domiciliary state for major insurance subsidiaries of The
Travelers Group.
82
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv. 6(b)(3) (West 2005) (forbidding
investments in preferred stock “rated in the four lowest categories” established by
the SVO).
83
Id. subdiv. 6(e)(2) (West 2005)(permitting investments in bonds,
obligations, and notes that are rated in the four highest categories by at least one
NRSRO, or in one of the two highest categories by SVO). Id. subdiv. 6(f) (Noninvestment grade obligations must meet an earnings test to be eligible for
investment).
84
PUB. L. 98-440, effective Oct. 3, 1984.
85
15 U.S.C. § 78c(1)(41).
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equivalent of U.S. government obligations.86 Because insurers are
universally permitted to invest in U.S. government obligations, SMMEA
has effectively required states to permit insurers to invest in high-rated
mortgage-backed securities. Dodd-Frank repeals the provision of SMMEA
that tied the preferential treatment of MBS to high credit ratings,87 but the
repeal does not go into effect until July 2012.88
SMMEA did provide for a seven-year period in which states could
affirmatively opt out of its requirement that high-rated MBS be treated the
same as Treasury bonds.89 It appears that ten states opted out of SMMEA’s
preemption provisions for insurance,90 including two states that are major
insurance regulators, Connecticut91 and New York.92
Even states that did not opt out of SMMEA do have rules
permitting insurer investment in specified mortgage-backed securities.
These rules do not refer to ratings, and instead depend on characteristics of
the mortgages themselves, such as loan priority, loan-to-value ratio,
whether the mortgages are covered by mortgage insurance, and the
amortization period of the loans. 93 In light of SMMEA’s requirement that
insurers be permitted to invest in high-rated mortgage-backed securities, it
seems that these statutes expand the category of mortgage-backed securities
in which insurers can invest.
86

15 U.S.C. §77r-1(a)(1)
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PUB. L.
111-203, July 21, 2010. § 939(e).
88
Id. §939(g).
89
15 U.S.C. § 77r-1(b).
90
JASON H.P. KRAVITT ET AL., SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (2010)
§ 17.05 n.386.
91
CONN. GEN. ST. ANN. § 38a-102i. Connecticut permits insurers to make any
investments that are “prudent in respect of the business of [the] insurance company
and diversification considerations,” Id. §38a-102(a), subject to limits on the
percentage of assets that may be invested in the portion of mortgages that exceeds
a 75% loan to value ratio. Id. § 38a-102c(f)
92
N.Y. INS. L. § 1401(c). New York permits insurers to invest in notes backed
by first and second mortgages meeting specified loan-to-value thresholds. See
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(4).
93
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subd. 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. §17B:201(c); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1177 (non-excess funds -- notes backed by insured
mortgages), 1194.81-82 (excess funds -- notes backed by first or second mortgages
that meet combination of loan-to-value, mortgage insurance, and amortization
requirements); N..J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(c) (mortgages meeting combination of
loan-to-value, agency guarantee, and amortization requirements).
87
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iii. Structured Products Other than
Mortgage-Backed Securities
Minnesota and California have rating-based rules that expressly
govern insurers’ investments in structured or asset-backed securities.94
Other states, such as Massachusetts,95 have rating-dependent provisions
that are drafted broadly enough to cover such investments, even if the term
“asset-backed” or “structured” is not used. Still others, such as New York,
permit insurers to invest in obligations with high ratings issued by
“institutions” without defining that term.96
iv. Non-U.S Investments
Ratings determine the eligibility of non-U.S. investments for
insurer investment in New York, 97 Minnesota, 98 and New Jersey. 99
94

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv.. 8(b) (West 2005) (permitting
investment in asset-backed arrangements in which at least 90 percent of the dollar
value of the assets are eligible for direct investment or that have a rating in the top
four categories from at least one NRSRO or in the top two categories from SVO);
CAL. INS. CODE §1192.10(a)(3) (West 2005) (permitting asset-backed security
investments that have ratings in one of three highest categories by at least one
NRSRO and one of the two highest NAIC categories). Such investments are
limited to 10% of an insurer’s total admitted assets. Id. § 1192.10(b).
95
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63(14G) (supp. 2010). Section 14G
permits investment in obligations of U.S. and Canadian “institutions,” as defined in
§63A(1) subject to rating requirements. Section 63A(1) in turn defines
“institution” as “a corporation, a joint-stock company, an association, a trust, a
business partnership, a business joint venture or similar entity.” This definition is
broad enough to include typical structured products, which are issued by trusts.
The specific rating requirement of Section 63(14G) is that the product initially be
rated “at least BBB- or Baa3 or the equivalent thereof” by an NRSRO recognized
by SVO and receive an initial or provisional rating of in the top two categories
from SVO directly or via a filing exemption. Id. § 63(14G)((1)-(3). California
likewise defines “institution” broadly to include business trusts. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 1192 (West 2005) (authorizing investment in “interest-bearing obligations
issued by a nonaffiliate institution”); id. §1196.1(f)(5) (defining “institution” to
include “business trust”). See infra note 92 and note 113, (Although California
does not impose a rating threshold on individual investments, it does limit
aggregate investments in low-rated obligations of “institutions.”).
96
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2). (McKinney 2006).
97
See id., § 1404(a)(6) (permitting non-life insurers to make foreign
investments “substantially of the same … investment grades as those eligible for
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b. Aggregate Exposure Limits
Even when state laws do not use ratings to specify permitted
investments, they often require insurers’ portfolios to satisfy rating
requirements in the aggregate. For example, in Minnesota, insurers other
than life insurers may invest only up to 15 percent of total admitted assets
in noninvestment grade obligations,100 which are defined in terms of
ratings.101
California102 and Massachusetts103 impose the same ratingbased limits on aggregate holdings of medium- and low-quality
investments as the Model Act. Connecticut limits the percentage of assets
investment under other provisions of this section”); § 1405(a)(7)(C)(i)(I)
(permitting life insurers to make foreign investments in governments or institutions
of countries “rated in one of the three highest rating categories by an independent,
nationally recognized United States rating agency”).
98
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.29, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2005) (requiring that
sovereign debt have a rating in the top two categories from an NRSRO to be
eligible for investment); id. subdiv.. 2(b) (requiring that obligations of a foreign
business entity have a rating in the four highest categories from an NRSRO “or by
a similarly recognized statistical rating organization, as approved by the
commissioner, in the country where the investment is made,” or have a rating in
the highest two categories from SVO); id. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 14(a)(ii) (permitting
life insurers to invest in obligations of non-U.S. banks only if the debtor bank “has
a long-term deposit rating or a long-term debt rating of at least Aa2 as found in the
current monthly publication of Moody’s Credit Opinions or its equivalent.”).
99
See N..J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(e)(1)(a) (West 2006) (limiting investments
to those in obligations of institutions or governments of jurisdictions “rated in one
of the two highest categories by an independent, nationally recognized United
States rating agency.”); id. 17B:20-1(e) (A life insurer may invest up to 3% of
aggregate assets in aggregate in countries that do not meet the rating standard).
100
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 17(d) (West 2005).
101
See id. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 10(i) (defining “noninvestment grade
obligations” as “obligations which, at the time of acquisition, were rated below
Baa/BBB or the equivalent by a securities rating agency or which, at the time of
acquisition, were not in one of the two highest categories” established by SVO).
102
See CAL. INS. CODE § 1196.1(a)(6) (West 2005) Compare id. § 1196.1(a)
with NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGUALTIONS, AND GUIDELINES 280-1 § 10.B (2001).
California law also provides that affiliated insurers may invest in “cash
management pools” that hold corporate debt obligations, as long as the obligations
have a maturity of less than one year and carry an NAIC-1 or NAIC-2 rating.
103
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63A(1) (West 1998) (defining “medium grade
obligation” and “lower grade obligations” in terms of NAIC ratings); id. § 63A(2)
(limits on investment in medium and lower-grade bonds).
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that can be invested in “high yield obligations,”104 as defined by ratings.105
c. Concentration Limits
Most states’ laws prohibit insurers from investing more than a
specified fraction of their assets in any one particular entity. For example,
New York law prohibits insurers from investing more than 10 percent of
admitted assets in securities of any one institution.106 Here again, ratings
may come into play. In New York. “mortgage-related securities” – defined
by rating107 -- are simply exempted from the concentration-limit rule.108
d. Pool Requirements
Most states authorize insurers to participate in investment pools.
Some insurance groups pool investments from multiple regulated insurance
subsidiaries, presumably to exploit economies of scale. AIG’s securitieslending travails arose from such pooling activity.109 Such insurance pools
are often subject to rating-dependent regulation and often are required to
invest only in instruments that the insurers contributing the funds could
invest in.
New Jersey generally does not impose rating-dependent investment
limits on property and casualty insurers, although it has adopted Section 25
of the Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version), dealing with
investment pools.110 Notably, it appears that New Jersey law generally
104
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102c(c) (2007) (limiting high-yield investments to
10% of admitted assets).
105
Id. § 38a-102b(c) (2007) (defining “high yield obligations” as those that
“are not rated as investment grade by any nationally recognized United States
rating agency” or NAIC).
106
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1409(a) (McKineey 2006) (“[N]o domestic insurer shall
have more than 10 percent of its admitted assets…invested in, or loaned upon, the
securities…of any one institution.”). New York’s rating-based definition of a
mortgage-related security parallels the federal definition. Compare 15 U.S.C.
§78c(1)(41).
107
Id. § 1401(a)(2) (“’Mortgage-related security’ means an obligation that is
rated AA or higher (or the equivalent thereto) by a nationally recognized securities
rating agency” and meets other criteria).
108
Id. § 1409(c) (10 percent limit does not apply to “mortgage-related
securities” or securities issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac).
109
See infra note 269.
110
See N..J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:24-28 to -36. (West 2007).
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does not authorize property and casualty insurers to invest in corporate
bonds or asset-backed securities other than mortgage-backed securities,
which are not defined in terms of ratings.111
e. Derivative Exposures
Ratings also play a role under New York law in defining the parties
with whom insurers can enter into derivatives transactions. Insurers are
prohibited from amassing derivative exposure of more than 3 percent to
parties other than “qualified counterparties.”112 “Qualified counterparties”
are “qualified banks,” “qualified broker-dealers” and other counterparties
“rated AA-/Aa3 or higher by a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization” and approved by the Superintendent of Insurance.113 A
“qualified bank” in turn is defined as one that is AA-rated.114 Although
“qualified broker-dealer” is defined in terms of size and not rating,115
ratings also are relevant in that any derivative exposure to a counterparty is
treated as an obligation of that counterparty,116 so that non-life insurers
apparently can take derivative exposure only to counterparties meeting
rating requirements according to the rules for investment in obligations of
U.S. companies.

f.

Non-Rating-Based Authorizations

State statutes often will authorize investments without regard to
ratings. In addition to the common practice of permitting mortgage-backed
security investments without regard to ratings described above,
California,117
Connecticut,118
New
Jersey,119
Massachusetts,120
111

See id.. § 17:24-1.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1410(f)(2)(A) McKinney 2006).
113
Id § 1410(f)(3)(A).
114
Id § 1410(f)(3)(C)(iv).
115
Id § 1410(f)(3)(B).
116
Id. § 1410(f)(1).
117
See Cal. Ins. Code § 1192(a) (West 2005) (corporate bonds);
118
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102(a) (2010) (Insurers may make all such
investments “as are prudent in respect of the business … and diversification
consideration.”)
119
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(d) (West 2005) (authorizing New Jersey life
insurers to invest in corporate bonds without regard to ratings). The law does not
appear to specify any standard of creditworthiness for these investments. See id.
112
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Minnesota,121 and New York122 all expressly permit certain types of
investments without regard to rating. When ratings are not required for
individual investments, the statute often provides that the insurer must
make only “prudent”123 or “sound”124 investments.
g. Catch-all Provisions
Even when rating-dependent requirements limit insurer
investments, state investment laws typically provide “catch-all provisions”
that permit investments of relatively modest size in instruments that do not
meet other requirements. 125

120

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63(7) (West 2010) (real-estate loans); id. §
63(14A) (corporate bonds). MassMutual and its two principal insurance
subsidiaries, C.M. Life and MML Bay State Life, are domiciled in Massachusetts.
121
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60L.02 (West 2010) (requiring $2 billion in
admitted assets, NRSRO rating in one of the three highest categories, plus other
criteria, for exemption eligibility)
122
New York is the principal regulator for the New York Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, as well as for insurance subsidiaries of AIG. N.Y. INS. LAW §
1405(a)(2) (McKinney 2010) (preferred stock); id. § 1405(a)(3) (obligations
secured by real property); id. § 1405(a)(5) (obligations secured by personal
property).
123
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102(a) (insurers may make all such investments
“as are prudent in respect of the business … and diversification consideration.”);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405(c) (requiring directors and officers to use “that degree of
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances” in making investments); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60L.04, subdivs.
1-2 (authorizing insurer exempt from default investment rules to “loan or invest its
funds … to the same extent as any other corporation or person under the laws of
this state or the United States,” but requiring that board of directors “exercise the
judgment and care … that persons of reasonable prudence, discretion, and
intelligence exercise in the management of a like enterprise”); id. § 60L.05(5)
(establishing “the extent of the diversification of the insurer’s investments” as a
criterion for evaluating prudence of investment). Connecticut is the domiciliary
state for major insurance subsidiaries of The Travelers Group and The Hartford.
124
CAL. INS. CODE § 1196(a) (West 2005). California is the domiciliary state
for the major insurance subsidiaries of Farmers Group, Inc. (which are organized
as inter-insurance exchanges under California law), as well as of a major insurance
subsidiary of Allstate
125
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv.. 12; CAL. INS. CODE §1210.
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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FAILURE OF RATINGS
ON NOVEL, UNSEASONED PRODUCTS

The way in which ratings were incorporated into the regulatory
system made it possible for insurers to take on exposures to novel financial
products such as subprime and Alt-A residential mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations.
The capital requirements
regime was built around agency credit ratings, and in many instances state
investment laws directly required high ratings for insurer investment in
novel instruments.
During the financial crisis that started in 2007, these products also
suffered a high incidence of large credit-rating downgrades that can be
described as unexpected, even unprecedented. Although it will always be
possible to argue that the ratings did not “fail” in some sense, all the major
credit rating agencies have conceded that their ratings on novel products
did not perform as well as intended during the financial crisis.
Although the solvency-rated U.S. insurance industry reportedly
fared better in the financial crisis starting in 2007 than the banking
industry, the poor performance of formerly high-rated novel products did
create some important problems for the industry. The underperformance of
such products was quite important to the failure of the bond insurance
industry and of AIG, although it can be argued that the latter case does not
impugn the existing capital and investment requirements for regulated
insurers as the fatal exposures were undertaken by an unregulated affiliate
of the insurance companies. The poor performance of life insurers’ novelproduct investments also put stress on that segment of the industry, leading
to regulatory changes as described in Part IV, below.
A.

Subprime and Alt-A RMBS and CDOs Are Novel
1. Subprime and Alt-A RMBS

Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) are not
particularly novel – the first private-label securitization dates to 1983 – but
MBS backed by subprime and “Alt-A” mortgages extended to borrowers
with poor credit are of more recent vintage. A 2007 study put it thus:
“Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and the issuance of
mortgage-backed securities was dominated by loans to prime borrowers
conforming to underwriting standards set by the Government Sponsored
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Agencies.”126
One highly influential account, by Gary Gorton, describes
subprime and Alt-A mortgages as reflecting a distinctive, novel security
design for a distinctive purpose: enabling the lender to lend profitably to
borrowers with poor credit risk.127 He emphasizes the prepayment penalty
and interest step-up features of subprime RMBS in describing such
mortgages as effectively creating “compound options” on the underlying
property for the lender, thereby increasing the lender’s exposure to home
price appreciation.128 Whether one accepts this specific explanation or not,
secured lending based on collateral value rather than the borrower’s ability
to repay has to increase the lender’s sensitivity to collateral price changes.
Rating conclusions based on the history of prime RMBS thus were less
relevant to these securities.129
The scale of subprime and Alt-A issuance is certainly a novel
phenomenon. As recently as 2001, subprime and Alt-A securitization
totaled $98.5 billion, as compared to $1,087.6 billion for agency-backed
securitizations and total mortgage origination of $2,100 billion.130 By
2006, subprime and Alt-A securitization was $814.3 billion, as compared to
$904.6 billion in securitizations by government-sponsored entities, such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.131 This reflected a massive expansion in the
extent of subprime mortgage origination132 and a doubling in the
126
Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Scheuermann, Understanding the Securitization of
Subprime Mortgage Credit, 2 (March 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
127
Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 4 (Yale Int’l Ctr. For Fin. , Working
Paper No. 08-25, 2008)
128
Id. at 5.
129
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 118 (2011) (“Moody’s did not even develop a model specifically to take
into account the layered risks of subprime mortgages until late 2006, after it had
already rated nearly 19,000 subprime securities”)l id. at 120-21 (describing
evolution of Moody’s models). Although for of the ten members of the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission dissented from the report in two separate dissent, none
of dissenters contested the majority’s findings about ratings on subprime RMBS,
and the dissent in which three of the four dissenting commissioners joined stated
that one of the “ten essential causes” of the crisis was “failures in credit ratings and
securitization.” Id. at 418.
130
Ashcraft & Scheuermann, supra note 1216, at 7 (jumbo originations, i.e.
mortgages to prime borrowers that were too large to meet GSE guidelines -- and
originations that were not securitized made up the difference).
131
Id. at 7
132
Jie He , Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan. Credit Rating and the Evolution of
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percentage of subprime mortgages that were securitized. 133 Although there
is no universally accepted definition of a “subprime” mortgage, one
estimate is that total origination of subprime mortgages increased from $65
billion in the late 1990s to over $600 billion in 2006, with subprime
accounting for about a third of total mortgage volume in 2006.134
2. Growth of the CDO Market
CDOs can be defined as structured finance securities in which the
cash flows from a pool of assets are divided into senior and junior debt
classes, called “tranches.”135 The CDO market exploded in the years
leading up to the crisis, with global CDO issuance going from $157.4
billion in 2004 to $551.7 billion in 2006.136 The number of CDO tranches
issued nearly doubled from 2005 (4,708 tranches) to 2006 (9,278
tranches).137
B.

EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT RATINGS ON RMBS AND CDOS
FAILED

the Mortgage-backed Securities Market, 6 (March 2010) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Boston College Department of Finance) (subprime origination
increased from $65 billion around the turn of the century to over $600 billion in
2006). Subprime reportedly accounted for 13% of total mortgage origination in
2007. HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2009).
133
SCOTT, supra note 121132, at 3 (proportion of subprime mortgages
securitized rose from 46% to 93% from turn of the century to 2006)/
134
He, Qian & Strahan, supra note 121 132 at 6; SCOTT, supra note 121132, at
2.
135
Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 6; (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15045); see also Dan Luo, Dragon
Yong Tang & Sarah Qian Wang, A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Data
History, Model Uncertainty, and CDO (Mis-)Pricing 4 (November 15, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the School of Economics and Finance,
University of Hong Kong) available at www.fma.org/iamen/BayesianCDO.pdf
(CDO issuance grew from $17 billion in 1997 to over $500 billion in 2006-07).
Some commentators use a more general definition of CDO that would include
non-tranched structures. “CDOs entail the use of securitisation techniques to
create structured exposure to portfolios of multiple reference entities.” SATYAJIT
DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES, CDOS & STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS 305-06 (3d
ed. 2005).
136
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 13524, at 7.
137
Id. at 7.
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Structured products in general suffered a high rate of severe
downgrades in 2007 and 2008. 7.2% and 6.7% of tranches rated by
Moody’s were downgraded in 2007 and 2008 respectively, and the average
downgrade was 4.7 and 5.6 notches.138 This compares to an average rate of
downgrade on structured-finance securities of 1-2% per year.139 The
majority of the downgrades were on securities backed by first mortgages,
home equity loans (a category that apparently includes subprime loans),
and CDOs of ABS.140
One leading commentator puts it as follows: “Events since mid2007 have demonstrated that the major [rating agencies] grossly
underestimated the risk of loss associated with several types of structured
financial products that lay at the heart of the financial crisis.”141
1. RMBS
About 90% of rated RMBS value issued in the U.S. from 2003 to
2006 received AAA ratings, and 99.76% of rated issuance received
investment-grade ratings.142 Between December 2007 and September
2008, these securities experienced an extraordinarily high downgrade rate.
Adelino studies a sample covering 80% of RMBS issued in the U.S.
between 2003 and 2007,143 documenting the rapid growth of the market
during this period.144 Adelino does not distinguish between subprime/Alt-A
and conventional RMBS. The proportion of AAA-rated securities that had
been downgraded went from 0.5% to 16.2%, with equally dramatic
increases in downgrades among the lower rating classes.145 AAA-rated
RMBS had not yet been hit by a high level of default at the time of
Adelino’s study, although there were a few defaults even in this
category.146 Nevertheless, the level of downgrades was significant.
138

Id. at 24.
Id. at 24.
140
Id. at 25.
141
SCOTT, supra note 13221, at 125.
142
See Manuel Adelino, Do Investors Rely Only on Ratings? The Case of
Mortgage-Backed Securities 13, 42 tbl.1 (Nov. 24, 2009) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with author).
143
Id. at 10.
144
Id. at 42 tbl.1 (RMBS issuance covered by sample increased for $496.5
billion in 2003 to $1,080.4 billion in 2006).
145
Id. at 43 tbl.2.
146
Id. at 43 tbl.3 (0.4% of 2006-issued AAA RMBS had defaulted by
September 2008).
139
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Ratings are designed to be stable through the credit cycle, so mass
downgrades are themselves a sign of trouble. As Adelino points out, the
16% downgrade rated for AAA-rated RMBS issued between 2003 and
2006 contrasts with a historical one-year probability of downgrade on
triple-A structured finance instruments is less than 1 percent.147 By June
2009, Bank of America Merrill Lynch reported that over 64% of all AAA
rated non-agency RMBS had been downgraded to below investment grade
by at least one rating agency.148
Ashcraft catalogues a series of what he describes as “honest
mistakes” in rating RMBS, including underestimating the severity of the
housing cycle and model error brought on by “the lack of comprehensive
historical data,” particularly with respect to subprime mortgages, for which
historical data was “largely confined to a relatively benign economic
environment with very little data on periods of significant negative home
price appreciation.”149
2. CDOs
CDOs experienced a large number of severe downgrades in 2007
and 2008, accounting for 13% of structured-finance downgrades in 2007
and 22% in 2008.150
The performance of ABS CDOs – CDOs where structured products
such as CDOs and MBS make up the underlying pool of assets – is of
particular interest because of ABS CDOs’ role in the collapse of monoline
insurers. By January 2008, 17.35% of ABS CDOs insured by MBIA and
Ambac had been downgraded at least once, with only 3.63% upgraded.151
Barnett-Hart’s examination of a different sample of ABS CDOs reveals
that AAA tranches from 2005, 2006, and 2007 had been downgraded to
average ratings of BBB, B-, and CCC+ respectively by June 2009.152
Many CDOs were made out of RMBS – for example, around 70%
of ABS CDOs insured by Ambac and MBIA had RMBS or home equity as
147

Id. at 15.
Letter from John Bruins and Andrew Melnyk, ACLI, to Lou Felice and
Michael Moriarty, NAIC (Sept. 10, 2009) (on file with NAIC).
149
Adam B. Ashcraft, Discussion of Alchemy of CDO Ratings, 56 J. OF
MONETARY ECONOMICS 635, 637 (2009).
150
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 33 tbl.4.
151
Id. at 18.
152
Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown:
An Empirical Analysis 24 fig.10 (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished A.B. honors thesis,
Harvard College) (on file with Harvard College).
148
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collateral153 – and for those CDOs any errors in rating RMBS would have
been compounded.154
Because of the tranched structure common to CDOs, a critical
aspect of CDO rating and pricing is the correlation of defaults among the
underlying assets of the CDO. If raters rate the correlation too low, then
the ratings will be too high. If market participants assess the correlation as
too low, then the tranche prices will be too high. Default correlation,
however, is difficult to estimate accurately because defaults are generally
relatively rare events. It is widely believed that rating agencies and the
market assessed CDOs assets’ correlation as too low, resulting in overrated and over-priced CDOs.155 For example, a national decline in realestate prices would result in a lot of homeowners defaulting on their
mortgages at once (i.e., in a highly correlated fashion). Some researchers
have argued that CDOs were inherently difficult for any market participant
to evaluate because of limited data156 and fundamentally flawed models,157
so that ratings were more or less destined to be of low quality. More
jaundiced observers point to the fact that one rating agency’s model for
CDOs based on corporate bonds assumed no correlation between
companies in different industries.158
3. Other Examples of Novel-Product Rating Failure
It is sometimes argued that the underlying problem with ratings on
novel products in the financial crisis was a generally unanticipated national
decline in house prices. Although this certainly contributed to the collapse
of RMBS and CDO valuations, there are examples of rating failure on
153

Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 15.
See Ashcraft, supra note 13498, at 638 (arguing that CDO investors did not
“look through” credit ratings on RMBS to underlying collateral, instead “focusing
on Monte Carlo simulations which took the CRAs’ view of nonprime RMBS as
given.”).
155
See, e.g., Luo et al., supra note 13524, at 5.
156
Id. at 2 (“Because defaults are rare and credit cycles take a long time to
materialize . . . a short data history, say, five years of month[ly] observations, will
significantly underestimate the tail distribution of the credit portfolio and default
correlation.”).
157
Id. at 3. Luo et al.’s comment about model error reflects their view that a
very specific model change (to incorporate a “frailty factor”) is highly desirable.
The authors’ point about short data histories survives and is independent of this
very specific and contestable view about appropriate models. Id.
158
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 20.
154
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specific novel products that are not tied to housing or real estate. For
example, the market for CPDOs (“collateralized proportional debt
obligation”), a novel product introduced in 2006, collapsed in 2007 after a
wave of downgrades. The underlying asset for a CPDO is an index of
corporate credit spreads and the product has no direct connection to real
estate.159 The rise and fall of collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) tells
a similar story. Issuance of this product rose from approximately zero in
1994 to $25 billion in 2000. By 2003, issuance was back to zero after a
rash of downgrades. The CBO market had recovered to the $3-$5 billion
level by 2007-08, suggesting the possibility that market participants had
recovered confidence on ratings on this product.160
C.

LOSSES ON RMBS AND CDOS HARMED INSURERS
1. Financial Guaranty Insurers

The exposure of financial guaranty insurers such as Ambac and
MBIA to ABS CDOs is a well-known part of the story of their downfall.
Monoline insurers apparently took on a large proportion of the credit
exposures created by high-rated CDO tranches. S&P estimated that FGI
firms backed $127 billion in CDOs with some subprime loan exposure.161
Gorton estimates that FGIs held 26% of AAA CDO tranches.162 The two
largest bond insurers, Ambac and MBIA, had each sold CDS protection on
around $30 billion of CDO exposure by 2007.163 These CDO exposures,
which have been described as the “principal reason for Ambac’s significant
losses” during the financial crisis, led to mark-to-market losses of $5.9
billion in 2007 and $4.0 billion in 2008 and created a $10 billion liability

159
John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit
Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 123 (2009) [hereinafter Hunt, CRAs
and the WWCC].
160
See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 24, fig.6a.
161
SCOTT, supra note 121132, at 5.
162
See Pamela Peterson Drake & Faith Roberts Neale, Financial Guarantee
Insurance and the Failures in Risk Management 17 n.60 (May 2010) (unpublished
working paper) (citing Gorton).
163
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case
Study of Derivative Diclosures During the Financial Crisis 5 (UC Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 1585953, Mar. 15, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953.
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on the company’s balance sheet.164 By March 2010, MBIA had actually
paid $3.8 billion in claims on RMBS exposures and had a negative
unassigned surplus, which prevented it from writing new business.165
2. AIG
AIG had written CDS protection on $61.4 billion on multi-sector
CDOs with subprime housing exposure by 2007.166 AIG suffered writedowns to its CDS portfolio totaling $11 billion in 2007 and $20 billion in
the first nine months of 2008.167 Under the CDS agreements, AIG was
required to post collateral on account of the write-downs, and collateral
calls in July and August 2008 totaled $6 billion, or about 1/3 of the cash
AIG had on hand as of July 1.168 When AIG lost its AAA credit rating on
September 15, 2008, this triggered a further $20 billion in collateral calls
under the agreements, plunging AIG into distress and leading to its
government bailout the next day.169
AIG also had cash difficulties arising from its securities lending
program, because it received cash collateral in exchange for lending out
high-quality securities and invested that cash in RMBS. When AIG’s
counterparties became concerned about AIG’s situation, returned the lent
securities, and demanded return of the cash collateral, AIG was not able to
sell the RMBS, so that its cash was further drained, to the tune of $3.3
billion through August 31, 2008.170
3. Life Insurers
Life insurers held substantial amounts of non-agency RMBS -$145 billion as of year-end 2008.171

164

Id. at 27.
Moody’s Comments on MBIA’s Fourth Quarter Earnings and Ongoing
Litigations,
(Mar.
5,
2010),
http://www.mbia.com/investor/ratings/Moodys_030510.pdf.
166
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE. L REV. 943,
959 (2009).
167
See id. at 960.
168
Id. at 961.
169
Id. at 962.
170
Id. at 962–63.
171
ACLI Letter, supra note 137148, at 3.
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RATING FAILURE, RATING AGENCY FAULT, AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF SEASONING

The debate over whether rating agencies are at fault for poorquality ratings, by committing a species of fraud or otherwise, focuses
attention on whether agency ratings were as good as could be reasonably
expected.172 But even if ratings were as good as could be expected, that
does not necessarily mean that they were good enough for any and all
purposes. If ratings on novel products are unreliable because of a lack of
data on the products’ performance and experience in modeling the
products, then permitting an regulated insurer to invest in that product on
the basis of the rating is a questionable decision, even if the rating agency
did as well as it could have done or as well as the average or above-average
investor could have done.
A corollary to this is that one would expect ratings to become
more reliable over time with the accumulation of data and experience.
Indeed, the major rating agencies already have comprehensively revamped
their rating methodologies for RMBS and CDOs as a result of the crisis. It
seems to make more sense to give regulatory effect to ratings after the end
of an appropriate seasoning period than to do so immediately and without
regard to whether ratings on the product have proven themselves reliable.
V.

THE NAIC’S RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP: FIXING
RATINGS VERSUS REGULATING INSURANCE
The NAIC’s risk-based capital framework and federal and state

172
See,e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 1134321
(N.D. Cal. March 27, 2011) (denying rating agencies’ motion to dismiss negligent
misrepresentation claims based on agencies’ award of AAA ratings to auction-rate
securities); In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Secs. Litig., 2011 WL 321142 (Feb. 1,
2011) ; King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying rating agencies’ motion to dismiss common-law fraud
claims based on agencies’ award of AAA ratings securities issued by Rhinebridge
SIV (structured investment vehicle)); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying rating agencies’
motion to dismiss common-law fraud claims based on agencies’ award of AAA
ratings to securities issued by Cheyne SIV (structured investment vehicle));
California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Moody’s Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 24, 2010) (overruling rating agencies’ demurrer to claim for negligent
misrepresentation based on award of AAA ratings to Cheyne, Stanfield Victoria,
and Sigma Finance SIVs (structured investment vehicles)).

136

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol: 17.1

investment laws have conferred an important gatekeeping role on credit
ratings. In many cases, a recognized rating agency’s decision to rate an
investment product authorizes insurers to invest in that product.173 This is
important because insurers are responsible for a large fraction of fixedincome investment. Some rating-dependent rules rely on high ratings, as
explained above, and thus may encourage ratings inflation. But all ratingdependent rules depend on the fact of receiving a rating, and none
expressly distinguishes between ratings that are likely to be reliable and
ratings that are less likely to be reliable.174 This is curious, because the
reliability of a rating ought to be as important for regulation as how high
the rating is.
The apparent failure of ratings on a number of products175 has led
state insurance regulators to reexamine the role of ratings in their
regulations. Although this reexamination was initially quite broad-ranging,
it has narrowed significantly in scope. It now seems unlikely that the
NAIC will abandon credit ratings completely. Credit ratings offer insurers
and their regulators credit assessments at low cost, and historically ratings
from the major agencies have enjoyed a fairly high degree of market
acceptance.
The insurers who foot the bill for regulatory credit
determinations historically have liked the arrangement, citing its low cost.
Regulators may not want the large, difficult and unrewarding task of
making credit assessments on thousands of different financial instruments.
Most importantly, there are no terribly appealing alternatives to ratingdependent regulation or something very much like it.176
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the NAIC does not
seem to be on a path to complete elimination of ratings from its regulations.
The NAIC is not alone among regulators in its reluctance to follow that
173

See discussion supra Part II.B.
The fact that only ratings from approved agencies “count”
under NAIC rules, see supra note 658, attempts to distinguish between reputable
and nonrepuatable rating agencies, but no finer distinction appears in the NAIC
rules. The rules do not contemplate the possibility that an agency might do a good
job on some ratings and not others.
175
See discussion supra Part III.
176
Although the NAIC has replaced credit ratings on some structured financial
products with outsourced assessments provided by private parties that are not
rating agencies, see discussion infra Part IV.B.3, the new arrangement seems to
exhibit many of the same benefits and potential problems are rating-dependent
regulation. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the shift is better
understood as a change in the form of rating-dependent regulation than as a move
away from rating-dependent regulation to something else.
174
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path to its end – for example, the SEC also tabled reforms of ratingdependent regulation until commanded by Congress to eliminate ratings.
Rating-agency reformers, by contrast, are often quite eager to
eliminate credit ratings from regulation, pointing to the way in which
ratings warp agencies’ incentives and arguing that ratings are generally
uninformative. (Indeed, the two largest rating agencies themselves voice
agreement with the first statement, although not the second.) It seems that
there is a persistent conflict between capital regulators and rating-agency
reformers on this score.
The rating-agency reformers won out in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which seems to require
elimination of credit ratings from federal regulation, and which removes a
number of federal statutory requirements that incorporate credit ratings into
financial regulation177 – including the provision of SMMEA that requires
state insurance regulators to permit insurers to hold high-rated mortgagebacked securities178. As one might anticipate, federal regulators are
resisting this mandate. Even apart from that, state insurance regulators’
reluctance to give up on rating-dependent regulation threatens to undermine
the federal goal of improving rating agencies’ incentives by eliminating
rating-dependent regulation. The use of ratings in capital regulation
threatens to become a source of tension in the ongoing struggle between
state and federal authority in the regulation of insurance.
If regulators were to rely only on ratings on seasoned products –
products in existence long enough for analysts to have a good sense of how
the product is likely to perform under various economic conditions – that
would accommodate the most important interests both of those who want to
rely on credit ratings and of rating-agency reformers who want to minimize
reliance on such ratings. Regulators and regulated parties could continue to
rely on ratings for traditional products, preserving the low cost of the
rating-dependent system and addressing any concerns regulators might
have about being made responsible for routine credit determinations.
A seasoning requirement therefore is a feasible solution to the
conflict between regulators and rating-agency reformers. A seasoning
requirement also would mitigate the major problems with rating-dependent
regulation. The worst-performing ratings have been on novel products, as
one might expect given the agencies’ lack of experience with them. And it
is in the context of certifying novel products for acceptance that ratingdependent regulation has its worst effects on agency incentives for quality.
177
178

PUB. L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) §939.
PUB. L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) §939(e).
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THE NAIC’S USE OF RATINGS: A CASE STUDY IN
REGULATORY OUTSOURCING
1. The “Filing Exempt” Rule

The NAIC adopted the “filing exempt” rule (“FE Rule”), effective
January 1, 2004.179 The Rule provides that bonds and preferred stock that
have a current, monitored rating by an NRSRO do not have to be filed with
the NAIC’s Securities Valuation Office.180 In effect, the Rule permits
insurers to decide to delegate the SVO’s credit assessment function to the
credit rating agencies, at least for issues that the agencies decide to rate. If
an insurer chooses to have the issue rated by the SVO, the insurer must pay
a fee.181
Unsurprisingly, insurers prefer to use rating agencies: They use
ratings from the rating agencies rather than the SVO for about 80% of their
holdings,182 and SVO personnel confirm that insurers use SVO ratings
primarily when the rating agencies do not issue ratings on the instrument in
question.183
It appears that the NAIC adopted the Rule in response to concerns
that the SVO did not have the funding to conduct high-quality credit
analysis for the entire universe of bonds held by insurers. An NAICcommissioned 1998 report by KPMG Peat Marwick concluded that that the
“SVO has difficulty completing an in-depth analysis on the more complex
non-rated issues that due to the large volume of submissions it receives, as
well limited, qualified, trained staff available to perform the analyses.”184
The consultants found that there was “a need to either change the mission
of the SVO and perform much less credit analysis, or to update its
standards and dramatically increase its resources to improve the quality of
credit analysis performed.”185
179
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the
NAIC Filing Exemption Rule, supra note 5758, at 1.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 1-2.
182
See Evangel, supra note 61, at 11 (percentage computed by author).
183
Interview with Chris Evangel, Managing Director, Sec. Valuation Office
(June 29, 2010)
184
PEAT MARWICK, KPMG, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DUE DILIGENCE
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE SECURITIES VALUATION OFFICE 2 (June
1998) [hereinafter SVO REVIEW].
185
Id. at 2.
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As between those two choices, KPMG recommended the former,
arguing that there was “little opportunity for the SVO to add value by
conducting detailed independent credit reviews where an NRSRO or
insurance company has, or should have, already undertaken such
analysis.”186 For rated securities, KPMG recommended that the NAIC rely
on the credit rating to assign the security to one of the six categories;187 for
unrated securities, KPMG recommended that the NAIC “accept the ratings
assigned by insurers,”188 at least as to insurers that “comply with a
comprehensive set of credit rating criteria, credit rating procedures and
related documentation.”189 In 2000, the NAIC took one step in the
direction the consultants recommended; it adopted a provisional exemption
under which corporate and municipal securities that received high ratings
from credit rating agencies no longer had to be filed with the SVO.190 In
2004, with the adoption of Rule FE, the exemption became permanent and
was expanded to all bonds and preferred stock rated by recognized rating
agencies.191
2. Reexamination of Rating-Dependent Regulation in the
Financial Crisis of 2007-09
The financial crisis and the attendant criticism of ratings provided
an occasion for NAIC to reconsider whether to strengthen the role of SVO
and reduce that of private credit rating agencies.192 In February 2009, the
NAIC empaneled a Rating Agency Working Group (“RAWG”) to
reexamine the use of private credit ratings in insurance regulation. The list
of issues that RAWG was to address began with “the problems inherent in
reliance on ratings.”193 Observers expected that the SVO’s role would be
186

Id. at 3.
Id. at 30.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Chris Evangel, Statement and Testimony Befote the NAIC’s Working
Group Public Hearing, Nov. 18, 2010.
191
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the
NAIC Filing Exemption Rule, supra note 58, at 1.NAIC, Understanding the NAIC
Filing Exemption (FE) Rule (draft Feb. 25, 2004) , at 1. “Recognized” agencies in
this context are those that the SEC has designated “nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations.”Id.
192
Vaughan, supra note 323, at 14 (U.S. regulators “revisiting their reliance
on rating agencies in the risk-based capital system”).
193
RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 1.
187
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upgraded significantly and that the NAIC might even go so far as to set up
its own credit rating agency.194
The RAWG held a public hearing in September 2009 and produced
a draft report in December 2009.195 After receiving a significant number of
comments and revising the draft, the RAWG presented its final report on
April 28, 2010.196
The RAWG summarized its recommendations to
regulators as follows:
•

•
•

“[E]xplore how reliance on ARO ratings can be reduced
when evaluating new, structured, or alternative asset
classes, particularly by introducing additional or alternative
ways to measure risk;”
“Consider alternatives for regulators’ assessment of
insurers’ investment risk, including expanding the role of
the NAIC Securities Valuation Office;” and
“[T]ake[] into account” “the steps taken by the NRSROs in
correcting the causes that led to the recent rating
shortfalls.”197

The final report’s recommendations reject the complete elimination
of rating-dependent regulation recommended by some commenters and
apparently embraced by Congress in the Dodd-Frank bill, stating that
agency ratings “have a role in regulation.”198 At the same time, the RAWG
does express a commitment to reducing reliance on credit ratings, finding
that “NAIC policy on the use of [credit] ratings should be highly selective.”
199

The RAWG’s specific proposals for changing the use of ratings
focus on new and structured products. Consistent with this Article’s
recommendation that regulators require a seasoning period before
permitting regulatory use of ratings on novel products200, the Final Report
194

See Sean P. Carr, NAIC Seeks to Form Its Own Rating Agency, BESTWIRE,
Oct. 20, 2008, at 1.
195
NAIC RATING AGENCY WORKING GRP., EVALUATING THE RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – DRAFT FINAL
REPORT 6 (Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT].
196
RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398.
197
Id. at 1.
198
Id. at 5.
199
Id.
200
See infra Part VIII.
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recommends that the Valuation of Securities Task Force consider whether
new investment products “should be ineligible for filing exemption and/or
instead be subject to regulatory evaluation.”201 For structured products, the
recommendation is that the NAIC “develop[] alternative methodologies for
assessing structured security risks,” and render structured products
ineligible for filing exemption “where an alternative method is adopted.”202
The merits of this approach are discussed more fully in Part __, below.
The decision to focus on new and structured finance ratings in
reforming rating dependent regulation apparently reflects recognition that
municipal, corporate, and structured finance ratings are not fully
comparable,203 and in particular that agency ratings are more reliable for
traditional instruments such as corporate and municipal bonds.
Accordingly, the Final Report recommends further study to confirm if use
of ratings in solvency regulation should “differ for municipal, corporate
and structured securities as general asset classes,”204 and the Report’s
recommendations on municipal bonds contemplate retention of ratingdependent regulation in that context.205 The distinction also reflects the
weight of opinion in the comment letters that the RAWG received.
Such a distinction makes sense not just in light of the immediate
history of the performance of novel-product ratings in the financial crisis,
but also from a theoretical standpoint. Scholarly treatment of rating
agencies has emphasized the importance of reputational capital in giving
agencies incentives to issue only high-quality ratings: Agencies arguably
would not risk their reputations for high quality by producing low-quality
ratings.206 But no agency has an existing reputation for high quality in
rating novel products, so reputation should not be as effective in this

201

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6. The Report also recommends that NAIC continue to “evaluat[e]
the merit of an alternative method to determine the NAIC designations to
structured securities, in addition to RMBS,” in an apparent reference to the special
valuation method NAIC adopted for RMBS. Id. at 7.
203
See RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 2-3.
204
Id. at 4.
205
Id. at 4-5.
206
See, e.g., Fabian Dittrich, The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and
Regulation 155-54 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished dissertation, University of
Cologne); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2; Gregory Husisian, Note, What
Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of
Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 426-27 (1990).
202
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context.207
There is but lukewarm support for the idea of upgrading the SVO’s
role in the Final Report. A draft recommended that the NAIC “consider the
possibility of establishing an SVO-like entity as a not-for-profit rating
agency,”208 but the Final Report adds the critical qualification “where
[rating agency] rating coverage is not adequate.”209 Given that complaints
about agency ratings have focused on reliability and quality, rather than
“coverage,” the Final Report’s language seems to signal abandonment of
the idea of an NAIC-sponsored rating agency. Enthusiasm for expanding
SVO’s role also appears to be waning even in areas that would not require
NAIC to set up its own rating agency. For example, the draft report called
on NAIC to use SVO in developing alternatives to ratings “if supportive of
consumer protection objectives,”210 but the Final Report omits this
recommendation.
Momentum is against shifting against eliminating credit ratings in
other respects as well. The December 2009 draft recommended that rating
agency ratings “should no longer be used to set RBC [risk-based capital]
for structured securities,” in part because structured securities are
vulnerable to market risk and are highly illiquid.211 The Final Report states
instead that NAIC should “develop tools to better address market and
liquidity risk in structured securities.”212 The December 2009 draft of the
Report grouped some recommendations under the heading “Eliminate or
Modify the Filing Exempt Rule”;213 the Final Report’s heading is simply
“Modify the Filing Exempt Rule.”214
Although the RAWG’s Final Report seems to reject complete
elimination of credit ratings from the NAIC’s rules, it does signal a desire
to reduce the use of credit ratings. It states that NAIC’s “policy on the use
of ARO [credit] ratings should be highly selective”215 and identifies ten
issues for further study by the NAIC. As of early April 2011, units within
NAIC have completed a number of such studies,216 although it does not
207

Hunt, CRAs and the WWCC, supra note 159148, at 112.
RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 175195, at 6.
209
RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 5. The Final Report also
eliminates the term “SVO-like.” See id.
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RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 175195, at 5.
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Id. at 7-8.
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RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 3938, at 6.
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RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1975, at 7.
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RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 6.
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RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 5.
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See Proposed Methodology to Assess the Reliability of NRSRO Credit
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appear that further action has been taken.
But even if the NAIC reduces reliance on credit ratings, it may not
reduce its reliance on regulatory outsourcing in general: The NAIC does
not seem interested in expanding the SVO’s role, as discussed above. And
in the one area where the NAIC has rejected reliance on ratings – credit
assessments for mortgage-backed securities – the NAIC has continued to
outsource credit determinations to private entities.217 The next section
takes up why the NAIC and other financial regulators may want to
outsource responsibility for credit determinations.
B.

WHY IS OUTSOURCED REGULATION SO POPULAR?

The NAIC and other financial regulators are reluctant to abandon
rating-dependent regulation altogether, and to the extent NAIC is moving
away from rating-dependent regulation, the substitute is to have credit risk
assessed by private entities that are not rating agencies. This section
proposes two explanations for financial regulators’ desire to outsource
credit-risk determinations.
1. The Desire for Rating-Dependent
Transcends Insurance

Regulation

The NAIC’s experience fits into a broader pattern of regulatory
desire to outsource regulatory decisions – in particular, to outsource them
to rating agencies. Although the full extent of rating-dependent regulation
has never been documented,218 regulators have incorporated credit ratings
in widely varying areas, including the basic capital rules for brokerdealers,219 some capital rules for banks,220 deposit-insurance assessments,221
Ratings, Memorandum from Bob Carcano, SVO, to Matti Peltonen, Chair,
Valuation of Securities Task Force, Oct. 8, 2010; Analysis of the Performance of
NRSRO Credit Ratings and Implications of Default Statistics Associated with
NAIC Designations, Memorandum from Bob Carcano and Wes Beal, SVO, to
Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of Securities Task Force, Oct. 10, 2010;
Alternatives and Supplements to the Use of NRSRO Credit Ratings, Memorandum
from Bob Carcano and Wes Beal, SVO, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of
Securities Task Force, Oct. 8, 2010.
217
See discussion infra Parts VI.A & VI.B.
218
The most comprehensive survey appears to be JOINT FORUM, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STOCKTAKING ON THE USE OF CREDIT RATINGS (2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf.
219
See SEC Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2010). It is worth
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and limits on the permitted investments of national banks,222 money market
funds,223 and federal thrifts.224 Regulators also seem to use high credit
ratings as a proxy for the absence of conflicts of interest: the Department
of Labor has granted an exemption to ERISA conflict-of-interest rules that
permits underwriters to sell structured securities to an ERISA plan to which
the underwriter provides services – as long as the securities have high
credit ratings and other requirements are met.225
Financial regulators other than NAIC have started to act to reduce
their reliance on ratings since the beginning of the financial crisis, but
progress has been fitful. For example, in summer 2008 the SEC proposed a
three-part set of rules that would have sharply reduced the agency’s
reliance on credit ratings.226 The SEC tabled most of the reductions in
2009227 and adopting new rules embracing the use of credit ratings in
noting that the major Wall Street banks were not covered by this particular rule in
the period immediately leading up to the crisis. Instead, they had all opted into an
alternative capital regulation system that was part of the “Consolidated
Supervisory Entity” program. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARN’S AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM iv-v (2008), available at
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditsinspections/2008/446-a.pdf
220
See 12 C.F.R. Part 3 App. A §§ 3(a)(4)(iii), 3(b), 3(a)(2)(xiii)(C) (2010).
221
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 327.8(i), 327.9(d)(2)
(2010).
222
12 C.F.R. §§ 1.2-1.3 (2010).
223
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010).
224
12 C.F.R. §§ 560.40(a)(1)-(2), 560.42 (2010).
225
Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 2000-58, 67 Fed.
Reg. 54,487 (Aug. 22, 2002).
226
References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008); Security Ratings, 73
Fed. Reg. 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008); References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Securities Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposed July
11, 2008).
227
In October 2009, the SEC adopted a final rule removing some references to
credit ratings from its rules, References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,358 (Oct. 9, 2009), but reopened
the comment period on the other, more significant, proposed changes. References
to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg.
52,374 (Oct. 9, 2009). Separately, the SEC in May 2010 proposed – but has not
adopted – a further rule that would eliminate reliance on ratings in determining
whether asset-backed securities are “shelf eligible.” Asset-Backed Securities, 75
Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,331 (proposed May 3, 2010).
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2010.228 Only in 2011 – after the Dodd-Frank Act ordered federal financial
regulators to remove ratings from their rules – did the SEC once again take
up proposals to remove ratings from its rules.229 Even those proposals,
which were still pending as of early April 2011, would not repeal the use of
credit ratings in some important areas, such as in calculating the net capital
of smaller broker-dealers.230
2. A Political Explanation: Stakeholder Interests and
Rating-Dependent Regulation of Insurance
The leading scholarly approach to understanding insurance
regulation is to consider how the various stakeholder groups, including
regulators themselves, interact to produce a policy result.231 Rating228

See Money Market Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010)
(amending 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7). The SEC continued to define “Eligible
Securities” as those that receive high credit ratings or that are of “comparable
quality” to those receiving high ratings. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(12), 75 Fed. Reg.
at 10,110, and requires money-market fund boards to take action when rating
agencies downgrade securities below certain levels. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(7), 75
Fed. Reg. at 10,114. The SEC’s continuing reliance on credit ratings in this
context has come in for academic criticism. See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking
Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1185-87 (describing
SEC’s continued reliance on rating agencies in the Final Rule as “[p]erhaps the
most curious decision of the SEC in response to all that has occurred in the past
two years”). The SEC recently proposed eliminating the express references to
credit ratings in its money-market rule. See References to Credit Ratings in
Certain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,897
(March 9, 2011)..
229
See References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act
Rules and Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896 (March 9, 2011); Security Ratings, 76 Fed.
Reg. 8,946 (Feb. 16, 2011).
230
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1), 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (defining net capital and
providing that high-rated securities count more toward satisfying net-capital
requirement than low-rated ones). The largest broker-dealers all have opted to use
an alternative method for net capital that relies on internal models rather than credit
ratings. See Charles Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
323, 343 n.107 (2011). This method continues to be used , although the SEC has
been reexamining it in the wake of criticism since the financial crisis. See Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, “Testimony Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis
Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” at 12-13 (Jan. 14, 2010).
231
See MEIER, supra note 23, at 167 (“The political economy of insurance
regulation results from a complex interaction of industry groups, consumer
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dependent regulation is fairly easy to understand under this approach,
because the leading stakeholders – insurers and regulators – have strong
incentives to prefer rating-dependent regulation.
The industry has an incentive to support rating-dependent
regulation because it does not want to pay for the SVO to perform the
function, as discussed above.232 Certainly, it appears that insurers led the
charge to water down the NAIC’s draft report calling for reduced reliance
on credit ratings.233 Moreover, insurers may want to benefit from the
liability shield of rating reliance: If regulators rely on the ratings, the
argument goes, who could fault the industry for doing the same? One
might also expect the industry to be more comfortable with the rating
agencies’ private bureaucracies than the public bureaucracy of NAIC.
On the other hand, if the industry exerts a strong influence on the
NAIC, as one leading study concludes,234 then why is it that insurers show
so little interest in keeping the rating function within that organization,
where it can be controlled? A partial answer may lie in the availability of
interests, regulatory bureaucrats, and political elites”); Randall, supra note 201, at
670-86 (explaining states’ authority over insurance industry and role of NAIC in
terms of stakeholder preferences); Schwarcz, supra note 910, at 1715 (introducing
framework in which industry as regulatory “buyer,” regulator as regulatory
“seller,” and regulatory “regulator” would interact under conditions of regulatory
competition).
232
See supra Part IV. A.1 [describing industry reluctance to pay for SVO]
233
See NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-38 to 10-45 (comment
letters from American Council of Life Insurers expressing opposition to
precipitous repeal of filing exempt rule and taking issue with RAWG draft report’s
characterization of rating agency performance as overly negative). Another
constituency for rating-dependent regulation in the SEC and NAIC cases is the
regulated entities themselves. The Securities Industry and Financial Market
Association opposed the SEC’s proposal to eliminate references to credit ratings in
its Net Capital Rule for broker-dealers. See Fed. Reg. 52,377-78 nn.35-36 (Oct. 9,
2009); Fed. Reg. 52,379-81 (Oct. 9, 2009) (the money-market industry criticized
the SEC’s move away from rating-dependent regulation). The Department of
Labor’s reliance on ratings in the context of ERISA exemptions for structured
products also appears to originate with an industry proposal. Exemptions
Allowing Previously Prohibited Transactions Under ERISA and the I.R.C. of 1986,
55 Fed. Reg. 21455-01(May 24, 1990).
234
Randall, supra note 201, at 669 (“[T]he history of the NAIC suggests . . . a
systematic bias in favor of the industry.”); Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1763 (“[I]n
the aggregate, ordinary ‘monopolistic’ insurance regulation is more frequently
subject to substantial regulatory capture that produces underregulation as opposed
to excessive regulation.”).
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rule bailouts, as discussed below. If the industry can change the rules in
midstream on an ad hoc basis235 when the rating agencies produce results
insurers do not like, that reduces the value of paying to maintain the SVO
function year in and year out.
State regulators have an incentive to support rating-dependent
regulation because it permits them to avoid blame for poor credit
determinations236 without sacrificing broader authority to set general
policy.237 More fundamentally, no real alternative has emerged, as
discussed below.238
The rating agencies themselves might be expected to support
regulatory use of ratings, as this increases demand for their products.239
Indeed, it has been suggested that rating-dependent regulation is the basis
of the rating agencies’ business.240 In fact, the rating industry’s position is
more complicated. The largest rating agencies, Moody’s241 and Standard &
235

See infra Part IV.
See Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How
Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 839 (2010) (identifying “blame avoidance” as a
persistent regulatory bias); Richard Scott Carnell, Regulator’s Incentives, in MAKE
MARKETS BE MARKETS 35, 37 (ROOSEVELT INST., ED. 2010) (identifying
regulatory incentive to avoid blame by trying to ensure that problems become
apparent during successors’ tenure).
237
Compare Randall, supra note 201, at 684-85 (arguing that Congress has an
incentive to leave insurance regulation in the hands of the states in the context of
regulatory changes permitting greater financial services integration:
“By
preserving the existing regulatory structures, Congress may be able to take credit
for modernizing financial services and enhancing the international competitiveness
of U.S. firms while avoiding blame for the inevitable problems that will
accompany the changes.”).
238
See infra Part IV.B.3
239
See Thomas J. McGuire, Exec. Vice President and Dir., Moody’s Corporate
Dep’t, Ratings in Regulation: A Petition to the Gorillas, Speech at Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Apr. 28, 1995) (Moody’s executive stating that “[f]rom a financial
perspective, I believe that regulation has increased the revenues of the rating
industry and contributed to the growth” of rating agencies).
240
See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 74 (Richard M. Levich et al.
eds. 2001).
241
See Testimony of Raymond M. McDaniel, Testimony Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry
Comm’n,
6
(June
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0602-McDaniel.pdf
(stating
that
“Moody’s has also continuously advocated for the elimination of the regulatory use
236
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Poor’s,242 take the position that regulators should not rely on credit ratings
in their rules, while the next-tier rating agencies, Fitch243 and DBRS,244 are
far more sympathetic to rating-dependent regulation. The suspicion arises
that competitive position drives the rating agencies’ views on this issue:
Moody’s and S&P seek to protect their position as market leaders, while
the smaller agencies see regulatory recognition of their ratings as an
opportunity to boost share.245
of ratings”); McGuire, supra note 23912, at 1 (“Moody’s . . . recommends that
use of ratings be phased out of financial regulation, such that the sole judge of the
quality of rating opinions will again be the investors who bear the risks of fixedincome investment.”).
242
Chris Atkins, Letter to the Editor from S&P Vice President of
Communications, Credit Ratings Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/opinion/lweb15ratings.html
(“[W]e
emphatically support legislative proposals that use of ratings should not be
mandated through government regulation.”); Deven Sharma, Letter to the Editor
from S&P President, Why Rating Requirements Don’t Make Sense, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 19, 2010 ( “We support removing investor rating requirements and believe the
market – not government mandates – should decide the value of our work.”).
243
See Fitch Ratings, Inc., Submitted Statement of Fitch Ratings (Sept. 24,
2009) reprinted in NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-79 to 10-80
(“Ratings have been used constructively in many places in regulation, as they are
an important common benchmark. From a regulatory point of view, the question
of what would be used in place of credit ratings is rarely answered satisfactorily.”);
Reforming Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Capital
Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong. 17-18 (2009) (statement of
Stephen W. Joynt)(“[R]atings have been used effectively in regulation in many
places as independent benchmarks – a position that has been supported by many
market participants – and we continue to suggest an in depth case-by-case review
of any removal to determine whether such a course of action is appropriate. The
question of what would replace ratings also remains unanswered – or at least
without a thorough understanding of the specific pros and cons, and unintended
consequences.”).
244
DBRS also seems to support rating-dependent regulation to a greater extent
than Moody’s and S&P. See Letter from Mary Keogh, Managing Director,
Regulatory Affairs, DBRS to Richard Newman, Bob Carcano & Dan Daveline,
NAIC (Jan. 6, 2010), reprinted in NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-57
(“DBRS understands that the use of ARO credit ratings by the market increased
over time due to the ARO’s historical expertise in the field of credit analysis. This
expertise was gained through the skills and experience of its credit analysts that
takes years to build.”).
245
See Fitch Ratings, Inc., supra note 21643, at 10-80 (“[I]f you eliminate the
use of ‘NRSRO’ ratings in regulation, company and industry participants will
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Whatever the agencies’ motives, the leading agencies’ opposition
to rating-dependent regulation seems to have had little effect on insurance
regulation specifically. Fundamentally, the agencies have little ability to
control how their ratings are used.246
Moreover, despite general
expressions of opposition to rating-dependent insurance regulation,247 the
agencies’ recent statements of support for changing the system seem tepid.
Moody’s statements in opposition to rating-dependent regulation in the
recent NAIC proceeding were heavily qualified248 and S&P’s more so,249
despite the agencies’ strong contemporary statements to more general
audiences opposing rating-dependent regulation in general.250
Consumers, for their part, generally show up as relatively weak
stakeholders in studies of insurance regulation, due to their dispersion and
the low salience and high complexity of insurance regulation issues.251
Organized consumer groups do not appear to have had much impact on the
use of credit ratings in insurance solvency regulation, although one such
group expressed opposition to rating-dependent insurance regulation in the
likely develop or maintain their own guidelines and use credit ratings anyway. We
believe they will default to the largest ‘brand name’ rating agencies (Moody’s and
S&P) . . . .”.
246
Letter from Raymond W. McDaniel, President, Moody’s Investors Serv. to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 28, 2003), available at
http://sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/moodys072803.htm (rating’s status as a
‘public good’ “led to their adoption by various authorities for certain public policy
objectives.”).
247
See McGuire, supra note 21239, at 8 (NAIC’s use of ratings in capital
regulation “has inadvertently created a very pernicious set of economic incentives
for the rating agency industry”).
248
See David Teicher, Written Statement of David Teicher, Managing Dir.,
Moody’s Investors Serv. Before the NAIC Rating Agency Working Grp. Meeting,
Sept. 24, 2009, at 9 (“Moody’s supports efforts to discontinue or limit the use of
ratings in regulation . . . We also recognize, however, that in light of current
market conditions, eliminating or reducing ratings-based criteria should be pursued
judiciously ….”).
249
See Grace Osborne, Written Statement of Grace Osborne, Managing Dir.
and Lead Analytical Mgr. for N. Amm Ins. Ratings Before the Meeting of the
Rating Agency Working Grp. Of the NAIC, Sept. 24, 2009, at 6 (“[I]f regulators
and policymakers choose to incorporate ratings in their rules as benchmarks, the
use of additional benchmarks may also be warranted.”).
250
See supra notes 214-15.
251
See Randall, supra note 201, at 670-72; MEIER, supra note 23, at 139
(describing difficulty in creating a measure of the importance of consumer groups
because of the paucity of such groups).
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recent NAIC proceeding.252
A question that emerges from this analysis is why NAIC ever
relied at all on SVO rather than the rating agencies. After all, the analysis
above suggests that the balance of stakeholder interests seems to favor
rating-dependent regulation overwhelmingly. One possible explanation is
that the NAIC solvency program was born in the 1990s in response to a
spate of highly publicized insolvencies,253 so that there was a high premium
on demonstrating regulatory independence from industry at that time. As
memory faded, the importance of showing independence decreased.
NAIC’s reliance on credit ratings simply hasn’t attracted comparable
attention in the current financial crisis,254 so no comparable need to take
action arose.
3. A Substantive Explanation: The Need for a Measure
of Credit Risk and the Absence of Compelling
Alternatives
a. The Need for a Measure of Credit Risk
I have argued elsewhere that a pure measure of credit risk is
appropriate in any “asset-by-asset” capital regulation system.255 An assetby-asset system is one in which capital requirements are determined by
combining the risks to which each of the regulated firm’s assets are subject,
252

Birny Birnbaum, Testimony of Birny Birnbaum, Ctr. for Econ. Justice,
Before the NAIC Rating Agency Working Grp., Sept. 24, 2009, at 1 (“[S]tate
insurance regulators should not be delegating their regulatory responsibilities to
private entities, particularly to private entities whose incentives are not aligned
with those of the public function.”). No consumer groups submitted comments in
the NAIC’s rating-agency proceeding. See NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at
10-37. Although a consumer-group representative participated in the September
24 public meeting, his comments focused exclusively on the RMBS revaluation
proposal.
253
See Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance
Regulation: Is It What They Really Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 300–04
(2002) (describing proposals for federal regulation of insurance solvency in
response to high-profile failures and such proposals’ ultimate failure in response to
opposition from industry and state regulators).
254
See supra Part III.C.2.
255
John Patrick Hunt, One Cheer for Credit Rating Agencies: How the Markto-Market Accounting Debate Highlights the Case for Rating-Dependent Capital
Regulation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 749, 775-77 (2009) [hereinafter Hunt, One Cheer].
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such as the current U.S. insurance and banking capital regulation regimes.
The reason is that there is at least some probability that a firm will
not have to liquidate all its assets. That means that a measure of how well
the assets will perform if held to maturity is needed, and that entails a
measure of credit risk over the life of the assets. The argument may apply
with even greater force to insurance companies than to banks, because
insurance companies may be more exposed to the risk that an asset will not
pay over the long term, and less exposed to the risk that it will have to be
sold for a fire-sale price.
After all, “maturity transformation” – long-term lending funded by
short-term borrowing – is central to the business model of commercial
banks.256 And investment banks came to rely heavily on short-term
borrowing, not necessarily to fund long-term, illiquid assets, but rather to
fund short-term assets that were supposed to be liquid. When the market
turned so that those were not liquid, disaster ensued.257
By contrast, the core business of an insurance company is
transferring and pooling risk.258 If premiums are prepaid, this does not
necessarily entail any short-term borrowing. That means that the risk that
an insurance company will have to sell large quantities of assets is smaller.
This is not to say that insurance companies face no liquidity risk at all.
AIG faced a severe liquidity problem, not just in its parent company, but
apparently also in its regulated life insurance subsidiaries.259 And it has
been recognized for some time that life insurers that issue policies that
accumulate large surrender values can become vulnerable to runs.260 But it
seems that liquidity risk – the great villain of the recent crisis – is a larger
concern for banks than for insurance companies.261 That suggests that
credit risk is a relatively bigger problem for an insurance company than a
bank.

256
See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF
BANKING 4-5 (1997).
257
See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF
2007 47-50 (2010) (describing how decreased willingness to accept structured debt
as collateral led to asset sales, falling prices, and systemic insolvency).
258
See JEFFREY CARMICHAEL & MICHAEL POMERLEANO, THE DEVELOPMENT
AND REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 81 (2002).
259
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
260
See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 274-75.
261
See GUILLAUME PLANTIN & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN INSURERS GO
BUST 2 (2007).
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b. The Absence of Compelling Alternatives
Federal regulators working on alternatives to credit ratings for bank
capital recently told the national media that the absence of strong
alternatives to the ratings was a major obstacle to replacing private credit
ratings.262 Although replacing private credit ratings certainly does not
appear impossible, each of the alternatives has practical, substantive, or
political problems that apparently have not been carefully evaluated.
i. Alternative 1: Government Provision
One alternative is government provision of credit ratings. The
regulator is supposed to regulate, so why not let it regulate? Observers
have been making this point for a long time, and the idea has been
gathering some momentum in academic circles recently.263
The recent NAIC experience described above is instructive here.
The SVO effectively was a government credit rater, and it was perceived as
underfunded and heavily reliant on private ratings. Even after the highprofile failure of many private credit ratings, there was little appetite to
restore SVO’s function. Of course, this case study just describes how
events actually did unfold; it certainly does not prove that government
credit raters can never receive stable, ample funding and do a good job
without pressure from trying to please customers who buy or sell financial
instruments. But the history, in combination with the stakeholder analysis
above, suggests difficulties in creating and sustaining a high-quality
government rater throughout market cycles. Indeed, cyclical rise and
decline in regulatory vigor has been identified as a problem for financial
regulation generally.264 It may be difficult for whoever is paying the bills
262
See Michael R. Crittenden, Financial Overhaul Stymies Top Regulators –
New Law Might Need Altering Already, as Implementing Its Restrictions on the
Use of Credit Ratings Stirs Concerns, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at C1 (quoting
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair as saying “some of the more likely replacements . . . are
far from perfect”).
263
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial
Organization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41, 41-42, 51-57 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002); Milosz
Gudzowski, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis: The Need for a
State-run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
245 (2010).
264
See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth
and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 420-22 (2006)
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to continue to see the benefit of replicating over 1 million credit ratings265
that are otherwise available free after the memory of the most recent crisis
has faded.
ii. Alternative 2: Self-Regulation and
“Dynamic Risk Modeling”
A second alternative to rating agencies is self-regulation. This is
the core of the Basel II banking regulation framework’s “advanced
approaches,” which call for banks to develop internal credit ratings and
which base the credit-risk portion of the capital charge on these ratings.
Apart from the many criticisms that have been leveled against this
approach in the context of banking,266 and apart from the fact that the
continued viability of the Basel II framework is in some doubt, selfregulation is quite dubious as applied to the insurance industry. The
fundamental justification for capital regulation is often said to be consumer
protection.267 If the fox is going to put in charge of the henhouse, why
bother?
Suggestions that the current system be replaced with dynamic riskmanagement approaches drawn from quantitative finance seem to fall into
the same category.268 For example, Martin Grace and Robert Klein argue
that the existing accounting-based approach is inappropriately “backwardlooking” and argue that it should be replaced with a “forward-looking”
approach based on such techniques. Because the present system is based
on accounting numbers, it allegedly embodies a “static approach” based on
(describing deregulatory pressures imposed by upward stage of cycles of
macroeconomic activity and investor trust); Richard Scott Carnell, Regulator’s
Incentives, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS (Roosevelt Inst. ed., 2010), 35, 36-37
(arguing that the “dynamics of interest-group politics” help explain why regulators
fail to strengthen regulatory standards during an economic boom).
265
This is the number of credit ratings maintained by the two largest private
credit rating agencies. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Annual Report on Nationally
Recognized
Statistical
Rating
Organizations
9
(2009),http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0909.pdf.
266
See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The
Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial
Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 186–89 (2009).
267
See supra notes 14-15.and accompanying text.
268
See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Insurance Regulation: The Need
for Policy Reform, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 117, 118-19 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009).
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“historic, reported” values and does not “look forward to consider how an
insurer might fare under future scenarios.”269 They couple this argument
with a call for “principles-based” regulation as practiced in the E.U., rather
than the “rules-based” regulation that state regulators in the U.S. employ.270
Although this risk management approach enthralled Alan Greenspan,271 its
theoretical foundations have been attacked by Nicholas Taleb272 and others.
Setting aside the theoretical debate, this kind of dynamic risk
management approach seems inextricably tied to self-regulation. Certainly,
Grace & Klein conclude that “[d]ynamic modeling is best performed by
each insurer, using an internal model subject to regulatory review.”273
Given the complexity of such approaches, it is difficult to see how
regulators could implement it without extensive reliance on the regulated
parties’ judgments of risk.
iii. Alternative 3: Market-Based
Regulation
Another leading alternative to rating-dependent regulation is
market-based regulation. One might simply look at credit spreads – that is,
at market prices – to assess credit risk. 274 The problem here, as I have
argued at length elsewhere,275 is that market prices result from the
interaction of many different factors, not just credit risk. Credit risk
cannot simply be read off a price chart. Although market prices
undoubtedly can be useful inputs into any assessment of credit risk –
whether performed by rating agencies, regulators, or someone else, marketbased regulation is not an independent alternative to rating-dependent
regulation.

269

Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 118, 120.
271
See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Red. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, (May 8, 2003) (“The use of a
growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated
methods for measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the
enhanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries.”).
272
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 274-85 (2007).
273
Grace & Klein, supra note 240, at 127.
274
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH U.L.Q. 619, 624–25 (1999).
275
Hunt, One Cheer, supra note 228, at 772-75.
270
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iv. Alternative 4: Private Providers That
Are Not Credit Rating Agencies
A final alternative, one that NAIC has embraced in the context of
RMBS as described in further detail below,276 is the idea of having credit
assessments for regulatory purposes be provided by private entities that are
not rating agencies. A threshold question is whether this is truly an
“alternative” at all. After all, regardless of whether a credit rating agency
such as Moody’s or a non-credit-rating-agency analytical organization such
as PIMCO Advisory or BlackRock is performing the credit analysis, the
regulator is outsourcing its decisions to a private third party.
Putting that question to one side, the decision to employ private
non-agency credit assessors may respond to either or both of two criticisms
of credit rating agencies and their ratings. First, credit ratings embody the
agency’s determination in a single three-letter symbol on an ordinal scale.
A “BBB” rating on an instrument tells the user only that the agency thinks
that an instrument has more “credit risk” than an “A” instrument and less
“credit risk” than a “BB” instrument. The rating does not give a
quantitative estimate of any aspect of risk. Moreover, exactly what is
captured in “credit risk” may vary from agency to agency. For example,
Standard & Poor’s main credit ratings are based on the instrument’s
probability of default, without taking into account how much the
instrument is likely to lose if it does default. Moody’s ratings take both
probability of default and loss in the event of default into account, but the
firm does not specify how these factors are weighted in general.
Alternative risk assessments offer the possibility of quantitative
and much more detailed estimates of credit risk. For example, such an
assessment might state that there is a 40% chance of default and an
expected 20% loss in the event of default. Or they might state that there is
a 10% chance of a default resulting in a 60% loss and a 30% chance of a
default resulting in a 7% loss.
Although these more precise and detailed assessments might well
be useful, particularly in constructing numerical capital requirements, the
difference between this type of assessment and what the rating agencies
provide is superficial. There is no reason in principle why rating agencies
cannot provide such information, and the agencies have started to offer
separate “recovery ratings,” which reflect the likely severity of default, in
addition to their main credit ratings on many instruments.
The second major reason for favoring alternative providers is that
276

See discussion infra Parts VI.A-B.
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there may be some difference between an alternative provider and a credit
rating agency that suggests that the alternative provider will do a better job.
Certainly, some companies may produce better products than others, but it
seems odd to assume ex ante that, say, PIMCO Advisory will do a better
job than, say, Moody’s without evidence to this effect unless there is a
fundamental structural difference that supports that assumption.
The issuer-pays conflict might be such a difference. If alternative
providers are paid by the regulator for high-quality ratings, then they don’t
face the conflicts of interest that raters that are paid by the rating by parties
who want high ratings face. The importance of the issuer-pays conflict is a
matter of continuing debate and will not be resolved here. But even if we
assume that alternative providers have this advantage, it puts them in the
same class as the SVO. They are paid by the regulatory system for their
ratings, and in the context of insurance that means they are paid by the
industry. Apart from the potential conflict of interest that introduces,
reliance on alternative providers faces the same problem as reliance on the
SVO: insurers are unlikely to continue wanting to pay for credit
assessments when rating agencies are doing the job for free.
Even if one were to conclude that alternative private providers are
better than rating agencies, there would still be a significant politicaleconomy problem with regulatory reliance on them.
C.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
RATING-AGENCY REFORM

If regulators have a persistent desire to outsource credit risk
assessment regulation to rating agencies or other third parties, then they
would be expected to resist legislative mandates to eliminate such
regulation. Indeed, there are already signs that regulators are resisting
Dodd-Frank in this respect. The Acting Comptroller of the Currency, John
Walsh, testified to Congress in February 2011 that “In [the] context of
enhanced regulation that Dodd-Frank provides, the absolute prohibition
against any references to ratings under Section 939A goes further than is
reasonably necessary.”277 Financial regulators’ desire to outsource puts
277

John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Testimony Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, at 11 (Feb. 17, 2011).
see also Crittenden, supra note 234 (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John
Dugan as stating that “[i]t might be worth Congress taking a second look” at its
expression of desire to remove private credit ratings from federal financial
regulation).
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them in conflict with rating-agency reformers, who focus on the perceived
negative effects of rating-dependent regulation on the quality of the ratings
themselves. Thus, Congress’ effort to expunge private credit ratings
completely is understandable, if precipitous: If regulators will not purge
credit ratings themselves, someone needs to force them to do it or it will
not happen.
But state insurance regulators’ continued reliance on credit ratings
stands to frustrate Congress’s purpose to a substantial extent. If ratingdependent regulation gives agencies incentives to rate every product or to
give inflated ratings, then retaining rating-dependent regulation for the
huge insurer market in credit-risky securities retains those poor incentives
to a large extent. The regulatory use of credit ratings stands to become
another point of conflict in the ongoing debate over the proper roles of
federal and state insurance regulators.
1. Why Rating-Agency Reformers Oppose RatingDependent Regulation
Even if ratings are the best available alternative for capital
regulators, rating-dependent regulation may still be a problem because of
its effect on the quality of credit ratings themselves. The idea is that
because issuers or investors need particular credit ratings in order to satisfy
regulatory requirements, there is a source of demand for agency ratings that
has nothing to do with quality. In the legal academic literature, this line of
argument dates to Frank Partnoy’s 1999 article The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Rating Agencies.278
The idea that rating-dependent regulation is an important force
driving ratings toward low quality initially met with resistance, in particular
from authors who believe that rating agencies have significant reputational
capital that they would not be willing to risk by producing low-quality
ratings.279 As the years have passed, the movement against ratingdependent regulation has gathered steam,280 and Section 939A of the Dodd278

Partnoy, supra 246, at 623-24.
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 14-15; Dittrich, supra note 185, at
149-55.
280
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies & Regulation: Why
Less Is More, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 43 (Roosevelt Inst. ed., 2010);
Christian C. Opp et al., Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation: Rating
Inflation
and
Regulatory
Arbitrage
(2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540099
(presenting
279
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act seems to embody
a desire to eliminate federal regulatory agencies’ dependence on credit
ratings.281 Section 939A requires “each Federal agency” to review their use
of credit ratings within one year282 and to “remove any reference to or
requirement of reliance on credit ratings.”283
Rating-dependent regulation may reduce rating quality not just
because it independently reduces agencies’ incentives to produce highquality work, but also because regulatory reliance on ratings is likely to
complicate or frustrate other efforts to improve rating-agency quality.
For example, the major premise of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act is that increased competition will help rating-agency
performance,284 but rating-dependent regulation may cause competition to
be bad for the market. If issuers just need to get one or two285 ratings of a
certain level to accomplish what they want to accomplish, then competition
may take the form of jockeying to give inflated ratings – competition in
laxity.286 Moreover, with rating-dependent regulation, it’s not just issuers
who demand high credit ratings. We would expect investors to demand
them as well: Higher ratings help regulated investors such as insurance
companies and banks in satisfying regulatory requirements, as we saw
above.
From the standpoint of increasing rating quality, the argument for
reducing regulatory dependence on agency ratings is certainly logical. But
an important premise – that rating-dependent regulation is an important
force driving rating-agency behavior – has never really been tested.
Indeed, only recently have we started to see the first comprehensive
surveys that allow us to understand what the extent of regulatory
dependence on agency ratings actually is.287
theoretical model indicating that regulatory use of ratings may produce complete
breakdown of ratings’ informational content under some circumstances).
281
H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 521-22 (2010).
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. 3850, 109th Cong. §
2(5) (enrolled bill as passed by Senate and House, Sept. 29, 2006) (“the 2 largest
credit rating agencies serve the vast majority of the market, and additional
competition is in the public interest.”).
285
See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 43,
73 (2004) (discussing importance of “two-rating norm”).
286
See, e.g., Hunt, CRAs and the WWCC, supra note , at 136.
287
See JOINT FORUM, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STOCKTAKING ON THE
USE OF CREDIT RATINGS (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf.
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2. The Dodd-Frank Bill and the Conflict Between
Financial Regulators and Rating-Agency Reformers
Reformers who seek to eliminate ratings from financial regulation
enjoyed their greatest success to date in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Section 939A of the Act instructs
each federal agency “to the extent applicable” to review and remove its
rating-dependent regulations.288 It seems to reflect a Congressional desire
to eliminate federal rating-dependent regulation, though the extent to which
is actually a command to the agencies do so is open to question. The
meaning of “to the extent applicable” is not clear – there is nothing in the
statute that expressly makes clear what would make Section 939A
applicable or inapplicable. One interpretation would be that Section 939A
is “applicable” to all financial regulatory agencies, but agencies who wish
to continue using ratings might argue that “to the extent applicable” confers
discretion on them in this respect.
Even if a Congressional mandate to eliminate federal ratingdependent regulation in a year is precipitous in light of the discussion
above, such a mandate would be understandable from the standpoint of
rating-agency reform if regulators have a consistent tendency to want to
288

Section 939A provides in its entirety:
(a) Agency Review.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this subtitle, each Federal agency shall, to the extent applicable, review—
(1) any regulation issued by such agency that requires the use of an assessment
of the credit-worthiness of a security or money market instrument; and
(2) any references to or requirements in such regulations regarding credit
ratings.
(b) Modifications Required.—Each such agency shall modify any such
regulations identified by the review conducted under subsection (a) to remove any
reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such
regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall
determine as appropriate for such regulations. In making such determination, such
agencies shall seek to establish, to the extent feasible, uniform standards of creditworthiness for use by each such agency, taking into account the entities regulated
by each such agency and the purposes for which such entities would rely on such
standards of credit-worthiness.
(c) Report.—Upon conclusion of the review required under subsection (a),
each Federal agency shall transmit a report to Congress containing a description of
any modification of any regulation such agency made pursuant to subsection (b).
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rely on ratings, whether arising from legitimate if parochial needs, their
own biases, or pressures from those they regulate. Simply put, someone
has to force them to do it.
But even if the federal agencies cooperate – and early signs suggest
they may not – state insurance regulators’ continued reliance on credit
ratings seems like an important obstacle to improving the market by
reducing rating-dependent regulation. This is because insurance companies
are such a large segment of the overall bond market: U.S. insurer holdings
of nonfinancial corporate bonds are equal to about half the total outstanding
principal of such bonds from U.S. issuers; their holdings of municipal
bonds are equal to about 15% of the outstanding principal in that market.
The U.S. insurance sector currently owns around $2.2 trillion in corporate
bonds;289 for comparison, the total amount of U.S. nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate bonds outstanding as of the first quarter of 2010 was $4.25
trillion.290 As of year-end 2008, insurers held $432 billion in municipal
bonds,291 and the total amount outstanding was $2.7 trillion.292
Thus, even complete elimination of credit ratings from federal
regulatory requirements may not have the desired effect on rating-agency
incentives. Of course, Congress probably has the power to preempt state
regulation of insurance in this area, and the extent to which it should
exercise that power is an ongoing subject of debate. Unless Congress
retreats from its objective of complete elimination of rating-dependent
regulation, or the risk measures the federal regulators are to devise
persuade state insurance officials to abandon rating-dependent regulation,
this subject promises to become another area of tension in the historically
289

Sapna Maheshwari, Insurers ‘Live and Die’ with $2.2 Trillion in Corporate
BUSINESSWEEK,
May
28,
2010,
Bonds,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-28/insurers-live-and-die-with-2-2trillion-in-corporate-bonds.html.
290
FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1: FLOW
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (June 10, 2010). The cited
figures mean that U.S. insurers hold bonds equal in magnitude to about half the
U.S. corporate bond market, but don’t necessarily imply that insurers own half of
U.S. corporate bonds – insurers hold non-U.S. bonds. NAIC’s figures tell a similar
story: U.S. insurers held $1.9 trillion in nonfinancial corporate bonds at the end of
2008, when total nonfinancial nonfarm corporate bonds outstanding were about
$3.8 trillion. Evangel, supra note 164, at 11.
291
Evangel, supra note 164, at 11.
292
SIFMA, Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt (2008), available at
http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/Overall_Outstanding.pdf.
research/research.aspx?ID=10806.
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vexed relationship between state and federal authority over insurance.
VI.

AIG, THE BOND INSURERS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK

The far-reaching effects of the failures of AIG and the bond
insurers during the financial crisis challenged the notion that insurers do
not pose systemic risk. Credit ratings served a gatekeeping function for
both AIG’s and the bond insurers’ investments in novel products,
investments that contributed to their failure. Nevertheless, the New York
State Department of Insurance, which has principal responsibility for
regulating the bond insurance industry showed even less interest in
reducing rating dependence for bond insurers than the RAWG did for the
rest of the industry. Instead, it imposed a series of outright bans on risky
activities.
If there is tradeoff between safety and conservatism on the one
hand and efficiency, dynamism, or innovation on the other, then
recognizing previously unrecognized systemic risk pushes the optimal
tradeoff toward safety. Although efforts are under way to reduce any
systemic risk posed by insurers, the possibility of such a risk nevertheless
supports an effort to make certain insurers safer, even if there are costs to
doing so. A seasoning requirement for ratings on novel products offers a
way of accomplishing this that actually seems less intrusive than the
apparently permanent activity bans the New York Department of Insurance
has put in place.
A.

THE FAILURES OF AIG AND BOND INSURERS CHALLENGE THE
CONSENSUS THAT INSURERS DO NOT POSE SYSTEMIC RISK

Until the financial crisis, the prevailing view was that insurance
companies did not pose a systemic risk. Two leading commentators
summed up the conventional wisdom in 2005: “Systemic risk has not been
a major preoccupation of insurance regulators, and there has been no
evidence of the failure of an insurance company being a significant source
of systemic risk.”293 This viewpoint makes a good deal of sense. As
discussed above, insurance companies generally do not rely on short-term
funding to the same extent banks do, so they are less vulnerable to panics

293
Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in
Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY
BEYOND BASEL 15, 23 (Hal S. Scott ed. 2005).
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and bank runs.294 Moreover, the consequences of panics are likely to be
less severe: Unlike banks, insurance companies do not operate the
payment system. Nor do they originate many loans.
But the failures of AIG and the bond insurers in the financial crisis
seemed to create or threaten systemic consequences. Major banks had
large exposures to AIG through its CDS activities and lending operations.
The bond insurers’ difficulties apparently increased uncertainty about the
novel products they insured and therefore deepened the problems of the
institutions that owned those products. Moreover, bond insurers’ problems
apparently contributed to liquidity problems in the municipal bond market
and interfered with municipalities’ ability to borrow, because many
municipal bond issues depended on bond insurance coverage. The
proposition that the failures actually created a systemic risk is still
disputed,295 and it is true that some of the more damaging exposures were
taken on by insurance-company affiliates rather than regulated insurers.
But the idea that capital-regulated insurance companies pose a systemic
risk can no longer be dismissed out of hand.
1. AIG
The
294

perception

that

the

insurance

group

AIG

was

Id. at 24.
See MARY A. WEISS, SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE U.S. INSURANCE SECTOR 2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_weiss_systemic_risk_100223.pdf
(“[T]he
analysis suggests that insurers are not instigators or the cause of systemic risk”);
THE GENEVA ASS’N, SYSTEMIC RISK IN INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE
AND
FINANCIAL
STABILITY
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.genevaassociation.org/Portals/0/Geneva_Association_Systemic_Risk_i
n_Insurance_Report_March2010.pdf (“Applying the FSB [Financial Stability
Board] criteria to the main activities of insurers and reinsurers, we conclude that
none pose a systemic risk”); BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24
(classifying insurance companies as “non-systemic large and not highly levered”
institutions); Charles Goodhart, Procyclicality and Financial Regulation, 16
BANCO DE ESPAÑA INFORME DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 11, 15 (2009) (same).
These analyses are not altogether consistent. For example, Brunnermeier and
Goodhart both seem to assume that life insurance companies are not leveraged.
See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; Goodhart, supra, at 15. But
Weiss’ examination of data leads her to conclude that life insurers’ leverage is
comparable to that of commercial banks. See Weiss, supra, at 30. She does find
that “[p]roperty-casualty insurers are much less highly leveraged than either lifehealth insurers or banks”). Id.
295
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“systemically important”296 was the articulated basis for the U.S.
government’s decision to put at least $182.5 billion297 at risk starting in
September 2008 to save the firm from disorderly failure.
The perception seems to have stemmed primarily from CDS
positions taken by AIG’s trading subsidiary, AIG Financial Products Corp.,
which had sold credit protection to major banks on a large volume of multisector CDOs, many of which were exposed to subprime mortgages.298 AIG
Financial Products Corp. is not an insurance company and is not subject to
solvency regulation as described in this Article.299
Although regulators have been adamant that AIG’s regulated life
insurance companies did not face a solvency threat,300 these entities did
296
See Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
U.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce
Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan (March 2, 2009) (announcing aid to AIG
“in order to stabilize this systemically important company”); see also Brady
Dennis, Bernanke Blasts AIG for ‘Irresponsible Bets’ That Led to Bailouts, WASH.
POST, March 4, 2009 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke as
testifying to Senate committee, “[W]e’re not doing this to bail out AIG or their
shareholders, certainly. We’re doing this to protect our financial system and to
avoid a much more severe crisis in our global economy.”).
297
William K. Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945,
975 (2009).
298
See id. at 959, 979-81.
299
See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong,
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation; Testimony to
the U.S. Sen. Comm. On Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 5, 2009, at 3
(Statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Ins. Dep’t, “AIG
Financial Products is not alicensed insurance company. It was not regulated by
New York State or any state.”; Dennis, supra note 264, (quoting Bernanke, “There
was no oversight of the Financial Products division. This was a hedge fund,
basically, that was attached to a large and stable insurance company….”).
300
See Sjostrom, supra note 266, at 978; auses and Effects of AIG Bailout: H.
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (written testimony
of eric Dinallo, Superintendent of Insurance, New York State Ins. Dep’t). available
at
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option+com_content&task=view&id=3375&
Itemid=2.(stating that New York regulated insurance companies were solvent).
Certainly, insurance regulators have been adamant that policyholders were not at
risk. See Dinallo, New York State Ins. Dep’t, Testimony to the U.S. Sen. Comm.
on Housing, Banking & Urban Affairs, March 5, 2009, at 6 (“[E]ven if there had
been a run on the securities lending program with no federal rescue, our detailed
analysis suggests that the AIG life insurance companies would not have been
insolvent.”); Joel Ario, Insurance Comm’r, Pennsylvania Ins. Dep’t, Testimony of
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experience difficulty as counterparties in securities lending transactions
demanded the return of cash collateral, which apparently would have been
difficult to accomplish because much of the collateral had been invested in
highly rated mortgage-backed securities301 which had declined in value and
couldn’t readily be sold.302 These counterparties were in many cases
important financial intermediaries,303 so this modern-day bank run could
have had systemic consequences.
State insurance regulators argue that the threat to AIG’s life
insurers and the financial system would never have arisen if the company’s
CDS losses hadn’t sparked a bank run.304 The AIG life insurers’ securitieslending troubles may have been a matter of liquidity rather than
solvency,305 although this is disputed.306 The evidence suggests – although
the NAIC Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters., U.S. House of Reps., March 18, 2009, at 6, 11.
301
Dinallo, supra note 269, at 5 (AIG’s securities lending program
investments were “almost exclusively in the highest-rated securities” and
mortgage-backed securities made up “60 percent of the collateral pool.”); Ario,
supra note 269, at 10 (29% of AIG collateral pool was composed of subprime
MBS).
302
Sjostrom, supra note 266, at 961-62. It is not clear what prevented AIG
from selling the securities returned to in the unwind of the lending transactions, as
these apparently were government bonds, which remained liquid throughout the
crisis.
303
Press Release, American Int’l Group, Inc., AIG Discloses Counterparties to
CDS, GIA, and Securities Lending Transactions, Att. D. (March 15, 2009),
(disclosing fourth-quarter 2008 payments of $1 billion or more from direct Fed
support to securities lending counterparties Barclays, Deutsche Bank, BNP
Paribas, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, HSBC, Citigroup, Dresdner Kleinwort,
Merrill Lynch, UBS, and ING).
304
See Dinallo, supra note 269, at 4 (“If there had been no Financial Products
unit and only the securities lending program as it was, we would not be here
today”); Ario, supra note 269, at 8 (“[S]ecurities lending did not pose
unmanageable systemic risk and was not the reason for federal intervention. AIG
Financial Products was the source of federal intervention.”).
305
Dinallo, supra note 269, at 6 (absent “run on the securities lending
program,” regulators “would have continued to work with AIG to unwind its
program and any losses would have been manageable … [E]ven if there had been a
run on the securities lending program with no federal rescue, our detailed analysis
indicates that the AIG life insurance companies would not have been insolvent.”).
306
See Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the
Future of Insurance Regulation, Sept. 2009, at 11, available at
www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_namic.pdf..
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it does not conclusively establish – that the securities lending activities of
AIG’s life-insurance subsidiaries posed a systemic risk.
2. Bond Insurers
a. Industry Background
Bond insurers, also called “financial guaranty insurers” or
“monoline insurers,” insure against default losses on debt obligations. As
of 2008, the industry accounted for about $3 billion in direct premiums,307
and eight firms accounted for about 99% of direct premiums written
between 2001 and 2008.308 The basic premise of the bond insurance
industry is that the guaranty insurer maintains very strong credit, so that by
insuring a debt obligation it reduces the credit risk on that obligation. The
lower credit risk because of the insurance “wrapper” allows the issuer to
sell the debt at a lower yield, so that the interest savings at least cover the
cost of the insurance premium.309 How this industry would add value in a
truly efficient market is not immediately intuitive, although theoretical
arguments based on asymmetric information have been advanced to justify
its existence.310
The bond insurance business originated in311 the municipal debt
market and continued to be important to that market until the financial
crisis. From the mid-1990s until 2008, around half of new municipal bond
issuances were covered by bond insurance.312 Starting in the 1980s, bond
insurers expanded into insurance of financial products other than municipal
debt.313 The first expansion was to guarantees of public project finance

307

See Pamela Drake & Faith Neale: Financial Gaurantee Insurance:
Arrogance of Ingnorance in an Era of Exuberance (Aug. 2009) (unpublished
working paper) (on file with author) at 9.
308
See id. at 9-10.
309
See JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBÉ, SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
FACE OF THE CREDIT CRUNCH 69 (2009).
310
See Anjan Thakor, An Exploration of Competitive Signaling Equilibria with
“Third Party” Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance, 37 J. FIN.
717 (1982).
311
See James P. McNichols, Monoline Insurance and Financial Guaranty
Reserving
231,
233
(2003)
available
at
www.casact.org/pubs/forum/03fforum/03ff231.pdf..
312
See Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 30 Fig. 2.
313
See id. at 276, at 25 Tbl. 1; Circular Ltr. 19, at 2.

166

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol: 17.1

bonds, starting in the late 1980s.314 Later, bond insurers began to take on
credit risk associated with more novel and complex financial products.
They insured notes issued by CDOs,315 created special purpose vehicles to
sell credit protection on CDOs by entering into credit default swaps,316 and
invested in CDOs.317 This activity eventually grew to account for a large
proportion of the bond insurers’ business.318
b. Industry Failure and Systemic Effects
As described in greater detail above, downgrades, collateral calls,
and defaults on novel financial products led to severe financial problems
for the bond insurers.319 Losses that call solvency into question are, of
course, significant for any insurer, but superior credit is by definition the
stock in trade of financial guaranty insurers. Bond insurers operated with
high leverage to begin with because of the perceived safety of their
exposures, and the financial crisis caused most bond insurers to suffer
serious rating downgrades and to be unable to meet regulatory capital
314

See Bartlett, supra note 152, at 9.
See id. at 9.
316
See Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 6 (outstanding notional value of
monoline CDS was $550 billion as of March 2008)
317
See id.,at 17.
318
Drake & Neale report that structured finance “compris[ed] up to half the
insurance portfolio of several [financial guaranty] insurers.” Id. at 6.
319
See, e.g., Helen Remeza, Financial Guaranty Insurance Industry 2009
Review and 2010 Outlook, MOODY’S SPECIAL REP., at 2 (Feb. 2010) (Moody’s
report asserting that financial guaranty insurers saw their resources “severely
depleted as a result of claims, mostly from direct mortgage exposures and
leveraged exposures through ABS CDOs, but also through stress in their insured
asset-management business.”). Although the extent of financial insurers’ exposure
to actual default losses on insured novel products is not clear, and although it is
argued that prices on such instruments during the crisis were reduced below fair
value due to market liquidity issues and investor panic, Bartlett documents the
existence of actual losses on highly rated notes issued by CDOs and insured by
monoline insurers. See e.g., Robert Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information
Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis at 4849 (2010) available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract/=1585953 (liquidation of
Kleros Preferred Funding VI Ltd. CDO in late 2009 resulted in a $2 billion
principal deficiency on $2.4 trillion of Class A-1S notes insured by Ambac). The
Class A-1S notes carried an initial rating of AAA. See Kleros Preferred Funding
VI Ltd. Offering Circular at 1, (June 6, 2007) available at
http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/kleros_5756.pdf
315
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requirements.320 By 2010, only one bond insurer was writing new
business.321
The failure of the bond insurers naturally affected their
counterparties and the markets for the products they insured. The failure of
CDS and insurance policies on novel products seems to have imperiled the
bond insurers’ counterparties in the same way AIG’s failure might have. 322
The fact that the insurance coverage for such exposures had been called
into question presumably increased uncertainty and decreased confidence,
further reducing liquidity for RMBS and CDOs. Even municipal bonds,
historically seen as quite safe, were seriously affected. Prices plunged and
municipalities reportedly found it difficult to issue debt.323
B.
Rating-Dependent Regulation of Bond Insurance and Systemic
Risk
The experience of the financial guaranty insurance industry
illustrates the problems with rating-agency gatekeeping of insurancecompany exposures. The exposures in this case arose from the bond
insurers’ decisions to invest in novel products, and even more importantly
from their decision to insure novel assets in various ways. The financial
guarantors were allowed to insure novel products because rating agencies
had given those products investment-grade ratings.
The regulatory response to the state of the FGI industry did not
seriously question rating-dependent regulation, providing yet another
example of regulators’ reluctance to abandon ratings altogether. In fact, the
New York State Department of Insurance increased its reliance on credit
ratings, and its efforts to prevent recurrence of the FGI industry’s plight
took the form of outright, apparently permanent bars on certain FGI
activities. Here again, a seasoning requirement for giving regulatory effect
to credit ratings would have averted the problem – a problem that in this
case apparently contributed to systemic crisis. Moreover, a seasoning
requirement would be less intrusive in some respects than the approach the
320

Remeza, supra note 288, at 3.
See id. at 2.
322
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 288 at 51 (“Like AIG Financial Products,
monoline insurers stood at the center of the Financial Crisis in light of their key
role insuring the super-senior tranches of multi-sector CDOs tied to residential
mortgages.”).
323
See Marc Levinson, Financial Regulation’s Fatal Flaw COUNS. OF
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Jan.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21263/financial_regulaitons_fatal_flaw.html.
321
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Department of Insurance eventually adopted.
1. Pre-Crisis Rating-Dependent Regulation of Bond
Insurers
Credit risk is central to the financial guaranty insurance industry.
Credit risk doesn’t just affect the performance of the guarantors’
investments; it also determines the amount they are required to pay out in
claims. Unsurprisingly, credit ratings come up frequently in discussions of
the industry.
A bond insurer’s credit rating is important to its business. One
recent study declares that “the value of a monoline financial guarantee
insurer is directly tied to its credit rating.”324 This is probably due in large
part to the fact that certain obligations that New York-regulated insurers
otherwise cannot purchase can become eligible for investment if they are
covered by bond insurance – but only if the bond insurer maintains a AAA
rating.325
The credit ratings of individual instruments are central to the
regulation of bond insurers. The New York State Department of Insurance
apparently is the most important capital regulator for financial guaranty
insurers,326 and New York’s pre-crisis solvency rules for financial guaranty
insurers were heavily rating-dependent:
Policyholders’ surplus: Financial guaranty insurers must maintain
a policyholder’s surplus (excess of admitted assets over liabilities)327 of $65
million.328 Only specified types of assets can be used to satisfy this
324

Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 21; see also McNichols, supra note 280,
at 257 (“the monoline’s highest priority is maintenance of its AAA ratings”).
325
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2)(iii) (McKinney 2006).
326
It appears that even when financial guaranty insurers are domiciled in states
other than New York, the state of domicile will look to New York for capital
standards. See, e.g., Office of the Comm’r of Ins., State of Wisconsin, Report of
the Examination of Ambac Assurance Corporation (Aug. 31, 2007), at 34-35
(noting that Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac “is also subject to the minimum capital
requirements of the New York Insurance Laws, which are more restrictive than
Wisconsin requirements for certain segments of the financial guaranty business.
The New York aggregate risk limitation requirement serves as an industry standard
for the evaluation of minimum capital requirements of a financial guaranty insurer
and is used as the minimum standard in Wisconsin.”).
327
N.Y. INS. LAW § 107(a)(42) (McKinney 2006).
328
Id. § 6902(b)(1). (McKinney 2009) The New York State Department of
Insurance stated in 2008 that it would seek to increase this “to a figure in excess of
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requirement,329 and one of those types is municipal bonds – as long as they
carry high ratings.330
Contingency reserves: Financial guaranty insurers must maintain
contingency reserves to cover losses on insured instruments. For bonds
other than municipal obligations and special revenue bonds, the amount of
the required contingency reserve depends on the credit rating of the insured
instrument: Insurers must hold 1-1.5% of guaranteed principal against
investment-grade obligations,331 and 2-2.5% of guaranteed principal against
non-investment grade obligations,332 where “investment grade” is a ratingdependent determination.333
Aggregate risk limitations: Financial guaranty insurers must
maintain surplus to policyholders and contingency reserves334 against the
unpaid principal, interest, and other obligations of guaranteed obligations,
net of reinsurance ceded and collateral.335 The amount of surplus and
reserves that has to be held against an insured obligation under this rule
generally depends on the obligation’s rating. For example, the insurer must
hold reserves and surplus equal to 1-1.5% of the insured amount of most
investment-grade obligations336 and 2-4% of the insured amount of most
non-investment-grade obligations.337
Overall investment-grade limit: At least 95% of the insurer’s
aggregate net liability on municipal obligation bonds, special revenue
bonds, and industrial revenue bonds must be on investment-grade

$150
million.”
Circ.
Ltr.
No.
19,
at
10,
available
at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2008/c108_19.htm.
329
See N. Y. INS. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 2006) (setting forth general rules
for what assets can be used to satisfy policyholders’ surplus requirement)
330
See N. Y. INS. LAW (McKinney 2009) § 6902(b)(3).
331
Id. § 6903(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
332
Id.. LAW § 6903(a)(4)(B)(iii)-(v)
333
Id. § 6901(n) (investment-grade obligation is one rated in the “top four
generic lettered rating classifications by a securities rating agency acceptable to the
superintendent,” identified in writing by such a rating agency to be of investment
grade quality, or rated NAIC-1 or -2 by SVO.
334
Id. § 6904(c).
335
Id. § 6901(d) (defining “aggregate net liability” in these terms).
336
N.Y. INS. LAW § 6904(c)(1)(C)-(D) (McKinney 2009).
337
Id. §6904(c)(1)(E)-(G). Notably, municipal bonds are subject to the same
(low) capital requirement regardless of credit ratings. See id. § 6904(c)(1)(A)
(requirement to hold 0.333% of principal value of municipal bonds in reserves and
surplus).
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instruments.338
Although the aggregate insurance risk limitations mentioned above
could be considered a form of risk-based capital requirement, the New
York State Department of Insurance apparently does not impose risk-based
capital standards based on exposures.339
Bond insurers apparently played a large role in securing acceptance
of novel products.340 Because bond insurers’ own ability to take on
exposures was rating-dependent, this created an indirect form of ratingdependent regulation. A potential investor that would not or could not
invest in a product based on the product’s rating might invest based on the
bond insurance – insurance enabled by the existence of a rating.
2. The New York State Department of Insurance Deepens
Its Reliance on Ratings in Response to the Crisis
The failure of bond insurers in the financial crisis has led some
commenters to conclude that “[s]olvency procedures currently used by
regulators are not sufficient to monitor the solvency of bond insurers, due
in part to the lack of risk-based capital standards and the deviation of FGIs
away from their core business.”341
338

Id. § 6904(b)(2).
See Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 12-13 & n.45. Drake and Neale
report that financial guaranty insurers are all regulated by the State of New York,
which has adopted a separate regulatory regime for these insurers that does not
incorporate NAIC’s risk-based capital guidelines. Id.
340
See Bartlett, supra note 288, at 9 (securitized products “typically required
some form of external credit enhancement in order for the senior notes … to
receive an investment grade credit rating” and financial guaranty insurers were
well positioned to provide enhancement because “no monoline insurer had ever
experienced a single ratings downgrade.”); McNichols, supra note 280, at 257
(estimating that 1/3 of all asset-backed security transactions are wrapped by AAA
insurers); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Joint Forum, Credit Risk
Transfer 21 (March 2005) (“To a great extent, their role appears to be to provide
an additional layer of bonded due diligence (beyond that provided by the rating
agencies) that enables CDO tranche buyers to become comfortable with purchasing
instruments that they themselves are uncertain how to evaluate fully”). On the
explosion of novel securitized products, see, e.g., Yongheng Deng et al., CDO
Market Implosion and the Pricing of Subprime Mortage-Backed Securities 3-4
(March 2009) (global CDO issuance expanded from $300 billion to $2 trillion
from 1997 to 2006, subprime asset-backed CDO issuance increased from $10
billion in 2000 to $50 billion in 2006).
341
Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 42.
339
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The New York Department of Insurance has taken action to
address such concerns. On September 22, 2008, the Department issued
Circular Letter Number 19, which provided new guidance for financial
guaranty insurers in response to the declines in the structured-finance
market and the rating agency downgrades of the leading bond insurers.342
Circular Letter 19 did not directly reduce the role of rating agencies.
Indeed, New York deepened its commitment to rating-dependent
regulation. Circular Letter 19 includes a statement that the Department
expects that FGIs’ entire portfolios will be invested in investment grade
assets, with “investment grade”343 determined by rating. Circular Letter 19
also forbids financial guaranty insurers to insure non-agency CDOs of ABS
absent special permission from the Superintendent – or a policy provision
that the insurer holds an unsubordinated senior position with a rating of A
or better.344
By enacting what appears to be a permanent ban on insuring ABS
CDOs under certain conditions, Circular Letter 19 imposes a requirement
that is more onerous and intrusive than a seasoning requirement would
have been.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM

The difficulties that apparently systemically important regulated
insurers faced after highly rated novel products failed to perform as
anticipated highlight the importance of rating reliability. The failure of a
systemically important institution has important consequences, so if all else
is equal, systemically important institutions should be regulated more
conservatively than institutions that lack systemic importance. The precrisis rating-dependent bond insurance regulations described above did not
distinguish appropriately between ratings that could be expected to be
highly reliable and those that could be expected to be less reliable. Ratings
on financial products with a long history are likely to be more reliable than
ratings on novel products. This is true even if the novel-product ratings are
as good as anyone has a right to expect,345 and regulatory conservatism is
342

Circ. Ltr. No. 19. Circular Letter No. 19 took effect January 1, 2009.
See id. at 9 (the “95% investment grade” rule previously had covered only
municipal, special revenue, and industrial development bonds).
344
Id., at 5.
345
The same observation applies to the bond insurers’ internal assessments of
credit risk, which contemporary analysts regarded as first-rate. See Joint Forum,
Credit Risk Transfer 37 (March 2005) (“At this stage, the Working Group has not
343
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even more strongly indicated if the market cannot fully digest the extent
and nature of an insurer’s exposures to novel products, as appears to have
been the case for the bond insurers.346
A seasoning requirement – a determination that ratings will not be
given regulatory effect until the rated product has been in existence long
enough to permit reliable ratings – is a simple way of achieving regulatory
conservatism. It appears less intrusive and restrictive than imposing
permanent bars on taking exposures to novel products, as New York’s
insurance department apparently has done.
VII.

RMBS, RULE BAILOUTS, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITAL
REGULATION

As the RAWG and the New York State Department of Insurance
were illustrating the difficulty of abandoning rating-dependent regulation in
general, a separate NAIC proceeding was illustrating the difficulty of
sticking to rating-dependent regulation – or any ex ante capital rules – in
the midst of a financial crisis. Rating-agency downgrades of RMBS during
the financial crisis would have required insurers to raise large additional
amounts of capital under the risk-based capital rules. In response, the
NAIC abandoned its rating-dependent rules for RMBS and substituted an
alternative third-party credit risk assessor. The NAIC’s action resembles
the move away from mark-to-market accounting in banking around the
same time, which apparently was motivated by a desire to provide capital
relief in that sector. Both actions can be described as “rule bailouts” –
changes to the rules in the midst of a crisis at the behest of a regulated
industry in order to avoid the need to raise capital or be found insolvent.
found evidence of hidden concentrations of credit risk. Nevertheless, there are
some non-bank firms whose primary business model focuses on taking on credit
risk. These include the monoline financial guarantors and the specialized CDS
entity described above. Other market participants are fully aware of the nature of
these firms. In the case of the monolines, credit risk has always been their primary
business activity and thus they have invested heavily in obtaining expertise in the
analysis of credit risk. The rating agencies also obtain significant data on
individual transactions entered into by the monolines. While it is clearly possible
that one of these firms could experience unanticipated problems or otherwise
misjudge the risks involved, such problems are not likely to be the result of having
entered into the business of CRT activity lightly. Given their orientation toward
super senior risk, the monolines exhibit more exposure concentration rather than
risk concentration.”)
346
See Bartlett, supra note 288, at 1-4.
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Rule bailouts may be justified on their own terms when they
happen. The life insurance industry presented a well-reasoned argument
for the change – albeit an argument that did not rest on anything specific to
the financial crisis and that could have been raised years earlier. Almost
any rule bailout can be characterized either as a justified response to the
failure of preexisting rules devised by fallible humans to work in a
financial crisis or as an unjustified example of regulatory forbearance –
reflecting perhaps the fact that regulators want to believe, along with their
regulated charges that things will turn around somehow, or at least that
failure can be staved off until a new regulator is on the watch.
Whether any particular rule bailout was justified or unjustified on
the merits, the tendency to engage in rule bailouts has implications for the
design of capital rules. For example, regulators might consider limiting
reliance on rigorous, painful enforcement of existing rules in a financial
crisis, which in turn counsels conservative requirements to build up
institutions’ cushions when a crisis is not occurring. Relatedly, rule
bailouts impart a kind of shadow countercyclicality to capital requirements
that might be considered in designing a macroprudential regulatory system.
High capital requirements are not as procyclical as they might appear if
they are likely to be relaxed in crisis. And the unexpected failure of ratings
that depended on correlation measures, which triggered the pressure for a
rule bailout, suggests that regulators should be cautious in approaching
regulatory-reform suggestions that would increase reliance on accurate
forecasts of correlation.
The tendency toward rule bailouts is characteristic of capital
regulation generally, not just of rating-dependent regulation. But ratingdependent regulation as practiced by insurance regulators helped create the
conditions for a rule bailout by making it easy for insurers to amass large
exposures to novel assets that performed unpredictably in a financial crisis.
A seasoning requirement would have helped avoid that situation.
Moreover, a seasoning requirement is less vulnerable to the forces that
produce rule bailouts than, say, a requirement that regulators take prompt
corrective action to resolve endangered institutions, because the seasoning
requirement does not rely on regulators to make painful decisions in the
midst of a financial crisis.
A.

RMBS REVALUATION IN THE CRISIS OF 2007-09

In the wake of the crisis, the NAIC changed its approach to
solvency regulation of residential mortgage-backed securities. Instead of
relying on agency ratings, NAIC now relies on models developed by
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PIMCO Advisory to place each RMBS into one of the six NAIC
categories.347 The RAWG report states that this change, “(1) identifies the
actual risks presented by RMBS; (2) quantifies the severity of possible
losses; (3) provides a better measure of losses against which surplus must
be kept; and (4) when appropriate, frees up capital, in particular for
securities held at a discount.”348
This decision generally follows a proposal that the American
Council of Life Insurers advanced in August 2009 after a wave of
downgrades to the credit ratings of RMBS. 349 ACLI argued that the ratingbased capital rules required the insurers to hold too much capital.350 In
particular, ACLI argued that agency ratings were based “primarily on the
likelihood of the first dollar of loss,”351 so that the ratings did not
“distinguish between securities that are projected to experience a total loss
and securities that are projected to experience minor losses.”352 Thus, a
10% chance of default produced the same rating, regardless of whether the
bond was likely to lose 1% or 100% of its value on default. Although
Moody’s apparently did not submit formal comments on the ACLI
proposal before it was adopted, Moody’s later argued that this was an
unfair characterization of its ratings; for securities were expected to incur a
loss (usually those rated below B), Moody’s stated it was an unfair
characterization because its ratings were based on anticipated recovery.353
Moody’s also argued that its recovery estimates on subprime RMBS were
no lower than those implied by market prices.354
347

RAWG Final Report, supra note 38, at 4.
Id. at 4.
349
Letter from John Bruins, Senior Actuary, Am. Council of Life Insurers
(ACLI) & Andrew Melnyk, Managing Director, ACLI to Michael Moriarty, Chair,
Valuation of Securities Task Force, NAIC & Lou Felice, Chair, Capital Adequacy
Task Force, NAIC (Aug, 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.naic.org [hereinafter “ACLI Aug. 10, 2009 Letter”].
350
Id. at 1. (“unwarranted impact on RBC being experienced by the industry”
as a result of rating agency RMBS downgrades).
351
Id., at 1.
352
Id. at 3.
353
Debash Chatterjee et al., Moody’s Ratings on U.S. RMBS Reflect Expected
Recoveries: Ratings on Impaired Securities Do Not Overstate Risk, Final Report
of the RAWG to the Fiancial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1,2
(Nov. 6, 2009) available at http://www.naic.org/scommittees_e_rating_agency.htm
(click on “Rating Agency WG Final Report”; then proceed to section 8 of Moody’s
pdf),
354
Id. at 2.
348
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ACLI argued that this was inappropriate because the risk-based
capital system was calibrated to levels of loss given default typical of
corporate bonds, while RMBS were likely to suffer much less loss given
default than corporate bonds.355 Thus it arguably was inappropriate to
make an insurer hold as much capital against a B-rated RMBS as against a
B-rated corporate bond.
This was a serious issue for the insurers; ACLI cited a report
finding that at least 64% of AAA-rated non-agency RMBS had been
downgraded to below investment grade by at least one rating agency by
June 2009.356 ACLI estimated the credit-risk capital component of their
capital requirement attributable to RMBS increased from $2 billion as of
the end of 2008 to $11 billion by the end of 2009 as a result of the RMBS
downgrades.357
ACLI’s proposal was adopted with little formal comment; NAIC’s
records reveal only two official comments, both friendly to the ACLI
proposal.358 The NAIC adopted special rules under which a third-party
355
ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 4. In particular, ACLI
argued that in the event of a corporate default, corporate bond indentures typically
terminate interest payments and accelerate maturity of the principal, effectively
terminating the security on default. ACLI argued that RMBS structure, by
contrast, allow securities to continue receiving principal and interest even after an
event of default. Id. Thus, ACLI argued, “In the case of senior RMBS tranches,
the ability to receive several years of coupon payments alone dramatically
improves expected economic recoveries relative to a typical corporate bond.” Id.
ACLI’s letters proposing the change in methodology did not present any
quantitative data backing this analysis, and it does not appear that any such data
was presented in the course of NAIC’s consideration of ACLI’s proposal.
356
Id. at 3.
357
ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 3. Apparently the actual
increase in the amount of capital the industry would have to hold would be
somewhat less than the $9 billion difference between these two numbers because
of the way the risk-based capital formula combines the different risks to arrive at a
total risk-based capital requirement – a process called “taking correlation into
account.” See supra Part __. For example, if a company had a $2 billion capital
charge for interest rate risk, a $2 billion capital charge for credit risk, and a $10
billion capital charge for insurance risk, then total risk-based capital would be
around $10.8 billion. If the credit-risk component of the charge were to increase
from $2 billion to $11 billion, then total risk-based capital would be $16.4 billion,
an increase of $5.6 billion, not $9 billion. The formula guarantees that the increase
in total capital will be less than the increase in the credit risk charge unless the
company has no insurance risk.
358
One comment was from a provider of analytical tools for RMBS that would

176

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol: 17.1

evaluator would establish a price range for each RMBS for each of the six
NAIC designations, and those ranges would be used instead of credit
ratings to establish the amount of capital that the insurers were obliged to
hold.359
The change apparently had the intended effect; NAIC estimated
that the change in valuation method reduced the credit-risk capital charge
for life insurance companies’ RMBS holdings from $10.8 billion to $3.5
billion – a 68% reduction.360
The rating agencies resisted the notion that their rating downgrades
were responsible for the industry’s straits. Moody’s suggested that most of
the reduction in required capital came from the decision to give insurers the
benefit of bargain purchases and write-downs, rather than the change in
who was doing the assessment.361 For its part, Fitch pointedly commented
that its ratings “are expressly not designed to effect a pre-determined
regulatory outcome, such as ‘free[ing] up capital.’”362
have been a potential candidate to be hired to carry out the third-party valuation
exercise. See Letter from Andrew Davidson, Pres., Andrew Davidson & Co. to
Michael Moriarty, Chair, Valuation of Securities Task Force, NAIC, & Lou Felice,
Chair, Capital Adequacy Task Force, NAIC (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the
author)
available
at
http:www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_091014_materials.pdf.. The other
was from a life insurance company that suggested technical changes to the process
for valuing the RMBS. See E-mail from Andy Hopping, Exec. Vice Pres. & CFO,
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. to Richard Newman, NAIC (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file
with author) http:// naic.org/documents/committees_e_091014_materials.pdf.. .
359
See NAIC, Re: RFP 1344 – Assessment of Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities
(RMBS)
13
)
(Oct.23,
2009)
http://naic.org/documents/svo_rmbs_rfp_102309.pdf. _
360
Estimated RBC Impact from the RMBS Initiative 1 (Apr. 8, 2010), available
at http://www.naic.org/rmbs/100408_rbs_impact_estimate.pdf.
The values are
for the year-end 2009 risk-based capital requirement. After taking correlation into
account, the reduction was smaller in absolute terms but about the same in
percentage terms: the change reduced the amount of life insurers’ post-correlation
capital charge attributable to RMBS credit risk from $8.4 billion to $3.0 billion, or
65%. (total life insurer capital charge from NAIC par value is about $178 billion
and book adjusted carrying value about $ 151 billion).
361
Scott Robinson, Most U.S. Life Insurers RMBS Capital Relief from Change
in Computation, Not Switch to PIMCO, Final Report of the RAWG to the
Financial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1, 1 (Jan. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency.htm (click on
“rating Agency WG Final Report:” then proceed to Section 8 of pdf).
362
Letter from Charles Brown, General Counsel, Fitch Ratings to Richard
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THE RULE BAILOUT IN CONTEXT

It seems that the problem ACLI identified with the regulators’ use
of ratings to assess the risk of RMBS, assuming it was a problem at all,
existed before the crisis and was not a product of the crisis. Whatever the
merits of the underlying argument about recovery values on RMBS versus
corporate bonds, this episode illustrates the willingness of regulators to
adjust capital requirements to fit the interests of regulated parties during a
systemic crisis. ACLI expressly justified its request on the basis of the old
rules’ “unwarranted” and “severe” impact on required capital.363 It
parallels other examples of departure from established rules and customs
during the crisis, such as the dubiously legal abandonment of long-standing
Federal Reserve practices to make unprecedented loans,364 and the bankfriendly amendment of fair value (or “mark-to-market”) accounting rules in
March 2009, by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).365
The mark-to-market changes were widely viewed as a form of
regulatory “forbearance.”366 Although mark-to-market rules have their
critics, including some who are known more for trust in markets than
doubts about them,367 the sudden discovery in the midst of a crisis that
Newman, NAIC, Bob Carcano, NAIC, & Dan Daveline, NAIC, Final Report of the
RAWG to the Financial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1, 4 (Jan 5,
2010)
(on
file
with
author)
available
at
http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency.htm (click on “Rating Agency
WG Final Report:” then proceed to Section 6 Fitch Ratings of pdf).
363
See ACLI Aug. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 2.
364
See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L REV. 463, 477
(2009).
365
See Kara Scannell, FASB Eases Mark-to-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr.
3, 2009 (describing banking industry’s argument for changing rule and FASB’s
decision to do so).
366
Jonathan Weil, Suing Wall Street Banks Never Looked So Shady,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 24, 2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0224/suing-wall-street-banks-never-looked-so-shady-jonathan-weil.html. See also
James Chanos, We Need Honest Accounting, WALL. ST. J., March 24, 2009
(characterizing relaxation of capital requirements as an alternative, and superior,
method of providing regulatory relief as compared to changing mark-to-market
rules).
367
See Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: The
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 22-23 (U. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin
Wokring
Paper
No.
458,
2009),
,
available
at
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these rules are “procyclical” – a fact that apparently had gone unnoticed by
those in a position to make or influence policy when marking to market
was, presumably, procyclically inflating a bubble – suggests that the markto-market relief was indeed a form of “rule bailout.” Certainly, the banking
industry – in both its GSE368 and private369 segments – supported the
changes, although some commentators questioned whether the game was
worth the candle for the banks, given the relatively small percentage of
their assets that was even subject to mark-to-market accounting.370
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1385382.
368
See Letter from Michael Guttau, Chmn., & John L. von Seggern, Pres. &
CEO, Council of Fed. Home Loan Banks to Russell G. Golden, Technical Dir.,
Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., 1 (March 27, 2009) (on file with author) (proposed
changes to FAS 157 “an improvement over existing guidance”) available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818328874&blobheader=application/pdf
[hereinafter
Council Letter 132]; Letter from Michael Guttau, Chmn., Council of Fed. Home
Loan Banks & John L. von Seggern, President & CEO, Council of Fed. Home
Loan Banks to Russell G. Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., 1
(March 27, 2009) (on file with author) (proposed changes to FAS 115, 125, and
EITF 99-200 “an improvement” over existing guidance, but do not go far enough)
available
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818329600&blobheader=application/pdf, (hereinafter
Council Letter 98).
369
See Letter from Donna Fisher, Sr. Vice President , Am. Bankers Ass’n to
Russell Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., (March 30, 2009) (on
file with author) (“We strongly support” proposed changes to FAS 157), available
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818331124&blobheader=application/pdf
[hereinafter
ABA Letter 31A]; Letter from Donna Fisher, Sr. Vice President., Am. Bankers
Ass’n to Russell Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd. (March 30,
2009)
(“Overall,
ABA supports the proposed” changes to FAS 115, 124, and
EITF
99-20-b),
available
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818430414&blobheader=application/pdf
(herinafter
ABA Letter 31).
370
David Reilly, Commentary, Elvis Lives, and Mark-to-Market Rules Fuel
March
11,
2009,
Crisis,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sis=aD11FOjLK1y4
(reporting analysis of company data finding that only 29% of assets of the 12
largest banks were held in mark-to-market categories at year-end 2008). Of
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IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL REGULATION

The insurance industry’s experience with rating failure on RMBS
and the resulting rule bailout has three major implications for capital
regulation. First, the tendency toward rule bailouts causes capital
regulations to be less pro-cyclical than they otherwise would be. Second, if
regulators have a tendency toward rule bailouts in financial crises, that
suggests that policymakers should not put too much stock in prompt
corrective action requirements that order regulators to take ailing
companies into receivership. Both these points seem to weigh in favor of
higher capital requirements than would otherwise be justified. Finally, the
failure of correlation-sensitive ratings on RMBS suggests caution in
adopting suggestions that entail greater regulatory reliance on correlation
measures.
1. Built-in
Countercyclicality
Forbearance

and

Regulatory

There has been acute interest in macro-prudential regulation since
the crisis began. Macro-prudential regulation “concerns itself with factors
that affect the stability of the financial system as a whole.”371 One type of
macro-prudential regulation is adopting countercyclical capital adequacy
requirements – requiring that firms hold more capital in a boom and less in
a crisis.372 Another proposal for macro-prudential regulation would be
permitting institutions with access to long-term funding – perhaps
including insurers – to value their assets using long-term third party
valuations rather than market prices.373 As described in Part IV374, the
course, a highly leveraged institution could be rendered insolvent by losses on a
relatively small percentage of its holdings.
371
MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 167, at viii.
372
Id. at 29 (capital regulation measures “have to be counter-cyclical, i.e.,
tough during a credit boom and more relaxed during a crisis”).
373
See, e.g., Avinash D. Persaud, The Rise and Apparent Fall of MacroJune
24,
Prudential
Regulation,
VOXEU.ORG,
2009,,http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3694; Avinash D. Persaud,
Regulation, Valuation, and Systemic Liquidity, 12 BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN.
STABILITY REV. 75, 79 (2008). As explained, insurance regulation in the United
States already follows this prescription for capital regulation, as non-impaired
insurer assets are not marked to market for regulatory purposes. [check]
374
Goodhart, supra note 264, at 14-15 (previously viewed as having little, or
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consensus not long ago was that insurance companies did not pose a
systemic risk. Although that consensus has come under pressure because
of the financial crisis, proponents of macro-prudential regulation tend to
believe that because of this, insurance companies need only microprudential regulation.375
As described above, recent events have challenged the assumption
that insurers pose no systemic risk, so macro-prudential regulation, at least
of certain insurers, may be appropriate. If so, the possibility of rule
bailouts affects the extent to which a given capital requirement is
procyclical. Capital requirements are said to be procyclical in part because
they can prompt cycles of fire sales when prices are low. Asset prices go
down, forcing entities to sell assets to satisfy capital requirements, which
drives prices down more. The capital requirement deepens the downward
leg of the cycle. Rule bailouts mitigate this effect because regulators find
ways not to require the forced sales just described.
At the same time, rule bailouts seem to embody a kind of
unprincipled forbearance. The tendency to forbear seems to reflect the
worst incentives of regulators: to hope for the best, or at least that the
worst will not happen on the regulator’s watch. Such a tendency to push
problems off into the future would be consistent with insurance regulators’
reported tendency to underprice ex ante premiums for guarantee funds.376
Unbridled regulatory forbearance can in some circumstances be a
very bad idea– that is typically understood to be one of the central lessons
of the S&L crisis. Regulators may decline to take aggressive action to
wind up an insolvent firm, hoping along with the firm’s management that
the firm will turn itself around.377 In the meantime, the firm takes greater
and greater risks in an effort to extricate itself from insolvency.378 This pas
de deux can increase the ultimate cost of resolution dramatically.379 The
no, leverage” suggesting to the need for “micro-prudential regulation”).
375
See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; Goodhart, supra note 264,
at 15.
376
See David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the
Premiums to Meet the Practice, in PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1, 34 (Robert
E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004). ]
377
See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance
Regulation? Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1707, 1763 – 1764 n.256 (2010).
378
See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 294-95 (8th ed. 2007).
379
See Martin F. Grace et al., Insurance Company Failures: Why Do They
Cost So Much?, Ga. State Univ. Working Paper 03-1 (Oct. 30, 2003), at 29,
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insurance industry and its regulators380 were accused of behaving similarly
to S&Ls and their regulators during the era of the S&L crisis, which also
saw several high-profile insurance insolvencies.381 Thrift and insurance
regulators both became subject to “prompt corrective action” (PCA)
requirements during this period. As described in Part II.A.2 above, PCA
requirements direct the regulator to take action when capital levels fall
below specified thresholds. They are designed to prevent forbearance.
Rule bailouts illustrate a problem with a system that relies on PCA
requirements to force regulators to take unpleasant actions during a crisis.
The regulators can just change the rules to circumvent the requirements.382
Before being too hard on regulators for their rule bailouts, we
should remember that no massive wave of insolvencies has appeared in the
insurance sector in the current crisis– at least to date.383 And NAIC’s CEO
reminds us that some scholars believe that NAIC’s changes to asset
valuation rules in the 1930s helped insurance companies survive the Great

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463103 (reporting
the results of an empirical study finding that there are three main components of
resolution costs: “the pre-insolvency condition of the firm; the degree of
regulatory forbearance; and the transparency of post-insolvency administration”).
380
See STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES:
INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 6 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter FAILED
PROMISES] (“The same patterns of industry and regulatory conduct [as in the S&L
industry] have emerged from the Subcommittee’s recent investigations of
insurance company insolvencies.”); see also STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
103D CONG., WISHFUL THINKING: A WORLD VIEW OF INSURANCE SOLVENCY
REGULATION 6 (Comm. Print 1994) (“The single, overriding weakness plaguing
the supervision of domestic and foreign insurance companies is the widespread
practice of wishful thinking by regulatory officials.”).
381
See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 349, at 2 (“The Subcommittee examined
in great detail the failures of Mission Insurance Co., Integrity Insurance Co.,
Transit Casualty Co., and Anglo-American Insurance Co. Collectively, these four
failures are projected to cost the American public more than $5 billion...”).
382
Cf. Brunnermeier et al., supra note 16, at 33-34 (arguing that
macroprudential regulation should be implemented by rules rather than regulatory
discretion: Otherwise, few regulator/supervisors will actually dare to face the
odium of tightening in boom conditions.).
383
See Martin Grace, A Reexamination of Federal Regulation in the Insurance
Industry, at 1-2, Networks Financial Insititute Policy Brief No. 2009-PB-02 (Feb.
2009). available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=135053
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Depression with only modest insolvencies and policyholder losses.384
Although we would expect any such wave would appear only after a lag,
the general recovery in credit markets since 2008 and early 2009 suggests
that the very large credit spreads in those periods did not forecast
corresponding high levels of credit loss, perhaps because they reflected
high risk aversion and an absence of liquidity. So perhaps this particular
rule bailout will turn out to have been justified, at least from a short-term
perspective.
Whether any specific rule bailout was justified or not, the
possibility of rule bailouts seems to weigh in favor of higher capital
requirements. The negative consequences of a high requirement are
smaller, because there is less chance of forced fire sales during a crisis, and
the benefits of a high requirement are greater, because rule bailouts and
forbearance increase the costs of distress, placing a higher premium on
staying out of distress.
2. Ratings in Crisis and the Asset-by-Asset Debate
The RMBS experience sheds light on another debate in capital
regulation, the asset-by-asset debate. The RBC formula has been attacked
for years on the ground that it does not give enough credit to ideas from
financial economics about the value of diversification.385 The RBC
formula, so we have been told, fails to take a portfolio approach to
assessing risk. The Model Investment Law, at least in its Defined Limits
Version, has come in for equally severe criticism.386 These criticisms do
384

Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance
Regulation 18 & n.25, Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief 2009-PB-03 (Feb.
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1350539
(noting that NAIC altered asset valuation rules not just in the 1930s, but also in
“periods of market turmoil in 1907, 1914, and 1917-21”).
385
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 346, at 1765 (RBC formula “does a poor
job accounting for insurers’ diversification and risk mitigation measures,
employing a simple covariance formula that does not credit standard hedging
techniques, much less sophisticated portfolio design.”).
386
See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Investment Law: A Missed
Opportunity, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:
ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES (Edward I. Altman & Irwin T.
Vanderhoof, eds. 1996) 41, 41 (arguing that NAIC’s draft Model Investment Law
misses a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity by “adopt[ing] a ‘pigeon-hole
approach that addresses categories of risk assets (and activities) on a standalone
basis, ignoring portfolio effects and the potential for offsetting interactions among
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deserve to be taken seriously, as I have argued elsewhere.387
The value of diversification depends on how the assets in the
portfolio move together. The idea of co-movement is usually expressed
using the term “correlation,” a numerical measure of co-movement that
ranges from -1 to 1. The lower the correlation between each pair of
assets, the greater the diversification benefit of each pair of assets. The
criticism of the RBC system and Model Investment Law is that it does not
give enough credit for diversification. In fact, as explained in Part II.A.1
above, the RBC system assumes that credit risks have a correlation of 1 –
that is, that there is no diversification benefit.
Under normal circumstances most assets are not perfectly
correlated with one another so the perfect-correlation assumption is too
conservative, just as critics claim. But it is a common saying in the
financial community that “in a crisis, all correlations go to one.”388 And in
fact defaults on the mortgages underlying RMBS turned out to be more
correlated during the crisis than rating agencies or many investors
anticipated. Indeed, the high ratings and subsequent downgrades on the
RMBS in question were based in large part on diversification benefits that
failed to materialize in the crisis.
If a capital regulation system is to be designed so that the regulated
companies meet specified probabilities of survival during a financial crisis,
the assumption that credit risks are perfectly correlated looks more like a
prudent, conservative design feature than a technologically retrograde
failure to keep up with contemporary thought. The failure of ratings on
novel products counsels caution about importing higher levels of
sophistication into the capital regulation system, at least without sufficient
testing of the underlying assumptions.
VIII.

THE CASE FOR A RATINGS SEASONING REQUIREMENT
IN REGULATION

The performance of insurance solvency regulation during the
financial crisis mapped to the performance of the ratings on which
regulators’ solvency determinations are based. Regulated life and property
& casualty insurers were not heavily exposed to products on which ratings
the categories.”).
387
See Hunt, supra note 255, at 776-77..
388
RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS,
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FIANCIAL INNOVATION 26 9John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. eds., 2007)..
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failed, and they by and large escaped insolvency. AIG and financial
guaranty insurers were heavily exposed to products on which ratings failed,
and they did suffer insolvency.
The ratings that failed were ratings on novel products. Substantial
evidence indicates that agencies simply did not know what they were doing
in rating these products. Although rating agencies have sometimes been
successful in rating novel products right out of the box, it seems hard to
dispute that ratings on novel products are less reliable than ratings on more
seasoned products.
Rating failure on novel products may or may not indict rating
agencies. Perhaps their performance was as good as anyone had a right to
expect. The experience does highlight a potential problem with the design
of the regulatory system, though. Rating-dependent regulation of the
insurance industry treats all ratings, on novel and traditional products, as
the same. But they are not the same, because ratings on novel products can
be expected to be less reliable. As a simplifying device, imagine two
ratings, one on a traditional industrial corporate bond and one on a novel
structured product. Assume for the sake of argument that each rating
corresponds to a 75% chance of default and that 75% is in fact the best
estimate of the chance of default for each obligation.389 But the corporatebond rating may be more reliable: Think of a 75% +/- 5% chance of
default for that bond, as opposed to a 75% +/- 25% chance of default for
the novel bond. A regulatory system that wants insurers to hold only bonds
with a chance of default reasonably close to 75% might well admit the first
rating and not the second.
If all bond ratings should not be treated equally, how should
regulators decide which ratings to credit? A simple seasoning requirement
could be used to distinguish between reliable and less-reliable ratings. For
example, if ratings on novel products did not “count” for regulatory
purposes until a substantial volume of the product had been on the market
for some period designed to correspond to the length of the credit cycle,
perhaps 5-7 years, this would allow regulators and credit rating agencies to
observe the product’s performance under varying economic and market
conditions, so that final ratings would be more reliable.390
389

As discussed, rating agencies state that ratings do not correspond to
specified default probabilities, although some researchers have concluded that
S&P’s CDO ratings were designed to achieve just such probabilities.
390
A seasoning requirement for giving regulatory effect to ratings is in some
respects a partial substitute for a more general system for deterring issuance of
low-quality ratings on novel products. For example, if a rule requiring
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Such a seasoning requirement would be a more narrowly tailored
change to rating-dependent regulation than other proposals that are under
consideration or that have been adopted. For example, the first-draft
RAWG proposal to eliminate rating-dependent regulation on structured
products seems to give short shrift to rating agencies’ ability to learn from
mistakes. Dodd-Frank’s requirement that rating-dependent regulation be
eliminated at the federal level is even more sweeping.
The strongest argument for sweeping elimination of ratingdependent regulation is that RDR damages rating quality. But the heavily
rating-dependent regulatory system apparently has not degraded rating
quality to unacceptable levels for traditional obligations. Although
scholars have argued that ratings do not add value in the sense of
improving on what anyone with access to the financial press could
accomplish,391 that level of quality seems “good enough for government
work,”392 as other scholars have argued. Rating-agency critiques of the
pernicious effect of rating-dependent regulation on agency incentives
likewise focus on RDR’s effects in the context of novel products.
A seasoning requirement for rating-dependent regulation could
conceivably impede the development of novel financial products, as ratingregulated investors would effectively be barred from purchasing such
products. Of course, the overall social utility of financial-product
innovation is the subject of an unresolved debate, and in that sense it is
unclear that this objection has any force at all. In any event, hedge funds
and accredited individual investors are not subject to rating-dependent
regulations and would be able to purchase novel products. And under
Dodd-Frank, ratings are to be excised from federal regulations anyway,
creating another potential market for unrated products.
From a political-economy point of view, a seasoning requirement
is more feasible than more aggressive RDR-reduction measures. The
seasoning requirement could be implemented by NAIC via a change to
Rule FE, so that a state-by-state effort is unnecessary. Industry is spared
the expense of paying for efforts that duplicate reliable rating-agency
efforts. The seasoning requirement addresses Moody’s and S&P’s major
disgorgement of profits on low-quality profits were adopted, see Hunt, Credit
Rating Agencies, supra note 148, at 53, then we might expect agencies not to issue
low-quality ratings on novel products, so that no seasoning requirement would be
needed.
391
Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 246, at 509.
392
Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After
Enron?, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283, 283 (2009).
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criticisms of RDR, and the other rating agencies have adopted essentially
an agnostic line. By adopting a bright-line seasoning rule, regulators would
avoid taking responsibility for each and every decision to permit insurers to
make investments. At the same time, seasoning reduces one potentially
harmful political-economy effect: rule bailouts. If rating performance is
more reliable, it is less likely that ratings will perform in unexpectedly
negative ways that result in industry’s demanding a rule bailout.
Given NAIC’s evident lack of interest in complete eradication of
RDR at this time, an effort to do so seems likely to require a costly stateby-state battle. Congress could take action, but states have successfully
resisted federal efforts to encroach on their authority for nearly 70 years.
Arguments based on systemic risk might provide some traction, but they
don’t really apply to core insurance activities, with the possible exception
of financial guaranty insurance, which effectively has a single regulator
already.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Rating-agency reformers have good arguments for removing
private credit ratings from the regulatory system. At the same time,
financial regulators have both good reasons and strong incentives to
continue relying on private credit ratings or something very much like
them. Congress’ recent expression of desire to eliminate credit ratings
from financial regulation, taken together with state insurance regulators’
reaffirmation of the role of ratings in regulation, sets the stage for a
confrontation on this score.
One approach to addressing the problem of rating-dependent
regulation would be for regulators to stop relying on “unseasoned” ratings
– that is, ratings on novel financial products without a significant history of
market experience. Such ratings should be less reliable than ratings on
traditional products. Recent events with CDOs and subprime RMBS
suggest that that was the case, and that regulatory reliance on novel product
ratings created systemic risk and pressure for rule bailouts that reliance on
traditional ratings did not. Selectively reducing rating reliance by focusing
on unseasoned ratings preserves the benefits that regulators and the
regulated industry derive from the present system while addressing the
most serious problems with rating-dependent regulation.
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY V. GLENN:
WILL THE SUPREME COURT DECISION REDUCE
CONFUSION AFTER FIRESTONE?
Ryan M. LoRusso*
***
A recent report to the United States Congress indicated that about
131 million Americans are currently enrolled in employee benefit
plans which fall under the jurisdiction of the Employee Retirement
Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Some plans are
structured so that the plan administrator will be paying benefits out
of the firm’s profits. The possibility exists that the administrator may
be swayed to decide in favor of the company in an effort to protect
the financial health of the company which employs him. Recently, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn, the Supreme Court
addressed the questions of whether a plan administrator that pays
benefits out of company profits is acting under a conflict of interest,
and if so, how the conflict of interest should be taken into account
upon review by a court. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Glenn, the circuit courts had been employing a variety of approaches
in taking this apparent conflict into account.
This note begins by providing an overview of the areas of trust law
impacting the Court’s decision and then reviews the case-law prior
to the Supreme Court decision. The note then discusses the decision
in Glenn and the case law that has developed following the Court’s
decision. This comment argues that the Supreme Court made the
correct decision by holding that this scenario did constitute a conflict
of interest, and by allowing the circuit courts to take the conflict into
account by weighing it among a variety of other factors.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent report to the United States Congress indicated that
about 131 million Americans1 are currently enrolled in employee
* J.D. candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2011.
Thanks to my Mom, Dad, sister Angela, and Holly for your support
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benefit plans which fall under the jurisdiction of the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 In some
plans, the plan administrator will be paying benefits out of the same
pool of money as profits are derived. Recently, in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company v. Glenn, an employee enrolled in an employee
benefit plan falling under the jurisdiction of ERISA was denied
benefits by a plan administrator. The administrator would have paid
the benefits out of the same funds as which profits are derived. The
employee appealed the denial and the question was presented to the
Supreme Court of whether an insurer that pays benefits out of the
same funds as its profits are derived is acting under a conflict of
interest under ERISA.3 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Glenn, the circuit courts had been employing a variety of approaches
in taking this apparent conflict into account. This paper reviews the
law prior the Supreme Court decision and the case law that has
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn. This
paper argues that the Supreme Court made the correct decision by
stating that this scenario did constitute a conflict of interest, and by
allowing the circuit courts to take the conflict into account by
weighing it among a variety of other factors.
II.

HISTORY
A.

TRUST LAW AS APPLIED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that principles of trust law
must guide the courts in determining the appropriate standard of

throughout law school and in writing this comment. Also, thanks to
Professor McCoy for your help in revising this comment.
1
CONG. RES. SERVICE, ERISA Regulation of Health Plans: Fact
Sheet, available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/
erisaregulationofhealthplans-114.pdf.
2
See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
3
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
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review of a denial of benefit claims under ERISA.4 Therefore, a
short discussion of the relevant trust law principles may be helpful.
First, a trust as defined by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, and subjects the
trustee to the duty to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries.5 As
applied in the context of this case, the Supreme Court stated that
those administering employee-benefit plans must be guided by
principles of trust law.6 To begin, trust law generally prohibits a
fiduciary from acting under a conflict of interest.7 However, an
exception exists if the trustee was appointed by a settler who is aware
of the trustee’s conflict of interest.8 The Restatement takes the
position that a conflict of interest alone is not enough to remove a
trustee, but when “conflict of interest situations exist, the conduct of
the trustee in the administration of the trust will be subject to
especially carefully scrutiny.9 Furthermore, when a conflict of
interest situation is approved by the settler, the “trustee-beneficiary’s
conduct is to be closely scrutinized for abuse, including abuse by less
than appropriate regard for the duty of partiality.”10 The Restatement
also provides guidance to determine when an abuse of discretion may
exist and lists several factors including: “the existence or
nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries.”11 A leading treatise concurs stating that the extent of
discretion conferred upon the trustee and any conflict of interest with

4

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110
(1989).
5
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
6
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11.
7
George Gleason Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 534 (1993).
8
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS §107.1 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2001).
9
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. F, illus. (1) (2003).
10
Id. at § 79 cmt. B, illus. (1).
11
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
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the beneficiaries must be taken into account in determining an abuse
of discretion.12
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn (Glenn),13
the trustee was given discretionary powers in administering the trust.
Generally, this means that a court will not interfere with a trustee’s
exercise of a discretionary power when that exercise is reasonable
and not based on an improper interpretation.14 But, what constitutes
an abuse of discretion is not a rigid, constant standard. The point at
which an abuse of discretion is reached will vary, depending upon
the basic fiduciary duties and the terms of the trust, including the
amount of discretion given to the trustee.15 Of course, acting on the
basis of an improper motive is a factor that can be considered by a
court when determining if a trustee abused his discretion.16 Also, it is
important to note that “abuse of discretion” is a legal conclusion that
the trustee has exceeded the amount of discretion given to him in the
trust, and not the standard under which a court reviews the trustee’s
actions.
B.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
1974

OF

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) plays a central role in MetLife v. Glenn; therefore, a limited
discussion of ERISA will be helpful. ERISA was enacted by
Congress to protect the interests of employee-benefit plan
participants by requiring the disclosure of relevant financial
information to beneficiaries, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligations for fiduciaries of employee-benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and

12

AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW
TRUSTS §187 (4th ed. 1987).
13
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).
14
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a (2003).
15
Id.
16
Id.

OF
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ready access to the federal courts.17 Also, ERISA preempts virtually
all state laws in conflict with it, and no other federal law
systematically regulates employee benefit plans.18
Before ERISA was enacted, employee benefit and pension
plans operated with no substantial federal regulation.19 There were
various bodies of state law which would act to protect employees
prior to ERISA, but Congress determined this type of piecemeal
approach to be insufficient to protect employees’ interests and
expectations.20 Specifically, Congress found that the minimum
standards governing then existing plans to be insufficient; that plan
funds were inadequate to pay promised benefits; and that plans
terminated before accumulating enough funds to pay employees their
expected benefits.21 Accordingly, the stated purposes of the law
include establishing a uniform source of law to govern the
administration of employee-benefit plans, and promoting and
protecting employee’s interests and expectations in the plans. In
addition to those purposes cited by the statute itself, there are
numerous judicially-declared purposes to the statute.22 Some of the
most relevant include encouraging employers’ to adopt employee
benefit plans,23 while also giving employers a degree of flexibility in
administering the plans.24 To further encourage plan creation,
Congress intended to minimize the administrative burdens imposed

17

60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 1 (2003).
Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 575, 576 (1992). See also Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review
in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1098-1109 (2001) (for an
in depth discussion of case-law pre-Firestone).
18

19

Kevin Walker Beatty, Commentary, A Decade of Confusion:
The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as
Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 733 (2000).
20
Id.
21
60A AM. JUR. 2d Pensions § 1 (2003).
22
Id. § 2.
23
Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir.
1995).
24
Id. at 501.
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on employers by creating a standardized set of procedures.25 The
Court in Glenn noted that Congress believed that removing the
unpredictability that resulted from the application of various state
laws would encourage the creation of employee benefit plans, but the
unpredictability that results from an opaque standard of review could
also impede Congress’s goal of encouraging plan creation. Also, the
Supreme Court has stated that the principal goal of ERISA is to
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.26 Courts
have also stated that ERISA was enacted to protect employees from
employers who could pursue their own interests in the management
of the retirement plan.27
To ensure the realization of its stated goals, ERISA provides
that a fiduciary “shall discharge his duties with respect with respect
to a plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and
for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries”28 while using the care, skill, diligence, and
prudence of prudent man in a similar situation.29 To ensure the
statutory goals are enforced, ERISA allows a plan participant or
beneficiary to bring a civil suit in Federal Court to recover benefits
due to him, enforce his rights under the plan, or clarify his right to
future benefits under the plan.30
Despite its length, ERISA leaves many important issues to be
interpreted by the courts.31 So while Congress intended to provide a
statutory grounding to employee-benefit law, the deference to the
courts was partly a recognition by Congress that the law surrounding
benefit plans had long been part of the common law.32 Also, the gaps
25

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 834 (1997).
27
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 333 (1981); Reich v.
Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
28
See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
29
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)B (2006).
30
§ 1132 (a)(1)B.
26

31
32

Conison, supra note 18, at 576.
Id.
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in the statute reflect Congress’s intent for the courts to experiment
and refine the law surrounding benefit plans. There were no models
for Congress to draw on when enacting ERISA, so in an effort not to
upset settled law, Congress deferred to the courts on some of the
more important parts of the law in this regard, including of course,
the relevant standard of review.
C.

FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. V. BRUCH

The Court’s decision in Firestone plays an important role in
shaping the outcome of the Glenn. In Firestone, the Court addressed
the appropriate standard of review of benefit determinations by
fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA.33 Firestone acted as
the fiduciary of an employee-benefit plan which stated that workers
were entitled to receive benefits if the workforce was reduced.34
When Firestone sold three of its plants to another company, the
workers brought suit under ERISA claiming that a reduction in
workforce occurred entitling them to benefits.35 Firestone denied the
claim citing the fact that all of the workers were hired by the new
company at the same positions and wages.
The Court in Firestone noted that ERISA sets out no standard
of review under 1132(a)(1)(b) which allows a participant to
challenge benefit determinations.36 The Supreme Court noted that
the federal courts had adopted the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
to fill the gap left by the statute, mainly by analogizing the ERISA
statute to the Labor Management Relations Act and borrowing its
standard.37 However, the Supreme Court found the adoption of this
standard was inappropriate because of differences in the statutes—
mainly the fact that courts used the standard to gain a jurisdictional

33

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105
(1989).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 109.
37
Id.
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basis over the LMRA suits was not present because ERISA explicitly
authorizes such suits.38
The Court held that when a court reviews a fiduciary’s denial
of benefits under ERISA, the court should be guided by principles of
trust law.39 The Court’s conclusion was based upon the fact that the
ERISA statute, while not setting forth a standard of review,
“abounded” with language borrowed from the body of trust law.40
The Court also found support for this conclusion in the legislative
history.41 The Court also noted that Congress wanted the courts to
develop a federal common law in regards to the standard of review.42
Having settled that trust law principles should guide courts in
the review of a fiduciary’s denial of benefits, the Court then stated
how these trust law principles should be applied. In Firestone, the
plan administrator was not vested with any discretion when
determining employees’ benefits.43 The Court looked to trust law
and determined that when a fiduciary is not vested with any
discretion, a de novo standard of review should apply.44
However, the Court continued at length on the appropriate
standard of review when a fiduciary is given discretion, even though
this was not essential to the decision. The Court cites the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts for the principle that a deferential
standard is appropriate if a trustee is given discretion in
administering the trust.45 The Court also stated in dicta: “Of course,
38

Id. at 109-10.
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11.
40
Id. at 110.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 112-13.
44
Id. at 112-15.
45
Some courts would regard this deferential approach as a review
for abuse of discretion and some courts would review under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. The First Circuit stated that
“abuse of discretion”, “arbitrary and capricious”, and
“reasonableness” were functionally equivalent in the ERISA context.
Denmark v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 566 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
39
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if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who
is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed
as ‘factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”46
The Court’s statement in Firestone is dictum because the facts did
not present a fiduciary that was given any discretion in administering
the trust. It is likely that the Court’s statement regarding fiduciaries
with discretion was intended to provide guidance to the federal
courts on the appropriate standard of review in those cases.
Given ERISA’s statutory goal of providing increased
protection to employees, a de novo standard of review seems
appropriate. However, under Firestone a plan can receive deferential
review if it vests the fiduciary with discretion. Because most plans
contain such language or can easily be made to contain such
language, “the court . . . essentially nullified applying the standard
that it deems most appropriate.”47 Despite Firestone’s efforts to
speak on the topic, the Circuit Courts would split on the appropriate
way to determine if a conflict of interest constituted an abuse of
discretion by a plan administrator.
D.

DIFFERING
FIRESTONE

CIRCUIT

COURT

APPROACHES

AFTER

Because Firestone did not clearly state how this conflict
should be taken into account, the circuit courts subsequently
developed several different approaches for taking a conflict of
interest into account under ERISA.
1. The “Presumptively Void” Approach

Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit also stated that there is no difference
between a review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and
“abuse of discretion....” Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term
Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861 n.8 (7th Cir. 2009).
46
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
47
Beatty, supra note 19, at 739.
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The presumptively void test has been adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit and Ninth, with the Ninth later overruling it as
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.48 In Brown v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, the Eleventh Circuit stated that when a conflict
of interest exists, a conflicted fiduciary may favor, perhaps even
unconsciously, his own interests over that of the beneficiaries.49 The
court reasoned that this would leave the beneficiaries unprotected
unless the burden of proof shifted to the administrator to demonstrate
that the conflict did not affect his decision.50 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit held that when a “plan beneficiary demonstrates a
substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary responsible
for benefits terminations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove
that its interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion
was not tainted by self-interest.”51 If the fiduciary carries that
burden, a court should review the fiduciary’s decision with deference
and not under a de novo standard of review.52
The Ninth Circuit applied a “presumptively void” approach in
Atwood53 before overruling Atwood in Abatie v. Aetna Health and
Life Ins. Co. in 2006.54 In Atwood, the Ninth Circuit applied a
traditional abuse of discretion standard to the decision of a conflicted
trustee, unless the affected beneficiary produced some evidence that
conflicted interest caused the fiduciary to breach a duty.55 Under that
method, a beneficiary was required to bring forth evidence showing
that the conflict of interest affected the decision.56 If no evidence
48

See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th
Cir. 1995); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.,
898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
49
Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1566.
52
Id. at 1568.
53
Atwood, 45 F.3d 1317.
54
Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 966-69
(9th Cir. 2006)
55
Id. at 1322-23.
56
Id. at 1323.
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other than the bare existence of the conflict existed, no heightened
review was undertaken.57 If evidence was brought forth, the court
would be “very skeptical” in deferring to the decision of trustee with
discretion.58 The court deferred to trust law for the principle that an
action taken by a fiduciary in violation of his duties is
“presumptively void”, and so the trustee had the burden of proving
the conflict did not affect his decision.59 This approach is interesting
because the presence of a conflict is not taken into account without
evidence it affected the trustee’s decision and the standard of review
remains the same. However, Firestone states that the conflict should
be taken into account whether or not there is evidence to suggest it
affected the trustee’s decision. In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the approach of Atwood was not completely
consistent with Firestone and overruled that approach60.

2. The Sliding Scale Test
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have adopted
the “sliding scale” approach.61 Under the sliding scale approach, a
court will always apply an arbitrary and capricious standard, but a
court will decrease the level of deference given to the conflicted

57

Id.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966-69.
61
See Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir.
1993); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d. 631, 638-42 (5th
Cir. 1992); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836
F.2d. 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987); Chambers v. Family Health
Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 824-27 (10th Cir. 1996).
58

200

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

administrator’s decision in proportion to the seriousness of the
conflict.62
In Van Boxel, the Seventh Circuit stated that it is necessary to
maintain flexibility when reviewing a benefit denial by a plan
administrator.63 To this end, a “sliding scale” of review is most
appropriate – the review is more searching and extensive the greater
the suspicion of partiality.64 Also, the court argued that this approach
squares with the practice of judges to engage in a more extensive
review when they believe there is a greater risk of the fiduciary being
partial.65 The Tenth Circuit has also that the “sliding scale” approach
was more consistent with the flexible standard articulated in
Firestone.66 Implicitly, it seems that the court is arguing the courts
have always employed a “sliding scale” approach—the courts would
simply adjust the amount of deference they accorded under the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard based on the presence of a
conflict.
3. “Combination of Factors” Test
The “combination of factors” approach was adopted by the
Sixth Circuit in Calvert.67 In that case, the court stated that a
“conflict of interest” was to be considered and weighed by a
reviewing court among any other relevant factors that could lead to a
finding of an abuse of discretion.68 This approach was used to review
Glenn’s denial of benefits, and was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Glenn.69
4. Eleventh Circuit
62

Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825.
Van Boxel, 836 F.2d. at 1052.
64
Id. at 1052-53.
65
Id.
66
Chambers, 100 F.3d. at 826-27.
67
Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005).
68
Id.
69
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008).
63
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Following Firestone, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a six-step
burden shifting approach in Williams to take a conflict of interest
into account.70 If the plan administrator was vested with discretion,
his decision would be upheld if it was not “arbitrary and
capricious”.71 If a conflict of interest existed, then the court would
then review under a “heightened arbitrary and capricious” standard.72
The court stated this standard fell between “de novo” and a regular
“arbitrary and capricious” review, although the court could not
define exactly where.73 To deal with this, the court adopted a twostep approach where the burden was on the beneficiary to prove the
administrator had a conflict of interest.74 If proved that he did, the
administrator then had the burden of proving that his decision was
not tainted by self- interest.75 The case does seem compatible with
Firestone, but there is some vagueness to the test because the court
did not define a precise standard of review. Of course, this vests the
judge with great leeway in making a decision.
III.

METROPOLITAN
GLENN

LIFE

INSURANCE

COMPANY

V.

The standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Firestone
had proved inadequate in providing clear guidance to the circuit
courts on how to take a conflict of interest into account when
reviewing a plan administrator’s discretionary decision to deny a
claimant benefits. This resulted in several different approaches by
the circuit courts in apparent contravention of some of ERISA’s main
goals—creating uniformity and predictability in the law surrounding

70

Williams v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 113738 (11th Cir. 2004).
71
Williams, 373 F.3d. at 1137-38.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1138.
75
Id.

202

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

employee benefit plans. When the Supreme Court heard Glenn, it
was against this background that the case was considered.
A.

ISSUE

The Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company v. Glenn on June 19, 2008.76 This case presented two
questions to the court: (1) whether a plan administrator that both
evaluates and pays claims operates under a conflict of interest, and
(2) how any such conflict should be taken into account on judicial
review of a discretionary benefit determination.77 The facts of the
case are set forth below.
B.

FACTS

In this case, the plaintiff, Wanda Glenn (hereinafter Glenn),
was an employee of Sears Roebuck & Company.78 Sears provided its
employees with the option of enrolling in a Group Long-Term
Disability Plan, in which Glenn participated.79 The Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (MetLife) acted as the plan’s fiduciary, and
made decisions regarding which employees were entitled to
benefits.80 Under the plan, MetLife both reviewed and paid claims.
Sears is the plan sponsor and administrator.81
In April 2000, Glenn was diagnosed with severe dilated
cardiomyopathy, the symptoms of which include fatigue and
shortness of breath.82 Prior to suffering the disease, Glenn had
worked as a sales manager from 1994 through 2000.83 The District
76

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S, 105, 105 (2008).
Id. at 2347.
78
Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:2003CV0572, 2005 WL
1364625, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77
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Court found that this job involved a considerable amount of standing
and walking, as well as some lifting.84
Because of the
cardiomyopathy, Glenn stopped working in April 2000 and applied
for disability benefits in June 2000.85 MetLife approved her claim
for disability benefits, which were awarded for a twenty-four month
period.86 These benefits were based on a finding that the employee
was “completely and continuously unable to perform the material
duties of her regular job.”87 After the twenty-four month period
ended, the employee would have to meet a considerably stricter
standard to continue to maintain unemployment benefits: the
employee would have to demonstrate that she was “completely and
continuously unable to perform the duties of any gainful work or
service for which she is reasonably qualified taking into
consideration her training, experience, education, and past earning.”88
Glenn filed for social security disability benefits, but this provided
her little relief.89
In March 2002, MetLife had Dr. Patel meet with Glenn to
reevaluate her status as disabled.90 After the meeting, the doctor
stated that Glenn was capable of performing sedentary work, i.e.
work as an office clerk or secretary.91 Another doctor was consulted

84

Glenn, 2005 WL 1364625, at *1.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 662 (6th Cir.
2006).
88
Id.
89
In August 2000, Glenn filed for Social Security disability
benefits on the suggestion of the plan administrators. Her request
was initially denied but eventually approved by an administrative
law judge. She received about $13,000 from Social Security, but
seventy-five percent was recovered by MetLife for “overpayment of
benefits” and the other twenty-five percent was recovered by her
lawyers. Id. at 663.
90
Id. at 664.
91
Id.
85
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and agreed with the assessment by Dr. Patel.92 Based on this finding,
MetLife did not grant Glenn’s request for benefits after the twentyfour month period because it was determined that she was capable of
performing some work, and thus, could not meet the standard under
the second test which required: not only that she was not able to
perform her previous job, but also that she was not able to perform
any job for which she was reasonably qualified.93
Glenn asked MetLife to reconsider its decision.94 After
meeting again with Dr. Patel, he stated that it was his opinion that
Glenn was still having “significant difficulty” returning to any type
of work because the emotional stress of the job exacerbated her
condition.95 MetLife again decided to discontinue benefits as of
September 2002.96 Interestingly, MetLife seemed to disregard Dr.
Patel’s findings as of the second meeting and based its opinion on his
previous statements that Glenn was able to work. In February 2003,
Glenn again appealed submitting a new report from Dr. Patel, dated
February 12, 2003, that Glenn was unable to work. MetLife referred
Glenn to another doctor who stated that Glenn may be able to work,
but if emotional stress exacerbates her condition then permanent
disability would be appropriate.97 Again, MetLife decided to
terminate benefits based upon a finding that there was some work
that Glenn would be able to perform.98
C.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) permits a person that is denied benefits to challenge the
denial in federal court.99 The plan in which Glenn participated fell
92

Id.
Glenn, 461 F.3d at 664.
94
Id. at 665.
95
Id. at 664-65.
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Id. at 664.
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Id. at 665.
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Id.
99
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). See supra notes 24-26.
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under the jurisdiction of ERISA allowing Glenn to bring suit in a
federal court.
After her requests for benefits were denied by MetLife, Glenn
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio in 2005.100 Glenn sought reinstatement of her
disability benefits under ERISA.101 Both Glenn and MetLife moved
for summary judgment and the court entered judgment in favor of
MetLife.102
In reaching its decision, the court began by establishing the
appropriate standard of review when reviewing an administrator’s
denial of benefits under ERISA.103 The court began by applying
Firestone and determined that the administrator was granted
discretionary authority.104 Under Firestone, if the plan grants the
administrator deferential authority, the denial of benefits is reviewed
under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.105 In
addition to the standard of review, another issue, one that would
eventually be presented to the Supreme Court, was raised in the
District Court: how to factor in the “conflict of interest” which is
present when administrator is both deciding whether an employee is
eligible for benefits and is the one paying the benefits.106 The district
court stated that a conflict of interest is a factor that must be
considered under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.107 In
granting summary judgment for MetLife, the district court stated that
the administrator had not acted “arbitrarily or capriciously” in
denying benefits because there were doctor’s reports that indicated
that Glenn was capable of working.108 Also, the court stated that it
100

Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:2003CV0572, 2005 WL
1364625, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at *3-4.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Glenn, 2005 WL 1364625, at *4.
107
Id.
108
Id. at *7.
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was not arbitrary and capricious to look skeptically on a doctor’s
report that recanted a previous statement.109 Based on this finding,
the court found that there was a reasoned basis for the
administrator’s decision and upheld the denial of benefits.
After being denied benefits by the district court, Glenn
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the
District Court, stating that the decision of the plan administrator was
arbitrary and capricious.110
The Court of Appeals used the
“combination of factors” approach in which a conflict of interest is
considered among many other factors in determining if there is an
abuse of discretion.111 The Court first noted that the District Court
correctly stated that the plan administrator’s conflict of interest was a
factor that should be weighed in its decision, but that the District
Court seemed to disregard this factor by giving it no weight in its
decision.112 The Court of Appeals also noted that the contrary
finding by the Social Security administrator that Glenn was totally
disabled should have been given more weight by the District Court
and plan administrator.113 The Court of Appeals noted that MetLife
used this finding to deduct the benefits it had paid to Glenn, and then
demanded a refund from her which was paid out of her Social
Security benefits.114 The Court of Appeals stated that it was unfair,
and inconsistent for MetLife to then give the Social Security
administrator’s determination no weight in finding that Glenn was
not totally disabled.115 The Court also found that the District Court
did not properly consider all of the medical evidence before it and
the plan administrator’s finding in regard to the medical evidence

109
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Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 674-75 (6th Cir.
2006).
111
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was an abuse of discretion.116 Essentially, the Court found that the
conflict alone was not determinative.117 It accorded it some weight,
but relied on other factors in determining that the plan administrator
abused his discretion.118 Therefore, the Court reversed finding the
decision of the plan administrator “arbitrary and capricious” under
the “combination of factors” test.119
D.

SUPREME COURT DECISION

After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Glenn, MetLife
sought certiorari requesting that the Supreme Court determine if a
plan administrator who is responsible for determining benefits and
paying claims operates under a conflict of interest.120 Upon
suggestion of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court also
considered how any conflict of interest should be taken into account
upon judicial review of a discretionary benefit determination.121
The case was decided on June 19, 2008 and the opinion was
delivered by Justice Breyer, in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Alito joined.122 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment.123 Justice Kennedy also filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.124 Justice
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
Thomas.125
In answering the questions addressed to the Court, the Court
first cited to its decision in Firestone.126 The Court noted that
116
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Id. at 119 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
124
Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Firestone required that the Court analyze the fiduciary’s decision in
light of trust law principles.127 The Court set forth four criteria that a
court must consider under Firestone.128 First, a court should be
guided by principles of trust law. As applicable here, that means that
a court should draw an analogy between a plan administrator and the
trustee of a common-law trust, in which common-law trustees have a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to those in the trust.129 The plan
administrator’s actions must be analyzed in light of the duty of
loyalty. Second, principles of trust law require a court to review a
denial of plan benefits under a de novo standard, unless the plan
provides to the contrary.130 Third, a plan can provide to the contrary
by granting to the administrator a fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine benefits.131 Of course, the administrator is still bound by
the duty of loyalty. If the administrator possesses discretion, the
denial of benefits will be reviewed under a deferential standard.132
Fourth, if a conflict of interest exists, the conflict of interest must be
weighed as a factor in considering whether there has been an abuse
of discretion.133
E.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

In the lower court decisions, the conflict of interest issue was
expressly addressed. First, both the district court and Court of
Appeals agreed that there was a conflict of interest in this case based
on MetLife’s role in both determining and paying benefits. Second,
the District Court and Court of Appeals both agreed as to the
appropriate standard to apply to the facts. Both courts stated that if
there is a conflict of interest, it is to be weighed as a factor in

127
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determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.134
However, the lower courts differed in their application of the
standard. The Court of Appeals stated that the District Court did not
apply any weight to MetLife’s conflict of interest.135 This was an
important factor in the Court of Appeals reversal of the district court
decision.
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court first stated that a
“conflict of interest” does occur when an administrator is responsible
for both determining benefits and paying benefits.136 The Court
noted that the conflict of interest results from the administrator being
torn between fulfilling its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the plan
beneficiaries and protecting the company’s financial interest.137 The
administrator has a duty of loyalty to grant all claims to which the
beneficiaries are entitled.138 But, every dollar paid in benefits comes
out of the administrator’s profits. Therefore, the court reasoned, in
close calls especially, the administrator would be torn between
fulfilling both of these interests.139 The Court also stated, in keeping
with Firestone’s holding of analogizing to trust law principles, that
this was the type of conflict a court would take into account when
reviewing the discretionary acts of a trustee.140
In arguing that the plan administrator was not conflicted,
MetLife raised various arguments. First, MetLife argued that an
employer who creates a plan where the administrator will act in the
dual role of determining and dispensing benefits foresees this
potential conflict, and implicitly approves it.141 The Court disposed
of this argument rather quickly, by analogizing to trust law, stating

134

See supra notes 92-109.
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that even when the settlor knows the trustee is conflicted, the
reviewing court must still take account of the conflict.142
Second, MetLife argues that the court is not required to
follow principles of trust law if it conflicts with the language,
structure, or purpose of the governing statute, in this case ERISA.143
MetLife stated that finding a conflict is inconsistent with the statute’s
objectives because it would result in increased litigation through
complex review proceedings, deter employers from creating plans,
and interfere with employer’s right to administer their own plans in
violation of ERISA.144 Again, the Court dismissed these concerns
rather quickly stating that they were not inconsistent with the
statute.145 The Court noted that trust law “functions well with a
similar standard”, and there was no evidence that the rule adopted by
the Court would have a chilling effect on benefit plans.146
Ultimately, the Court relied on Congress’ desire to offer employees
increased protection for work-related benefits147 to offset the factors
named by MetLife.
The Court did give considerable attention to MetLife’s
argument that the conflict was acceptable because any business has
to make decisions regarding a trade-off between profit and service,
and insurance companies should not be an exception. MetLife
argued that the market, as well as regulators, provides sufficient
checks on MetLife’s handling of discretionary claims.148 If MetLife
were to deny too many claims, it would only be hurting itself as
employers and employees would switch to the service of a different
company. The Court did not explicitly reject this argument;
however, it found that a conflict of interest did exist under ERISA
for several reasons. First, the Court noted that the presumption that
the market will provide a sufficient check is weakened because the
142
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employer purchases the plan instead of the employee.149 The Court
noted that the employer may have incentives to choose the insurer
who provides lower rates by being stingier in granting claims. Thus,
the Court reasoned that the marketplace argument does not work
perfectly in this situation.150 However, the Court ignored the fact that
the employees could leave a company that provided insufficient
benefit plans, so the market argument does still carry some weight
(assuming employees are perfectly informed). However, its force is
reduced because of the difficulty in finding a new job, especially
considering the historically high unemployment rate of 9.6% in late
2010.151 So while the “marketplace argument” is not totally
discredited, its force is significantly undermined by the disconnect
between the employee and the choice of insurer.
Second, the Court noted that “ERISA imposes higher-thanmarketplace quality standards on insurers.”152 The Court cites to
Firestone, which stated that, under 1104(a)(1) of ERISA, that the
administrator must “discharge his duties. . . solely in the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries” of the plan.153 The statute also
requires that a full and fair review be given to all claim denials.154
Also, judicial review of claim denials provides an additional check in
addition to those provided by the marketplace and regulators.155
Here, the Court notes the difference in the duties imposed on the
insurance company regulated under ERISA from the duties imposed
on the normal market participant. Obviously, a normal market
participant does not have to act for the sole interest of his customers
and is free to balance his own interests with those he serves, subject
to the checks placed on his conduct by the market. So while the
149
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market can provide on check on the discretion of the administrator,
under ERISA more is required. The duty to act solely in the interest
of one’s customers goes far beyond the burden placed on any other
unregulated market participant.
Finally, the Court noted that the factors advanced by MetLife
as diminishing the unfairness of any conflict of interest can be taken
under consideration by any reviewing body or court.156 So, a court
can consider any countervailing influences to the administrator’s
desire to act in the financial interest of his company.
The issue considered whether a conflict of interest existed
was not an area of much controversy in the law prior to the case, and
all of the Justices agree that a conflict of interest was present. In
fact, in many cases the employer would be willing to submit that a
conflict of interest existed and contest the appropriate standard of
review. The standard of review was much more unsettled, as
evidenced by the circuit split. That point is addressed next.
F.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Next, the Court addressed the question of how the existence
of a conflict of interest should be taken into account by a court on
review. In answering this question, the Court relied on a statement
set forth in Firestone: “[A] conflict should be weighed as a ‘factor in
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’”157 The
Court stated it did not want to overrule Firestone, and Court
reaffirmed Firestone’s reliance upon trust law principles.158 The
court stated that Firestone simply restated established trust law
principals in affirming a deferential standard of review to an
administrator who is given discretion.159 The Court stated that under
current trust law, a “deferential standard is applied to the
discretionary decision-making of a conflicted trustee, while at the
same time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the
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conflict when determining whether the trustee, substantively or
procedurally, has abused his discretion.”160
The Court declined any invitation to adopt a de novo standard
of review to any administrator given discretion, stating that it would
be inappropriate for several reasons.161 First, the Court noted that
many ERISA plans that require the administrator to assess payments
and provide payment grant discretionary authority to the
administrator.162 Since most claim denials occur under these types of
plans, the court thought it unwise and unmanageable for reviewing
courts to look at all of these claims de novo.163 Second, the Court
stated that Congress made no mention of any standard of review in
enacting the ERISA legislation.164 The Court reasoned that if
Congress wanted a specific standard of review, it would have
specifically stated it in the legislation.165 Because a de novo standard
creates a greater burden on any reviewing court, the Court seems to
be implying that Congress would have stated its desire for de novo
review had it wanted one.
Next, the Court appears to reject the “presumptively void”
test, stating that there is no need for the creation of “special burden
of proof rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules”.166
The Court stated that this is a very fact sensitive inquiry because of
the differences likely to be present in most situations, and the
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the standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review.”
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115.
162
Id. at 116.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 116. The Court never makes no reference to the
“presumptively void” test or cites to any of the cases which hold
follow it. But, the Court’s statement that there is no need for any
strict rules or rebuttable presumptions leaves little is a strong
indication that the “presumptively void” test is no longer valid.
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presence of a conflict is just one factor to be weighed.167 The Court
stated that if the insurer had taken steps to prevent the conflict of
interest from playing a role in the administrator’s decision, then this
factor may not play much of a role in the reviewing court’s
determination.168 Examples of this would be making sure those
determining the validity of claims had no incentives to consider the
firm’s interest in making a profit.169
The Court concludes by stating, essentially, that because
there are so many factors that play a role in determining whether an
administrator’s judgment is fair, it is impossible to articulate a
precise standard.170 The Court states that a rigid standard or
procedure would improvidently restrict court’s discretion in dealing
with many different factual scenarios.171 Essentially the Court is
acknowledging that no standard can substitute for the process of
judgment. Ultimately, the conflict of interest must be considered
along with any other relevant factors (i.e. whether the Social Security
administrator had a complete record in front of him at the time the
decision was made or whether MetLife took steps so that its
administrator would not be inclined to consider the firm’s profits
during his decision making process) to determine if the administrator
abused his discretion.172 The court acknowledged that this standard
“did not consist of a detailed set of instructions” in keeping with its
position that the creation of such a standard would be unwise.173 The
Court acknowledges the limits of these standards in that they can
167

Glenn, 554 U.S. at 117.
Id.
169
One solution is to pay the administrator a fixed salary that is
not dependent on the firm’s profit or the administrator’s record in
denying or approving claims.
170
Id. at 117. (The Court noted it had not articulated a precise
standard and stated that it is not wise to create formulas that will
“falsify the actual process of judging.” “There are no talismanic
words that can avoid the process of a judgment.” Id. at 119.)
171
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 116.
172
Id. at 117.
173
Id. at 119.
168
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restrict a judge’s inquiry because they are incapable of allowing a
judge to take account of all relevant factors all of the time.174
Ultimately, the Supreme Court holds that a court should review a
denial of benefits by an administrator given discretion under an
abuse of discretion standard, and that any conflict of interest must be
taken into account, but leaves the amount of weight it carries up to
the reviewing court.175 Additionally, the Court rejected the argument
that there is a change in the standard of review from deferential to de
novo.176 The weight the conflict is given will be a fact sensitive
inquiry, depending upon how much the court determines that the
conflict factored into the decision.
G.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS CONCURRENCE

Chief Justice Roberts agrees that an insurer who both
determines benefits and pays claims has a conflict of interest that is
“pertinent” in reviewing claims decisions.177 However, Chief Justice
Roberts disagrees with the majority as to how much it should matter.
Chief Justice Roberts believes that the presence of a conflict of
interest should only be considered if there is evidence suggesting the
conflict affected the administrator’s decision.178 Under this standard,
the court would be looking to see if an “improper motive” played a
role the administrator’s denial of benefits, not just to the potential for
an improper motive. 179
Chief Justice Roberts is worried that the majority standard
will prove to be too unpredictable because of the amount of

174

Id. at 116
Id. at 117-18.
176
Id. at 115..
177
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 119-26. (Roberts, C.J. concurring in all but
Part IV and concurring in the judgment). Part IV of the Opinion
discussed how a conflict of interest should be factored into the
review of a claim decision.
178
Id. at 119-20.
179
Id. at 122-23.
175

216

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

discretion it gives to a reviewing court. 180 Chief Justice Roberts
worries that the majority standard will simply act to substitute
judicial discretion for that of the administrator. This is even more
worrisome to him because the judge is removed from the actual
proceedings and is given a large amount of discretion.181 He notes
that important criteria of ERISA were predictability and certainty
and he explains that the Court’s indeterminate standard strays from
these policy goals.182 He believes that because the conflict of interest
is not given a definitive weight the law is left in an uncertain state.
Chief Justice Roberts reasons that this will lead to fewer companies
deciding to create employee benefits plans because the companies
will be unsure about the law and the potential costs of liability.183
For Chief Justice Roberts, the increase in costs (in terms of
uncertainty) does not outweigh any benefits that stem from increased
judicial flexibility.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts would uphold the decision
of the Court of Appeals.184 Even though he does not believe there is
any evidence that the conflict of interest played a role in the
administrator’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts believes that the plan
administrator still abused his discretion.185 He states that the
administrator’s inconsistent position in regard to the Social Security
determinations and the lack of consideration to doctor’s reports
stating that Glenn should not work and its failure to provide its own
experts with certain doctor’s testimony are all evidence of an abuse
of discretion—but not evidence that a improper financial interest
played a role in the administrator’s decision.186 For this reason, Chief
Justice Roberts states that the decision of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed.

180

Id. at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
182
Id. at 122.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 125.
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Id. at 124-25.
186
Id. at 123-24.
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JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE.

Kennedy believes that the majority has correctly applied the
Firestone decision and that framework set out by the Court is
workable.187 Kennedy states that the framework set out by the Court
will not undermine the control of dual-role administrators over the
employee benefit plans because the conflict of interest will not be
considered by the court if the insurer takes the appropriate
safeguards.188
Because the administrators retain control, the
incentive system for the creation of these plans will not be altered
much.
Kennedy believes the case should have been remanded to the
Court of Appeals because the Court stated that the conflict of interest
can vanish as a factor to be considered if the insurer can show it put
in place safeguards so that the administrator would not consider the
financial interests of his employer.189 Because MetLife was unaware
of this, it did not present any evidence that it put in place the
appropriate safeguards.190 Kennedy states that it is unfair to MetLife
to have expected it to put forth evidence regarding any safeguards
because it had no notice of the relevance of those safeguards.191 For
those reasons, Justice Kennedy would remand the decision to the
Court of Appeals.

I.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT

Scalia begins by stating that he agrees that a conflict of
interest exists because the plan administrator pays benefits out of its
187

Glenn, 554 U.S. at 125-27. (Kennedy, J. concurring in all but
Part IV of the Court’s opinion and dissenting in part).
188
Id. at 125-26.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 126.
191
Id.
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own coffers.192 After that, he parts ways with the majority stating
that he is in “fundamental disagreement” with the majority
approach.193 His dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, addresses several
points.
First, he states that the majority approach is too
unpredictable.194 Scalia states that the majority approach makes each
case unique because any number of different factors must be
considered and weighed, depending upon the circumstances.195 In
addition, each factor can be different weights from case to case,
making ruling unpredictable.196
Second, Scalia believes that the conflict should not be
considered unless there is evidence to indicate that the conflict of
interest improperly motivated the administrator’s decision.197 He
states that the part of the Firestone opinion stating that a conflict
must be considered as a factor when an administrator is vested with
discretion is “sheer dictum” because the administrator in Firestone
was not conflicted.198 Therefore, the court never had the opportunity
to consider the standard of review for an administrator with
discretion.199 While he does believe the Court must be guided
principles of trust law, Scalia believes that the Court has misapplied
trust law in an effort to reconcile the Restatement with the dictum in
Firestone.200 Accordingly, Scalia would adopt the entirety of the
Restatement “and its clear guidelines for judicial review.”201 Abuse
of discretion, as he interprets it, refers to four distinct (emphasis
added) failures; the trustee acted dishonestly; he acted with some
192

Glenn, 554 U.S. at 127-134 (Scalia, J., with whom Thomas, J.,
joins, dissenting).
193
Id. at 127.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 127-28.
198
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 128.
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Id.
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Id. at 129.
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other improper motive; he failed to use judgment; or he acted beyond
the bounds of a reasonable judgment.202 Scalia emphasizes that these
are distinct and separate abuses, and so should be considered
separately in contrast to the majority opinion which allows all
relevant factors to be considered and weighed at once.203 Scalia takes
issue with the majority’s approach of simply taking a conflict under
consideration with all factors and giving it varying amount of
discretion depending upon the facts.204 He believes it to be too
unpredictable and “opaque”.205 His solution, adoption of the
Restatement, requires the four distinct abuses to be weighed
separately206—not “chucked into a brown paper bag and shaken up to
determine the answer”.207 This certainly clarifies how the judge
reached his decision—over time this would likely lead to increased
predictability. Essentially, Scalia is arguing for limiting the judge’s
discretion and increased disclosure on how the judge reached his
decision.
As a final point, Scalia argues that a conflict should not be
considered unless there is evidence that the trustee acted with an
improper motive.208 If a trustee makes a reasonable decision, then it
should not be overturned because of the presence of a conflict of
interest, even if the court believes a better decision could have been
made.209 Scalia is worried that a trustee will avoid a decision that he
believes to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries because it may
appear that the conflict affected his decision, and choose a decision
202

Id. at 131. A trustee abuses his discretion by acting on an
improper motive when he acts ‘from a motive other than to further
the purposes of the trust’. Improper motives include ‘spite or
prejudice or to further some interest of his own other than that of the
beneficiary.’ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 (2003).
203
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 131-32.
204
Id. at 129-30.
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Id.
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Id. at 129.
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Glenn, 554 U.S. at 129.
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that looks less self-serving.210 Accordingly, he states “there are no
gradations
of
reasonableness…[r]easonable
is
reasonable…[g]radating reasonableness, and making it a ‘factor’ in
the improper motive determination will have the precise effect of
eliminating the discretion the settler has intentionally conferred upon
the trustee.”211 Scalia is apparently worried that the majority’s
standard will restrict the administrator’s discretion to the detriment
of the beneficiaries because it gives so much leeway to the reviewing
court.212
IV.

CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES FOLLOWING GLENN

Following MetLife, almost every Circuit has addressed the
question of how to apply the ruling in the MetLife case. Overall, it
appears the ruling has produced greater uniformity among the Courts
than prior to the decision. Still, there is certainly a considerable
amount of uncertainty among several of the Circuit as to exactly how
the ruling should be applied.
All Circuit Courts to consider the matter have applied a
combination-of-factors type of review after Glenn, even they do not
explicitly call it that in their opinion.213 In this regard, there is little
210

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
212
Id. at 128-30. (Earlier in his dissent, Scalia referred to the
majority’s standard as “de novo review in sheep’s clothing.” Id. at
130.).
213
See Crowell v. Shell Oil. Co., 541 F. 3d. 295, 312 (5th Cir.
2008) (“…we [must] ‘take account of several different
considerations, of which a conflict of interest is one’”); Estate of
Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a court must “consider a conflict of interest as one of several
factors in determining whether an administrator of fiduciary abused
his discretion”); Wakkinen v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 531 F. 3d
575, 581 (8th Cir. 2008) (“any one factor will be considered as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced” (citing Glenn,
128 S. Ct at 2350). Holcomb v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of
211
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conflict that a conflict of interest is factor that must be weighed
among any other relevant factors to determine if there is an abuse of
discretion. The main source of controversy is how the conflict is to
be weighed by the judge. That matter is addressed next.
While the circuit court approaches in regard to the standard of
review are not identical after Glenn, there does seem to be much
more uniformity. Glenn held that when a conflict is present, there is
no change in the standard of review from deferential to de novo;
rather a conflict should be considered as a relevant factor and given
more weight depending upon the circumstances.214 From this, almost
all circuits have concluded that a heightened review when a conflict
is present would be incompatible with Glenn.215 The sliding scale
Amer., 578 F. 3d. 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Glenn embraces a
‘combination-of-factors method of review’ that allows judges to
‘take account of several different, often case-specific factors.’”(citing
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2351)); Carden v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 559 F. 3d
256,260 (4th Cir. 2009). (“a conflict just becomes one of the
‘several different, often case-specific factors’ to be weighed together
to determine if the administrator abused his discretion” (citing Glenn,
128 S. Ct. at 2351)).
214
See supra notes 168-74.
215
See Holland v. Int’l Paper Co.576 F. 3d. 240, 248 (5th Cir.
2009) (stating that Glenn directly repudiated the application of any
form of heightened review when a conflict of interest is present).
See also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co. 458 F. 3d 955, 967
(9th Cir. 2006) (claiming their approach was a “conscious rejection”
of the sliding scale approach); Estate of Schwing v. The Lilly Health
Plan, 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that “in light of Glenn, our
‘sliding scale’ approach is no longer valid); Champion v. Black &
Decker Inc., 550 F. 3d 353, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2008); (holding that
after Glenn, “the consequence of this finding [of a conflict of
interest] is not to modify the standard of review, but rather to
consider the conflict as but one among factors in determining the
reasonableness of the plan’s discretionary determination”); Doyle v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F. 3d. 1352, 1359-60
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Glenn implicitly overrules and
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approach requires a court to adjust the level of deference depending
upon how much the conflict factored into the decision, and Glenn
requires a court to adjust the amount of weight given to the conflict
while maintaining an abuse of discretion review. Therefore, almost
all circuit courts to consider the issue have found the sliding scale
approach incompatible with Glenn. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have all found the sliding scale approach
incompatible with the standard in Glenn because it requires a
heightened standard of review.216
The Ninth Circuit “consciously rejected” the sliding scale
approach in Abatie,217 which was decided before Glenn. In Montour,
the Ninth Circuit stated that it has employed the Glenn standard by
using an abuse of discretion review, and including a conflict of
interest as a factor to be weighed.218 It then adjusts the weight of the
conflict depending upon the circumstances.219 After stating that it has
rejected the sliding scale approach, the court stated that it will adjust
the level of skepticism it applies depending upon the facts, including
how much a conflict may have tainted an administrator’s decision.220
The increased level of skepticism sounds very similar to a heightened
standard, which most circuits agree is not compatible with Glenn. It
also sounds similar to a sliding scale approach, which the Ninth
Circuit rejected in Abatie. Ultimately, it is difficult to reconcile a
purported rejection of the sliding scale approach with using varying

conflicts with [their] precedent to the extent that it requires district
courts to review benefit determinations by a conflicted administrator
under a heightened standard of review); Wakkinen v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 531 F. 3d 575, 581 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the existence of
a conflict did not lead the court to…a change in the standard of
review).
216
See supra note 214.
217
Abatie, 458 F. 3d at 967.
218
See Montour v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 588 F. 3d
623, 632 (9th Cir. 2009).
219
Id.
220
Id.
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amounts of skepticism dependent on the presence of a conflict. It
remains to be seen how this will be resolved.
The Tenth Circuit found that the sliding scale approach
mirrored the Supreme Court’s approach in Glenn.221 The Tenth
Circuit stated that the conflict of interest must be incorporated as a
factor to be weighed upon review.222 The court found that the best
way to incorporate the conflict of interest factor is a sliding scale
approach where the court will always review under an arbitrary and
capricious standard, but decrease or increase the level of deference in
proportion to the seriousness of the conflict.223 This is certainly in
direct opposition to the approach taken by the other circuits, and
seems to contradict with Glenn’s language of not changing the
standard of review.
In Doyle, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Glenn standard by
stating that a heightened review was not compatible with Glenn.224 It
then rejected arguments that, after Glenn, a court must give greater
weight to the existence of a conflict if there is no evidence the
administrator put safeguards in place to assure accurate claim
assessment.225 The court also rejected arguments that the burden was
on the administrator to bring forth evidence of safeguards—such that
if the administrator brought forth no evidence, this would weigh
against them in the test.226 The Court rejected these arguments “as
the type burden shifting rule the Glenn court rejects.”227 The Court
stated that if there is no evidence regarding safeguards, then the court
should simply focus on other factors—not hold it against the
administrator.228 The court also rejected an argument that the conflict
221

Weber v. GE Life Assurance Co., 541 F. 3d. 1002, 1010-11
(10th Cir. 2008).
222
Id. at 1010.
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Id. at 1010-11.
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1352, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2008).
225
Id. at 1362.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.

224

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

should be given greater weight when an administrator places greater
weight on medical evidence denying a disability than those affirming
a disability.229 The court simply stated that an administrator’s
preference for “objective medical evidence” did not entitle the
beneficiary to a higher standard of review.230 This ruling is
consistent with Glenn’s holding that there is no need to establish any
type of burden shifting rules.
The Seventh Circuit has struggled with the application of the
standard of review after Glenn. Initially, the Seventh Circuit seemed
to adopt the combination of factors test in Glenn.231 Then, in Marrs,
the Court took a step back and noted that “there are two ways to read
the majority opinion.”232 One is a combination of factors approach
which has been adopted by several of the other circuits, including
apparently, the Seventh Circuit. There a conflict is considered and
weighed among many other factors, depending upon the
circumstances of the case. However, the Judge Posner, in writing the
opinion, expressed discomfort with this standard, stating that it
“sounds like a balancing test which unweighted factors are
mysteriously weighed…[s]uch a test is not conducive to providing
guidance to courts or plan administrators.”233 The Seventh Circuit
then stated that this “rudderless balancing test did not have to be the
final word” on the standard that should be applied by [courts and
plan administrators].234 Accordingly, the court devised a more
“directive” approach in which a reviewing court looks to the
“gravity” of the conflict, and the likelihood it influenced the
administrator’s decision—not just the presence of a conflict as the
Supreme Court seemed to require.235 The “gravity” of the conflict is
inferred from the circumstances of the case, including the
229
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See Doyle, 542 F. 3d. at 1362.
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Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564
F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2009).
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reasonableness of the administrator’s procedures and any safeguards
set up by an employer.236 The main modification of the test in this
case is the focus on the “gravity” of the conflict instead of its bare
existence. The Seventh Circuit is clearly uncomfortable with the
Glenn test because it does not assign a specific weight to factors or
even state what factors must be considered. To remedy this, it
focuses on the things that are easier to quantify, like “safeguards”
and “administrative procedure” to determine the weight of the
conflict. This still gives a lot of discretion to the reviewing court, but
the focus on specific factors will seem to force more disclosure
remedying some of the “mystery” the Seventh Circuit found
unsettling in the Glenn test.
The First Circuit stated that a combination-of-factors-test is
the appropriate test after Glenn, and also slightly modified its
approach after Glenn.237 Previously, it had used an approach where a
court could disregard a conflict of interest without more based on the
market forces approach. If a conflict of interest was present without
more, it could be disregarded based on the theory that market forces
would restrain the administrator from abusing his power. The court
based this on the rationale that an employer would not contract with
an insurer with a “reputation for miserliness.” If it did, the employer
would risk losing employees. After Glenn, the First Circuit noted
that a conflict must be given some weight regardless of the present of
“market forces.”238 Overall, the Glenn ruling has resulted in a greater
uniformity of approaches by the circuit courts. But, as stated above,
differences still persist. The standard in Glenn does not provide
much guidance as to how exactly a court should consider and weigh
the many factors it takes into account upon review, and this is largely
the reason why different approaches live on.
V.

ANALYSIS
236

Id.
Denmark v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 566 F. 3d
1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009). (holding that the combination-of-factors test was
the appropriate test after Glenn).
238
Id. at 9.
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Metropolitan Life v. Glenn represents a battle between two
approaches to judicial review: The first approach states that judges
should be given a large amount of flexibility in making a decision so
that they can take account of all relevant factors in each individual
case. Attempting to delineate a precise standard will result in an
unnecessary limit on judge's discretion because no standard can
possibly account for all possible scenarios. On the other hand, an
imprecise and vague standard gives judge’s far too much discretion
and makes it difficult to understand their decisions. This decreases
predictability, which leads the dissent to advocate a more predictable
and open standard which makes it easier to understand judge’s
decisions.
As stated above, one of the central purposes of enacting
ERISA was to increase predictability and uniformity239, and the
decision in Glenn should be evaluated against this backdrop. In this
regard, the decision certainly makes the law more predictable, as the
circuit courts approach is more uniform than it was pre-Glenn. All
circuit courts to consider the matter use a combination-of-factors
type of review.240 Almost all circuits, aside from the Tenth, now
agree that heightened scrutiny is not compatible with Glenn.241 So,
while some differences remain, it is clear the Glenn decision has
moved the circuit courts into adopting a more uniform approach, and
hence more predictable approach.
While the approach is more predictable, individual outcomes
are not. Could the decision-making process could be made more
predictable? Probably, and this could be done by adopting a more
uniform, albeit less flexible standard as Scalia argues in his dissent.242
Adoption of the Restatement on this matter would provide a more
predictable approach because: 1) it provides less flexibility to judges;
and 2) a conflict is only considered if there is evidence that the
conflict actually resulted in the decision being made by an improper
239
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motive, i.e. consideration of the plan administrator’s financial
interest. This is same point on which the seventh circuit struggled in
Marrs.243 It was clearly uncomfortable with factors being given an
indeterminate weight and then being “mysteriously weighed.” If the
Supreme Court had accorded specific weights to a number of factors,
in say, a multi-factor balancing test it would likely have increased
disclosure by judges, while at the same time limiting their discretion.
And this would of course increase predictability because it would be
easier to tell how most judges made their decisions.
But another goal of ERISA was to provide increased
protection to employees, and on balance, it seems that the Supreme
Court’s test does comport with this statutory goal. By providing
increased flexibility to judges, the Supreme Court allows judges to
take account of any factors that may have affected an administrator’s
determination. Also, because it may be difficult to prove a conflict
affected an administrator’s decision, allowing a court to take account
of the bare existence of a conflict certainly protects employees.
Scalia would not overturn any decision that is reasonable244, but as
the seventh circuit noted, both a decision in favor of and in denial of
benefits, may be reasonable, and so the administrator’s unconscious
bias may push him to deny the benefits.245 Because evidence that the
conflict actually affected the decision may be difficult to obtain,
allowing consideration of the conflict increases employee protection.
On the other hand, the decreased predictability of this standard may
result in the creation of fewer employee benefit plans.
Overall, the majority approach, concurrence by Chief Justice
Roberts, and the dissent by Scalia all seem to seek the goal of
benefiting plan beneficiaries. They simply disagree on how to do so.
The majority opinion would give judge’s increased flexibility to take
a conflict of interest into account—this helps beneficiaries because
any conflict will always be allowed to be taken into account by the
judge and any conflict will weigh in favor of the beneficiary. But
Chief Justice Roberts worries that the increased uncertainty resulting
243

Marrs, 577 F. 3d 783.
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from the indeterminate weight given to the conflict will lead to the
creation of less employee benefit plans. He understands that
increased unpredictability is equivalent to increased risk and
therefore, increased costs.246 If one assumes that employers are risk
averse, this is an economically sensible analysis. If they are risk
averse, employers will dislike the possibility of a ruling against them
more than they will like the possibility of a ruling for them.
Essentially, the argument is that employers would prefer have an
exact standard to taking a 50-50 chance where they could end up
better or worse off. If employers are risk-averse, and the majority
standard leads to increased unpredictability, then Chief Justice
Roberts may be correct that less employee benefit plans will be
created. Scalia’s dissent also seeks increased predictability, which as
explained above, would help promote the creation of employee
benefit plans or at least maintain the current number of employee
benefit plans.
Finally, the prevalence of the benefit plans at issue has
grown rapidly. As stated earlier there are currently about 131 million
Americans enrolled in employee benefit plans. 247Of course, these
leads to a multitude of factual scenarios that must be considered
upon review by judges. In this regard, the flexible standard stated by
the majority is the better standard. As the majority recognized, no
standard can take account of all relevant factors, and so it is better to
allow judges flexibility in making this determination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the majority decision was the correct decision.
The flexibility it provides to a reviewing court that is forced to take
account of a wide range of factual scenarios combined with the
protection it provides to employees by allowing a conflict to be taken
into account regardless of whether evidence can be produced
246

If one does not accept the proposition that increased
uncertainty to employers is equivalent to increased costs, then the
analysis is not compelling.
247
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outweigh the increased predictability of a more rigid standard.
Because the majority approach seems to better reflect the reality that
benefit decisions are very complicated and the reality that evidence
proving a conflict provided an improper motive is difficult to obtain,
it is on balance the better approach.

FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS:
INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CONCERNS
Esteban Carranza-Kopper*

***
During the past decades, there have been multiple discussions on
the issue of fronting arrangements. In general terms, a fronting
arrangement can be considered as an alternative risk transfer method
(ART)1 where an insurer licensed in a certain jurisdiction (fronting insurer)
issues a policy to cover local risks but all or virtually all of such risks are
then ceded or reinsured with an unlicensed carrier (reinsurer), who will
normally take over the administration of all claims related to the risks.2 In
exchange for its services, the fronting company normally receives a small
percentage of the total premium.3 It can be said, therefore, that the fronting
company issues a policy and appears to the world to be an insurer, but in
reality it has actually passed on to a given reinsurer most or all of the risk
of coverage4 and most claim-handling obligations.
The debate surrounding this practice has focused on multiple
subjects, such as whether the fronting practice is a way to circumvent state
statutes,5 whether the fronting practice is good or bad when analyzed from
the perspective of the policyholder6, the regulators,7 or the industry,8 and
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See Thomas Holzheu, Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) Products, in Reinsurance:
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2
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000).
3
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 1017 (4th ed. 2007).
4
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160 (2008).
5
See, e.g., Salvatore R. Curiale, The Dark Side of Fronting, RISK
MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1991, at 26-27.
6
See, e.g., Fred A. Simpson, When Fronting Carriers Fail, Equity Protects
Policyholders, 8 J. TEX. INS. L. 2 (2006).
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also whether the practice should be banned or further regulated. As will be
examined in this article, some regulatory attempts relating to the fronting
practice have been discussed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC),9 while certain jurisdictions have gone beyond the
attempt and have actually enacted statutory provisions on this matter. In
addition, there is case law examining this practice and recent rulings are
worthy of thought.
Given the above considerations, this article seeks to provide a
thorough analysis of this practice, the motivations for companies to support
it, as well as its negative aspects and associated risks. This article will also
examine regulatory reactions, statutes, and recent case law dealing with
the subject of fronting.

***
I.

INTRODUCTION TO FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS
A.

DIVERSITY OF DEFINITIONS

As noted above, the practice of fronting involves an insurance
company that issues a policy, which is then completely reinsured with a
reinsurance carrier. This reinsurance carrier is usually unlicensed in the
jurisdiction of interest. Notwithstanding some approaches to reach a
definition of fronting and although most regulators would agree that
fronting includes a cession of an entire line or class of insurance to an
unlicensed carrier who controls the underwriting and claims decisions,
there is no common definition among the states or within the industry.10
Moreover, one could validly argue that this practice has the characteristics
of a “chameleon”, because fronting may take different forms and
appearances depending on the specific motivation for its use.

7

See, e.g., NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, FRONTING QUESTION PRESENTED: LEGAL
OPINION, (Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2005/rg050111.htm.
8
See, e.g., Howard W. Greene & Jon Harkavy, Fronting is a Consumer Right,
RISK MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1991.
9
See Vincent J. Vitkowsky & John L. Ingersoll, Survey of 1992 Developments
in the Public Regulation of Insurance, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 408, 408 (1993).
10
See NAC Reinsurance Corp., Reinsurance Contracts: Content and
Regulation 33 (1991) (unpublished material, available from NAC Reinsurance
Corp., One Greenwich Plaza, Greenwich, CT 06836).
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For example, fronting arrangements can be used to insure risks that
a company cannot write directly.11 When fronting is used to write business
directly in a state where a given insurer is not licensed, it has been
described by a Court as an arrangement through which a state-licensed
insurance company issues certain policies, which are immediately reinsured
to 100 percent of their face value by an out-of-state unlicensed insurer.12
Such Court explained:
In a fronting arrangement - a well-established and perfectly
legal scheme -policies are issued by a state-licensed
insurance company and then immediately reinsured to 100
percent of their face value by the out-of-state, unlicensed
insurer. In a typical fronting arrangement, the fronting
insurer issues policies on its own paper and in its own
name, and the out-of-state unlicensed insurer takes over the
administration of all claims as part of the reinsurance
agreement13.
When a fronting arrangement is used for self-insurance purposes, a
Court described the fronting policy as "a form of self-insurance in which
the deductible is identical to the limits of liability, and the insurance
company acts only as surety that the holder of the fronting policy will be
able to pay any judgment covered by the policy.”14 On a more aggressive
court approach, it has been said that “[i]n a fronting policy, the insured
essentially rents an insurance company's licensing and filing capabilities,
but the insurance company does not actually pay any claims.”15 In this
sense, by using fronting as a self-insurance mechanism, an insured can
retain all of the risks originally covered by the fronting policy.16
Focusing on self-insurance and the captive17 market, it has been
said that fronting denotes a practice whereby “a commercial insurance
11

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3.
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000).
13
Id.
14
Landers v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Nos. 81506, 81531, 2003 WL
21468908, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2003).
15
Dorsey v. Fed. Ins. Co., 798 N.E.2d 47, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
16
Tharp v. Berdanier, No. CIV.A. 21473, 2003 WL 22900646, at *4 n.3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003).
17
A captive insurance company can be defined as a “company formed to
insure the risks of its parent corporation.” HARVEY W. RUBIN, DICTIONARY OF
INSURANCE TERMS 70 (5th ed, 2008).
12

230

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

company ("fronting company") licensed in the state where a risk to be
insured is located, issues its policy to the insured,” and such risk is then
fully transferred to a captive insurance company.18 Consequently, the
insured obtains a policy issued on the paper of the commercial insurance
company, but, economically, the risk of that coverage resides with the
captive insurance company.19
Some authors conceptualize fronting as a specialized form of
reinsurance.20 While by examining common definitions of reinsurance,21
the motivations for its use,22 and its usual purposes23 one could think of
valid arguments against such conceptualization, it is difficult to
differentiate between fronting and traditional reinsurance practices.24 Even
18

See John Prescott & Deborah Lambert, What’s Up Front: A Guide to
Fronting Arrangements, Mar. 1 2002, http://www.captive.com/newsstand/
jlcovt/Fronting.html.
19
Id.
20
Holzheu, supra note 1, at 116 n.2. See also Prescott & Lambert, supra note
18.
21
Reinsurance is normally defined as “insurance for insurance companies.”
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. It can be defined as “the transaction whereby
the assuming insurer in consideration of premium paid, agrees to indemnify the
ceding company against all or part of the loss which the latter may sustain under
the policy or policies which it has issued.” See REINSURANCE ASS’N OF AMERICA,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY AND CASUALTY REINSURANCE 47 (2008).
22
It is argued that the “fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk
so that no single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its
ability to pay, is enhanced by reinsurance”. NAC Reinsurance Corp., supra note
10, at 1. In the same sense, “[r]einsurance is a mechanism used by the insurance
industry to spread the risks it assumes from policyholders. Through it, the
industry's losses are absorbed and distributed among a group of companies so that
no single company is overburdened with the financial responsibility of offering
coverage to its policyholders.” Donald A. McIsaac & David F. Babbel, The World
Bank Primer on Reinsurance 1 (World Bank Fin. Sector Dev. Dep’t, Working
Paper No. 1512, 1995).
23
Normal motivations for reinsurance reside in the fact that reinsurance can
increase an insurer´s underwriting capacity, stabilize its profits from fluctuations,
reduce unearned premium reserves, and provide protection against catastrophic
losses. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE
116 (10th ed. 2008). From an economic perspective, one of the most important
functions of reinsurance is the insurer’s ability to take balance sheet credit for the
amount of reinsurance coverage protection it holds. Deirdre G. Johnson, Unlocking
the Mysteries of Reinsurance, 760 PRACTISING L. INST. 243, 255 (2007).
24
See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8.
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though customary reinsurance definitions normally recognize the
possibility that an insurer could potentially transfer “all” of the risk under a
given policy,25 one could argue that the fronting practice in principle does
not seem to fit with the objectives, types, and purposes of reinsurance as to
qualify as a specialized form of reinsurance. For example, fronting does not
seem to pursue spreading risks within a given mass but actually involves
the full transfer of a set risks to a reinsurer, who seems to act more like an
insurer and less like a reinsurer. Moreover, fronting normally involves the
transfer of claim handling obligations, which in traditional reinsurance are
normally held by the underlying insurer.26
As noted above, one of the uses of fronting arrangements is to
permit a reinsurer to write coverage that it cannot do directly.27 Therefore,
in this author´s opinion and for the purposes of this article, fronting will be
considered as an arrangement that uses reinsurance as its transfer vehicle28
and, therefore, as one of its components, but not necessarily constituting by
itself a specialized form of reinsurance.
Aside from the situation described above, there is another practice
that has been conceptualized as fronting reinsurance. “[F]ronting
arrangements devised by direct insurers and reinsurers have been replicated
by reinsurers and retrocessionaires” in the higher layers of coverage.29
Unlicensed or unaccredited reinsurers may turn to other reinsurers to serve
as fronts for reinsurance contracts in order to meet solvency, security or
other statutory requirements,30 thereby enabling the underlying insurer to
obtain credit for the reinsurance coverage. When agreement is reached, the
fronting reinsurer will issue the required reinsurance and will retrocede all
or a significant portion of the risk to the unlicensed or unaccredited

25

See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3; REINSURANCE ASS’N OF
AMERICA, supra note 21.
26
See Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 Conn. Ins.
L.J. 345, 372 (2009).
27
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3.
28
In this sense, fronting has been defined as “arrangements by which an
insurer, for a specified fee or premium, issues its policies to cover certain risks
underwritten or otherwise managed by another insurer or reinsurer. The insurer
then transfers all, or substantially all, of the liabilities thereunder to such insurers
by means of reinsurance”. REINSURANCE ASS’N OF AMERICA, supra note 21, at 31
(emphasis added).
29
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE 1-25 (2d ed. 2000).
30
Id.
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carrier.31 Fronting practices at these layers of coverage can enable an
unlicensed or unaccredited alien reinsurer to effectively provide coverage
without having to comply with the trust fund requirements that are
customary for unlicensed alien reinsurers. This situation was explained by a
federal court in New York when analyzing a case where a carrier acted as a
front for a reinsurance syndicate from London.32 The court explained:
Plaintiff ASRIC is an insurance company organized under
Delaware law . . . Elkhorn/Delta was a member of a
reinsurance syndicate in London managed by Stetzel
Thomson & Co. Ltd. . . . Elkhorn/Delta was one of twentytwo members of this syndicate and the only member
incorporated in the United States . . . According to ASRIC,
because Elkhorn/Delta was the only member incorporated
in the United States, Stetzel designated Elkhorn/Delta as
the “fronting” company for the syndicate . . . Under the law
of Delaware, ASRIC's state of incorporation, an insurer
will receive reinsurance credit only if the reinsurer is
licensed to transact insurance in Delaware or in another
state with comparable standards of insolvency for
insurance companies. If the reinsurer is an unincorporated
alien insurer, the reinsured can obtain reinsurance credit
only if the reinsurer establishes a trust fund here for the
benefit of the reinsured.” Because most states have
comparable standards, the fronting arrangement allowed
ASRIC to obtain a reinsurance credit for all the risks ceded
to Elkhorn/Delta, without the other members of the
syndicate having to post security in the United States.33
Considering the various uses and forms of fronting, the
development of a precise definition is not a simple task. Moreover, the
definition that a given jurisdiction may adopt would probably depend on
the specific concerns that such jurisdiction may find in the practice of
fronting. Nevertheless, by examining the common elements of its various
uses, the author of this article considers that a definition of fronting could
be proposed as follows:
31

Id.
Id.
33
American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta America Re Ins. Co., 836 F. Supp.
183, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y., 1993).
32
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Fronting describes a series of alternative risk-transfer
methods that share the following common elements: a) the
presence of a company (fronting company) that issues an
insurance or reinsurance policy, which is then completely
or substantially ceded to a carrier (assuming carrier), b) the
assuming carrier is normally unlicensed or unaccredited in
the jurisdiction where the fronting company is licensed or
accredited, c) the assuming carrier normally controls the
underwriting and claims decisions of the respective policy
or policies.
B.

PURPOSES AND MOTIVATIONS.

Considering the variety of definitions and uses of fronting
arrangements, it is reasonable to infer that these risk-transfer schemes can
respond to various purposes and motivations, which depend on the specific
business of a given company or group of companies. In general terms, it
can be said that fronting arrangements may respond to one or more of the
following motivations:
* For Licensing Purposes: By means of a fronting arrangement, a
carrier is enabled to write coverage that it cannot do directly34 by using the
services of a fronting company that is licensed in the state of interest. Such
a risk-transfer method may be used where the insurer is not licensed to
write business or a specific line of insurance in a particular state, and where
the specific - and sometimes multi-state - insurance program would require
such licensure35.
A fronting program may permit an insurer to write national
programs during the time its’ state licenses are being processed.36 It may
also be an appropriate tool when “statutory prohibitions serve to undercut
an insurer's longstanding relationship with its insured.”37 Needless to say,
this licensing motivation is normally subject to strong criticism by state

34

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3.
See Larry P. Schiffer, Up-Front About Reinsurance, INT’L RISK MGMT.
INST. (Jan. 2004), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2004/schiffer01.aspx.
36
See Robert M. Hall, Fronting: Business Considerations, Regulatory
Concerns, Legislative Reactions and Related Case Law (2001),
http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/frontingdoc.htm.
37
Curiale, supra note 5.
35
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regulators,38 who see this as a way to circumvent state statutes, as will be
noted in Section III of this article.
* For Rating Reasons: Sometimes an insurance program or an
insured will require a certain financial rating for a carrier to be qualified.39
When this situation occurs and the interested carrier does not fulfill the
rating requirement or later suffers a downgrade of its rating that could force
it to exit the program, the interested carrier may use the services of a
fronting company in order to comply with such rating requirements.40
* For the Purpose of Entering or Exiting a Given Market: Fronting
can be the mechanism through which a carrier may gradually enter a new
insurance field with the financial and technical support of a reinsurer.41 By
using a fronting arrangement, a carrier may gradually test an insurance line
or a whole market with additional security and protection. Conversely,
fronting can also be a sound tool where a carrier wishes to exit a given field
but regulatory requirements oblige the business to be renewed for a certain
period of time.42 The carrier will continue to renew the business during the
required time period but completely transfer its risks to a given reinsurer.
As it will also be noted in Section III below, there is a significant
caveat on this motivation, which is that despite the transfer of risk, the
company may have not entirely freed itself from its liability and related
obligations.43
* For the Functioning of Captive Companies: There are situations
in which a company or a group of companies consider that the creation of a
“captive” insurance company, which they own and control, provides a
method of obtaining insurance coverage for their operations in a more

38

For example, as addressed by the Committee on Insurance of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1993, “[t]o insurance regulators,
the term fronting usually has a pejorative connotation, implying a situation in
which the reinsurance arrangement is a matter of form between a licensed ceding
company and an unlicensed reinsurer, the purpose of which is to allow the
unlicensed reinsurer to do indirectly what the state prohibits it from doing directly:
sell insurance within the state. Regulators view fronting as a device which enables
an unlicensed reinsurer to avoid the restrictions to which it would be subject if it
were a licensed insurer directly issuing insurance policies to the public . . . .”
OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-37.
39
See Schiffer, supra note 35.
40
Id.
41
Hall, supra note 36.
42
Id.
43
See Abramovsky, supra note 26, at 372.
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efficient and productive manner.44 Captives can be defined as special
purpose insurance companies which are created for insuring or reinsuring
the risks of its parent company or associated corporation.45 In this type of
ART method, fronting is said to be a necessary service for the success of
captive insurers.46
Because captives are normally off-shore or out-of-state
companies47 that would probably not comply with statutory requirements
for insurers, a majority of captives lack the required licenses to transact
business of insurance.48 The captive operation, therefore, normally requires
the existence of a fronting arrangement to enable the risk-transfer
mechanism.49 Because of the size50 and popularity51 of the captive business,
one would think that the majority of fronting arrangements probably occur
within the captive market arena.

44

See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3.
Thomas F.X. Hodson & Cathleen T. Heath, The Outlook for Fronting
(Special Report: Captives & ART), RISK & INSURANCE (Mar. 1, 2002).
46
Id.
47
The primary jurisdictions where captives are incorporated are Bermuda, the
Cayman Islands, and the state of Vermont. See TOWERS PERRIN, CAPTIVES 101:
MANAGING
COST
AND
RISK
1,
http://www.captive.com/service/TowersPerrin/images%20and%20pdf/Captives%2
0101.pdf.
48
Hodson & Heath, supra note 45 (“Generally, a company must be licensed to
do business in the jurisdiction in which a policy is issued. A majority of captives
lack the required licenses to do business and, therefore, captives often must use a
fronting arrangement in order to do business in a state in which its parent's risks
are located. A fronting insurer is a licensed carrier that issues the policies that a
captive cannot issue.”).
49
See id. (“A typical fronting arrangement will operate as follows: (i) the
captive's parent pays a premium to the fronting insurer; (ii) the fronting insurer
issues a policy to the parent; (iii) the fronting insurer cedes the balance of the
remaining premiums back to the captive; and (iv) the captive may retrocede a
portion of the risk to a reinsurer.”).
50
See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 47 (“Captive insurance is big business.
More than 40% of major U.S. corporations and many multinational companies own
one or more captives.”).
51
As a curious note, even the teams of the National Football League (NFL)
created in 1984 a Bermuda captive for the purposes of reinsuring the teams’
workers’ compensation insurance through fronting arrangements, although such
company ended in liquidation proceedings. See N.F.L. Ins. Ltd. v. B & B
Holdings, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 8580, 1993 WL 78090 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993).
45
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It has been noted that the use of captives and fronting arrangements
normally increase in times of hard market conditions.52 The hardening of
the market creates a series of challenges for companies such as increased
cost of risk management programs, decreased coverage, changes in terms
and conditions of coverage, reduced limits or capacity offered at renewal,
and increased deductibles and retentions mandated by carriers.53 This
market situation normally causes a significant number of companies to seek
alternative risk-transfer schemes, such as the use of captives and fronting
arrangements. As noted in recent industry surveys, fronting is an essential
service for the captive industry.54
* For Tax Deduction Purposes: Although this motivation is
normally linked with the operation of captive insurers, it is appropriate to
treat it separately due to its importance. Normally, a company that chooses
to insure its operations through a captive company would wish to achieve
tax deductibility of its premiums through successful risk-shifting.55 The
reasons are obvious; while premiums paid to a captive insurance company
are deductible as business expense for tax purposes, the sums set aside in a
self insurance program are not deductible as a business expense.56
It is important to point out that on December 11, 2009 the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) released two Private Letter Rulings, where it
approved the use of a captive reinsurance arrangement involving a fronting
insurer.57 In these rulings, the IRS analyzed the situation where a group of
52

See Hodson & Heath, supra note 45.
Id.
54
The 2010 results of the annual survey conducted by the Captive Insurance
Companies Association (CICA), show that 100% of consulted captive entities rated
the overall level of importance of fronting to their captive as either very important
or important. Other aspects of interest follow: a) 78% of respondents said that
having an A rated fronting company as very important, b) 85% of respondents
listed admitted paper among the primary reasons for using a front, c) 46% of
respondent listed regulatory compliance among the primary reasons for using a
front, and d) 89% of respondents characterized the price of fronting as reasonable.
See United States: 2010 Survey Results on Fronting and Reinsurance Released by
PRWEB
(March
11,
2010),
CICA,
http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/3689674.pdf.
55
See Prescott & Lambert, supra note 18, at 1.
56
See RUBIN, supra note 17, at 70.
57
See IRS Approves Captive Reinsurance Arrangement as "Insurance" for Tax
CLIENT
ALERT
(Feb.
4,
2010),
Purposes,
SONNENSCHEIN
http://www.snrdenton.com/news__insights/alerts/irs_approves_captive_reinsuran.a
spx.
53
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individuals formed a captive reinsurer, which ultimately reinsured certain
risks originally insured by a fronting company.58 The IRS considered that
the captive reinsurance arrangements constituted insurance for tax
purposes, since risk shifting and risk distribution were present in such
arrangements.59
II.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS

Despite the criticism and regulatory concerns towards fronting
arrangements, it is unquestionable that such arrangements continue to exist
today and with few exceptions remain unregulated. One could then validly
think that these arrangements are not only widely used, as noted above in
relation to the captive market, but must also have positive opinions and
supporters.
In general terms, fronting arrangements have been considered as
valid and legal mechanisms of risk-transfer by both courts and some
industry experts.60 The Reliance Court for instance described fronting
arrangements as well-established and perfectly legal schemes.61 Similarly, a
footnote in the Tharp Court decision described fronting programs as legal
58

Id. “In the facts of each PLR, a group of individuals formed a domestic
captive reinsurer (the Company) which ultimately reinsured certain risks of two
groups of entities. One group of entities (the related entities) was owned by the
shareholders of the Company; the other group of entities (the unrelated entities)
was unrelated to the Company. The risks of each entity were insured by a fronting
insurer; portions of the insured risk were reinsured by two intermediate reinsurers
before being ultimately reinsured by the Company.”.
59
Id. “The PLRs held that the Company's captive reinsurance arrangement
constituted insurance for tax purposes, applying the definition of insurance
enunciated in the seminal 1941 Supreme Court case of Helvering v. LeGierse, 312
U.S. 531 (1941). The Court stated in LeGierse that, in order for an arrangement to
constitute insurance for tax purposes, risk shifting and risk distribution must be
present. . . . A private letter ruling such as the PLRs constitutes binding authority
only for the taxpayer to whom it is issued. Nonetheless, such a ruling is viewed as
expressing the current views of the IRS with respect to the subject matter of the
ruling.”
60
See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 6, at 1 (“Through variations of these
arrangements, companies enjoy a lawful and cost effective way to self-insure
losses without meeting the formal legal requirements to qualify as insurers (or selfinsurers) in those jurisdictions where the companies do business.” See also JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 3 (“Although ‘fronting’ has a pejorative connotation in
most usages, fronting in insurance is often highly appropriate.”).
61
See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000).

238

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

risk management devices.62 Considering the potential levels of coverage
where fronting may occur, it has been noted that both insurer-reinsurer and
reinsurer-retrocessionaire fronting contracts have been upheld in the face of
challenges to their validity.63 It must be noted that even though fronting is a
controversial subject, most commentators do not address whether it is legal
or not, they simply note that it is an existing practice that causes significant
concerns.64
Upon analyzing the question of whether New York Insurance Laws
restricted or prohibited fronting, the New York Insurance Department
concluded that proper licenses shall be obtained if an unauthorized insurer,
under the guise of reinsurance, engaged in activities that would require a
license.65 Nonetheless, the Department acknowledged that the Insurance
Laws do not preclude an unauthorized insurer from reinsuring 100% of an
authorized insurer’s risks, as long as this activity does not allow the
unauthorized insurer to engage in activities that would otherwise require it
to obtain a license.66
One of the most avid critics of fronting has even considered that
the practice should not necessarily be banned and noted that some fronting
is useful.67 Other experts acknowledge some of the benefits that fronting
may bring.68 Some authors have even qualified fronting as a consumer
62

See Tharp v. Berdanier, No. CIV.A. 21473, 2003 WL 22900646, at *4 n.3
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003).
63
See OSTRAGER AND VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-28.
64
Robert M. Hall, Fronting and Direct Actions Against Reinsurers: The Final
Chapter, 1 (2008), http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/FrontFinalChapArt.pdf.
(“Experienced insurance executives know that fronting carries with it significant
business, regulatory and solvency concerns. It has been on and off the regulators’
radar screen for at least fifty years.”)
65
See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 7.
66
Id.
67
See Curiale, supra note 5 (“Does this mean regulators should ban the
practice? Not necessarily; some fronting is useful and arguably should remain.
Fronting can, in limited and defined instances offer a means by which all parties
can achieve their goals in a cost-effective manner. For example fronting may be
appropriate when statutory prohibitions serve to undercut an insurer's longstanding
relationship with its insured. This may occur when an insurer of a multistate firm
lacks the requisite authority for writing particular lines in certain states or when an
overseas insured opens a U.S. branch and seeks to retain its foreign-based insurer,
especially when such insurer would qualify (and perhaps intends to apply) for
licensure in the state in which the risks are resident.”).
68
See, e.g., Hall, supra note 36 (“From a business standpoint, fronting has two
benefits: (1) it allows reinsurers to run primary insurance programs without being
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right, and considered that its elimination would not only be bad policy but
would be an anti-consumer policy.69
III.

NEGATIVE OPINIONS AND REGULATORY CONCERNS

As much as fronting may have supporters of the practice, it does
have a considerable number of opponents, especially among regulators.70
The most common argument cited against fronting is that it enables an
unauthorized carrier to circumvent existing statutes71 and offer direct
coverage without proper licensing. On the contrary, at least two authors
consider this argument as “ironic” since a major reason of fronting is to

licensed as such or establishing the mechanisms to service insureds; and (2) its
gives primary insurers the opportunity to profit from fronting fees without
incurring significant insurance risk.”). But the author warns that “[w]hile the first
benefit may be real, the second is often illusory given the highly leveraged nature
of the transaction, the adverse interests inherent in the relationship and the
particular vulnerability of the front when something goes wrong. Many insurers
have learned through sad experience the pitfalls of fronting.” Id.
69
See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“Problems with definition aside,
eliminating fronting is bad policy because it is anti-consumer. Fronting is not done
to the policyholder; it is done for the policyholder. When an admitted carrier enters
a fronting arrangement with a policyholder's captive, it does so at the behest of,
and for the benefit of, that policyholder.”).
70
See Hodson & Heath, supra note 45 (“While fronting is accepted as a
necessary service for the success of captive insurers, it is not necessarily favored
from a regulatory standpoint.”). See also Schiffer, supra note 35 (“In certain states,
fronting is not looked at very favorably by insurance regulators.”); Vitkowsky &
Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 417 (“While fronting transactions serve useful functions,
insurance regulators believe that fronting transactions should be subject to careful
scrutiny. There is great discomfort among regulators with the notion of unlicensed
foreign and alien insurers using a licensed insurer to reinsure risks in the licensed
insurer's state of domicile, when such foreign and alien insurers are not subject to
state regulation.”).
71
See Curiale, supra note 5 (“No matter how you slice it, fronting is a fiction
designed to circumvent the existing insurance regulatory framework.”). See also
Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“Opponents view fronting as a method of
circumventing state laws.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3 (“Also, at times
such [fronting] policies may be written for illegal or unethical purposes, such as for
the purpose of evading state regulation or taxation.”); Hodson & Heath, supra note
45 (“When a company fronts business and then reinsures it 100 percent to a
captive, a regulatory may see the transaction as a way to circumvent the licensing
requirements of the state.”).
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seek compliance with state laws relating to financial responsibility.72
Another weakness in the circumventing argument is that it could be used
against any conduct a regulator dislikes. For instance, a tax regulator could
use a similar argument against customary tax advice. Thus, it must be
recognized that as the market evolves into new practices, it usually dictates
ways to legally conduct certain businesses, which may initially seem to
circumvent the statutes but in the end result to be perfectly legal schemes.73
Very similar or at least related to this circumventing argument, is
the notion that fronting aids and abets an unlicensed carrier to do business
within a given jurisdiction.74 In an opinion issued by the New York
Insurance Department, about one year after the opinion cited in Section II
above, the Department clearly stated its position that through fronting, a
licensed insurer may illegally aid an unlicensed carrier.75 The opinion states
the following:
The Department is also concerned about the issue of
fronting, which generally arises when a ceding insurer is
100% or substantially insured on a risk, by an unauthorized
insurer. This situation occurs when unauthorized insurers,
in order to avoid New York’s statutory requirements, enter
into reinsurance agreements with domestic companies
who, in essence, act as fronting companies for the
unauthorized insurers. Any arrangement or activity that
would constitute the aiding of an unauthorized insurer
would violate Section 2117 of the Insurance Law, and any
authorized insurer that did any business that is equivalent
to one of the specified types of insurance contained in N.Y.
Ins. Law § 1101(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2005) in a manner
designed to evade the provisions of the Insurance Law
would be in violation of N.Y. Ins. Law § 1102 (McKinney

72

See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8.
As expressed by Allan Meltzer in the Wall Street Journal, “[t]he first
principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write rules; and markets develop
ways to circumvent these rules without violating them.” See Abramovsky, supra
note 26, at 345.
74
See Hall, supra note 36.
75
See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, REINSURANCE – PERCENTAGE OF RISKS
RETAINED BY CEDING INSURER: LEGAL OPINION, (Jan. 6, 2006),
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2006/rg060105.htm.
73
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Supp. 2005). Each case would be evaluated on its own
facts.76
At least one author has considered the aiding and abetting
argument as “metaphorical” because most states have very precise rules on
what activities by unauthorized insurers constitute doing business and
fronting generally does not violate such rules.77 One could also argue that if
regulators wish to ban or regulate fronting, a precise and clear rule should
be the way to do so, instead of relying on potentially ambiguous or
questionable arguments.
Regulators have also expressed concern about the potentially
fraudulent conduct that may be committed through the use of fronting.78
Some arrangements may trick consumers into believing they are doing
business with a sound insurer when in reality their insurance is being
provided by an unfunded or unknown carrier.79 Without a doubt, fronting
would serve a dark purpose under this scenario. One could think of fronting
as an ethical practice when chosen or at least known by the insured, but it
certainly turns unethical when used with the intent to deceive the
policyholder.
Another commonly cited concern of fronting is the potential
solvency issue that may arise from its practice, as it could threaten the
solvency of the ceding insurer.80 This concern involves situations such as
credit risks associated with fronting practice, potential insolvency of the
fronting company, and even potential insolvency of the reinsurance or
captive company. On this matter, it should first be noted that even when a
fronting company cedes all of the risk associated with a policy, that
company still remains liable to the direct insured for all of the associated

76

Id.
See Hall, supra note 36.
78
See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-39.
79
Id.
80
Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“First, some contend that fronting
threatens the solvency of the ceding insurer. They argue that the ceding insurer is
putting itself on the hook for risks it does not underwrite, since it simply passes the
risk on to a reinsurer for a fee.”). But the author validly points out that “[i]f a
regulator questions the security of fronted business, he or she has the power to
deny credit for reinsurance to the ceding carrier in accordance with state laws . . . .
The power to grant or deny credit for reinsurance is available to regulators for
traditional reinsurance arrangements, and fronted transactions should be treated
just like any other.” Id.
77

242

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

coverage.81 Consequently, if the reinsurer becomes insolvent or there is a
substantial coverage disagreement,82 the fronting carrier will find itself in a
very difficult position, since it will face the obligation to pay 100% of the
ceded risks with a very small percentage of the premium.83 For these
reasons, a prudent fronting carrier should investigate its reinsurer’s
reputation and claims-handling practices,84 and obtain appropriate collateral
security.85 Such collateral is useful not only to protect the company from
the credit risk associated with potential failure by the reinsurer, but also to
address the balance sheet impact of an unlicensed reinsurer on the fronting
company due to the application of statutory accounting principles.86
Although these measures do not solve the problem entirely, as the
operations still carry associated risks, they do help reducing some of these
risks.
Another complicated situation may be present in the event of
insolvency of the fronting carrier. Absent a cut-through endorsement87 and
due to the highly probable presence of a standard insolvency clause88 in the
reinsurance agreement, if the fronting company goes insolvent, the
reinsurance recoverable would probably be collected for the benefit of all
policyholders of the front and not necessarily for any specific underlying
insured. This would certainly destroy the original intent of the fronting
program and would leave the insureds with no protection. As will be
81

See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-26.
Klaus Gebhardt, Being Clear Up Front: There are More Areas of Potential
Reinsurance Coverage Disputes Than You May Think, BEST’S REVIEW, May 1,
2002 (“Apart from the obvious credit risk associated with ceding business to other
insurance and reinsurance companies, the peril of fronting also may manifest itself
in coverage disagreements.”).
83
See Hall, supra note 36.
84
See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-27.
85
See William N. Curcio, Putting up a Good Front, BEST’S REVIEW, Oct.
2003, at 71, 74.
86
Id.
87
“A cut-through endorsement amends a reinsurance agreement by providing
that, in the event of insurer insolvency, the reinsurer will pay reinsurance proceeds
due to the insurer directly to the individual or entity named in the endorsement.”
See NAC REINSURANCE CORP., supra note 10, at 34.
88
An insolvency clause will nearly be found in all reinsurance contracts due to
statutory rules relating to credit for reinsurance, and will allow the liquidator of an
insolvent insurer (normally the Commissioner of Insurance in a given state) to
directly collect the reinsurance recoverable under reinsurance contracts for the
benefit of all policyholders and creditors of the insolvent company. See NAC
REINSURANCE CORP., supra note 10, at 29.
82
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examined under Section V of this article, this situation could be solved if
recent court rulings, that recognize a direct policyholder action against
reinsurers of a fronting program, become adopted as standard case law for
fronting practices.
IV.

REGULATION OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS

Considering the regulatory concerns over the practice of fronting,
there have been various proposals to regulate it which go back as far as the
1950’s.89 For example, in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, the New York
Department of Insurance proposed a fronting regulation (Regulation 82)
due to their ongoing concern about this practice, but the Regulation was
never adopted.90
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has also
discussed proposals to regulate the practice, most notably the draft model
acts entitled “Limitations on Reinsurance Activities of Insurers Model
Act”91 and the “Fronting Disclosure and Regulation Model Act”.92 These
attempts, however, encountered severe opposition in the industry, due to
the prevalence of using fronting arrangements for captives and other
businesses.93
Despite such strong opposition from the industry, the NAIC
adopted the “Fronting Disclosure and Regulation Model Act” in their

89

See Hall, supra note 36.
See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 7.
91
Vitkowsky & Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 416.
92
See Hall, supra note 36.
93
See Vitkowsky & Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 417 (“An early 1992 exposure
draft of the fronting model Act received a great deal of criticism from the
insurance industry.”). See also Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8, at 29 (“If the
NAIC's draft model act were to become law, it would mean that policyholders
would lose an important part of their ability to manage their own risks. No longer
could captives be used to reinsure their parents' coverage. Risk managers would be
unable to tap admitted reinsurance capacity and the excess and umbrella market.
The NAIC draft would prohibit policyholders from using capacity for difficult-toplace risks which may not be available in the traditional market under acceptable
terms. Risk managers would not even be permitted to designate the reinsurers on
their own risks. In short, many responsible and well-established insurance
programs would no longer exist.”).
90
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Winter National Meeting in December, 1993.94 The purpose of the Act, as
provided in its June 1993 Draft, is as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure proper disclosure and
regulation of reinsurance transactions in which an insurer
domiciled in this state or, if the transaction covers risks
resident in this state, an insurer licensed in this state,
delegates to an unauthorized reinsurer underwriting or
claim settlement authority, on business written directly by
the licensed insurer or assumed from another licensed
insurer.95
The Act later provides the requirement of prior regulatory approval
for certain reinsurance transactions, most notably: a) when the annual gross
written premium for business subject to the proposed transaction exceeds
5% of the insurer’s statutory policyholder surplus, as reported in its most
recent financial statement,96 b) when annual gross written premium for the
business subject to the transaction when added to all similar transactions is
expected to exceed 15% of the insurer’s statutory policyholder surplus, as
reported in its most recent financial statement.97
Despite certain exemptions contemplated in the Act, the industry’s
opposition continued to be strong.98 A sector of the industry considered the
NAIC regulation not only as redundant but as impeding consumer access to
alternative risk-transfer methods.99 Moreover, it was alleged that the
practical result of this regulation was to increase the costs of captive
transactions because the additional burdens placed on the fronting carriers
would be passed on to the captives.100 It appears that the opposition was
strong enough since the Model Act was not adopted by any state.101

94

See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, FOURTH QUARTER 1993 PROCEEDINGS
15 (Mar. 1995).
95
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, Third Quarter 1993 Proceedings, 665
(Nov. 1994).
96
Id. at 666.
97
Id. at 667.
98
See Paul S. Brown, Insurance Consumer Wary of Insurance Regulators,
NOTES
(Jan.
1,
1994),
available
at
ROUGH
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3615/is_199401/ai_n8726254.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See Hall, supra note 36.
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Despite the failure of the NAIC Model Act, certain states – most
notably Florida102 – have issued some form of regulation of fronting, either
by statute, regulation, or bulletin. It has been noted,103 however, that the
number of states is very limited – only 17 states and the Virgin Islands and that their regulation is either vague or overly broad.104 Additionally and
as previously mentioned, other states rely on the Aiding and Abetting
statutes in an attempt to forbid the fronting practice.105
As noted above, fronting regulation has often failed to be precise or
to even contain definitions of the forbidden practice. If regulators want
proper regulation of fronting practices, a clear and precise language should
be the norm. For example, such language could refer to the amount of risk
retained by a fronting carrier106 or the delegation of claims handling
102

Florida statutes forbid an authorized insurer to act as fronting company for
an unauthorized insurer which is not an approved reinsurer. FLA. STAT. §
624.404(4)(b) (2004). The statute later defines fronting company as “an authorized
insurer which by reinsurance or otherwise generally transfers more than 50 percent
to one unauthorized insurer which does not meet the requirements of s.
624.610(3)(a), (b), or (c), or more than 75 percent to two or more unauthorized
insurers which do not meet the requirements of s. 624.610(3)(a), (b), or (c), of the
entire risk of loss on all of the insurance written by it in this state, or on one or
more lines of insurance, on all of the business produced through one or more
agents or agencies, or on all of the business from a designated geographical
territory, without obtaining the prior approval of the office.”. Id.
103
See Hall, supra note 36.
104
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 193U (excludes fronting transaction
from the definition of a medical malpractice insurer but fails to define fronting);
VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-2614 (2007) (also forbids fronting but fails to define it);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 1695 (1993) (limits the scope of fronting regulation by
defining a fronting company as “an insurer or ambulance service association which
by reinsurance or otherwise, generally transfers to one or more unauthorized
insurers or ambulance service associations, the risk of loss under ambulance
service contracts written by it in the territory”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6627 (also
vaguely defines a fronting company as “an authorized insurer or licensed service
warranty association which, by reinsurance or otherwise, generally transfers to one
or more unauthorized insurers or unlicensed service warranty associations, the risk
of loss under warranties written by the company in this state.”).
105
See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 75.
106
See HODSON & HEATH, supra note 45. (“The distinction between a ’proper’
reinsurance transaction and an ’improper’ fronting arrangement is perhaps found
in the amount of risk retained by the fronting company and the purpose of the
transaction. A regulator might question the legitimacy of a fronting arrangement if
the purpose is solely to avoid a state's licensing requirements and the entire
amount of the risk is passed along by the fronting company.”).
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obligations. As explained above, however, strong industry opposition
should be expected to any regulatory attempt to curtail fronting
arrangements.
V.

COURT EXAMINATION OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS

Under typical reinsurance contracts and absent a specific cutthrough endorsement, an underlying insurer does not have privity of
contract with, or a right of direct action against, a reinsurer107, since the
only contracting parties are the cedent and the reinsurer108. This situation
also arises due to the indemnity nature of the reinsurance contract, which
requires the cedent insurer to initially pay a claim in its entirety before
demanding the reinsurance recoverable.109 Moreover, when a cedent insurer
becomes financially troubled and is subject to state insolvency laws,
reinsurance recoverables are normally collected by the Insurance
Commissioner, or the state official administering the insolvency, by
enforcing the insolvency clauses that are commonly required by statutes in
order for the cedent to obtain credit for reinsurance.110
Both of the situations mentioned above would typically cause an
insured to fail in an attempt to sue a reinsurer directly. Some courts,
however, are inclined to accept a direct claim from an insured to a reinsurer
when the financially-troubled insurer merely acts as a fronting company
rather than a true insurer111. In these cases, reinsurers have been held to the
same standards as insurers when they act as insurers rather than
reinsurers112.
For example, in 1959 the Supreme Court of Missouri, upon
analyzing a typical fronting case, held in O’Hare v. Pursell that by taking
over the complete risk, service of business, and other obligations, a
reinsurer put itself in the position of a contracting party with the insureds.
107

See Johnson, supra note 23, at 250; see also J.C.Penney Life Ins. Co v.
Transit Casualty Company in Receivership, 299 S.W.3d 668, 673-74 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009) (“Ordinarily, the original insured has no interest in the reinsurance.
Indeed, a reinsurance contract ‘operates solely as between the reinsurer and the
reinsured. It creates no privity between the original insured and the reinsurer.’ …
The reinsurer is ‘solely and exclusively’ liable to the reinsured and has no
contractual obligation or liability to the original insured.”).
108
See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 21, at 9.
109
Id.
110
See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-88-10(a).
111
See Johnson, supra note 23, at 250.
112
See Hall, supra note 36, at 6.
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The Court held that the law supplied the privity necessary for insureds to
maintain a direct action against the reinsurer113. Similarly, in 1979, the
Court of Appeals of Indiana held in Foremost Life Insurance Company v.
Department of Insurance that consumers may proceed directly against
reinsurers as third party beneficiaries where a reinsurer assumes
responsibility directly to the policyholders114. The Court analyzed a
reinsurance treaty where the reinsurer took 100% of the risks and assumed
all administrative responsibilities of the policies.
In addition to these opinions, there are two fairly recent cases both from Pennsylvania - that are very important to consider as part of any
fronting analysis. A brief explanation of such cases follows:
A.

KOKEN V. LEGION115

This case involved petitions for liquidation of Legion Insurance
Company and of Villanova Insurance Company by the Pennsylvania
Insurance Commissioner, M. Diane Koken. Both Villanova and Legion
were rather sizeable fronting insurers that became insolvent despite
significant funding efforts by their common parent company116. As part of
the proceedings, several insureds who used Legion as part of their fronting
programs, sought direct access to the respective reinsurance agreements in
order to avoid the reinsurance proceeds from going to the insolvent estate
for the benefit of all creditors, as advocated by the Commissioner.
These insureds were Pulte Homes, Inc., Psychiatrists Purchasing
Group, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., and Rural/Metro Corporation. The
court recognized that in the fronting programs of these insureds, the
reinsurer not only bore 100% of the underlying risk but was directly chosen
by the respective policyholders as part of their fronting programs.117
Despite strong opposition, the Court approved the Commissioner’s
petition to liquidate the companies, but, it also granted the petition of the
insureds and gave them third-party beneficiary status with respect to the
reinsurance agreements. In doing so, the court applied the Guy118 test with
113

See O’Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. 1959).
See Foremost Life Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 395
N.E.2d 418 (Ind. App. 1979).
115
See Koken v. Legion Ins. Co., 831 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
116
See Simpson, supra note 6, at 3.
117
See Koken, 831 A.2d at 1241.
118
Id. at 1237 (“In Guy [Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983)], our
Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining third-party beneficiary
status: (1) recognition of the beneficiary's right must be ‘appropriate to effectuate
114
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regard to the insureds’ third-party beneficiary status, but clarified that
direct access to reinsurance is a right to be established on a case-by-case
basis. The court reasoned:
The Policyholder Intervenors all assert third-party
beneficiary rights but on different factual grounds. The
rights of Pulte, Rural/Metro and PPG stem from facultative
reinsurance agreements specific to their individual risks;
they were issued facultative certificates. American claims
rights under a reinsurance agreement that is not strictly
facultative, i.e., a facultative obligatory treaty. On the other
hand, the contract, or wording, between Legion and
Syndicate 271 contains language that expresses American's
right to cut-through Legion to collect reinsurance directly
from Syndicate 271 [Footnote omitted]. In spite of the
differences in their circumstances, all the Policyholder
Intervenors can demonstrate third-party beneficiary status
under the two-part Guy test.
First, it was the intention of the parties that the reinsurer
assume all underwriting risk. Legion's only role was that of
a fronting company, and the parties did not intend that
Legion use the proceeds of the reinsurance for its general
business purposes. Further, the reinsurance proceeds were
used exclusively and entirely for the payment of
Policyholder Intervenor claims, which satisfies the second
part of the Guy test. Payment by the reinsurance companies
was through Legion but for the benefit of the Policyholder
Intervenors. In short, each “reinsurer” functioned as the
direct insurer for each of the Policyholder Intervenors.119
Direct access to the reinsurance contracts was granted in these
situations because the “true” insurer of the policyholders was actually the

the intention of the parties,’ and (2) contract performance must ‘satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary’ or ’the circumstances
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.’”).
119
Id. at 1237.
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reinsurer and not Legion. As clarified by the court, granting such a right
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.120
B.

ARIO V. SWISS RE.121

This case involved the parties’ objections to a Referee’s ruling on
whether direct access to reinsurance should be allowed on fronting
programs covering the insured’s liability for workers compensation upon
insolvency of the fronting carrier. Both parties, the Insurance
Commissioner and the insured Tribune Company, considered the Koken
case to be supportive of their positions. Tribune wanted direct access to
certain reinsurance recoverables under fronting programs, but the Insurance
Commissioner considered that Tribune had no such right, relying on the
reasoning of the Koken case122.
According to the facts of the case, Tribune Company and Swiss
Reinsurance entered into certain fronting programs for Tribune’s workers’
compensation exposure, using Reliance Insurance Company as a front. The
first program, entitled Guaranteed Cost Program (GCP), provided that
Reliance would insure and transfer certain workers’ compensation
liabilities to Swiss Reinsurance, subject to certain interim and aggregate
limits. This meant that Reliance was left with potential excess liability. The
second program, entitled Loss Portfolio Transfer (LPT), provided that
Reliance would also insure and transfer certain workers’ compensation
liabilities to Swiss Reinsurance. However, this program differed due to the
absence of significant caps and the presence of excess insurance by
Tribune. As a result, Reliance was left with no real exposure and acting
merely as a pass-through entity.
Because the transaction was not structured as an up-front
arrangement and Reliance retained certain underwriting risk, the court
upheld the Referee’s ruling that Tribune should not have direct access to
reinsurance related to the GCP program123. As for the LPT program, the
court also upheld the Referee’s ruling that Tribune should have direct
access to reinsurance since the purpose of the transaction was simply a
pass-through liability to Swiss Reinsurance.124

120

Id. at 1236.
Ario v. Swiss Reins Am. Corp., 940 A.2d 552 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 2007).
122
See id. at 554.
123
Id. at 556.
124
Id. at 558.
121
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The court identified several factors to be used in deciding whether
an insurer should have direct access to reinsurance. The factors to be
considered are: 1) did the insurer take on any underwriting risk or act as a
front, 2) did the insurer enter into the transaction in order to generate fees,
and not premium, 3) did the ‘reinsurer’ function as a ‘direct insurer’ for the
policyholder and was the claims handling process and the funding of claims
the responsibility of the reinsurer, 4) did the policyholder facilitate the
reinsurer's involvement, 5) did the equities favor the policyholder's claim to
direct access.125 Although this test could provide a useful guide for fronting
situations, the court did not clarify if all factors had to be satisfied or if the
presence of some but not all factors would suffice.
By examining the previously cited cases and opinions, one could
conclude that courts are recognizing direct policyholder actions against
reinsurers when there is a clear fronting program. But until such rulings are
adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts, it is reasonable to think
that each case will be evaluated on its own facts and such evaluations will
vary considerably depending on the jurisdiction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

By analyzing the above considerations and facts, several
conclusions can be reached. First, fronting can be characterized as a legal
risk-transfer mechanism, except where it is expressly prohibited or
restricted. Although there has been an ongoing discussion on whether or
not the practice of fronting circumvents existing statutes, there does not
seem to be a strong argument against it and courts have generally
considered these arrangements as legal. If a given state wants to forbid or
regulate the practice, then a clear and precise set of express rules should be
the norm.
Second, fronting is a helpful tool when properly used as it may
enable a company to plan a successful captive program or an insurer to
maintain its long-standing relationship with a client. As noted above,
fronting has been considered an essential component for the survival of the
captive industry and even its most avid critics believe that at least some
form of fronting should be allowed.
Third, even though reinsurance contracts normally do not grant any
privity rights to the underlying policyholders, it is unquestionable that
courts have taken a more progressive approach when viewing the fronting
practice and they have acknowledged the reality of the relationship
125

Id.
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between the parties. Courts are moving towards recognizing policyholders’
direct rights of action against reinsurers when the cedent insurer has only
acted as a front and the reinsurer is acting as the true insurer.
Fourth, despite the above remarks, one cannot blind oneself from
the negative implications and consequences that fronting can bring when
used improperly. It is understandable why regulators are concerned with
the practice of fronting. There have been abuses that resulted in
insolvencies, potential fraud on policyholders, and evasion of state
controls. In this sense, at least some regulation is necessary and helpful. For
such regulation to be successful, however, a precise definition of the
targeted practice is fundamental.126 The construction of a definition should
focus on the common elements of the practice in order to achieve that
precision.
Given the diverse characteristics and widespread uses of fronting
arrangements, one can conclude that state authorities have the option of
regulating this practice through either a general or specific regulatory
approach. A general approach would seek to regulate fronting as a general
practice, either by prohibiting it or by limiting and regulating its use.
Again, a precise definition is a mandatory component of such legislation. In
contrast, a specific approach would seek to regulate the areas or fronting
practices that cause specific concerns to a given regulator, without banning
or restricting the practice in general. For example, a given regulator may
not be concerned about all fronting practices, but may be alarmed by
specific aspects or uses of it127. The determination of the potential aspects
to be regulated, however, depends on the specific concerns of each
jurisdiction.
As general conclusion, fronting is a valid, useful, and legal tool,
except where expressly prohibited. Due to the negative consequences that
fronting may also bring, at least some regulation establishing clear and
precise guidelines would be appropriate; but, a general ban of the practice
would not be convenient, especially for the captive industry. If a state
chooses to regulate fronting, a specific regulatory approach would not only
be more effective for compliance and enforcement purposes, but would
probably be viewed more positively by the industry. Ultimately, this is a
matter of state choice.

126
127

See HALL, supra note 36, at 3.
For example, when fronting is used to deceive consumers.
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ANNUITY COEPTIS: IS THERE A WAY TO AVOID
AMERICAN EQUITY INVESTMENT LIFE INSURANCE CO. V.
SEC BECOMING A HERALD FOR THE SEC GAINING
REGULATORY CONTROL OVER ALL SECURITIESRELATED INSURANCE PRODUCTS?
Russell Hasan

This note is a critique of the July 2009 D.C. Circuit case American
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, in which the court rejected a
challenge to the Securities Exchange Commission’s Rule 151A, which had
subjected fixed index annuities to SEC regulation. The court held that the
1933 Securities Act’s section 3(a)(8) exemption for insurance did not exempt
fixed index annuities from SEC regulation. This note begins by exploring in
considerable detail the case law on the insurance exemption contained in the
1933 Securities Act. The note then looks at the history of the rise of fixed
index annuities, and examines the economic theory that underlies index
investing, which is the investment strategy that gave birth to a demand for
fixed index annuities. The note proceeds to look at contemporary case law
applying the insurance exemption to decide whether fixed index annuities are
exempt from SEC regulation under section 3(a)(8). The note then offers
substantive analysis of why fixed index annuities should be exempt as
insurance. The note argues that fixed index annuities transfer the risk of
stock-picking from insured to insurer and that the beta risk vs. non-beta risk
distinction from index investing theory is a suitable basis for regulating index
annuities differently than variable annuities. The note argues that fixed index
annuities pose challenges of solvency and contractual interpretation, which
are the regulatory challenges of insurance, but do not pose disclosure
challenges, which are the regulatory challenges that the SEC addresses. The
note then argues that the D.C. Circuit completely misunderstood the
economics of how fixed index annuities function. The note concludes by
offering policy arguments on why it is best for the states and not the SEC to
regulate fixed index annuities.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the July 2009 D.C. Circuit case American Equity Investment Life
Insurance Co. v. SEC, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed
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the question of whether fixed index annuities are insurance.1 This question
matters because annuity products which qualify as insurance are exempt
from the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 because of the
insurance exemption in § 3(a)(8) of the Act, and are therefore not subject to
regulation by the Securities Exchange Commission.2 The SEC had earlier
in 2009 released its new Rule 151A, which stated that fixed index annuities
(for the most part) are not insurance under § 3(a)(8) and are therefore
subject to SEC regulation.3 The petitioners, who included American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Company, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, and as amici curiae Phillip Roy Financial Services LLC
and Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, brought suit and
argued that the SEC’s classification of fixed index annuities as securities
and not as insurance was unreasonable.4 The court in American Equity held
for a variety of reasons that the SEC had been reasonable in determining
that fixed index annuities were not insurance.5 The court relied heavily
upon precedent in the two most relevant United States Supreme Court cases
addressing the insurance exemption, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. of America (VALIC) and SEC v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Co. (United Benefit).6

1

Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010).
2
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2006). The insurance
exemption in the Securities Act of 1933 provides that the Act does not apply to
“[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like
functions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of
Columbia.” Id.
3
Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg.
3138 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at17 C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240). The SEC was
responding to allegations that buyers of fixed index annuities had been victimized
by various frauds necessitating heightened regulation, including the possibility that
fixed index annuities might be marketed as investments and sold to buyers for
whom the fixed index annuities are not suited. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Coleman,
Equity Indexed Annuities: "Securities," or Exempt Insurance Products Under the
Federal Securities Laws?, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 80 (2006).
4
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 924-25.
5
Id. at 934.
6
Id. at 926.
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Because I believe that the D.C. Circuit both misinterpreted the
relevant precedent and severely misunderstood the nature of the financial
product in question, I argue in this note that the court reached the wrong
result in American Equity in holding that the insurance exemption did not
apply to fixed index annuities. In the process of this analysis I present a
new conceptual framework for understanding insurance, risk, and
securities, which courts will be able to use when examining other quasisecurity annuity products in the future. I conclude by examining the policy
implications of whether the SEC should have a broad regulatory net for
catching every new and innovative financial product or whether the SEC’s
mandate should be more narrow and allow more control to the states; I
argue that the latter choice is preferable.
I begin by explaining the precedent that is important to
understanding the issues relating to fixed index annuities in Part II. I then
explore the theory of index investing, the rise of fixed index annuities, and
the SEC’s efforts to regulate fixed index annuities in Part III.A. Then I
present the contemporary cases that reached the question of whether fixed
index annuities qualify for the insurance exemption in Part III.B. In Part
IV.A, I present my conceptual framework for understanding insurance risk
and show why a fixed index annuity is actually a form of insurance and is
not a security. I conclude with policy arguments in Part IV.B.
II.

PRECEDENT DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE
EXEMPTION
A.

EARLY CASES DEFINING SECURITIES AND INSURANCE

One of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the question of
what is insurance is Helvering v. Le Gierse, a case that involved a decedent
who had purchased a life insurance policy and an annuity simultaneously
from the same insurer for similar amounts, such that each policy hedged or
counterbalanced the other.7 The decedent died and the beneficiary tried to
claim the life insurance proceeds as tax-exempt under a tax exemption for
life insurance.8 The Court held that the life insurance policy did not qualify
as insurance for purposes of the insurance exemption in the 1933 Act
because the two contracts considered as a whole did not constitute “risk7

Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 536 (1941). The Court was
interpreting section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926. Id. at 537.
8
Id. at 537.
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shifting and risk-distributing,” which is the essence of insurance.9 The
Court found that usually life insurance involves shifting the risk of death
from those dependent upon the insured to a group of people (implicitly,
everyone else who buys life insurance).10
Helvering is significant because the United Benefit Court cites
Helvering for two propositions: (1) that a contract which is insured is not a
contract of insurance and, (2) assuming investment risk does not create
insurance. The case does stand for those propositions, but the Court in
Helvering also looked at whether a financial product shifts and distributes
economic risk to determine whether or not it is insurance, whereas the
Court in United Benefit failed to do this kind of Helvering analysis; later I
will argue that an analysis of fixed index annuities satisfies this riskshifting test used in Helvering.
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Supreme Court held that
a contract to sell and develop land was a security even though it did not
precisely match the enumerated list of products defined as securities in the
1933 Act because it matched one of the more general descriptions of
securities in the Act.11 This case is relevant because it held that “what
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the
plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect” are all relevant in determining whether a product is a security.12
The Supreme Court in the landmark case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
held that deals termed land sales combined with management contracts
were actually products that sold shared profits in citrus farms in exchange
for contributions of money and were therefore securities.13 The Court held
that whether the financial product was speculative, and whether the product
was backed by an asset with intrinsic value, was irrelevant to whether it
was a security. Rather, “[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely

9

Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 540.
11
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). The Court
was interpreting section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 350.
12
Id. at 352-53.
13
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). The Court was
interpreting section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 297.
10

2010

ANNUITY COEPTIS

257

from the efforts of others.”14 Fixed index annuities would clearly fit within
this definition of securities unless the insurance exemption applied.15
B.

VALIC
1. The Majority Opinion

The United States Supreme Court first had the chance to directly
address the question of whether security-related annuities qualify for the
insurance exemption to the 1933 Securities Act in SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co. of America (VALIC).16 In VALIC, the court was faced
with a variable annuity product in which the insured paid premiums into an
account which were invested in common stocks and other equities by the
insurer and then received payments from the insurer based upon the return
of the investments.17 The variable annuity insurer claimed that the variable
annuity was insurance exempt from SEC regulation.18 The VALIC majority
held that the variable annuity was a security and not insurance.19 Its
reasoning is summed up in a key quote from the case:
We realize that life insurance is an evolving institution.
Common knowledge tells us that the forms have greatly
changed even in a generation. And we would not undertake
to freeze the concepts of ‘insurance’ or ‘annuity’ into the
mold they fitted when these Federal Acts were passed. But
we conclude that the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some
investment risk-taking on the part of the company. The risk
of mortality, assumed here, gives these variable annuities
an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not real;
superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a
variable annuity that has no element of a fixed return
assumes no true risk in the insurance sense. It is no answer
to say that the risk of declining returns in times of
14

Id. at 301.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
16
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65
(1959).
17
Id. at 69.
18
Id. at 66-68.
19
Id. at 71.
15
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depression is the reciprocal of the fixed-dollar annuitant's
risk of loss of purchasing power when prices are high and
gain of purchasing power when they are low. We deal with
a more conventional concept of risk-bearing when we
speak of ‘insurance.’ For in common understanding
‘insurance’ involves a guarantee that at least some fraction
of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts. The
companies that issue these annuities take the risk of failure.
But they guarantee nothing to the annuitant except an
interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other equities
an interest that has a ceiling but no floor. There is no true
underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it
has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding
and usage.20
Thus, the Court found variable annuities were securities, not
insurance, because the insurer did not assume risk and did not pay out a
fixed amount.21 I will return to this quote later, but for now I point out two
things. First, the Court claims that fixed payments are required in order to
constitute insurance.22 The Court can be read to say that fixed payments are
necessary to be insurance as a per se rule, or it can be read to say that the
insurer assuming risk and providing a reduction in risk for the insured are
necessary to constitute insurance, since the reasoning the court offers is that
fixed payments are necessary precisely because they offer the reduction of
risk for the insured and an assumption of risk in the insurance sense for the
insurer. I discuss what it means to assume risk in the sense of insurance
below. Second, the Court says it does not freeze a definition of insurance.
To summarize the overall theory of the case, the VALIC majority expresses
a theoretical paradigm for understanding insurance according to which
“insurance” is defined as a product in which the insurer—not the
consumer—bears the investment risk.
2. Justice Brennan’s Concurrence
Justice Brennan wrote a long and influential concurrence in VALIC
in which he agreed that the variable annuity was not insurance, but on
20

Id. at 71-73 (citations omitted).
Id.
22
VALIC, 359 U.S. at 70-71.
21
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slightly different grounds than the majority.23 His analysis was based upon
looking at the purpose of the insurance exemption. In his view, the purpose
of the insurance exemption was not that Congress wanted to prevent dual
state-Federal regulation, nor that Congress believed that state insurance
regulators who regulated insurance at the time the Act was drafted were
perfect.24 Rather, Justice Brennan argued that the insurance exemption
existed because there were insurance financial products that state insurance
regulators were better designed to deal with than the SEC. In his view, the
test for whether a financial product is a security to be regulated by the SEC
or an insurance product to be regulated by the states should depend upon
whether the product poses the kind of challenges that were being dealt with
either by the 1933 Securities Act or by the state insurance regulations that
existed at the time the Securities Act was passed.25
When he fleshed out this test, Justice Brennan asserted that the
purpose of the 1933 Act was primarily to ensure disclosure to investors.26
He said that “the philosophy of the Act is that full disclosure of the details
of the enterprise in which the investor is to put his money should be made
so that he can intelligently appraise the risks involved.”27 According to
Justice Brennan, state insurance regulation of annuities is different in that
the focus of annuities regulation is, first, to interpret contractual terms, and
second, to ensure that the insurance companies are solvent and have
adequate financial reserves capable of paying out the benefits that they are
obligated to pay under the policies.28 According to the nature of fixed
annuities at the time the 1933 Act was created, there was no need for
disclosure relating to fixed annuities, whereas there was a strong need for
solvency and reserves regulation of fixed annuities.29 Therefore, because
the annuities at the time the Act was passed did not require disclosure
regulation, and the purpose of the 1933 Securities Act was primarily to
enforce disclosure, the insurance exemption made perfect sense.30

23

SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 73
(1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
24
Id. at 75.
25
Id. at 75-76.
26
Id. at 77.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
VALIC, 359 U.S. at 77.
30
See id.
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Applying his analysis to variable annuities, Justice Brennan held
that because variable annuity insureds are exposed to the investment
management of the insurers, the disclosure regulations of the 1933
Securities Act were highly relevant, and the contractual, solvency and
reserves regulations of state insurance regulation were not.31 Justice
Brennan, while arguing that the variable annuities also fall under the scope
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, said “[t]hese are the basic
protections that Congress intended investors to have when they put their
money into the hands of an investment trust; there is no adequate substitute
for them in the traditional regulatory controls administered by state
insurance departments. . . .”32 In footnote 26, Justice Brennan notes that
the “least-subtle” example of an area that state regulators are not equipped
to cope with is “investment policy,” in that the states do not regulate how
the variable annuity insurers invest the premiums, which stocks they may
invest in, and when they are allowed to change their investing strategy.33
Justice Brennan astutely opined that “[m]uch bewilderment could
be engendered by this case if the issue were whether the contracts in
question were ‘really’ insurance or ‘really’ securities-one or the other. It is
rather meaningless to view the problem as one of pigeonholing these
contracts in one category or the other,” because what matters is the
relevance of state insurance or Federal securities regulation, and not the
intrinsic essence of the product itself.34 Despite his rejection of any effort
to classify the essence of the product, Justice Brennan took the time to
explore the features of the product at issue in great detail and based his
analysis of the relevance of Federal or state regulation on what he found the
product’s risks to consist of.35 Summarizing the theory of the concurrence,
Justice Brennan’s paradigm of what constitutes insurance is quite different
from the majority: it turns not on the risk-shifting nature of the product, but
rather on the presence of risks that state insurance regulation seeks to
address (i.e., solvency and contract interpretation).

31

Id. at 78-80.
Id. at 85.
33
Id. at 86 n.26.
34
Id. at 80.
35
See VALIC, 359 U.S. at 81-85.
32
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3. Justice Harlan’s Dissent
In VALIC, Justice Harlan authored a spirited dissent in which he
began by observing that the insurance exemption codified a longstanding
tradition that insurance regulation belonged to the states and not to the
Federal government.36 Although the dissent failed to adequately address the
arguments raised in the majority opinion and the concurrence, it did make
an interesting argument, typified by two quotes, the first of which is:
“[Congress’ intent that the states regulate insurance] in my view demands
that bona fide experiments in the insurance field, even though a particular
development may also have securities aspects, be classed within the federal
exemption of insurance, and not within the federal regulation of
securities.”37 The second quote, which evinces a strong state’s rights view,
is:
It is asserted that state regulation, as it existed when the
Securities and Investment Company Acts were passed, was
inadequate to protect annuitants against the risks inherent
in the variable annuity and that therefore such contracts
should be considered within the orbit of SEC regulation.
The Court is agreed that we should not ‘freeze’ the concept
of insurance as it then existed. By the same token we
should not proceed on the assumption that the thrust of
state regulation is frozen. As the insurance business
develops new concepts the States adjust and develop their
controls. This is in the tradition of state regulation and
federal abstention. If the innovation of federal control is
nevertheless to be desired, it is for the Congress, not this
Court, to effect.38

36

SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 97
(1959) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted portions of the legislative
history showing that Congress had been concerned because at the time the Act was
passed it was debatable whether the Federal Government could regulate insurance
under the Commerce Clause power. See 77 CONG. REC. 2935-39, 2945-46, 3109
(1933).
37
VALIC, 359 U.S. at 100.
38
Id. at 100-01.
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Thus, although the dissent did not delve into the ways in which
contemporary state insurance regulation might be adequate to regulate the
investment aspect of variable annuities, Justice Harlan argued that
experiments could be classified as insurance, and should be so classified
given the strong history of state regulation of insurance. He also argued
that there is every possibility that state insurance, if capable of evolution
and not frozen in the form it consisted of in 1933, might actually become
competent to regulate quasi-security products.39 Justice Harlan’s theory of
insurance seems to be that any time an insurance company launches a bona
fide experiment, the resulting product is insurance. In other words, the
defining feature of insurance is the involvement of an insurance company,
not the risk-shifting nature of the product (as in the VALIC majority’s
theory) or the risks being regulated (as in Justice Brennan’s theory).
C.

UNITED BENEFIT

In United Benefit, the United States Supreme Court was tasked
with evaluating a new quasi-security product called a Flexible Funds
annuity and deciding whether it qualified for the insurance exemption.40
The annuity in question greatly resembled a variable annuity in that the
premiums, less a deduction for expenses (namely the net premiums,,),,
were held in a separate account and were invested primarily in common
stocks for the purpose of both interest returns and capital gains.41 The
annuity differed from prior variable annuities in that a percentage of net
premiums, which increased over the life of the contract from 50% in year
one to 100% in year ten, was guaranteed to be paid back to the insured,
although the product did not guarantee a rate of interest.42 The Court held
that Flexible Funds annuities do not qualify for the insurance exemption
even though part of the payments were fixed, for several reasons.
First, the Court argued that because the aspect of the payments that
were fixed could have been offered separately from the investment aspect
of the product, the fixed aspect was conceptually separable from the
variable investment-related payments and the two aspects could be

39

Id.
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co. (United Benefit), 387 U.S. 202, 204
(1967).
41
Id. at 205.
42
Id. at 205-06.
40
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considered and analyzed separately.43 Secondly, the Court found that the
products were marketed for growth and were “considered to appeal to the
purchaser not on the usual insurance basis of stability and security but on
the prospect of ‘growth’ through sound investment management.”44 Third,
the Court held that the product was not insurance because it was an insured,
i.e., hedged)),) contract rather than a contract of insurance, and the mere
assumption of investment risk did not create insurance.45 The Court cited
Helvering in support of this proposition and used that citation to argue that
the Flexible Fund was not insurance even though the insurer’s guarantee of
a return of principal reduced somewhat the insured’s risk. Helvering
formed the basis of this distinction, meaning that risk-shifting and riskdistributing seem to be a factor in distinguishing an insured (hedged)
contract from an insurance contract.46
The United Benefit Court cited with approval Justice Brennan’s
VALIC concurrence, and claimed that under Brennan’s analysis the
purchasers of Flexible Funds were seeking “growth through professionally
managed investment,” and were comparable to purchasers of mutual funds
and, therefore, entitled to SEC regulations governing disclosure.47 The
Court in United Benefit appeared to espouse the theory of insurance
embodied in Justice Brennan’s VALIC concurrence in that disclosure was
the relevant regulatory challenge for the growth and investment
management aspects of the Flexible Funds and its regulatory risk
determined whether the product was insurance.48

43

Id. at 209.
Id. at 211.
45
Id. The contract was hedged in the sense that some portion of the investment
was guaranteed.
46
United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 211; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text.
47
United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 210-11.
48
The United Benefit Court also cited C.M. Joiner for the proposition that a
relevant test of a security is “what character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect,” and found that this test showed that the product was a
security because it was marketed for growth rather than stability and security. Id. at
211.
44
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III.

THE RISE OF FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES AND SEC’S
RESPONSE

Fixed index annuities are a type of financial product that first took
off in the 1990s. The SEC has attempted to regulate fixed index annuities,
taking differing approaches to regulation at different times. This section
will explain what fixed index annuities are and trace the SEC’s regulatory
response.
A.

THE THEORY BEHIND INDEX INVESTING

In order to understand the nature of fixed index annuities it is
important to understand the investment theory behind index investing.
Index investing employs the strategy of passively investing in a securities
index (which is a very large group of stocks taken to represent the market
as a whole, for example the S&P 500, which consists of 500 stocks, or the
Russell 2000, which contains 2000 stocks) instead of picking individual
stocks. The theoretical basis for index investing is based upon two schools
of financial thought: Modern Portfolio Theory (also known as MPT) and
Capital Asset Pricing Model (also known as CAPM).49 Modern Portfolio
Theory, first developed by Harry Markowitz,50 essentially boils down to the
proposition that the best way to reduce the risk inherent in a portfolio of
stocks is to diversify (in other words, to purchase a multitude of stocks
each of which will perform differently under different conditions so that at
any given time the odds are that some of the stocks in the portfolio will be
doing well and, therefore, the odds of the portfolio as a whole doing well
will increase,,),, and to the corollary proposition for investing strategy that
a diversified portfolio is superior to a non-diversified portfolio from the
point of view of managing uncorrelated risk.51
Modern Portfolio Theory later evolved into a new financial theory
called Capital Asset Pricing Model, developed by William Sharpe among

49

See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 183-210
(4th ed. 1985).
50
See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952)
(presenting what is widely viewed as the original presentation of Modern Portfolio
Theory).
51
See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 193-99.
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others.52 Capital Asset Pricing Model introduced the idea of “beta,” a
mathematical statistical quantification of market risk, also called the
systematic risk.53 The Capital Asset Pricing Model posits that the risk that
is specific to an individual stock—the non-beta risk—can be diversified
away by building a diversified portfolio based on sound statistical and
mathematical models with other stocks that counterbalance the risk of the
first stock. At the same time, CAPM asserts that each stock also contains a
risk inherent in the individual stock which cannot be diversified away,
which is risk that comes from the relation of the stock to the market as a
whole; that risk is called beta.54 An example of non-beta risk is the risk
that a specific public company will have incompetent or dishonest
management. Beta quantifies the risk that a stock will go up or down
because the market as a whole goes up or down.55 The Capital Asset
Pricing Model modifies the general investing principal that more risk earns
greater reward to assert that more beta should earn greater reward, but more
non-beta risk should not earn more reward because any competent investor
can diversify all non-beta risk away and be left only with beta risk.56
The Modern Portfolio Theory and Capital Asset Pricing Model
became fashionable in the 1970s.57 The MPT/CAPM theory, with its
strong emphasis on diversification, is the theoretical structure that gave rise
to index investing.58 Index investing seeks to accomplish as much
diversification as possible and to diversify to the point of having only
systematic beta risk and eliminating non-beta risk by buying the stocks of
an index, such as the S&P 500, which is a collection of 500 reputable
stocks that is generally used as a measure of the performance of the stock
market as a whole.
The theory of index investing is that by buying an index one
assumes beta, the risk that the market as a whole will go up or down, but
avoids the individualized risks inherent in each stock that comprises the
market. The reasoning is that one can avoid non-beta risk without any loss
52

See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964) (presenting what is
usually viewed as a substantial contribution to the creation of Capital Asset Pricing
Model).
53
See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 199-209.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
Id. at 208-09.
58
Id. at 322.
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in returns, and therefore sensibly risk-averse investors will do so; however,
one cannot avoid the risk that the market as a whole will go up or down
because every stock’s beta inextricably ties it to the market, and therefore
beta is the only risk that a sensible investor will assume.
The index investing philosophy believes that it is impossible to
beat the market average, i.e., the index, by picking stocks. This is because
the movements of individual stocks are random, the stock market is
efficient and therefore stocks are usually priced correctly and rarely present
opportunities to buy undervalued stocks or sell overvalued stocks, and the
costs of picking stocks exceed the costs of passive investment.59 It is
important to understand that index investing, unlike most investing
strategies, is not a strategy for choosing the right stocks, and does not
purposefully assume any of the risks inherent in choosing stocks. It is a
strategy that foregoes choosing individual stocks and chooses to invest only
in the market as a whole as a way to eliminate the risks inherent in
choosing individual stocks and to grow one’s money as the economy
grows. The fundamental idea behind index investing is diversification as a
means of reducing financial risk. This matters because an investment
strategy devoid of stock-picking does not pose the same regulatory
challenges as traditional investing.
B.

THE RISE OF INDEX INVESTING PRODUCTS

Given that MPT/CAPM and the associated postulates of index
investing hold that one can and should diversify all non-beta risk away, that
it is impossible to beat the indexes by picking stocks, and that the market
can only go up over the long term, it follows from this investing philosophy
that a smart investor, instead of choosing individual stocks, should simply
buy the market. Doing so reduces or eliminates the risks associated with
picking stocks and hopefully allows one’s money to keep pace with the
growth of the market over the long term. In the 1970s, Wall Street saw the
demand for financial products designed to satisfy believers in MPT/CAPM,
and Wall Street gave birth to the index mutual funds, including mutual
funds that allowed small individual investors to invest according to an

59

See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 129-33, 174-76. See also CHARLES R.T.
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 201-05 (5th ed. 2006).
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index such as the S&P 500.60 By 2007, the fixed index annuity market had
grown such that there were 322 fixed index annuities offered by 58
different insurance companies, and at that time the collective sales volume
of fixed index annuities was $24.8 billion, and fixed index annuity assets
had reached $123 billion.61 Since their inception, index mutual funds have
become very popular, with at least $255 billion invested in S&P 500 index
mutual funds as of June 2005.62
Life insurance companies began to offer fixed index annuities in
1995.63 There are many kinds of fixed index annuities with different
features, but generally a fixed index annuity is an annuity in which the
insured makes payments to the insurer, and the insurer guarantees a return
of some percentage of the principal plus a minimum percentage interest
rate of return, similar to a fixed annuity. In addition, a fixed index annuity
offers the possibility for a higher percentage rate of return in excess of the
guaranteed rate of return, calculated by reference to the annual growth of
an equity index, although the formula used to calculate the excess rate can
be complicated.64 A fixed index annuity is similar to an index mutual fund
in that both offer returns based on the performance of indexes, but there are
also differences between the two. The purchaser of a mutual fund suffers
the risk that if the index goes down he will lose money, whereas the owner
of a fixed index annuity does not risk loss below the guaranteed levels.65 In
addition, an index mutual fund actually invests the purchaser’s money in
the stocks comprising the index, whereas a fixed index annuity insurer is
free to invest the insured’s payments however it wishes so long as it ends
up with enough money to pay the insured the amounts that he is owed
under the policy.66

60

See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 322-23; see Gary O. Cohen, Indexed
Insurance Products Versus Index Mutual Funds: Status Under the Federal
Securities Laws 2007, 1596 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 507, 515-16 (2007).
61
Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010).
62
See Cohen, supra note 60, at 517.
63
Id. at 518.
64
See id. at 526-43.
65
Id. at 511-12.
66
Id.
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THE SEC’S EFFORTS TO REGULATE FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES

The SEC’s approach to regulating fixed index annuities has
changed and evolved considerably over the last twenty years. Beginning in
1986 fixed index annuities were covered by Rule 151, which is a “safe
harbor” SEC regulation under which insurance products meeting certain
conditions are considered to be insurance not subject to the 1933 Securities
Act.67 Rule 151 provides that:
(a) Any annuity contract or optional annuity contract (a
contract) shall be deemed to be within the provisions of
section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.
77c(a)(8)), Provided, That
(1) The annuity or optional annuity contract is
issued by a corporation (the insurer) subject to the
supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing
like functions, of any State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia;
(2) The insurer assumes the investment risk under
the contract as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this
section; and
(3) The contract is not marketed primarily as an
investment.
(b) The insurer shall be deemed to assume the investment
risk under the contract if:
(1) The value of the contract does not vary
according to the investment experience of a
separate account;
(2) The insurer for the life of the contract
67

Gary O. Cohen, SEC Regulation of Index Annuities Versus Index Mutual
Funds, 1732 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
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(i) Guarantees the principal amount of
purchase payments and interest credited
thereto, less any deduction (without
regardto
its
timing)
for
sales,
administrative or other expenses or
charges; and
(ii) Credits a specified rate of interest as
defined in paragraph (c) of this section to
net purchase payments and interest
credited thereto; and
(3) The insurer guarantees that the rate of any
interest to be credited in excess of that described in
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section will not be
modified more frequently than once per year.68
The application of Rule 151 to fixed index annuities was relatively
uncertain from 1986 until 2008. In 1997 the SEC, having learned of the
growth of fixed index annuities since 1995, issued a concept release
seeking comments as to how it should regulate the new financial
products.69 But the SEC did not follow the comment process by
immediately promulgating a rule, and in the wake of SEC’s silence the
industry assumed that fixed index annuities could qualify for the insurance
exemption on a case-by-case basis, an approach that was tacitly approved
by the SEC in a statement on the SEC website.70
The SEC proposed Rule 151A, a new rule which defined fixed
index annuities as securities unless they met a specific set of requirements,
in June of 2008.71 After two separate comment periods in 2008, during
which the issue of fixed index annuity regulation led to divisive debate in
the insurance community, the SEC adopted Rule 151A by a vote of four to
one in December of 2008.72 The rule takes effect in January 2011.73
68

17 C.F.R. § 230.151 (2009).
See Cohen, supra note 60, at 518.
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The text of Rule 151A provides that:
(a) General. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of
this section, a contract that is issued by a
corporation subject to the supervision of the
insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or
any agency or officer performing like functions, of
any State or Territory of the United States or the
District of Columbia, and that is subject to
regulation under the insurance laws of that
jurisdiction as an annuity is not an “annuity
contract” or “optional annuity contract” under
Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C.
77c(a)(8)) if:
(1) The contract specifies that amounts
payable by the issuer under the contract
are calculated at or after the end of one or
more specified crediting periods, in whole
or in part, by reference to the performance
during the crediting period or periods of a
security, including a group or index of
securities; and
(2) Amounts payable by the issuer under
the contract are more likely than not to
exceed the amounts guaranteed under the
contract.74
A summary of Rule 151A is that to be insurance a fixed index
annuity must calculate its excess rate of return at or after the conclusion of
the time period during which the index’s performance is measured, and it
must be probable that the majority of money paid to the fixed index annuity
owner will be guaranteed (i.e., will not come from the index-linked excess
rate of return).75 The SEC’s adopting release on the Federal Register seems
74

17 C.F.R. § 230.151A(a) (2009). The exception in paragraph (c) of Rule
151A states that “[t]his section does not apply to any contract whose value varies
according to the investment experience of a separate account.” § 230.151A(c).
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to suggest that the centerpiece of the rule is the “more likely than not” test,
which was designed to express SEC’s belief, based on its interpretation of
VALIC, that if the majority of payout is guaranteed then the insurer bears
the majority of the risk and the financial product is therefore insurance,
whereas if the majority of the payout is not guaranteed then the insured
bears the majority of the risk and the product is therefore a security.76
IV.

CONTEMPORARY
CASES
APPLYING
INSURANCE
EXEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE
TO FIXED INDEX
ANNUITIES

There is scant case law to date on whether fixed index annuities are
insurance and thus exempt from regulation under the 1933 Act. The status
of fixed index annuities has been addressed in two recent cases. The first
was Malone v. Addison Insurance Marketing Inc., a 2002 case in federal
district court in Kentucky in which the court held that fixed index annuities
qualified for the § 3(a)(8) insurance exemption and also met the criteria to
qualify under the Rule 151 safe harbor.77 The second case is American
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, a case in which a coalition of
life insurance companies challenged the SEC’s Rule 151A in the D.C.
Circuit in 2009.
A.

MALONE

Malone was a case in which a plaintiff claimed securities fraud in
her purchase of fixed index annuities, requiring the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky to decide whether her fixed index
annuities were securities or were exempt under the insurance exemption.78
The court focused on VALIC and United Benefit as the two controlling
cases, and phrased its task as one of determining whether the contract at
issue operates more like a variable or fixed annuity.79 The court quoted the
United States Supreme Court as saying that “in searching for content in the
term ‘security,’ ‘form should be disregarded for substance and the
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See Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg.
3138, 3141-44 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240).
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emphasis should be on economic reality.’”80 The court discussed VALIC
and United Benefit and focused on whether the insured was exposed to
investment risk, and whether the insurer guaranteed a fixed dollar amount
for the insured, as factors in determining risk in the insurance sense.81 The
court then had this to say:
Plaintiff's effort, therefore, to classify her American Equity
contracts as the sale of a variable annuity fails for several
reasons. First, Plaintiff's two contracts with American
Equity guaranteed her a minimum 3 percent return,
irrespective of the performance of the S & P 500 Index.
As the Benefit Summary and Disclosure form states, the
annuity contracts were “designed to accumulate value
based on the average change in the S & P 500 Equity Index
during each contract year, without risking loss of premium
due to the S & P volatility.” In other words, in the event
the S & P 500 performed poorly, Plaintiff still received a 3
percent interest payment on top of her principal annually.
Consequently, American Equity assumed the investment
risk and not Plaintiff who received payment regardless of
how poorly the market performed.
Second, Plaintiff's benefit payments from American Equity
were not directly dependent on the performance of
investments made with her money. That is to say, as a
structural matter, Plaintiff's contract did not operate like a
variable annuity: her payments were not a function of a
personalized portfolio and her principal was not held in an
independent account. Had Plaintiff participated in a
variable annuity, she would have retained control over the
investment of her account. In this case, Plaintiff paid
American Equity lump sum premiums in the amount of
$216,289.53 and $64,214.32 and signed a contract that
guaranteed her a 3 percent return or more if the S & P 500
Index faired well. Moreover, at no point does Plaintiff's
complaint allege that her premiums were maintained in
separate accounts or that, for some reason, they should
80
81

Id. at 748 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
Id. at 749-50.
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have been-the keystone characteristic of all variable
annuity contracts.82
Thus, the Malone court held that because both principal and
interest were guaranteed, the insurer had assumed a risk sufficient to
constitute insurance and the insured was not exposed to the risk of the
index performing poorly, and because there was no separate account that
invested the insured’s money, the insured was not exposed to investment
risk.83 The Malone court then went on to address and refute an argument
which the American Equity court later found to be dispositive in reaching
an opposite result, the argument being that because the potential for
increased returns was tied to the performance of the S&P 500 that the
insured was exposed to a securities-like investment risk. The Malone court
said:
Finally, Plaintiff focuses on the fact that her return over
and above the guarantee depended on the performance of
the S & P 500 Index. In that way, her annuity contract did
involve an element of risk and uncertainty. However, this
argument is not conclusive for Plaintiff in these
circumstances. Defendants actually bore as much or more
of the risk than Plaintiff. American Equity guaranteed
Plaintiff at least three percent of the return or the S & P
500 Index based on whichever was greater. If American
Equity was unable to surpass this indexed rate in its own
investment of the Plaintiff's premium, then it was the loser.
More importantly, Plaintiff's risk was not that she would
lose the value of her initial investment, but rather the risk
that had she chosen a different contract her money might
have been worth more than 134 percent at the end of the
ten-year contract period. That type of risk-that she could
have gotten a better deal but for the pressure she
encountered to enter into this particular contract-is not the
type of risk central to determining whether a security
exists. See VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71, 79 S.Ct. 618 (noting
that “it is no answer to say that the risk of declining returns
in times of depression is the reciprocal of the fixed-dollar
82
83

Id. at 750.
Malone, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
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annuitant's risk of loss of purchasing power when prices
are high and gain of purchasing power when they are
low”). Because the Defendants assumed a much greater
risk, Plaintiff's Investment seems a lot more like insurance
and less like an investment for the Plaintiff.84
The court seems to be saying that because the principal and interest
were guaranteed, the risk of loss from the index not performing well was
smaller than the reduction in risk that came from the guaranteed portions of
the contract. The court also implies that the risk that the index will not
perform well enough to increase the payout is not the risk that the insured
will lose her money, it is the risk that if she had invested in a different
financial product she might have made more money. Here we see a hint of
the question of whether the risk of not receiving a benefit is the same as the
risk of suffering a loss. The Malone court seems to think that it is not; I
will argue later that the question is debatable but that the Malone approach
is preferable.
The Malone court went on to also hold that the fixed index annuity
in question satisfied the Rule 151 safe harbor.85 This part of the opinion is
interesting mainly because the court, after examining the product’s
insurance contract and sales brochure, found that the fixed index annuity
had been marketed primarily for stability and security and not primarily for
growth.86 The court, although it did not address the issue explicitly,
noticed no difference between setting the index rate before the annual
period or after the annual period for the purpose of meeting the safe harbor
requirement that the index rate be set annually.87
B.

AMERICAN EQUITY

Malone did not decide the validity of Rule 151A, having been
decided six years before. In 2009, after the promulgation of Rule 151A, a
coalition of insurers, joined by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, sued to overturn the SEC’s Rule 151A, culminating in the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v.

84
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SEC.88 The petitioners argued that the SEC’s Rule 151A conflicted with
the plain language of the insurance exemption in the 1933 Act, that it was
not supported by VALIC and United Benefit, and that it contradicted the
prior Rule 151, and the petitioners additionally made an administrative
procedural argument about the promulgation of Rule 151A.89 The court
applied the Chevron two-step test that would affirm the rule if, as the first
step, the statute in question was ambiguous, and, as the second step, the
SEC as the agency interpreting the statute offered a reasonable
interpretation.90 The court held that both steps were satisfied and affirmed
the SEC’s Rule 151A, based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in VALIC
and United Benefit.91 In particular, the American Equity court placed a
great deal of emphasis on VALIC’s holding that a variable annuity is not
insurance because the concept of insurance involves investment risk-taking
on the part of the insurer, that all the investment risk was on the insured
and none was on the insurer, and that the variable annuity insurer assumes
no true risk in the insurance sense.92 The court took United Benefit to stand
for the proposition that a financial product marketed for growth rather than
stability and security is not insurance.93
The American Equity court wholeheartedly accepted SEC’s
characterization of the facts in the case, specifically SEC’s analysis of the
nature, function and appeal of fixed index annuities.94 According to the
SEC, the buyer of a fixed index annuity is “exposed to a significant
investment risk-i.e., the volatility of the underlying securities index,” the
insured “assumes the risk of an uncertain and fluctuating financial
instrument, in exchange for participation in future securities-linked
returns,” and “an FIA's return was neither known nor guaranteed.”95 The
SEC asserted that the fixed index annuity’s guarantees as to principal and
interest rate were “superficial and unsubstantial” and they did not shift the
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Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010).
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Id. at 929-30.
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Id. at 930-31.
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Id. at 926-27, 930-31, 934.
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Id. at 926.
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Id. at 927.
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Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Indexed Annuities And Certain
Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified as 17
C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240)).
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investment risk to the insurer.96 While the court mentioned that fixed index
annuities do not entail any investment management, it said that this was not
the only relevant factor in the analysis.97
The court agreed with the SEC’s argument that the fixed index
annuity’s guarantee did not eliminate risk because the apt comparison was
between a traditional fixed annuity guaranteeing a five percent interest rate
and a fixed index annuity guaranteeing a one percent interest rate with a
potential for an index-based ten percent interest rate, such that the fixed
index annuity which fluctuates from one to ten percent was obviously far
more risky than the traditional fixed annuity which remains stable at five
percent, even though some rate of interest was guaranteed by the fixed
index annuity.98 The court accepted this argument in response to
petitioner’s challenge that the SEC used an unreasonable definition of risk.
The insurers in American Equity and their amici argued that SEC’s
definition of risk is irrational because risk is loss of principal and it is
arbitrary that an annuity with a guaranteed minimum return is less risky
than the same annuity with that minimum plus a chance at a higher return
tied to an index. The flaw is their argument, and the reason the court did
not buy it, is that it does not analyze risk in terms of the function of an
insurance contract. It is also problematic because the court believed that the
insured would have to pay higher premiums to gain access to index-based
rewards than those in a comparable non-indexed annuity.
Obviously for the analogy between a five percent rate of return and
a rate of return between one and ten percent to be persuasive the court must
have believed that the risk of not receiving a benefit is the same risk as the
risk of suffering a loss. The court held that how a product is marketed is
not a necessary component of insurance exemption analysis, even though it
was central to United Benefit.99 The court nonetheless found that the fixed
index annuities were being marketed as securities, although this finding
was based not on empirical data but on the a priori analysis that because
the product entailed investment risk it was therefore surely being marketed
as a security.100
The court accepted the SEC’s analysis along the lines of Justice
Brennan’s VALIC concurrence that fixed index annuities were better suited
96
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to be regulated by federal securities regulators than by state insurance
regulators. But the court did not look at the risks necessitating disclosure
as opposed to the risks necessitating solvency and reserves requirements as
Justice Brennan had done. Instead it looked only at whether the product
was a risky product or a no-risk product.101 The court, in response to the
petitioner’s argument that Rule 151A contradicted Rule 151, held that fixed
index annuities do not fall under the Rule 151 safe harbor requirements,
because according to the court’s interpretation of Rule 151 the interest rate
for the annual period had to be set prospectively at the beginning of the
annual period.102
After affirming the SEC’s decision that fixed index annuities are
not insurance, the American Equity court proceeded to address a second
issue, whether Rule 151A’s rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act. The court found that it was arbitrary
because SEC had failed to properly conduct an analysis of Rule 151A’s
effects upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation, and also
because the purpose that SEC claimed for its Rule 151A, namely that it
would provide clarity and certainty, would have been provided by any
rule.103 The court initially remanded the case for SEC to complete the
proper economic analysis.104 However, in July 2010 the D.C. Circuit
amended the decision in an unreported opinion, changing only the final
paragraph of the prior opinion and ordering that Rule 151A be vacated.105
The court observed that the SEC had argued that it was likely to reissue
Rule 151A, but noted that SEC’s analysis of the rule’s effects upon state
law had not yet been completed.106 The SEC has refused to say whether it
will reissue Rule 151A and has refused to comment on the legal status of
fixed index annuities in the wake of Rule 151A’s being vacated, so one can
presume that the current legal status of fixed index annuities is uncertain.107
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V.

WHY AMERICAN EQUITY WAS MISTAKEN IN HOLDING
THAT FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES ARE NOT INSURANCE

Although petitioners won the American Equity case based on
procedural grounds, ultimately their victory may be pyrrhic if the SEC
cures the procedural defects. In this section I argue why, from a purely
legal point of view applying the relevant precedent to the facts of the case,
the American Equity opinion’s decision that fixed index annuities are not
insurance was wrongly decided. I will then outline the various policy
justifications for leaving regulation of fixed index annuities to the states.
A.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS
1. The VALIC Argument

The risk that is transferred in a fixed annuity from the insured to
the insurer is the risk of picking stocks when investing for retirement. This
is the same risk that is transferred with a fixed index annuity. In a variable
annuity, the insured bears the stock-picking risk of the insurer; with a fixed
index annuity the risk of picking stocks is eliminated.
Risk-reward analysis may be useful to understand what is the
reduction of risk in the insurance sense, which was key to the VALIC
majority opinion.108 The fundamental principle that ties insurance and
securities together is the principle that to earn a greater reward you must
assume more risk. A security is an assumption of more risk in exchange for
a higher potential reward. An insurance policy is a reduction in risk bought
in exchange for a reduction in reward (i.e. you get less money in return for
a lower reward). Quasi-security insurance products do not fit neatly into
either category but can be examined using the same analysis. A traditional
fixed annuity provides a full guaranteed return that is lower due to the
buyer’s reduced risk. This is why it makes sense to fall under the insurance
exception. In a variable annuity in contrast, the buyer assumes higher
risk—in the form of investment risk—in exchange for greater reward in the
future, but more risk is in exchange for greater reward. This makes it a
security. On its surface, a fixed index annuity appears to involve an
assumption of market risk in exchange for greater reward. As such it may
be interpreted as a security. In fact, however, its purpose is to eliminate
non-beta risk, so like a fixed annuity its purpose is actually the reduction of
108
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risk, via the transfer of risk to the insurer. From the buyer’s point of view,
he: (1) shifts the non-beta risk to the insurer, and (2) reduces some beta risk
via the guarantee (absent the insurer’s insolvency.109
If a person saving for retirement himself could not use insurance
products and had to save for retirement, he would have to invest in equities
to keep pace with inflation, and he would bear the risk that those
investments would decrease in value. This risk, the risk of investing for
retirement and of suffering losses if one incorrectly chooses stocks while
investing for retirement, which can also be called the risk of investment
management, is precisely the risk that is transferred to the insurer from the
insured with a fixed index annuity. The insurer bears the non-beta risk of
investing, not the buyer. This risk is not transferred with variable annuities
that are invested in actively managed stocks, because the insured continues
to bear non-beta risk.
With a fixed index annuity, the buyer transfers his non-beta risk to
the insurer and keeps only the beta risk, i.e., that the economy will
irrevocably collapse. The insurer then takes the risk of investing the
insured’s money from the insured. It is not the guarantee of being paid a
certain percentage of premiums that makes it insurance, and indeed the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence precludes such an argument. The fact that
the insurer bore some risk was not sufficient to create insurance under the
VALIC analysis in United Benefit, and I would argue that it is not the
insurer’s bearing risk but rather the insurer’s taking the insured’s risk away
from the insured that creates insurance. It is the act of transferring risk
from the insured to the market that makes a fixed index annuity insurance.
What risk does the insured pass to the insurer in a fixed index
annuity? The risk that the insured would have kept in the absence of the
contract, which is the non-beta risk. It is the transfer of this non-beta risk,
that a fixed annuity insurer takes from the insured in exchange for
premiums.
2. The Risk of Loss
In American Equity, the insurers argued that the insurers assume
the risk of investing because if they invest badly they will have to pay the
insured’s payments with their own money, which is clearly true. But the
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court did not buy this argument because it believed that the buyer retained
market risk over and above the guaranteed return.
What risk of loss does the fixed index annuity buyer bear? He
bears a risk that the index will not perform well enough for him to receive a
higher interest rate above the minimum.110 But this is not a non-beta risk,
because it does not depend upon stock picking; it is a market risk, it is beta.
The insured bears the risk of not receiving a benefit, but this is not the same
thing as a risk of loss. The insured bears the risk of short-term market
downturns resulting in a loss of potential earnings. The American Equity
court seemed to think that potential loss of potential earnings is a risk, but
if you understand the theory behind index investing then it makes sense to
suppose that the buyers themselves will not understand it as a risk, and the
court should defer to their understanding.
Regarding the American Equity court saying that a fixed annuity
with a five percent guaranteed interest rate is less risky than a fixed index
annuity with a one percent guaranteed interest rate and a potential ten
percent index-related interest rate, the court is comparing apples and
oranges.111 The comparison of apples to apples is a fixed annuity with a
five percent interest rate compared to a fixed index annuity with a
guaranteed five percent interest rate that could go up to ten percent based
on an index.112 That is the right example, but the court simply ignores it. In
fact, a fixed index annuity is not riskier than a comparable fixed annuity.113
3. The Brennan Concurrence Argument
The Brennan concurrence in VALIC, as elaborated on in United
Benefit, dictates that the insurance exemption does not apply where
disclosure is the regulatory problem and does apply where contractual
interpretation, solvency and reserves are the regulatory problems.114
Disclosure and anti-fraud protections make a lot of sense with equity
110
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investments, whose shares and financial information can be manipulated or
misrepresented. Meanwhile, for the market risk aspects of fixed index
annuities, the disclosure concerns are less. There are big problems with the
calculation of the principal return on fixed index annuities and even with
the calculation of the excess interest rate that require disclosure. But on top
of that, fixed index annuities present insolvency concerns. State regulators
can address both—the SEC cannot.
The gist of Brennan’s VALIC concurrence is that the 1933 Act’s
purpose is to require disclosure so that investors can make an informed
decision. Normally when purchasing an individual stock there is a very
great deal of risk, and so it makes sense from a policy standpoint to ensure
that the consumer is making an informed decision and knows what he is
getting into. Otherwise there is the risk that the consumer may be taken
advantage of, and even if he is not, he is still entitled to know and
understand the details of where his money is going.
But this concern largely exists only for individual stocks and
actively managed investment strategies, which present non-beta risk and
can be amazingly complicated. Indexes are relatively simple compared to
stocks, because the index is an aggregate that over the long-term reflects
the strength of the market and the economy as a whole. The information
necessary to disclose the risks of investing in an index are quite simple: the
risk is only that the market and the economy will go up or down, and so
disclosure of non-beta risk is a second order issue. In contrast, the terms of
the fixed index annuity contracts, and concerns about the insurer making
proper payments, having adequate reserves from which to make payments,
and remaining solvent, are far more of an issue, and this falls generally
under what Brennan claimed to be the scope of state insurance regulation.
Therefore fixed index annuities should also be treated as insurance under
Brennan’s concurrence analysis.
The American Equity court seemed to have thought that the
insurers were arguing that the insurance exception applies because state
regulation is adequate and fixed index annuities contain no risk, which is a
horribly oversimplified, incomplete account of what the insurers’ argument
was (or should have been) with respect to the Brennan concurrence.115
What Brennan is saying is that the question is not whether adequate state
regulation exists, but that there is a kind or genus of investment, called
insurance, which presents different problems than the 1933 Act was
designed to deal with, and therefore qualifying for the insurance exemption
115
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turns on whether the financial product contains the risks that insurance
regulation was designed to prevent. Because the American Equity court
mistakenly ignored the solvency risk inherent in fixed index annuities it
thinks that the problem is the same as for stocks. Because the fixed index
annuity is not based on picking stocks, disclosure is a lesser issue and the
solvency and reserves regulation that Brennan claimed for the states is
more relevant.
The needs for disclosure that the SEC claims are met by Rule 151A
include disclosure of the terms of the contract, pricing, benefits, the details
of the guarantees, and the ways in which the rate is calculated from the
index.116 None of the SEC’s disclosure provisions pertain to the index
itself, which is supposedly where the riskiness of the product comes from.
Instead, they all have to do with the terms of the annuity contract, which
are fundamentally no different than the contractual terms of a fixed annuity
contract that are traditionally regulated by the states.
4. The United Benefit Argument
The fundamental argument under the United Benefit rule, which
can be seen as the updated version of VALIC, is that to be insurance the
purpose of the financial product must be stability and security rather than
growth through investment management.117 The purpose of a fixed index
annuity, like the purpose of index investing itself, is precisely this, to
achieve stability and to enable money to grow at a greater rate without
assuming any non-beta risk.
The MPT/CAPM theory shows that the purpose of index investing
is stability and security, not growth. Can reasonable men differ on Modern
Portfolio Theory? While people can differ on whether it is a good strategy
for managing money, no one can dispute that its purpose is to reduce and
spread risk, which is the definition of insurance. Similarly, no one can
interpret index investing as investment management with the risks of stockpicking. The purpose of index investing is identical to that of a fixed
annuity, to eliminate the risk of stock-picking. Its purpose is stability and
security, not growth.118
116
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The American Equity court repeatedly asserts that fixed index
annuities appeal to consumers on the basis of growth rather than stability
and security. Hence, according to the court, it necessarily follows that
fixed index annuities are marketed like a security because their appeal is
based on the performance of securities.119 If that were true, people who
buy fixed index annuities would buy variable annuities or individual stocks
instead. What attracts people to fixed index annuities is not the assumption
of investment risk in exchange for higher returns, it is a way to eliminate
investment risk by investing in the market over the long term by means of
products whose guarantees of interest and principal eliminate the risk of
loss in the event that the index has a short-term loss. The Malone court
found as much.120 Therefore, if marketing is a necessary prong in the
analysis the SEC was unreasonable because the product, ever so far from
appealing as an investment risk, has as its main appeal, and has achieved
widespread popularity, as a means of using index investing to reduce and
eliminate investment risk.
B.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. What Should SEC Worry About?

With the recent troubles on Wall Street the SEC has enough to
worry about in preventing frauds involving traditional stocks without
expanding its mandate to claim regulatory control over every financial
product that it can get its hands on. The SEC would perform best if it kept
to a tightly focused mission and did not overextend itself by becoming too
broad. Such a strategy would utilize the SEC’s limited resources in the
most efficient manner.

efficient market hypothesis which underlies much of Modern Portfolio Theory and
Capital Asset Pricing Model. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 94-96, 100
120
See supra text accompanying note 86.
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2. Consumer Protection
Some commentators have argued that SEC regulation is necessary
to protect insureds from fraud by fixed index annuity insurers.121 However,
the kind of fraud of which there is a risk is not distinctly securities fraud
and is such that state insurance regulators can guard against it.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
As SEC acknowledged, compliance with Rule 151A could cost the
insurance companies many millions of dollars, even up to $800 million.122
There seems to be little benefit to the consumers who would eventually be
forced to bear these costs. In the contemporary recession-plagued economy
there is no basis for placing a major burden on the insurance industry
absent a compelling justification, especially when it is the fixed index
annuity consumers who will ultimately pay the SEC’s bills.
4. The Benefits of State Regulation
There are classic yet relevant arguments that states are just as
competent as the Federal government, that allowing freedom to the states
increases experimentation which leads to progress and innovation in
regulation, and that the Federal government is bureaucratic and
inefficient.123 These ideas remain forceful today.124
VI.

CONCLUSION

The variable annuities in VALIC and United Benefit were
investment management products masquerading as insurance in order to
121

E.g., J.S. Coleman, Equity Indexed Annuities: "Securities," or Exempt
Insurance Products Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 34 no. 2 SEC. REG. L.J.
Art. 1 (2006).
122
See Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 3168.
123
E.g., Douglas R. Richmond, When It Comes to Insurance Regulation, Is
Uncle Sam the New Sherriff in Town?, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2696; see supra
text accompanying notes 37-39.
124
Indeed, it is worth noting that during the housing boom which led to the
recent recession, insurance regulation largely worked better than federal securities
regulation.
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escape from the SEC, but that doesn’t mean that it is impossible for a
securities-related financial product to truly be insurance. Fixed index
annuities are such a product. From a policy viewpoint, too much
unnecessary regulation is unwise and inefficient. From a legal viewpoint, a
logical argument can be made that an insightful analysis of the case law on
the insurance exemption in the Securities Act of 1933 combined with an
astute understanding of the facts involving fixed index annuities leads to
the conclusion that fixed index annuities qualify for the insurance
exemption. Even if the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to
overturn American Equity, hopefully this note will provide a conceptual
framework involving risk-reward analysis for future judges to use going
forward so that the insurance exemption in the 1933 Securities Act
continues to function. There is every reason to believe that imaginative,
creative financial entrepreneurs will develop new kinds of insurance, some
of which may be connected to securities, and even though the trend seems
to be towards giving the SEC control over all new securities-related
financial products, it would be unfortunate to see a day when insurance
exemption analysis is abandoned and every securities-related insurance
product is automatically classified as a security.
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